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Scientific Summary
1 Introduction
1.1 NICE's comparison of the incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) of a new technology, which is
more costly than existing alternatives, with the cost-effectiveness threshold is important in assessing
whether the health expected to be gained from its use exceeds the health expected to be forgone
elsewhere as other NHS activities are displaced (i.e. whether the new technology is cost effective).
1.2 When NICE issues positive guidance for a new intervention which imposes additional costs on the
NHS, the resources required to deliver it must be found by disinvesting from other interventions and
services elsewhere. This displacement will inevitably result in health decrements for other types of
individual. Thus the threshold represents the additional cost that has to be imposed on the system to
forgo 1 QALY of health through displacement.
1.3 Currently NICE uses a threshold range of £20,000 to £30,000 QALY gained, and this has remained
the case in NICE's methods guidance since 2004. There have been a number of calls for further
research on the value of the threshold.
1.4 This report details a 2-year project, funded by the NIHR and MRC Methodology Research
Programme, to develop methods to estimate the NICE cost effectiveness threshold.
1.5 NICE's remit implies a series of characteristics for any empirical research on the threshold:
x Reflect the expected health effects (in terms of length and quality of life) of NICE guidance
through the displacement decisions taken across the NHS rather than what specific services are
(or could have been) displaced.
x Facilitate regular updates, based on routinely available data, to reflect NHS changes such as real
overall expenditure and productivity. This would encourage accountability through scrutiny by
stakeholders and provide predictability for technology manufacturers' investment decisions.
x The nature of service displacement and the magnitude of the health forgone will depend on the
scale of the budget impact which should, ideally, be reflected in the value of the threshold.
x Methods should recognise the inevitable uncertainty relating to the evidence currently available
for the threshold and reflect its implications for policy.
2 Study methods
2.1 The aim was to develop methods to estimate the NICE cost-effectiveness threshold making use of
routinely available data. Objectives were:
i. Informed by relevant literature, to provide a conceptual framework to define the threshold and
the basis of its estimation.
ii. Using programme budgeting data for the English NHS, to estimate the relationship between
changes in overall NHS expenditure and changes in mortality.
iii. Extend the measure of benefit in the threshold to QALYs by estimating the quality of life (QoL)
associated with additional years of life and the direct impact of health services on QoL.
iv. Present the best estimate of the cost effectiveness threshold for policy purposes.
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2.2 Earlier econometric analysis estimated the relationship between differences in primary care trust
(PCT) spending and associated disease-specific mortality. Expenditure came from programme
budgeting data which allocates the entire volume of health care expenditure to broad programme
budget categories (PBCs) according to primary diagnosis.
2.3 This research extended this in several ways including estimating the impact of marginal increases or
decreases in overall NHS expenditure on spending in each of the 23 PBCs. These were linked to
changes in mortality outcomes by PBC across 11 PBCs.
2.4 The results of the econometric analysis were translated into broader effects in terms of QALYs. The
first stage linked estimated effects on mortality to life years taking into account the counterfactual
deaths that would have occurred if the population in a given PBC faced the same mortality risks as
the general population. The second stage accounted for the health (QALY) effects of changes in
mortality due to changes in expenditure reflecting how QoL differs by age and gender. The third
stage incorporated those effects on health not directly associated with mortality and life year effects
(i.e., the pure QoL effects) to estimate an overall cost per QALY threshold. The approach uses the
estimates of mortality and life year effects as 'surrogate outcomes' for a more complete measure of
the health effects of a change in expenditure. This appears more plausible than assuming no effects
of NHS expenditure on quality of life outcomes.
2.5 The estimated proportional effect on the mortality and life year burden of disease is applied to
measures of QALY burden. Applying a proportionate effect to measures of QALY burden of
disease is equivalent to assuming that any estimated effects on life years are lived at quality of life that
reflects a proportionate improvement to the quality of life with disease. It also allows quality of life
effects of changes in expenditure to be included; also based on proportionate improvement in the
quality of life with disease. In those PBCs where mortality effects could not be estimated the
proportional effect of changes in expenditure on QALY burden of disease is assumed to be the same
as the overall proportional effect on the life year burden of disease across those PBCs where
mortality effects could be estimated.
2.6 The methods planned for the study included a consideration of local data, collected routinely by
PCTs, on the types of intervention in which local decision-makers were investing and disinvesting.
The aim was to inform the link between the effects of expenditure changes on mortality and impacts
on broader health in terms of QALYs. These data may have indicated the types of interventions and
services, within a given PBC, on which investment and disinvestment were taking place. Using
targeted literature reviews, estimates of QoL for those activities may have been identified. However,
it was established that there were limited data available at a local level to facilitate this type of
analysis, so other data sources were used for this purpose.
3 Central or 'best' estimate of the threshold
3.1 The most relevant threshold is estimated using the latest available data (2008 expenditure, 2008-10
mortality). The central or 'best' threshold is estimated to be £12,936 per QALY.
4 Which PBCs have the greatest influence on the overall threshold?
4.1 Although the 11 PBCs where a mortality effect of changes in expenditure could be estimated only
account for 50% of the change in overall expenditure, they account for 78% of the overall health
effects. The other 12 PBCs, where mortality effects could not be estimated, account for an equal
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part of a change in overall expenditure (50%) but only 22% of the overall health effects, i.e., the cost
per QALY estimates associated with a change in expenditure in these PBCs are, in general, much
higher.
4.2 Insofar as investment and disinvestment opportunities in these PBCs might have been more valuable
(offered greater improvement in QoL) than suggested by the implied PBC thresholds, the overall
QALY effects will tend to be underestimated and the overall cost per QALY threshold will be
overestimated.
4.3 The overall threshold of £12,936 may be conservative (i.e., could be overestimated) with respect to
health effects in PBC5 (Mental Health Disorders), which accounts for a large proportion of the
change in overall expenditure (18%) and contributes most to the overall health effects (12%)
compared to these other PBCs. The cost per QALY associated with this PBC is based on an
extrapolation rather than observations of the direct impact of changes in expenditure on QoL.
Available evidence suggests that the investment and disinvestment opportunities in mental health
may have been more valuable than its implied cost per QALY.
5 How uncertain are the estimates and what are the implications?
5.1 Simulation methods were used to reflect the combined uncertainty in the various estimates from the
econometric analysis. This indicated that the probability that the overall threshold is less than
£20,000 per QALY is 0.89 and the probability that it is less than £30,000 is 0.97.
5.2 As the consequences of overestimating the threshold are more serious than underestimating it in
terms of population health, a policy threshold will be lower than the mean of the cost per QALY
threshold (i.e., lower than £12,936) to compensate for the more serious consequences of
overestimating the true value.
5.3 There were other ('structural') sources of uncertainty associated with the estimated threshold,
specifically relating to the choice of econometric models and identification of causal effects.
Although all the models passed the relevant tests of validity, there remained some uncertainty about
the validity of the instruments. This structural uncertainty constituted a greater part of the overall
uncertainty associated with the mortality effects of changes in expenditure, but the central estimate
of the cost per QALY threshold was robust to this uncertainty.
5.4 The method of analysis used to link the effects of changes in expenditure on mortality to a fuller
measure of health expressed in QALYs was also subject to uncertainty. A preferred analysis (or
scenario) was identified as making the best use of available information, with assumptions appearing
more reasonable than the available alternatives and providing a more complete picture of the likely
health effects of a change in expenditure.
5.5 A critical issue is whether, on balance, the central or best estimate is likely to be an underestimate or
overestimate of the cost per QALY threshold. Although other assumptions and judgments are
possible that retain some level of plausibility, they do not necessarily favour a higher threshold.
Indeed, when considered together, they suggest that, on balance, the central or best estimate of
£12,936 is, if anything, likely to be an overestimate.
x5.6 There are some reasons why the central estimate of the QALY threshold might be underestimated
(e.g., see items 1 to 4 in Box 5.1 in Section 5.4). For example in calculating life year effects it is
assumed that those deaths averted by a change in expenditure returns the individuals to the mortality
risk of the general population (matched for age and gender). There are a number of other reasons
why the central estimate might be overestimated (e.g., see assumptions 5 to 7 in Box 5.1). For
example, the health effects of a change in expenditure are restricted to the population at risk during
one year. This also means that the health effects of changes in expenditure which reduce incidence
(prevention of disease) will not be captured either. A more formal and longer lag structure in the
estimation of outcome elasticities would be likely to capture more health effects of a change in
expenditure.
5.7 The effect of other assumptions that have been necessary are more ambiguous although some
evidence suggests their net effect maybe conservative with respect to health effects of changes in
expenditure (e.g., assumptions 8 to 10 in Box 5.1).
6 The impact of investment, disinvestment and non marginal effects
6.1 The central estimate of the cost per QALY threshold is based on estimates of the health effects of
changes in expenditure across all 152 PCTs, some of which will be making investments (where
expenditure is increasing) and others making disinvestments (where expenditure is reduced or
growing more slowly).
6.2 The threshold is, however, likely to differ across these different types of PCT. It would be expected
that, other things equal, more expenditure would increase health but at a diminishing rate.
Therefore, the amount of health displaced by disinvestment would be expected to be greater, and the
associated threshold lower than the central estimate. Conversely, the health gained from investment
would be expected to be lower, and the associated threshold higher.
6.3 This was examined by re-estimating the outcome and expenditure effects separately for those PCTs
where their actual budget is under the target allocation from the Department of Health resource
allocation formula (i.e., those under greater financial pressure and more likely to be disinvesting than
investing), and those that are over target (under less financial pressure and more likely to be investing
than disinvesting).
6.4 The results confirm these expectations: the health effects of changes in expenditure are greater when
PCTs are under more financial pressure and are more likely to be disinvesting then investing. The
analysis suggests that budget impact not only displaces more valuable activities within each PBC but
that overall expenditure tends to be reallocated to PBCs which can generate more health. Although
further research might enable a quantitative assessment of how the relevant threshold should be
adjusted for the scale of budget impacts, the qualitative assessment seems clear: the central estimate
of the threshold is likely to be an overestimate for all technologies which impose net costs on the
NHS (almost all technologies appraised by NICE); and the appropriate threshold to apply should be
lower for technologies which have a greater impact on NHS costs.
7 How does the threshold change with overall expenditure?
7.1 The same methods were used to consider how the cost per QALY threshold is likely to have
changed from 2007 to 2008 as overall expenditure has increased. This provides some insights into
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how the threshold might be expected to change over time as, for example, overall expenditure and
NHS productivity changes.
7.2 This has implications for a judgement about the appropriate frequency of periodic reassessment of
the cost per QALY threshold. Other things equal, the threshold would be expected to increase
following a rise in overall expenditure, although this will depend on whether there is discretion over
how additional resources can be spent. However, insofar as the productivity of those activities that
are valuable to the NHS also improves through innovation, the threshold will tend to fall. So the net
impact of these two countervailing effects on the threshold cannot be determined a priori.
7.3 Differences in the estimated thresholds between 2007 and 2008 were assessed. Although overall
expenditure increased by 6% between 2007 and 2008 which represented real growth of 2% in 2007
prices, the overall threshold for all 23 PBCs fell by 5% in nominal terms and by 8% in real terms.
7.4 The reasons are complex but reflect changes in productivity, which differ across PBCs, but also a
general reallocation of a change in overall expenditure towards those PBCs that appear more
valuable in 2008. Given the uncertainty in estimation, subtle differences between 2007 and 2008
should not be over-interpreted. This analysis does suggest, however, that the overall threshold will
not necessary increase with growth in the real or even nominal NHS budget. This suggests that the
threshold is more likely to fall at a time when real budget growth is flat or falling and PCTs find
themselves under increasing financial pressure.
8 What type of health is forgone by approval of a new technology?
8.1 The methods of analysis can identify not only how many QALYs are likely to be forgone across the
NHS as a consequence of approving a technology which imposes additional costs on the NHS, but
also where those QALYs are likely to be forgone and how they are made up, i.e., the additional
deaths, life years lost and the QoL impacts on those with disease.
8.2 As an example, based on the 2008 central estimate of the cost per QALY threshold (£12,936), the
approval of ranibizumab for the treatment of diabetic macular oedema (prior to the patient access
scheme agreement) would have imposed additional annual costs of up to £80m on the NHS each
year and been likely to displace 6,184 QALYs elsewhere in the NHS. This forgone health is likely to
be made up of 411 additional deaths and 1,864 life years forgone, most of which are likely to occur in
Circulatory, Respiratory, Gastro-intestinal and Cancer PBCs. However, much of the total health
effect of these additional costs (4,987 QALYs) is associated with QoL forgone during disease which
is most likely to occur in Respiratory, Neurological, Circulatory and Mental Health PBCs.
9 Conclusions and implications for practice
9.1 The research presented here goes some way to providing an empirically-based and explicit
quantification of the scale of opportunity costs the NHS faces when considering whether the health
benefits associated with new technologies are expected to offset the health that is likely to be forgone
elsewhere in the NHS. As such it provides a basis for determining the appropriate threshold for
NICE decisions as well as those made centrally by the NHS and Department of Health more
generally.
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9.2 The methods presented can be used as a framework for further empirical work as additional and
more appropriate data emerge in the NHS. They also offer a basis for threshold estimation in other
health care systems with budget constraints that use cost effectiveness analysis to inform resource
allocation decisions.
9.3 The study also starts to make the other NHS patients, who ultimately bear the opportunity costs of
such decisions, less abstract and more known in social decisions. Since who happens to be known
or unknown is only a matter of perspective, time and ignorance, ethical and coherent social decisions
require that both should be treated in the same way. These methods contribute to removing some of
the ignorance and making the unknown more real.
9.4 This work has implications for the Government's proposals to move to a system of value-based
pricing for new prescription pharmaceuticals, which may include some additional weight for health
benefits in diseases which impose a large health burden and/or where there are wider social benefits
for patients, their carers and the wider economy. The methods developed in this research will allow
the same weights to be also attached to the type of health that is lost and estimate the wider social
benefits that are likely to be lost when the NHS must accommodate the additional costs of new
drugs.
10 Research recommendations
10.1 Update estimates of the threshold with more recent and future waves of expenditure and mortality
data.
10.2 If other aspects of social value are applied to health benefits of a new technology they must also be
attached to the type of health that is likely to be forgone due to additional NHS costs. The methods
developed here can be extended to allow weights to be also attached to the type of health that is
forgone and estimate the wider social benefits that are likely to be lost when the NHS must
accommodate the additional costs of new drugs.
10.3 We have demonstrated that these methods of analysis can be applied to quality of life data collected
as part of PROMs. This type of analysis could be applied to these data in key PBCs as PROMs is
rolled out providing some evidence about the quality of life effects of changes in PBC expenditure.
10.4 A key PBC is Mental Health. Currently outcomes data that could be linked to measures of quality of
life are routinely collected in primary care. In principle, the same methods of analysis can be applied
to these data once they are made available providing some evidence about the quality of life effects of
changes in mental health expenditure.
10.5Improved and more recent estimates of incidence (by age and gender) and duration of disease will
soon be available from the recently published updated WHO Global Burden of Disease
study. These data could be used when the threshold is re-estimated for later waves of expenditure
data. Alternatively, estimates could be based on CPRD data.
10.6Estimating a more complex lag structure based on the evolving panel data would provide valuable
evidence about the duration of the health effects of changes in expenditure. The recent release of
census data for 2011 may allow a panel model to be estimated allowing better control for unobserved
heterogeneity across PCTs as well as exploiting variation in outcomes, expenditure and other
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covariates over time. The formation of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG) in 2013 will make
the time series problematic for waves of expenditure after 2012 unless it is possible to match CCG
and PCT boundaries.
10.7If PBC expenditure and outcome data are available at CCG level (as well as covariates and suitable
instruments), it might become possible to estimate outcome and expenditure equations
simultaneously across PBCs. This would enable more of the likely health effects of changes in
expenditure to be reflected in the analysis.
1Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Policy context
A comparison of the incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) of a new technology with a cost-
effectiveness threshold is not the only consideration when the National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE) and its advisory committees issues guidance. But it is an important one as it allows an
assessment of whether the health expected to be gained from the use of a technology exceeds the health
expected to be forgone elsewhere as other NHS activities are displaced. For this reason a comparison of
the ICER of a technology to a threshold range is a critical part of the reference case in the NICE Guide
to Methods of Appraisal[1] and is often taken to be the starting point for deliberations about other
considerations including judgements of social value. Therefore, the value of the threshold is critical to the
assessment of whether technologies can be regarded as cost-effective. This is also true for other NHS
resource allocation decisions which potentially impose additional costs on local NHS commissioners.
From 2014 the Government plans to introduce a new approach to determining the appropriate price of
prescription pharmaceuticals. Under value-based pricing, the price the NHS pays for a new product will
be directly linked to its cost-effectiveness.[2, 3] Therefore, the value of the threshold will be even more
important as it will have a major impact on the prices that the NHS pays for pharmaceuticals, the access
that NHS patients will have to new drugs and the return that manufacturers can expect from future
research and development.[4, 5]
1.2 Estimating the cost-effectiveness threshold
A key part of NICEs remit is to make decisions which are consistent with the efficient use of NHS
resources. In the context of the NHS budget constraint, a consideration of efficiency has to reflect the
implications of imposing additional costs on the system which will displace existing services thus leading
to health decrements for patients other than those benefiting from the new technology being appraised.
The cost-effectiveness threshold is an estimate of health forgone as other NHS activities are displaced to
accommodate the additional costs of new technologies. A national decision-making body like NICE
needs an estimate of what is likely to be forgone across the NHS as we currently find it.[6] Of course,
this will change as circumstances and the NHS change; tending to rise with increases in budget and health
care costs but tending to fall with increases in the productivity of health technologies and the efficiency of
the NHS in general - including better local commissioning decisions.[7] A body like NICE cannot and
does not necessarily need to know what specific services and treatments will be displaced in particular
localities or who will actually forgo health.
What is required, therefore, is an accountable and empirically-based assessment of the health that is likely
to be forgone on average across the NHS. Currently NICE uses a threshold range of £20,000 to £30,000
per quality adjusted life year (QALY) gained, where additional considerations are required towards the
upper bound.[1] The empirical basis of this range of values is very limited and there have been calls for
further research in this area.[8] Explicit scientific methods are required which will provide accountability
so that estimates can be scrutinised by a range of stakeholders. Since estimates of the threshold will need
to be periodically revised, methods which make best use of routinely available NHS data are needed. As
well as accountability, this will also provide more predictability in likely changes to the threshold for the
investment decisions of technology manufacturers.
1.3 Aims and objectives
The aim of this research is to develop and to demonstrate methods to estimate the cost-effectiveness
threshold for the NHS which makes best use of routinely available data. Methods are required which can
capture the impact of a change in expenditure on length and quality of life (QoL), indicate how estimates
of the threshold have changed over time, reflect uncertainty in any estimates and assess its implications,
and indicate the impact of increases or decreases in spending. The project also aims to discuss options
for developing data sources in the UK to estimate the threshold more precisely over time.
The research has four main objectives:
2i. Informed by relevant literature, to provide a conceptual framework to define the threshold and
the basis of its estimation.
ii. Using programme budgeting data for the English NHS, to estimate the cost per life year gained
on average across the NHS, for marginal changes in budget.
iii. To extend the measure of the health effects of changes in expenditure by estimating the QoL
associated with additional years of life and the direct impact of health services on QoL.
iv. To synthesise this work to bring evidence on life-years and QALYs together, to present the best
estimate of the cost-effectiveness threshold given existing data, to show the implications of the
uncertainty in the current evidence and to provide recommendations for future data collection
and analysis.
1.4 Report structure
The main report is set out as a series of chapters, most of which are linked to more detailed analysis in
separate appendices. Chapter 2 provides a policy context for the research and a conceptual framework
for the subsequent empirical work. Chapter 3 outlines a simple theoretical model and associated
econometric analysis of programme budgeting data to estimate the link between changes in overall NHS
expenditure and mortality. Chapter 4 considers a range of analyses to extend the measure of health effect
from mortality to life-years gained and to QALYs. Chapter 5 draws out the main conclusions and
insights from the research.
3Chapter 2: Policy Context and Conceptual Framework
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the foundation for the empirical chapters that follow. It
addresses a series of questions regarding the nature of the cost-effectiveness threshold that NICE use to
guide its decisions, and the principles of how it should be estimated.
The chapter is informed by the results of a systematic literature search relating to these questions. Details
of the methods and results of that search, together with a summary of the papers identified, are provided
in Appendix A. In brief, the search uses a 'pearl growing' method to identify relevant papers. This
identifies a number of initial key articles ('pearls') on the basis of expert advice, and 'grows' these pearls in
a series of steps: extraction of citations and references from the initial pearls; identification of further
pearls from cited and referenced papers; repetition of citation and reference searches; and manual search
of references. This process is repeated until no further papers of relevance are identified. On this basis,
76 relevant papers were identified and are referred to, when relevant, in this chapter.
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section considers, at a conceptual level, what the cost-
effectiveness threshold to inform NHS decisions, such as those made by NICE's advisory committees,
should represent. Section 2.3 considers alternative routes to generating an empirical estimate of such a
threshold. The final section provides a brief overview of the methods used in the study.
2.2 What should the NICE threshold represent?
2.2.1 The threshold as a measure of opportunity cost
NICE uses cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) to inform the decisions underlying most types of guidance
that it publishes. The use of CEA is most prominent in appraisals relating to new medicines,[1] but is
also a key input into diagnostics appraisals as well as clinical guidelines and public health guidance.[1, 9]
For those interventions and programmes which impose additional costs on the NHS budget, their
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs) indicate the incremental cost per additional quality-adjusted
life-year (QALY) achieved relative to appropriate comparators. Although the ICER is one of a number
of evidential inputs into NICE committees' decisions, is has been shown to be the most important, at
least for technology appraisals.[10]
Interpreting whether a given ICER is acceptable requires the use of a cost-effectiveness threshold.
Given that NICE has no influence on the level of the NHS budget, its decisions need to consider that
budget a fixed constraint.[6] Therefore, the threshold should reflect the opportunity costs, in terms of
health forgone, resulting from the imposition of additional costs on the NHS. When NICE issues
positive guidance for a new intervention which imposes additional costs on the system, the resources
required to deliver it must be found by disinvesting from other interventions and services elsewhere.[11]
This displacement of existing services will result in health decrements for other types of individual.[12]
Thus the threshold represents the additional cost that has to be imposed on the system to forgo 1 QALY
worth of health through displacement.
Resource allocation decisions based on comparing an ICER with a cost effectiveness threshold uses some
simplifying assumptions including those of constant returns to scale and perfect divisibility of
programmes.[13] Some have suggested that this makes these methods unreliable,[14] although it has also
been argued that they provide useful approximations to guide decisions.[15] This report takes NICE's
use of these methods as a starting point, and does not review the literature relating to this debate in any
depth.
As Figure 2.1 illustrates, CEA effectively becomes an analysis of net health benefits: does the health gain
from the new intervention outweigh the health decrements associated with the displacement of existing
services necessary to fund it? Figure 2.1 shows the incremental costs and QALYs associated with a new
intervention relative to a comparator (the latter being shown at the origin). The new intervention
4generates 2 additional QALYs per patient and, at price P1, imposes an additional £20,000 per patient; the
ICER is, therefore, £10,000 per QALY gained. At a threshold of £20,000 per QALY, the additional cost
of £20,000 per patient translates into a decrement of 1 QALY (the distance between the y-axis and the
threshold). This is because the threshold indicates the additional cost that needs to be imposed on the
NHS budget in order to displace services that result in 1 QALY being forgone. Therefore, at that price,
there is a net health gain of 1 QALY per patient (2 gained from the new intervention and 1 forgone
through displacement). At a price of P2, the additional cost per patient of the new intervention is
£40,000 and the net health gain is zero: the 2 additional QALYs from the new intervention are the same
as the QALYs forgone through displacement. At the highest price of P3, the adoption of the new
intervention would actually result in a net health decrement of 1 QALY as it generates fewer QALYs (2)
than are forgone (3).
Figure 2.1: graph showing illustration of the NICE threshold as a basis for assessing net health
benefit. Adapted from Claxton et al[4]
The use of the threshold to facilitate this net health benefit (NHB) analysis can be expressed as in
Equation 2.1:
k
C
hNHB h
'' Equation 2.1
where h' is the change in health generated by the new intervention, hC' is the additional health care
cost imposed on the NHS, and k is the cost effectiveness threshold. The net health gain from adopting
the new intervention is, therefore, the health gained, h' , minus the health forgone ,
k
Ch' .
Understanding the NICE cost-effectiveness threshold as representing opportunity costs in terms of
health is explicit in NICE documentation (for example, the methods guide for technology appraisal[1]).
It is also clear in reports published by the Department of Health, such as the consultation report on
value-based pricing.[8, 16, 17] This conceptualisation of the principles of the NICE threshold is also
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5described in the broader literature.[6, 7] Formally, the threshold can be seen as the shadow price of the
budget constraint.[6, 7, 12, 18-20] Although this project focussed on the use and estimation of a cost-
effectiveness threshold for NICE decisions, the methods and estimates relate to any resource allocation
decision within the NHS where the opportunity cost could fall anywhere in the system. Hence it could
apply, for example, to Department of Health targets or to Commissioning Board directives, as well as
NICE guidance.
2.2.2 The threshold as the consumption value of health
Another view of what the threshold used in CEA should represent exists in the literature, however. In
general terms, this is based on the rate at which individuals are willing to forgo other forms of
consumption to achieve health improvement (sometimes referred to as 'willingness to pay').[21-40]
Although this consumption value of health can provide information on the value of health improvement
and may guide decisions such as the level of the overall NHS budget, it does not inform decisions
regarding how to allocate a fixed budget within the health care system.
The reason for this is that the consumption value of health applies equally to health gained as well as to
health forgone. This is shown in Equation 2.2 where the consumption value of health, v, is added to the
definition of NHB in Equation 2.1. This simply involves valuing both health gained and health forgone
by the same consumption value of a unit of health, v. Therefore, the use of the consumption value is
irrelevant: a treatment considered cost effective in Equation 2.1 (i.e. to have a positive NHB) will
inevitably be considered cost-effective in Equation 2.2, and an intervention with negative NHB (i.e. not
cost effective) will remain as such in Equation 2.2.1 Therefore, the magnitude of the threshold, k, is not a
value judgment but an empirical question which can, in principle, be estimated.
hC
k
v
hvNHB '' .
Equation 2.2
2.3 Estimating the threshold
2.3.1 NICE's threshold range
NICE has been reluctant to specify a single cost effectiveness threshold used in its decision making.[10]
It has also consistently emphasised that factors other than CEA are taken into consideration by the
various advisory committees.[1, 9, 10, 41-43] Therefore, it has preferred to indicate the range within
which its threshold value lies - £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY gained.[1, 9] Alongside this, it has
provided an indication of the role other factors play in determining which point of threshold range is
relevant. The latest guide[1] suggests that an ICER below £20,000 is likely to lead to recommendation
unless the evidence is considered highly uncertain; an ICER between £20,000 and £30,000 will lead to
1 This is the case so long as all incremental costs are health care system costs or, as currently, the perspective
adopted by NICE is commonly restricted to the health care system. If a broader perspective was to be adopted and,
insofar as there are some incremental costs (or benefits) of adopting a technology that fall on private consumption,
then v does become relevant to decision making because it represents the value of these consumption effects in
terms of health. In these circumstances it would be inappropriate either to compare an ICER which included
consumption effects to k (because consumption costs do not displace health in the NHS), or to compare it to v
(because some of the costs do not displace private consumption but displace health at rate k). The ratio of k/v
represents the value of NHS resources relative to private consumption. Observing k < v would suggest a positive
shadow price on NHS resources and public expenditure more generally, i.e., it would indicate that a public sector £
is scarce relative to a private £. See Claxton K., Walker S., Sculpher MJ. and Palmer S. Appropriate perspectives for
heath care decisions. Centre for Health Economics, University of York. CHE Research Paper 54; 2010 for a more
extended treatment of perspective, the implications for decision rules and the centrality of an estimate of the
threshold, k.
6recommendation if the committee is also happy with the levels of uncertainty in the evidence and/or the
QALY does not capture all aspects of benefit; and an ICER above £30,000 would only be recommended
if issues related to levels of evidential uncertainty and a failure to capture all benefits in the QALY are
particularly compelling.
In the following year, NICE issued further supplementary guidance relating to the appraisal of
interventions for patients with short life expectancy, although this can be considered to relate more to the
measure of benefit than factors to be considered outside of cost effectiveness.[44] In 2012 NICE issued
a draft update of its methods guide which added that, if a new technology has an ICER above £20,000
per QALY, the committee's deliberations would also consider 'aspects that relate to non-health objectives
of the NHS' (e.g. wider social considerations and/or costs that fall outside of the NHS budget).[45]
Although NICE has carefully argued the case for why its decisions are not driven entirely by a
comparison of the ICER with its threshold range, it has not provided any empirical evidence for why the
threshold range takes the value it does. Indeed it has been widely argued than an empirical basis for these
values should be generated.[8, 46-50] For example, the House of Commons Health Select Committee in
2008 argued:
The affordability of NICE guidance and the threshold it uses to decide whether a treatment is cost-effective is of
serious concern. The threshold is not based on empirical research and is not directly related to the budget, it seems to
be higher than the threshold used by PCTs for treatments not assessed by NICE. Some witnesses, including patient
organisations and pharmaceutical companies, thought that NICE should be more generous in the cost per QALY
threshold it uses, and should approve more products. On the other hand, some PCTs struggle to implement NICE
guidance at the current threshold and other witnesses argued that a lower threshold should be used. We recommend
that the threshold used by NICE in its full assessments be reviewed; further research comparing thresholds used by
PCTs and those used by NICE should be undertaken.... ([8], page 6).
2.3.2 The basis for empirical work
Although there is acceptance of the need for empirical work on the NICE cost-effectiveness threshold, a
set of issues exists regarding the starting point for such analysis. One aspect of this is the view that the
nature of the services that are displaced in response to additional costs being imposed by NICE guidance,
and hence the magnitude of the health forgone for other patients, will depend on the productivity of the
NHS and its overall (inflation adjusted) budget, both of which have increased since NICE initially defined
its threshold range.[51, 52] In principle an increase in the (real) NHS budget would allow it to introduce
interventions which were previously not cost effective which might be expected to increase the threshold
if these interventions were the marginal ones displaced in response to the budget impacts of NICE
recommendations. However, any increase in the NHS budget may be allocated to non-discretionary
expenditure. This would include, for example, expenditure relating to national initiatives such as new
contracts for consultants and activities to meet waiting list targets as well as, of course, the
implementation of NICE guidance. The non-discretionary nature of such expenditure means that these
types of activities cannot easily be disinvested from given a need to release resources to fund NICE
guidance. Therefore, if an increase in the NHS budget is largely devoted to these types of non-
discretionary expenditure, there will be a limited impact on the threshold.
Gains in productivity may come through doing worthwhile activities more cost effectively, including for
those marginal interventions displaced by NICE recommendations, suggesting a reduction in the
threshold. Alternatively, productivity gains might come through discontinuing activities which are not
worth doing (i.e. that produce no health improvement), freeing resources for additional cost effective
interventions which may be the marginal services displaced by NICE guidance - this can have the result
of increasing the threshold.
The net effect of these changes on the threshold could not be determined a priori and would depend how
any additional (real) budget were allocated and how the gains in productivity where achieved. This does
emphasise the fact that the threshold may change over time in response to these and other broader
7developments, and this would have to be considered as part of any regular updating of the empirical
analysis of the threshold.
A second issue to be considered relates to how decisions are taken locally about any displacement
following NICE guidance. The principles of CEA suggest that such displacement should relate to
interventions which are the least cost effective of those currently covered by the budget.[18] The basis
for how local commissioners and providers make their disinvestment decisions is not clear, however, and
there have been calls for greater transparency and guidance in this area.[51] It would be entirely
unrealistic to assume that displacement only takes place in those existing services which are the least cost
effective. The reality is that numerous criteria are likely to be used by commissioners in implementing
disinvestment, and that significant variation will exist between local decision makers.[12] Such criteria
might include, for example, equity concerns about a particular disadvantaged group locally or capacity
constraints regarding particular services. Therefore, NICE needs to know what is likely to happen on
average across the NHS given the reality of local decisions. If local decision making changes over time -
for example, if local commissioners become more focussed on displacing services which are the least cost
effective, in terms of population health - this may affect the estimate of the threshold.
2.3.3 Studying displacement locally
A reasonable conclusion from a consideration of these issues is, therefore, that local decisions about
disinvestment are likely to be an important determinant of the NICE threshold.[53-58] Appleby et al
sought to assess whether it was possible to study local decisions about service investment and
disinvestment to infer the cost effectiveness thresholds being used (implicitly) locally and to draw
conclusions about the appropriate level of the NICE threshold.[59] They identified six primary care
trusts (PCTs) and undertook structured interviews with each of the directors of public health. They also
administrated questionnaires to an opportunistic sample of finance directors from NHS trusts. On this
basis they developed a list of new services as well as those that had been deferred or discontinued. An
attempt was made to estimate the implicit local ICER relating to these decisions by using any cost
effectiveness evidence used to inform the decisions together with relevant evidence on cost effectiveness
from the published literature.
The study found it quite straightforward to identify specific services that had been introduced,
discontinued or deferred, but concluded that these decisions were typically based on clinical and other
non-economic factors. A number of 'decisions at the margin' were identified but none of these was based
on cost effectiveness analysis. Instead, the basis for changes in services was a 'business case', or overall
cost impact. It was possible to impute cost effectiveness for most of the services affected, but the study
concluded that, even with a larger sample of commissioners and providers, it would be very difficult to
estimate an implied cost effectiveness threshold locally. This would be because, firstly, most PCT
decisions were service reconfigurations including demand management and waiting list initiatives. By
their nature, teasing out the incremental cost and health effects, potentially across numerous types of
patients, would be an enormous challenge. Secondly, there would be difficulty in identifying all local
decisions as many options for investment, deferment or discontinuation are rejected before they are made
more explicit in documentation. A third problem would be the finding that a range of criteria is used to
make local decisions, with relatively little concern for cost effectiveness , making a local threshold
estimated in this way hard to interpret. A final challenge would be that it would be very difficult to
establish a causal link between a change in local NHS budget and specific local investment and
disinvestment decisions. The Appleby et al study highlights the problems that exist in deriving a cost
effectiveness threshold from a bespoke study of specific local resource allocation decisions.
2.3.4 What evidence is needed?
Given the challenges of studying local decisions as a means of establishing the NICE threshold, and
keeping in mind NICE's remit, it is possible to suggest a series of important characteristics that estimation
methods should have from the perspective of principle and practice:
8x They should reflect the effect of NICE guidance on the average of the displacement decisions
taken across the NHS, with less consideration on which types of patients and interventions are
affected and why the decision are taken. NICE cannot be expected to reflect what is likely to
be marked variation between local commissioners and providers in how they react to an
effective reduction in their budget as a result of positive guidance. Given NICE's remit, it is
the expected health effects (in terms of length and quality of life) of the average displacement
within the current NHS (given existing budgets, productivity and the quality of local decisions)
that is relevant to the estimate of the threshold.
x The methods used should not be a 'once and for all' effort but should facilitate regular updates
to reflect changes in the broader NHS context such as changes in the overall real budget and
productivity. This requires the use of data sources that are currently routinely available, are
expected to become so in the future or could be made available at reasonable cost. It may be
possible to glean some idea of how the threshold may change in the future by studying how it
has changed in the past, which would require routine data sources to extend back over a period
of time. Periodic updating using explicit scientific methods would encourage accountability
through scrutiny of estimates by relevant stakeholders. It would also provide more
predictability in likely changes to the threshold for the investment decisions of technology
manufacturers.
x The nature of the displacement of existing services (and hence the magnitude of the health
forgone) will depend on the scale of the budget impact coming through NICE guidance.
Therefore, the methods used to estimate the threshold should ideally be able to reflect this
budget impact.
x The methods should recognise the inevitable uncertainty relating to the evidence currently
available for threshold estimation and translate this into an expression of the uncertainty in the
estimate of the threshold. As well as providing information with which NICE can determine
the appropriate implications for its choice of a threshold value, this consideration of uncertainty
can help to prioritise further research or the collection of routine data.
2.4 An introduction to study methods
The current study has sought to develop methods consistent with these desired characteristics. This
section provides a summary of the methods used. Further details are provided in each of the later
chapters relating to the various components of work, and in the associated appendices. The general
approach taken is to use routinely available data to look at the relationship between overall NHS
expenditure and patients' health outcomes. By exploiting differences between PCTs in expenditure and
outcomes, it is possible to infer the costs of generating health improvement from NHS services at the
margin. In principle, this is what is needed as the basis of the NICE cost effectiveness threshold as it
provides an indication of the health forgone through the services displaced by the additional budget effect
of the Institute's guidance.
2.4.1 Past work
The study was able to build on some key existing research relating to the relationship between NHS
expenditure and mortality.[60-62] Since 2003 data on expenditure on health care across 23 programme
budgeting categories (PBCs) of care have been available for each PCT in the NHS in England. These
programme budgeting data seek to allocate, to broad areas of illness according to the primary diagnosis
(using ICD10 codes) all items of NHS expenditure, including expenditure on inpatient care, outpatient
care, community care, primary care and pharmaceuticals and devices.
For the purposes of this study, the merit of these data is that they open up the possibility of examining
the relationship between differences in local spending and associated disease-specific mortality outcomes
routinely available from the National Centre for Health Outcomes Development. In each programme,
the elasticity of outcome with respect to changes in expenditure was estimated controlling for differences
9between PCTs in need. Changes in mortality were then transformed into life-years gained using
assumptions regarding life expectancy without the change in expenditure. This provides estimates of the
marginal cost per life-year gained on average across the NHS by PBC.
This work focused largely on spending and outcomes in two of the largest programmes: circulatory
disease and cancer,[63] but has also informed the link across other programme categories.[61, 64]
Estimates of the cost per life year gained for 2006/07 were £15,387 for cancer, £9,974 for circulation
problems, £5,425 for respiratory problems, £21,538 for gastro-intestinal problems and £26,428 for
diabetes. These estimates were based on a straightforward, though carefully constructed, theoretical
model of health production which informs the specification and estimation of a set of equations. These
dealt with the challenge of there being alternative plausible directions of causation - for example, between
expenditure and health outcomes within a programme. This problem of endogeneity was addressed by
identifying and testing suitable instrumental variables. In doing so, they accounted for variation in the
clinical needs of the local population relevant to each programme together with broader local
environmental factors relevant to the costs of care and outcomes.
This earlier work provides a strong foundation for the current study through its consideration of the
average marginal elasticity of outcome with respect to programme expenditure. However, to estimate the
threshold suitable for NICE decision making, a number of further elements of research are necessary, and
these are described below.
2.4.2 Further econometric analysis
This further econometric research is covered in Chapter 3, with full details in Appendix B. The earlier
work estimated the cost per life-year gained for the major programme areas. The NICE threshold needs
to relate to the whole NHS and will, therefore, depend on all the programmes of care where
disinvestment takes place. Given that each programme of care has been estimated separately, it is not
clear how expenditure on particular programmes changes with the overall budget. For example, does
disinvestment tend to fall on respiratory care or diabetes following a budget impact from NICE guidance?
Therefore, the current study has further developed the econometric analysis to reflect the need for PCTs
to operate within a fixed overall budget. This provides an estimate of the budget elasticity of expenditure
in each PBC, and facilities estimates of the impact of marginal increases (or decreases) in overall PCT
budgets on spending in each PBC.
As well as indicating budgetary influences on programme spending these have then been linked to
changes in mortality outcomes by programme. These changes are used to estimate years of life lost taking
account of the fact that some of the observed deaths would have occurred anyway (had the same
population not been at risk in the particular PBC); that is, taking account of unobserved counterfactual
deaths. This takes into account how such budgetary changes (such as those imposed by NICE guidance)
translate through local decisions into changes in expenditure on programmes of care and then to health
outcomes.
Changes in budgets are in practice incremental rather than marginal, and it may be the case that the
outcome elasticities of programme expenditure in times of budgetary increase (when new initiatives are
introduced) are not the same as in times of budgetary decrease (when the focus is on disinvestment). The
possible effects of non-marginal changes have, therefore, been explored. The project has also sought to
explore how both expenditure and outcome elasticities, and hence the threshold, vary over time, and this
has been assessed by generating relevant estimates for three sets of data.
A development from earlier work has been to relate expenditure in period t to mortality in periods t, t+1
and t+2. Whilst the data used are largely cross-sectional, mortality data are linked so as to follow
expenditures. Given the inevitable uncertainty relating to assumptions in the analysis, extensive sensitivity
analysis is undertaken to consider the implications for the estimates.
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2.4.3 Moving from life-years to quality-adjusted life-years gained
A key element of the research has been to take the results of the econometric work linking NHS spending
and mortality, and to translate this into effects on life years and quality adjusted life years (QALYs). The
methods planned for the study included a consideration of local data, collected routinely by PCTs, on the
types of interventions in which local decision-makers were investing and disinvesting. The aim was to
inform the link between the effects of expenditure changes on mortality and impacts on broader health in
terms of QALYs. These data may have indicated the types of interventions and services, within a given
PBC, on which investment and disinvestment were taking place. Using targeted literature reviews,
estimates of QoL for those activities may have been identified. However, it was established that there
were limited data available at a local level to facilitate this type of analysis, so other data sources were used
for this purpose (see Addendum C2).
It has, therefore, been necessary to consider alternative data and approaches. This is tackled using three
sequential steps:
i. Translate the estimated effects on mortality from the econometrics work into life years by
exploring the limitations of the mortality data available at PCT level and the published years of
life lost (YLL) figures used in the econometric analysis, and by considering how to improve the
estimates using additional data and analysis.
ii. Consider how estimates of life year effects can be adjusted for the quality of life in which they are
lived, taking account of the gender and the age at which life years are gained or lost as well as the
quality of life implications of particular diseases.
iii. Explore ways to take account of those effects on health not directly associated with mortality and
life year affects (i.e., the pure quality of life effects) to estimate an overall cost per QALY
threshold.
This aspect of the analysis is described in Chapter 4 with further details provided in Appendix C.
The central or best estimate is based on two assumptions relating to the health effects associated with
expenditure, one conservative and the other more optimistic. The first assumption is that the health
effects of changes in one year of expenditure are restricted to one year. This is implicit in the estimates of
outcome elasticities estimated in the econometric analysis. This is likely to underestimate effects on
mortality since expenditure that reduces mortality risk for an individual in one year may well also reduce
their risk over subsequent years, and expenditure may also prevent disease in future patient populations.
Therefore, total health effects will be underestimated and the cost per life year or QALY threshold will be
overestimated. Although undoubtedly conservative, it may be offset to some extent by the more
optimistic assumption. It is assumed that any death averted by expenditure in one year will return the
individual to the mortality risk of the general population, i.e., the years of life gained associated with each
death averted are based on what would have been their life expectancy taking account of their of age and
gender (using life tables for the general population).
The extreme upper and lower bounds for cost per life year and cost per QALY thresholds are based on
making both of these assumptions either optimistic (providing the lower bound for the threshold) or
conservative (an upper bound for the threshold). The lower bound is based on assuming that health
effects are not restricted to one year but apply to the remaining disease duration for the population at risk
during the expenditure year. The upper bound is based on the combination of assuming that health
effects are restricted to one year and that any death averted is only averted for the minimum duration
consistent with the mortality data used to estimate the outcome. It is very important to note that the
lower and upper bounds are very much extreme values with limited plausibility.
2.5 Conclusions
A cost effectiveness threshold is needed to inform decisions by NICE, the NHS more generally or the
Department of Health which reflects the fact that opportunity costs fall on services and population health
at a local level. Given that it is (and will continue to be) unfeasible to know precisely which services are
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displaced across all localities within the NHS, the threshold should reflect the average implications on
health of actual local decisions about marginal changes in local service caused by changes in expenditure.
The absence of an empirical estimate of the threshold which reflects these principles lies behind the
project. Using data routinely collected in the NHS or available data that could be routinely updated, the
study is organised into two major parts. The first updates earlier analysis to estimate the relationship
between NHS expenditure and mortality, and the second seeks to translate these mortality effects into the
more general measure of health - the QALY.
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Chapter 3: The link between NHS spending, mortality and the cost of a life
year
3.1 Introduction
This section presents an overview of the econometric work undertaken to estimate the link between NHS
spending and mortality and how this is used to calculate the cost of a life year. As well as providing the
analytical foundations for estimates of cost per QALY threshold presented in Chapter 4 and 5 this work
also contributes to the on-going debate about the extent to which additional health care expenditure
yields improved patient health outcomes.
The work presented in this report takes advantage of the availability of two new datasets to examine the
relationship between National Health Service (NHS) expenditure and mortality rates for various disease
categories. One dataset contains mortality rates for various disease categories at the level of
geographically defined local health authorities, Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). The other dataset presents
NHS expenditure by PCT on 23 broad programmes of care (these programmes are listed in Table 3.1).
This dataset embraces most items of publicly funded expenditure, including inpatient, outpatient and
community care, and pharmaceutical prescriptions. NHS revenue derives almost entirely from national
taxation, and access to the system is generally free to the patient. The system is organized geographically,
with responsibility for the local administration of the NHS devolved to PCTs.2 PCTs are allocated fixed
annual budgets by the Department of Health, within which they are expected to manage the health care in
the locality.
We employ a model that assumes that each PCT receives an annual financial lump sum budget and
allocates its resources across the 23 programmes of care to maximize the health benefits associated with
that expenditure. Estimation of this model using the expenditure and mortality data facilitates two related
studies: first, a study of how changes in the NHS budget impact on expenditure in each care programme;
and second, a study of the link between expenditure in a programme and the health outcomes achieved,
notably in the form of disease specific mortality rates. The latter also permits the calculation of the cost
of an additional life year for individual programmes of expenditure.
The work presented here draws heavily upon on previous studies using these data[60, 62, 63, 65, 66] and
innovates in four major ways: (1) we relate expenditure in time period t to outcomes in periods t, t+1, and
t+2 combined3; (2) we present plausible outcome models for a large number of budgeting categories -
previous studies have tended to focus on the four largest care programmes; (3) we present estimates of
the cost of a life year for the enlarged number of programmes and, importantly, with the aid of
assumptions about the productivity of programmes without a meaningful mortality-based outcome
indicator, we extend our individual programme estimates to incorporate expenditure across all
programmes of care; and (4) while the models we present appear well specified according to appropriate
statistical tests, we subject our results to a substantial sensitivity analysis.
The next section presents a brief review of the relevant literature upon which the study builds. This is
followed by a summary overview of our approach to estimating the cost per life year across the various
programmes of care and the results obtained using Programme Budgeting data provided by the
Department of Health. Further details of all aspects of the modelling approach, description of the data,
the results we derive and calculation of costs per life year are set out in Appendix B. This section is
intended to be supported by the information contained within Appendix B.
2 Strictly speaking, these local health authorities are Primary Care Organisations (PCOs) but the vast majority of
these are Trusts and we retain this terminology throughout.
3 Due to data limitations the cited studies were only able to relate expenditure in period t to mortality in periods t, t-
1, and t-2 combined. Such studies assumed that PCTs had reached some sort of equilibrium in the expenditure
choices they make and the outcomes they secure.
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3.2 Previous studies
One of the most fundamental yet unresolved issues in health policy is the extent to which additional
health care expenditure yields patient benefits, in the form of improved health outcomes. The work of
health technology agencies such as the English National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE) has greatly improved our understanding at the micro-level of the costs and benefits of individual
technologies. However, there remains a dearth of reliable evidence at the macro-level on the benefits of
increased health system expenditure.
The empirical problems of estimating the link between spending and health outcomes are manifest. If one
relies on a time series of health outcome data for an individual health system it is difficult to disentangle
the impact of expenditure from a wide range of other temporal influences on health, such as
technological advances, epidemiological changes, and variations in broader economic circumstances.
Similar methodological difficulties arise if one attempts a cross-sectional comparison of different health
systems. In particular, when seeking to draw inferences from international comparisons, researchers
might have failed to adjust for all the potential external influences on health outcomes and this might
account in part for their findings. For example, in an early cross-sectional study of 18 developed
countries, Cochrane et al.[67] use regression analysis to examine the statistical relationship between
mortality rates on the one hand and per capita GNP and per capita consumption of inputs such as health
care provision on the other. They found that the indicators of health care provision were generally not
associated with outcomes in the form of mortality rates. Thereafter, the failure to identify strong and
consistent relationships between health care expenditure and health outcomes (after controlling for other
factors) has become a consistent theme in the literature, whilst, in contrast, socioeconomic factors are
often found to be good determinants of health outcomes.[68-70]
There is furthermore the possibility that indicators of health system inputs, such as expenditure, are
endogenous, in the sense that they have to some extent been influenced by the levels of health outcome
achieved. And the difficulty of satisfactorily estimating the impact of health system inputs on outcomes is
compounded by the great heterogeneity of health care, the multiple influences on outcomes, and the
rather general nature of the outcome mortality measure traditionally used. Consequently, the failure to
detect a significant positive relationship between expenditure and health outcome might reflect the
difficulties associated with any such study rather than the absence of such a relationship. For example,
Gravelle and Backhouse[71] examine some of the methodological difficulties associated with empirical
investigation of the determinants of mortality rates. These include simultaneous equation bias and the
associated endogeneity problem (that the level of health care input might reflect the level of health
outcome achieved in the past), and that a lag may occur between expenditure and outcomes (studies
typically assume that expenditure has an immediate effect on mortality).
To avoid the difficulties imposed by data heterogeneity inherent in international analyses, the study by
Cremieux et al.[72] examines the relationship between expenditure and outcomes across ten Canadian
provinces over the fifteen-year period 1978-1992. They find that lower healthcare spending is associated
with a significant increase in infant mortality and a decrease in life expectancy. Although challenging the
received empirical wisdom, one difficulty with the Cremieux et al.[72] study is that the estimated
regression equation consists of a mixture of potentially endogenous variables (such as the number of
physicians, health spending, alcohol and tobacco consumption, expenditure on meat and fat) and
exogenous variables (such as income and population density). The authors chosen estimation technique
(GLS) does not allow for this endogeneity and consequently the coefficients on the endogenous variables
may be biased.[71] Similarly, Nixon and Ulmanns[73] study, which uses three health outcome measures
and various explanatory variables (such as per capita health expenditure) for 15 EU countries over the
period 1980-1995, does not allow for the possibility that some of the explanatory variables may be
endogenous.
More recently, studies have started to address the endogeneity issue.[74, 75] Bokhari, Gai and
Gottret[74] estimate a cross-section model for 127 countries using data for 2000. They employ two
health outcome indicators (the under-five mortality rate and the maternal mortality rate). Bokhari et al.
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allow for the endogeneity of health expenditure via the use of instrumental variable techniques, and they
estimate the elasticity of these indicators with respect to total government health expenditure conditional
on the level of education and basic infrastructure (such as road transport and sanitation). They find that
health expenditure has a statistically significant negative impact on both under-five mortality and maternal
mortality. The authors do note, however, that their focus on child and maternal mortality implicitly
assumes that these outcome indicators are in some way representative of outcomes across all activities
financed by government health care expenditure. Data permitting, it would be preferable to relate health
care expenditure on those aged under five years to under-five mortality, and expenditure on maternal care
to maternal mortality.
In this study we relate expenditure in a specific disease area to mortality associated with those diseases.
We also address the endogeneity issue through the use of instrumental variables and, unlike previous
studies; we examine the sensitivity of our results to questions of instrument validity. Moreover, although
previous empirical work has been loosely based on the notion of a health production function, it has
rarely been informed by an explicit theoretical model. This is understandable, as the processes giving rise
to the observed health outcome are likely to be very complex, and any theoretical model might become
rather unwieldy. However, this absence of a theoretical model has sometimes led to an atheoretical
search for measures of health inputs demonstrating a statistically significant association with health
outcomes. In contrast, in this study we inform our empirical modelling with a theoretical framework. We
believe that this may lead to a more convincing and better specified model of health outcomes than that
used in many previous studies, and this model is outlined in the next section.
3.3 Modelling framework
In the literature on the relationship between health expenditure and health outcomes, the statistical model
estimated often contains a mixture of exogenous variables (such as income and population density) and
endogenous variables (such as health spending, the number of doctors, and spending on cigarettes and
alcohol). In such circumstances, the application of ordinary least squares will lead to biased coefficients
on the endogenous variables. To avoid this problem, Gravelle and Backhouse [71] recommend that
analysts model, even if only informally, the decision making process which generates the observed data
set.
To avoid the problem of simultaneous equation bias we have constructed a very basic model of the
budgeting and outcomes data generation processes. In places, the model makes some heroic assumptions
(which we hope to relax in future work) but the framework reveals some of the more salient features of
the data generation processes.
We assume  quite realistically  that each PCT, i, receives an annual financial lump sum allocation, ݕ௜,
from the Department of Health and that total within year expenditure for each PCT cannot exceed this
amount. We also assume  less realistically  that this lump sum is allocated across the J programmes of
care (J=23) by a single decision maker (although we know that in practice the programme budget data will
in part reflect the myriad of individual clinical decisions that health care professionals take every day and
that these are decisions over which PCTs exercise little control).
We assume that each PCT adheres to a social welfare function,ܹ(. ), that incorporates the health
outcome (h ) across all 23 programmes of care so that for each PCT
W = W(
Jhhh ,,, 21  ) Equation 3.1
Health outcomes might be measured in a variety of ways, but the most obvious is to consider some
measure of improvement in life expectancy, possibly adjusted for quality of life, in the form of a quality
adjusted life year.
We assume that, for each PCT and for each programme of care, there is a health production function
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that indicates the link between local spending on programme j ( jx ) and health outcomes in the same
programme ( jh ). Two such production functions are illustrated in Figure 3.1. We assume that increased
expenditure yields improvements in health outcomes, as expressed, for example, in local mortality rates,
but at a diminishing rate. Clearly the shape of the curve might depend on the health needs of the local
population (such as epidemiological conditions) and other local circumstances, such as socio-economic
conditions and local service input prices. Note that in Figure 3.1 the cost of securing a given level of
health outcome is  for whatever reason  higher in PCTa than PCTb.
Figure 3.1: The health production function for programme j in two PCTs
In algebraic form, each PCT seeks to maximise total welfare across all J programmes of care (J=23)
subject to the health production function for each programme of care of the form
),,( jjjjj znxfh  Equation 3.2
where jn is the need for health care in programme j, jx is PCT expenditure on programme j, and jz
represents environmental variables affecting the production of health outcomes in programme j (which
might include private (non-PCT) health care expenditure in the disease area). Each PCTs problem is to
select an expenditure level for each programme ሺݔ௝כ), so as to maximise the utility function in equation
(3.1) subject to the health production functions in Equation 3.2 and the budget constraint that total
expenditure on all programmes should not exceed PCT income (y).
Algebraically, the budget constraint is:
yxxx d 2321 ... Equation 3.3
Solving this maximisation problem yields the result that the optimal level of PCT expenditure in each
category, ݔ௝כ, is a function of the need for health care in each category ሺ݊ଵǡ ݊ଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݊ଶଷ),, environmental
variables affecting the production of health outcomes in each category ሺݖଵǡ ݖଶǡ ǥ ǡ ݖଶଷ), and PCT income
(y). Thus:
),,,,,,( 232123211
*
1 yzzznnnxx  
),,,,,,( 232123212
*
2 yzzznnnxx  Equation 3.4
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*
23 yzzznnnxx  
These results imply that each PCT will allocate expenditure across the 23 programmes of care so that the
marginal utility of the last pound spent in each programme of care is the same. Of course, this does not
mean that each programme receives the same amount of cash; financial allocations will depend on both
the relationship between utility and outcomes, and on the relationship between outcomes and expenditure
for each programme of care. If we assume that one extra unit of health outcome improves managerial
utility by the same amount irrespective of the programme of care, then the decision maker simply
allocates expenditure across all programmes to maximise total health outcomes. This is achieved by
ensuring that the marginal health outcome benefit (measured perhaps in QALYs) is the same for the last
pound spent across all programmes of care.
Thus, for each programme of care, there exists an expenditure equation (equation 3.4) explaining the
expenditure choice of PCTs and a health outcome equation (equation 3.2) which models the associated
health outcomes achieved. As presented, our basic model is static in the sense that the health production
function (equation 3.2) assumes that all health benefits occur contemporaneously with expenditure. We
acknowledge that for some programmes of care benefits might occur one or more years after expenditure
has occurred. This is particularly likely to be the case for those programmes aimed at encouraging healthy
lifestyles, where some benefits may occur decades after the actual programme expenditure. For other
programmes, such as maternity/reproductive conditions and neonate conditions, benefits may be largely
contemporaneous with expenditure. However, while our data are largely cross-sectional in nature, we are
able to link mortality data in such a way that this follows expenditures. Accordingly, for our empirical
modelling we estimate models using expenditure for period t with mortality data for periods t, t+1, and
t+2 combined. Appendix B presents a number of sensitivity checks on these assumptions including
models where mortality data precedes expenditure data4 and shows that these results are fairly consistent
with the results presented here.
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Programme budgeting in England
Prior to October 2006, there were 303 PCTs in England with an average population of about 160,000
people. In October 2006 the 303 PCTs became 152 PCTs. Some PCT boundaries remained unchanged
while other PCTs were merged with one or more neighbours to form a new, larger, PCT. In a few cases
the geographic area covered by an existing PCT was split between two or more new PCTs. These 152
PCTs have an average population of about 330,000 people. PCTs are allocated fixed annual budgets
within which they are expected to meet expenditure on most aspects of health care, including inpatient,
outpatient and community care, primary care and pharmaceutical prescriptions.
Programme budgeting data collection was initiated by the Department of Health in April 2003 when each
PCT was required to prepare expenditure data disaggregated according to 23 programmes of health care.
These programmes are defined by reference to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Version
10 codes at the four digit level, and most programme budget categories reflect ICD 10 chapter headings
(e.g., cancer and tumours, circulation problems, renal problems, neonates, problems associated with the
skin, problems associated with vision, problems associated with hearing, etc). In some cases, the 23
categories are broken down into further sub-areas to achieve a closer match with the various National
Service Frameworks (NSFs): for example, the large mental health category is broken down into substance
abuse, dementia, and other.
4 Due to data availability constraints previous studies had to relate expenditure in period t to mortality data in
periods t, t-1, and t-2 combined. Implicitly this assumes that data represent a quasi long-run equilibrium position,
and that relative expenditure levels and health outcomes within each PCT have been reasonably stable over a period
of time.
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Programme budgeting seeks to allocate all types of PCT expenditure to the various programme budget
categories, including secondary care, community care and prescribing. However, the system acknowledges
that a medical model of care may not always be appropriate, and two specific non-clinical groups --
Healthy Individuals and Social Care Needs -- have been created. These are intended to capture the
costs of disease prevention programmes and the costs of services that support individuals with social
rather than health care needs. In addition, in some cases it is not possible to assign activity by medical
condition, preventative activity, or social care need and, in these cases, expenditure is assigned to a
residual category (PBC 23) entitled Other. The most important element of this residual programme is
expenditure on general practitioner services (PBC 23a). In principle, it should be possible to allocate each
GP consultation to a particular care programme. However, at the moment the available data information
systems do not permit such an allocation and so all primary care expenditure is allocated to this residual
programme. The use of this residual category ensures that all expenditure is assigned to a programme of
care.[76]
The aim of the programme budget classifications is to identify the entire volume of health care resources
assigned to broad areas of illness according to the primary diagnosis associated with an intervention. It
serves a number of purposes, most notably to assist in the local planning of health care. But for this
study its crucial merit is that it opens up the possibility of examining the statistical relationship between
local programme spending and the associated disease-specific outcome. Various forms of data collection
and analysis are required to map PCT expenditure on acute, community and other services to the 23
programme budget categories. From the PCT perspective, however, the construction of each PCTs
return largely involves collating information provided by other bodies and drawing on other information
already in the PCTs own annual accounts. Details of how expenditure is assigned to programmes of care
can be found in Section B4.2 of Appendix B.
Table 3.1 shows the expenditure per head and the growth in this expenditure for each programme budget
category for 2003/04 to 2008/09.5 Year on year comparisons of expenditure in each group are
complicated by the fact that the algorithms used to allocate activity to PBCs are regularly revised.6
However, by 2008/9 total PCT expenditure per person had increased to £1,531 (up 28% from 2004/5).
The residual other category (programme budget category 23) still accounted for the largest share of
expenditure (14.9%) with per capita expenditure of almost £228, of which £145 was accounted for by
primary care expenditure. Mental health (budget category 5) accounted for just over 12% of expenditure,
but the expenditure share recorded by circulation problems (budget category 10) had fallen from 10.2%
to 8.5%. Other categories recording a fall in budget share of more than one half of one percentage point
included: the gastro-intestinal system (down from 6.1% to 5.1%), the musculo-skeletal system (down
from 6.0% to 5.2%), trauma and injuries (down from 6.0% to 4.2%), and maternity (down from 4.6% to
3.9%). Categories recording an increase in budget share of more than one half of one percentage point
included neurological problems (up from 2.9% to 4.4%) and dental problems (up from 1.1% to 4.1%).
Some of these changes will partly reflect revisions to the algorithms used to allocate expenditure to
particular PBCs. For example in 2006/7 expenditure per person on musculo-skeletal problems fell by
11% and expenditure on trauma and injuries fell by 25%. In the same year, expenditure on neurological
problems increased by 35%. This suggests that some types of activity, which were previously allocated to
musculo-skeletal problems and/or trauma and injuries, were re-allocated to neurological problems.
Similarly, up to and including 2006/7 expenditure that was not directly attributable to a particular
programme category was apportioned using admitted patient care percentages.7 In other words, if x% of
total admitted patient care expenditure was allocated to PBC 1, then x% of all expenditure that was not
directly attributable to a particular programme category was also allocated to PBC 1. With effect from
5 Comparable data for each programme budget sub-category is shown in Table BA.1 in Appendix B.
6 These revisions are documented in Appendix B, Section B4.3.
7Expenditure on, for example, community care, A&E, ambulance services, and outpatients can be difficult to
attribute a particular PBC. Critical care, rehabilitation, and specialised commissioning across care settings will also
be difficult to attribute to a particular programme.
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2007/8, however, NHS organisations were asked to select an appropriate basis for the apportionment of
this non-programme specific expenditure and that, where no reasonable basis existed, such expenditure
was to be allocated to the Other  Miscellaneous (PBC 23X) category. These two changes to the
algorithm used to allocate expenditure to particular PBCs illustrate that year-on-year comparisons of
expenditure need to be interpreted with care.
Expenditure per head on any given programme varies from one PCT to another and Table 3.2 presents
some statistics that indicate the degree of variation in expenditure levels across PCTs by programme
budget category. The first four columns of Table 3.2 present descriptive statistics for PCT expenditure
per person. These reveal that, for example, PCT per capita expenditure in the cancer programme
averaged £96.30 across all PCTs, with the minimum spend being £62.90 and the maximum being
£155.70.
Some PCTs will be spending more than other PCTs simply because they face higher input costs. The
second set of four columns in Table 3.2 present descriptive statistics for PCT per capita expenditure that
has been adjusted for the unavoidable geographical variation in costs (input prices) faced by PCTs.8
However, if anything this adjustment appears to increase the variation in expenditure across PCTs; for
example, the range of per capita expenditure on cancer increases from between £62.90 and £155.70
(unadjusted) to between £59.10 and £163.10 (adjusted for local health care input prices).
Another cause of the variation in expenditure levels is the fact that the need for health care varies from
one PCT to another. For example, areas with a relatively large proportion of elderly residents, or PCTs
operating in relatively deprived locations, can be expected to experience relatively high levels of spending.
The Department of Health has a well-developed methodology for estimating the relative health care
needs, which it uses as the basis for allocating health care funds to.[77]
The final set of four columns in Table 3.2 present descriptive statistics for PCT per capita expenditure
that has been adjusted for both the unavoidable geographical variation in costs and the local need for
health care faced by PCTs.9 For virtually every PBC, this adjustment reduces the variation in expenditure
across PCTs; for example, the standard deviation of PCT per capita expenditure falls from £19.70 to
£15.30 for the cancer programme. Although this adjustment reduces the variation in expenditure levels
across PCTs, this decline is quite modest and there are still substantial differences in expenditure even
after allowing for differences in local cost and need. For example, expenditure per head in the circulation
problems category varies between £78 and £328 using cost adjusted expenditure data, but falls between
£76 and £327 using cost and need adjusted population data.
The variation in expenditure across PCTs has led some commentators to question the reliability of the
programme budgeting data. The National Audit Office[78] undertook a survey of Trusts, PCTs and
SHAs to assess the quality of the data. They concluded that while the processes for collecting the
budgeting data were well defined in most areas, there remained scope for improvements to the robustness
of some of the data (e.g. non-admitted patient care). Appleby et al.[79] also considered the issue of data
reliability in variations in spending on cancer services and noted some large year-on-year changes.
However, the authors point out that it is difficult to define what might be either an implausible level of
expenditure or an implausibly large change in expenditure. This is complicated by the fact that the
Department of Health makes regular improvements to the way in which activity is matched to
programme categories.
8 This cost adjustment reflects the fact that health economy input prices vary considerably across the country and,
for some inputs, are up to 40% higher in London and the south east of England than elsewhere. We have used a
weighted average of the three Market Forces Factor Indices (MFFs) for HCHS, for prescribing, and for GMS/PMS
to adjust the raw expenditure figures in Table 2 for local input prices (see Department of Health, 2009)
9 This needs adjustment incorporates the AREA resource allocation formula for HCHS (see Department of Health,
2005).
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As with most datasets, there are likely to be recording and other errors associated with the programme
budgeting data. However, while we note that the allocation of programme budgeting data might not be
perfect there is no systematic evidence of this. Accordingly, for each disease category, we observe that
PCT expenditure per person varies considerably and this variation  holding constant input prices and the
need for health care  offers the opportunity to examine whether PCTs that spend more on health care
achieve a better outcome and, if so, at what cost. Empirical estimates of the strength of this relationship
for several programmes of care are presented in this report.
3.4.2 Health outcome data
Most studies of the relationship between expenditure and outcome have used some measure of mortality
as an indicator of the latter. We also employ mortality as an outcome measure. First, it is a relevant (albeit
not comprehensive) measure of the outcome of health care expenditure; and second, it is available for
more disease areas than any other outcome measure at PCT level.
Although mortality is available (by PCT) for several disease areas, it is not available for just over one-half
of all programmes not least because it is simply not relevant for these programmes (e.g., for learning
disabilities, vision problems, hearing problems, dental problems, and skin problems). Moreover, even
where a mortality measure is available, the ICD10 coverage of the mortality data often falls short of the
coverage of the expenditure data. For some programmes, therefore, we have combined the published
mortality rates for two or more disease areas in an attempt to match the ICD10 coverage of the mortality
data with that of the expenditure data.
Table B5.1 (Appendix B) shows how we have attempted to marry the mortality data (column c) and the
expenditure data (column a). ICD10 coverage of the component mortality rates for some PBCs falls
short of the expenditure data and the extent of this shortfall is illustrated by the ratio reported in the final
column of Table 3.3. For example, the cancers and tumours programme covers all expenditure associated
with ICD10 codes C00-C97 and D00-D49 but the PCT-based mortality data only relates to ICD10 codes
C00-C97. At the national (all England) level, figures are available which show that, in 2008, there were
62,072 deaths of those aged under 75 years from codes C00-C97 and that there were 63,076 deaths from
codes C00-C97 and D00-D49 combined. In other words, the PCT level mortality data reflects 98.4% of
all deaths associated with the expenditure codes. We adjust our cost of life (year) estimates for this
mismatch.
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Table 3.1: National (all PCT) expenditure per head (£) and growth in expenditure (%) by PBC group, 2003/4 - 2008/9
PBC # PBC description
Spend
(£) per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Growth
(%)
Growth
(%)
Growth
(%)
Growth
(%)
Growth
(%)
Share of
total
spend
(%)
Share of
total
spend
(%)
2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2004/5 2008/9
1 Infectious diseases 17.95 20.22 23.61 20.88 22.08 23.46 13 17 -12 6 6 1.7% 1.5%
2 Cancers and tumours 64.95 75.54 83.24 81.67 90.21 94.55 16 10 -2 10 5 6.3% 6.2%
3 Blood disorders 14.08 17.00 17.48 16.58 19.44 19.50 21 3 -5 17 0 1.4% 1.3%
4 Endocrine, nutritional 28.96 31.86 37.26 36.70 39.39 43.38 10 17 -1 7 10 2.7% 2.8%
5 Mental health 133.31 146.83 158.95 166.53 180.90 191.21 10 8 5 9 6 12.2% 12.5%
6 Learning disability 37.93 43.37 46.54 48.36 54.20 56.11 14 7 4 12 4 3.6% 3.7%
7 Neurological 29.83 35.09 41.06 55.27 62.43 67.64 18 17 35 13 8 2.9% 4.4%
8 Vision problems 24.61 27.65 28.24 26.97 30.69 32.95 12 2 -4 14 7 2.3% 2.2%
9 Hearing problems 5.73 6.32 6.27 6.21 8.07 8.16 10 -1 -1 30 1 0.5% 0.5%
10 Circulatory disease 110.12 122.37 124.28 122.06 124.77 129.94 11 2 -2 2 4 10.2% 8.5%
11 Respiratory system 54.60 62.71 69.56 65.07 67.68 77.97 15 11 -6 4 15 5.2% 5.1%
12 Dental problems 10.78 13.55 24.91 51.93 59.45 62.44 26 84 108 14 5 1.1% 4.1%
13 Gastro intestinal system 63.56 73.22 81.30 73.30 75.05 77.89 15 11 -10 2 4 6.1% 5.1%
14 Skin problems 20.98 24.90 26.84 28.31 30.41 32.34 19 8 5 7 6 2.1% 2.1%
15 Musculo Skeletal system 61.36 71.72 74.74 66.75 75.91 79.68 17 4 -11 14 5 6.0% 5.2%
16 Trauma and Injuries 62.31 72.13 76.41 57.29 57.56 63.54 16 6 -25 0 10 6.0% 4.2%
17 Genito Urinary system 55.32 62.38 67.38 68.98 67.83 73.78 13 8 2 -2 9 5.2% 4.8%
18 Maternity 52.28 55.04 60.42 57.64 57.09 60.44 5 10 -5 -1 6 4.6% 3.9%
19 Neonate conditions 11.72 13.93 13.42 13.17 15.15 17.23 19 -4 -2 15 14 1.2% 1.1%
20 Poisoning 9.68 12.32 14.25 14.59 15.84 18.31 27 16 2 9 16 1.0% 1.2%
21 Healthy individuals 20.29 22.77 26.18 26.85 31.44 35.74 12 15 3 17 14 1.9% 2.3%
22 Social care needs 24.81 30.93 33.59 30.29 35.29 36.58 25 9 -10 17 4 2.6% 2.4%
23 Other (includes GMS/PMS) 136.94 157.75 171.82 209.70 232.02 227.71 15 9 22 11 -2 13.2% 14.9%
1 to 23 All PBCs 1052.12 1199.60 1307.76 1345.10 1452.91 1530.59 14 9 3 8 5
Notes: (i) The population figures for 2003/4, 2004/5 and 2005/6 are identical (the total for England is 49,175,998).
(ii) The corresponding figure for 2006/7 is 50,476,231, for 2007/8 it is 50,695,989, and for 2008/9 it is 51,220,531.
(iii) The spend per head figures are calculated by summing expenditure across all PCTs and dividing by the national population.
(iv) All figures are at current prices.
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Table 3.2: PCT expenditure per head by PBC, 2008/9: (a) unadjusted; (b) adjusted for local costs; and (c) adjusted for local costs and local need.
Spend per head (unadjusted), £ Spend per head (cost adjusted), £ Spend per head (cost and need adjusted), £
Programme budget category Mean StdDev Min Max Mean StdDev Min Max Mean StdDev Min Max
1 Infectious diseases 26.5 24.6 8.6 151.8 25.7 21.7 8.6 136.7 25.0 21.4 9.5 139.5
2 Cancers and tumours 96.3 16.9 62.9 155.7 96.7 19.7 59.1 163.1 94.2 15.3 55.2 154.0
3 Blood disorders 20.3 7.0 7.7 49.4 20.2 6.5 8.0 49.1 19.7 6.0 8.2 44.2
4 Endocrine, nutritional 44.6 8.8 28.9 74.8 44.7 9.5 27.4 77.0 43.3 6.1 29.9 61.5
5 Mental health 201.4 60.0 118.9 474.1 200.3 54.0 122.8 422.8 194.0 41.9 132.3 362.0
6 Learning disability 56.8 18.8 7.7 125.9 57.0 19.4 6.8 123.6 55.7 18.8 6.7 136.6
7 Neurological 68.5 13.8 41.1 133.8 68.8 15.6 38.4 137.5 66.9 12.1 41.5 125.2
8 Vision problems 33.2 6.7 16.7 57.7 33.4 7.5 14.8 59.2 32.5 6.1 15.6 48.3
9 Hearing problems 8.6 3.7 0.9 24.0 8.7 3.9 0.9 25.5 8.3 3.3 0.8 22.0
10 Circulatory disease 131.6 26.7 88.0 317.3 132.2 30.5 78.2 327.6 128.5 24.4 75.7 326.9
11 Respiratory system 80.5 17.4 48.0 141.2 80.9 19.8 42.7 145.3 78.1 12.4 48.2 126.0
12 Dental problems 64.8 13.4 28.0 111.9 64.9 14.1 24.9 115.8 63.0 10.7 28.1 97.1
13 Gastro intestinal system 80.0 14.5 46.7 119.6 80.4 16.8 41.5 124.6 78.0 11.3 41.6 114.4
14 Skin problems 33.1 8.0 18.1 66.4 33.3 8.6 16.5 69.1 32.2 6.3 16.0 57.7
15 Musculo Skeletal system 79.9 17.6 43.3 127.3 80.4 19.9 39.6 132.5 78.2 16.6 41.0 116.4
16 Trauma and Injuries 63.2 16.7 12.5 139.3 63.4 17.4 11.5 125.0 61.8 15.6 10.4 103.6
17 Genito Urinary system 75.7 13.7 49.9 112.3 75.6 13.6 48.4 108.9 73.7 10.1 50.6 105.5
18 Maternity 63.3 16.7 24.6 124.4 63.1 15.8 21.9 117.9 61.4 12.8 24.4 96.5
19 Neonate conditions 18.4 7.3 6.4 46.4 18.2 6.8 6.6 43.7 17.8 6.6 5.8 47.8
20 Poisoning 18.6 4.2 10.8 31.2 18.7 4.7 9.6 32.3 18.2 3.9 10.1 33.1
21 Healthy individuals 38.4 18.1 9.7 125.0 38.4 17.8 8.9 115.6 36.7 14.5 9.4 104.5
22 Social care needs 40.8 56.6 0.1 415.2 41.2 59.2 0.1 432.9 39.7 55.0 0.0 411.5
23 Other (includes GMS/PMS) 230.8 44.5 138.2 396.1 230.2 42.4 140.7 356.5 226.8 45.8 134.1 346.0
All All PBCs 1,575.6 196.7 1,225.7 2,079.9 1,576.3 217.3 1,183.0 2,173.1 1,534.0 86.2 1,390.1 1,987.0
Note: the above statistics relate to 152 PCTs and the mean expenditure figures will differ slightly from the national ones in Table 3.1 because the statistics across PCTs are not
weighted for the size of each PCTs population.
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We acknowledge that mortality is a more relevant outcome indicator for some programmes (e.g., for
circulatory problems) than for others (e.g., for epilepsy) and, for this reason, we would expect better results
in some programmes than others. We also acknowledge that this focus on mortality ignores the impact of
expenditure aimed at chronic care and at palliative care. Nevertheless, our focus on mortality is purely
practical: it is both a widely available measure and it is clearly a relevant outcome indicator.10
The mortality data provide us with a number of possible outcome indicators including the under 75 years of
age standardised mortality rate (SMR) and the (under 75 years) standardised years of life lost rate (SYLLR).
The SMR gives equal weight to all deaths irrespective of the age at which they occur but the SYLLR gives
greater weight to deaths that occur at earlier ages. For our purposes we focus on a measure of the
avoidable years of life lost (YLL).11 This is calculated by summing over ages 1 to 74 years the number of
deaths at each age multiplied by the number of years of life remaining up to age 75 years. The crude YLL
rate is simply the number of years of life lost divided by the resident population aged under 75 years. Like
conventional mortality rates, the crude YLL rate can be age standardised to eliminate the effects of
differences in population age structures between areas, and this (age) standardised YLL rate is the health
outcome variable generally employed in this study.[80]
3.4.3 Other variables
We employ an instrumental variables (IV) estimation technique to our empirical models of the outcome
and expenditure equations as described in the next section. This is due to (i) own programme expenditure
is likely to be endogenous in the outcome equation and (ii) other programme need is likely to be
endogenous in the own programme expenditure equation. Endogeneity of programme expenditure results
from expenditure levels being responsive to levels of outcomes and/or unobserved need rendering
expenditure correlated with the residuals in an OLS regression of outcomes on expenditure. Due to
limitations of data other programme need in the expenditure equation is proxied by death rates (minus that
due to the programme under investigation). This will be influenced by expenditure decisions, including
expenditure in other programmes and is treated as endogenous in the expenditure model.
IV estimation basically involves replacing the endogenous variable in the equation of interest with its
predicted value from an OLS regression which regresses the endogenous variable on a set of instrumental
variables. These instruments should be good predictors of the endogenous variable (i.e., they should be
relevant and strong predictors) but should be appropriately excluded from the equation of interest (i.e., they
should be valid instruments).
We have a number of potential instruments available, mostly derived from 2001 Population Census. In our
earlier studies we found that a small sub-set of these instruments proved sufficient to generate plausible
results. These included: the proportion of the population providing unpaid care; the proportion of
households that are one pensioner households; index of multiple deprivation; proportion of the population
in the white ethnic group.
We also had available a further set of potential instruments and, where our more limited set of instruments
failed to generate plausible results, we extended our instrument search to include this wider set of variables.
This extended set of instruments is shown in Table 3.3.12
10 The approach adopted here is extendable in principle to other non-mortality based outcome indicators. We
illustrate such an application in Section B8.8 of Appendix B where we use EQ-5D utility scores pre- and post- an
operative procedure from the PROMs programme to generate a non-mortality-based outcome indicator, and we use
this indicator to estimate our outcome model.
11 One exception to this is the mortality rate for the trauma and injuries programme where initially only SMRs were
available.
12 Details of the construction of all instruments are shown in Table BA.2 of Appendix B.
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Our instruments reflect factors, such as socio-economic deprivation and the availability of informal care in
the community, which might indirectly impact upon mortality rates and/or health care expenditure levels.
As we shall see, although our instruments pass the appropriate statistical tests, some commentators claim
that such tests may have low power to detect the presence of invalid instruments. Consequently in section
B9 of Appendix B we examine how sensitive our results are to the presence of invalid instruments.
Table 3.3 reports descriptive statistics for the socio-economic and needs variables used in the study (these
statistics are for the variables in absolute form). For example, on average, lone pensioner households
comprise 14% of all households, the 'white ethnic' group accounts for 89% of the population and 10% of
the population provide unpaid care.
In addition to the instrumental variables, Table 3.3 also reports descriptive statistics for the Department of
Healths need for health care index,13 its need for HIV services index, and its need for maternity services
index. The latter two indices are used to either supplement or replace the all service measure of need when
estimating our models. The 'need for health care' index averages about 1 but varies substantially, with
some PCTs having a needs index more than 25% below the national average and others facing a need for
health care more than 30% above the national average. The Table also reports descriptive statistics for
some disease prevalence rates (e.g., for diabetes and for epilepsy) and, again, these are used to either
supplement or replace the all service measure of need when estimating our models. Finally, the MFF index
shows that input prices in the most expensive PCT are almost 20% above those in the least expensive PCT.
3.5 Approach to model estimation
The theoretical framework suggests the specification and estimation of a system of equations, with an
expenditure and health outcome equation for each of the 23 programmes of care. However, this approach
makes infeasible data demands, requiring variables to identify expenditure, need, environmental factors and
health outcomes in each of the 23 programmes of care. Moreover, mortality rates are available for less than
half of the 23 programmes. Rather than estimate a system of equations, we proceed on a programme-by-
programme basis, estimating health outcome and expenditure equations for those programmes for which
mortality data are available.
In line with the theoretical framework presented above, we specify the following expenditure (equation 3.5)
and health outcome (equation 3.6) models for each of the 23 programmes of care. Accordingly, for the j-th
programme of care we have:ݔ௜ ൌן ൅ߚ݊௜ + ߛ݉௜ + ߠݕ௜ + ߝ௜,݅ = 1, ,152 Equation 3.5݄௜ = ߩ + ߜ݊௜ + ߨݔ௜ + ߳௜,݅ = 1, ,152 Equation 3.6
where ݔ௜ is expenditure; ݊௜ is the own programme need for care; ݉௜ is the need for care in other
programmes; ݕ௜ is the total budget and ݄௜ is the health gain in PCT i .
Ideally we should employ a programme specific indicator of the level of need for each care programme൫݊௜௝൯ but these are not readily available. When estimating both the outcome and expenditure models we
therefore proxy the own programme health care need using the needs component of the Department of
Healths resource allocation formula.14 This needs element is specifically designed to adjust PCT
allocations for local health care needs and accordingly, ceteris paribus, we would expect a positive
13 This incorporates the CARAN formula for HCHS and reflects need across all health care services.
14 However, we do experiment replacing and supplementing this all service measure of need with more programme
specific measures where these are available (e.g., the diabetes and epilepsy prevalence rates).
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relationship between expenditure and need for each programme of care. We would also expect a positive
relationship between need and adverse health outcomes.15
The expenditure model includes both the own programme health care need (which is proxied using the
needs component of the Department of Healths resource allocation formula) and the need for health care
in all other programmes. In the absence of programme-specific measures of need, we use the all cause
mortality rate excluding the mortality rate in the programme of interest, ݉௜, as the proxy for need in other
programmes of care.
All variables have been log transformed so that parameter estimates can be interpreted as elasticities. In
other words, a regression coefficient of 0.5 implies that a 1% increase in the regressor is associated with a
0.5% increase in the dependent variable.
3.5.1 IV estimation
Other programme need, ݉௜, in the expenditure equation 3.5 and expenditure, ݔ௜, in the outcome equation
3.6 are both likely to be endogenous rendering OLS both biased and inconsistent. Endogeneity of
programme expenditure results from expenditure levels being responsive to levels of outcomes and/or
unobserved need. Other programme need in the expenditure equation is proxied by death rates which is
influenced by expenditure decisions and hence is treated as endogenous. To deal with this endogeneity we
employ instrumental variables (IV) estimation and implement two-stage least squares (2SLS). Unlike OLS,
IV is a consistent estimator in the presence of an endogenous regressor and, although in finite samples the
IV estimator will be biased, with the bias (providing certain assumptions are met) being less than that
associated with OLS.
For the health outcome equation, IV estimation can be viewed as finding variables (instruments) that are
good predictors of programme expenditure but which are appropriately excluded from the outcome
equation of interest (that is, from equation 3.6) because they are not predictive of outcome. The
assumption is that these instruments impact upon health outcome through their impact on expenditure
only, and that they do not have a direct effect on the outcome.16
Similarly, for the expenditure equation, IV estimation can be viewed as finding variables (instruments) that
are good predictors of the proxy for other programme need (݉௜) but which do not belong in the
expenditure equation of interest (that is, equation 3.5). The assumption is that these predictors impact
upon own programme expenditure only through their impact on other programme need and that they do
not have a direct effect on own programme expenditure.
The outcome and expenditure equations for any given programme may contain different instrumental
variables because these instruments are trying to predict different variables (own programme expenditure
and other programme mortality respectively). In addition, the instrument set for, say, the expenditure
equation may vary across programmes because the other programme need variable will reflect need in a
different basket of programmes for each expenditure equation.
15 Whilst need is a function of mortality/morbidity in the resource allocation formula, the relationship is not
sufficiently strong enough for us to be concerned about the endogeneity of the need in any individual care
programme.
16 IV estimation of say, equation 3.6, involves a first-stage regression of the endogenous expenditure variable, x, on the
instrument, z, and the set of exogenous regressors in equation 3.6, n. Predictions, xො, from this model can then be
included in a second-stage regression of equation 3.6 as a replacement for the endogenous regressor, x.
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We have a number of potential instruments available, mostly derived from 2001 Population Census. In
previous studies, we have often found that a small sub-set (four) of these instruments often proved
sufficient to generate plausible results. However, if plausible results were not obtainable with some
combination of these four instruments, we employed an extended instrument set. Further details of the
identification of suitable instruments for each model can be found in Section B7.3 of Appendix B.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics for the instrumental and other variables
Description Obs Mean
Std.
Dev. Min Max
Proportion of residents born outside the European Union 151 0.0794 0.0876 0.0088 0.3817
Proportion of population in white ethnic group 151 0.8927 0.1299 0.3942 0.9926
Proportion of population of working age (16-74) with LLT illness 151 0.1182 0.0250 0.0709 0.1798
Proportion of population providing unpaid care 151 0.0990 0.0118 0.0662 0.1221
Proportion of population providing unpaid care (<20 hrs week) 151 0.0667 0.0079 0.0461 0.0817
Proportion of population providing unpaid care (20-49 hrs week) 151 0.0113 0.0025 0.0065 0.0195
Proportion of population providing unpaid care (>50 hrs week) 151 0.0210 0.0051 0.0093 0.0353
Proportion of population aged 16-74 with no qualifications 151 0.2960 0.0642 0.1301 0.4555
Proportion of population aged 16-74 that are full-time students 151 0.0720 0.0270 0.0425 0.1626
Proportion of households without a car 151 0.2932 0.1046 0.1325 0.5761
Proportion of owner occupied households 151 0.6692 0.1128 0.2891 0.8205
Proportion of households in rented social (LA/HA) housing 151 0.2071 0.0918 0.0817 0.5356
Proportion of households in rented private housing 151 0.0924 0.0449 0.0349 0.2961
Proportion of lone pensioner households 151 0.1434 0.0184 0.0979 0.1942
Proportion of one parent households 151 0.0684 0.0180 0.0401 0.1207
Proportion of population aged 16-74 that are permanently sick 151 0.0574 0.0213 0.0242 0.1215
Proportion of population aged 16-74 are long-term unemployed 151 0.0113 0.0052 0.0036 0.0287
Proportion of 16-74 in employment that are in agriculture 151 0.0117 0.0119 0.0016 0.0668
Proportion of those aged 16-74 that are in professional occupations 151 0.2672 0.0688 0.1470 0.4958
Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007 151 23.8098 9.1168 8.0857 48.2627
Need index (incorporates CARAN formula) 151 1.0253 0.1334 0.7311 1.3479
MFF index for HCHS and prescribing 151 1.0021 0.0559 0.9410 1.1243
Diabetes prevalence rate 2007/8 (%, over 17 years) 151 5.4872 0.7982 3.22 8.51
Epilepsy prevalence rate 2007/8 (%, over 18 years) 151 0.7884 0.1489 0.41 1.09
HIV need index 151 1.1848 1.4984 0.1648 8.3332
Chronic kidney disease 2007/8 (%, over 18 years) 151 4.1687 1.2711 1.35 8.41
Maternity need index 151 1.0345 0.2106 0.6845 1.8129
Raw (unadjusted) population 2007/8 151 335,735 196,501 90,142 1,264,298
Note: these statistics are unweighted across PCTs and reflect the values for these variables as available for the
regression analysis of PB expenditure data for 2007/8 and for 2008/9.
Sources: Population Census 2001, Department of Health (2009), NHS Information Centre website.
The available instruments reflect factors, such as socio-economic deprivation and the availability of
informal care in the community, which might indirectly impact upon mortality rates and/or health care
expenditure levels. The set of instruments associated with each estimated equation was selected on both
technical and pragmatic grounds. From a pragmatic point of view, we require a parsimonious set of
instruments that satisfy the necessary technical criteria. These are, firstly, that they have face validity, that is,
that they are plausible determinants of the endogenous variable being instrumented, and secondly, that the
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instruments are both relevant and valid. The relevance of an instrument set refers to its ability to predict
the endogenous variable of concern, whereas validity refers to the requirement that instruments should be
uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest.
Should the instrument set be strong, relevant and valid, 2SLS will produce consistent estimates of the
parameters of the reduced form models. We subject the instrument sets to tests for validity using the
Sargan-Hansen test of over identifying restrictions.[81] The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are
valid instruments, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term, and that the instruments are correctly
excluded from the outcome equation of interest. A rejection of the null hypothesis casts doubt on the
validity of the instruments. We test for instrument relevance using Sheas [82] partial R-squared measure;
this reflects the correlation between the excluded instruments and the endogenous regressor. However,
even where valid and relevant, a non-zero but small correlation between the set of instruments and the
endogenous regressors can lead to the problem of weak instruments, again rendering IV estimation biased.
We test for the presence of weak instruments using the procedures set out in Stock and Yogo[83] and the
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic. A general test of model specification is provided through the use of
Ramseys[84] reset test for OLS and an adapted version of the test for instrumental variables[85].
Finally, we check that the presumed endogenous variable is in fact endogenous using the test proposed by
Durbin.[86] If the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected, then we revert to using OLS. While, in
general, our instruments pass the appropriate statistical tests, some commentators claim that such tests
may have low power to and hence may fail to reject the validity of the instruments when this is false in
small samples. Consequently in Section B9 of Appendix B we examine how sensitive our results are to the
relaxation of the assumption that the instruments are valid.
Further details of our approach to IV estimation are set out in Appendix B.
3.6 Results
The work presented here builds on previous studies of the link between expenditure and health outcomes.
Martin, Rice and Smith[63] reported outcome elasticities for two programmes (cancer and circulatory
disease) using expenditure data for 2004/5 and pooled mortality data for 2002, 2003, and 2004.17 This work
was extended in a subsequent study[66] to include several other programme and updated expenditure data
(2005/6). However, the authors struggled to obtain sensible outcome models for some programmes of
care. Attempts to improve model estimates by considering alternating measures of the population need for
health care18 and an extended set of potential instrumental variables are presented in Section B7 of
Appendix B. This work forms the basis for the set of key results from the empirical modelling of health
care expenditures and outcomes using more contemporaneous data presented in the following sections.
Details of all results presented are set out in Appendix B.
3.6.1 2006/7 expenditure data and mortality data for 2006/2008
This section presents results that relate expenditure in 2006 to mortality in the same year and in the two
following years (i.e., in 2006, 2007 and 2008). Throughout our measure of the need for health care is
derived from the Department of Healths resource allocation model based on the CARAN needs
formula.[87] This represents a more up-to-date needs adjustment than the AREA based model[88] that has
17 Note that the mortality data precedes expenditure in these models. This was due to data limitations at the time of
the study.
18 Initial modelling work employed the Department of Healths resource allocation model of the need for health care
based on the AREA report (Department of Health, 2005c). Subsequent refinements and updates to this model
employed the implementation of the CARAN model (Department of Health, 2009) and the initial findings of a Person
Based Resource Allocation study (Dixon et al, 2011). The use of these alternative models for the need for health care
was explored.
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been applied in previous studies[63, 66] and is directly applicable to the 152 PCTs in existence in the
2006/7 expenditure year. Expenditure data has been adjusted for differences in input prices using the
market forces factors (MFFs for HCHS and prescribing).19 The outcome and expenditure results for the big
four programmes are shown in Table 3.4 with the relevant outcome and expenditure elasticities highlighted.
In all four outcome models expenditure has a significant negative effect on mortality and the all service
measure of need has a significant positive effect. The squared value of the measure of need is also positive
and significant in the cancer outcome equation. In the respiratory outcome model, there is an additional
indicator of need  the proportion of the population that are permanently sick  and this is both positive
and statistically significant. The diagnostic statistics suggest that, in all four cases, own programme
expenditure is endogenous and that the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are
relevant. There is no evidence that the instruments are weak in three of the four outcome results. The
Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no evidence of model mis-specification.
However, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic for the respiratory disease outcome model is 7.022 and this is less
than the critical target of 10.0. This indicates that the instruments may be weak and not good predictors
of the programme expenditure. However, if we re-estimate this model having dropped the least significant
instrument, the coefficient on own programme expenditure becomes -2.622 and is significant at the 1%
level. Moreover, there is now no evidence of weak instruments (the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 11.025)
and it is this coefficient that we use for the respiratory outcome model in the cost of a life year calculations
below.
In three of the four expenditure models both the need and budget variables have a positive and significant
effect on own programme expenditure. In addition, the proxy for need in other programmes is negative
and significant in all four cases. The diagnostic statistics suggest that, for all four expenditure models,
expenditure is endogenous and the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are
relevant and there is no evidence that the instruments are weak. The Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there
is no evidence of model misspecification.
19 An exception to this is expenditure on GMS/PMS (PBC23a) which is adjusted using the GMS/PMS market forces
factor.
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Table 3.4: Outcome and expenditure models for the big four programmes using spend data for 2006/7 (two MFFs) and mortality data for 2006/7/8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13
cancer cancer circulation circulation respiratory respiratory gastro gastro
outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model
own programme spend per head -0.342*** -1.434*** -2.029*** -1.536***
[0.099] [0.218] [0.636] [0.468]
need CARAN per head 0.995*** 1.626*** 2.860*** 2.306*** 2.696*** 1.449*** 4.160*** 2.040***
[0.106] [0.343] [0.252] [0.372] [1.044] [0.331] [0.577] [0.378]
need CARAN per head squared 1.163*** 2.451
[0.348] [1.561]
SYLLR all deaths exclude cancer -0.855***
[0.191]
PCT budget per head 0.465 0.540* 0.679*** 0.446*
[0.300] [0.299] [0.251] [0.263]
SYLLR all deaths exc circulatory -1.666***
[0.295]
permanently sick 0.759**
[0.367]
SYLLR all deaths exc respiratory -0.672**
[0.305]
SYLLR all deaths exclude gastro -1.206***
[0.314]
lone pensioner households
Constant 6.501*** 5.913*** 11.413*** 10.696*** 13.756*** 3.346 9.719*** 8.370***
[0.436] [2.815] [1.046] [2.379] [3.279] [2.075] [2.009] [2.299]
Endogeneity test statistic 13.695 19.421 42.548 24.461 17.687 8.439 16.373 15.211
Endogeneity p-value 0.000215 1.05e-05 6.90e-11 7.58e-07 2.60e-05 0.00367 5.20e-05 9.61e-05
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.685 0.021 0.949 1.262 1.462 0.302 2.761 0.0164
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.408 0.084 0.814 0.261 0.227 0.583 0.0966 0.0898
Shea's partial R-squared 0.164 0.445 0.300 0.296 0.0785 0.327 0.140 0.356
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 17.85 41.88 32.37 32.02 10.02 34.98 14.86 35.72
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0.000133 8.04e-10 1.61e-06 1.11e-07 0.00666 2.54e-08 0.000592 1.75e-08
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.28 56.69 17.14 31.84 7.022 20.94 11.63 22.40
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.00537 0.18 0.136 0.00349 0.0120 1.497 1.669 0.007
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.942 0.668 0.712 0.953 0.913 0.221 0.196 0.935
Note: robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.6.1.1 Cost of a life year
The outcome and expenditure elasticities presented in Table 3.4 can be used to calculate the cost of a life
year in each programme. These calculations -- for both the big four programmes as well as for the other
six programmes with mortality based outcome indicator -- are shown in Table 3.5. The cost of a life
(year) estimates presented in Table 3.5 assume a 1% increase in each PCTs budget and are calculated
as:
the cost of an additional life in a particular programme
= the change in expenditure in that programme / the change in mortality in that programme
= (annual spend * expenditure elasticity) / (annual mortality * outcome elasticity
* expenditure elasticity)
and
the cost of an additional life year in a particular programme
= the change in expenditure in that programme / the change in life years lost in that programme
= (annual spend * expenditure elasticity) / (annual life years lost * outcome elasticity
* expenditure elasticity)
To illustrate this calculation let us calculate the cost of a life year for, say, the cancer programme. The
annual spend on cancer in 2006/7 is £4,122m and the expenditure elasticity for the programme is 0.465
so that the change in expenditure associated with a 1% increase in each PCTs budget is £19.1673m
(=1%*£4,122m*0.465). The total number of life years lost to cancer for 2006, 2007, and 2008 totals
2,207,021 life years and so the average annual loss is 735,674 life years. The outcome elasticity for the
cancer programme is 0.342 and the expenditure elasticity is 0.465 so the reduction in the number of life
years lost associated with a 1% increase in each PCTs budget is 1,170 (=1%*735,674 life
years*0.342*0.465). The cost of an additional life year is therefore £19.1673m (the change in
expenditure in the programme) divided by 1,170 (the reduction in the number of life years lost), and
this equals £16,383.
An integral part of the calculation of the cost of a life year is the annual mortality (life years lost) figure
associated with a particular programme. Ideally, the ICD10 coverage of the expenditure data should
coincide with that of the mortality data. However, as shown in Table B5.1 of Appendix B, the ICD10
coverage of the mortality data typically falls short of that for the expenditure data. Unless we adjust
the annual mortality figure so that its ICD10 coverage approximates that of the expenditure data, our
cost of life (year) estimates will be too large because they will underestimate the mortality gain.
Table 3.5 reports cost of a life year estimates both with and without this adjustment for ICD 10
coverage. Having incorporated this adjustment, the results show that the cost of a life year for the big
four PBCs is estimated as £10,604 and, for all ten programmes with a mortality outcome measure, the
estimate is £19,965. For all programmes, assuming a zero gain for the 13 PBCs without an outcome
indicator, the corresponding estimate is £73,457.
If we assume that PBC23 (largely primary care) generates a zero health gain (because the gains from
primary care are already reflected in the mortality rates for disease specific programmes) and that the
gain attributable to the remaining 12 programmes is, on average, the same as that attributable to those
with a mortality outcome measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes is £22,565.20
20 Refer to Appendix B, Table B8.23.
30
3.6.1.2 Non-PCT Department of Health funded expenditure
PCT expenditure accounts for a large proportion of Department of Health expenditure but PCTs do not
account for the Departments entire budget. In 2006/7 the Department of Healths gross expenditure
totalled £83.5bn. Charges raised £3.4bn so net expenditure totalled £80.1bn. Of this net expenditure,
PCTs accounted for £67.3bn (that is, 84%) and various other bodies accounted for the remaining
£12.8bn. A breakdown of this gross and net expenditure by major body is shown in Table B8.24 of
Appendix B. The Department of Health has allocated net non-PCT expenditure across the 23 PBCs. Of
the additional £12bn of net expenditure, £11.2bn (93%) has been allocated to PBC23. This largely
reflects: (a) the allocation of almost all Strategic Health Authority expenditure to either PBC23B (other:
SHAs including workforce development committees) or PBC23X (other: miscellaneous), and (b) the
allocation of almost two-thirds of Department of Health expenditure to PBC23X (other: miscellaneous).
The remaining £0.8bn of additional net expenditure is spread across all PBCs according to various
allocation rules and although this approach avoids allocating expenditure to the Other: Miscellaneous
category, this allocation of expenditure does not necessarily reflect actual expenditure.
The cost of a life (year) estimates presented above are based on the impact of a 1% exogenous change in
total net PCT spend. All of our outcome and expenditure models have been estimated using net PCT
expenditure, and all of our elasticities relate to this expenditure. Implicitly we assume that any budgetary
shock only affects PCT funding and that it leaves non-PCT funding unchanged. Suppose instead we
assume a 1% exogenous change in the Departmental budget. We have no information on how this
Departmental budgetary shock is likely to be split between PCT and non-PCTs budgets. One might
assume that the non-PCT budget is as responsive to a Departmental budgetary shock as is the PCT
budget. If this was the case then it would add 17.7% to our cost of a life year estimate for 2006/7.
However, in the absence of any information about the responsiveness of the non-PCT budget, it is
difficult to come to any firm conclusion about the impact of non-PCT expenditure on our cost of a life
year estimates.
3.6.2 2007/8 expenditure data and mortality data for 2007/2009
Outcome and expenditure models were estimated using updated data for expenditure (from 2006/7 to
2007/8) and updated mortality data (from 2006/2007/2008 to 2007/2008 /2009). Appendix B, Section
B10 presents detailed discussion of the findings including tables of results.
3.6.2.1 Outcome models
As before we model outcome as a function of own programme expenditure and a measure of health care
need, where the latter is proxied by the measure of need as employed by the Department of Health for
resource allocation purposes.21 There are, however, a few exceptions. For the respiratory programme we
further included the square of the measure of need to improve model fit. In some other PBCs we found
that the all service measure of need performed poorly and we replaced or supplemented this measure with
either a more programme specific measure (e.g., the epilepsy prevalence rate for neurological mortality) or
with a better performing proxy for need (e.g., the percentage of residents born outside the EU for
maternity/neonate mortality). These amendments improved model specification22. Full results for all
programmes are presented in Table B10.1 Appendix B; below is a summary of the findings.
Two sets of models were estimated for three (for cancer, respiratory problems and gastro-intestinal
problems) of the big four programmes. One of the two models used two instruments and so we report
21 Using the CARAN model (Department of Health (2009).
22 In addition to respiratory and neurological programmes the other programmes where the all service measure of
need was replaced are: endocrine: IMD07 and diabetes prevalence rate; genitor-urinary: lone parent households;
infectious diseases: IMD07 and HIV need per head and its square; maternity and neonates: proportion born outside
EU and proportion of population with no qualification aged 16 to 74. For trauma and injuries, the all service
measure of need was supplemented with the proportion of households without a car and proportion of full time
students.
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the instrument validity test statistic. In all three cases we failed to reject the null hypothesis of instrument
validity. However, there is some evidence of weak instruments (at least in the respiratory and gastro-
intestinal programmes) and if we dropped one instrument and re-estimated the model, evidence of
instrument weakness disappeared. The removal of one instrument has little impact on the coefficient on
expenditure and it is this coefficient that we use below in our cost of a life year calculations reported in
Table 3.5.
For the big four programmes the need variable has a positive and significant effect on mortality, and
expenditure has the anticipated negative effect. The diagnostic statistics reveal that, in all four PBCs, own
programme expenditure is endogenous and that the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the
instruments are relevant and there is no evidence that they are weak in the models with one excluded
instrument. The Pesaran-Taylor test reveals no evidence of model miss-specification.
The outcome results for the other programmes are similar to but more diverse than those for the big four
programmes. This is to be anticipated because mortality is a much rarer outcome in these programmes
than it is in the big four programmes. Own programme expenditure is not endogenous in four of these
programmes but we retain the IV estimator for three of these four because this yields more plausible
results than the OLS estimator (the results are more plausible in the sense that the signs on the
coefficients are more in line with our prior expectations)23.
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the endocrine problems programme but
this is not statistically significant. The all service measure of need is not relevant for this PBC; instead, we
find that the diabetes prevalence rate is positively associated with mortality, as is a measure of deprivation
(the IMD2007).
Mortality from epilepsy is negatively and significantly associated with expenditure in the neurological
programme. Both the all service need for health care and the epilepsy prevalence rate are positively and
significantly associated with mortality in this programme.
Expenditure has a negative and statistically significant effect on mortality (from renal problems) in the
genitor-urinary problems programme. The prevalence of lone parent households is positively associated
with mortality.
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the infectious disease programme and this
is statistically significant. The all service measure of need is not relevant for this PBC; instead, we find
that a measure of need associated with HIV is positively associated with mortality, as is a measure of
deprivation (the IMD2007).
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the maternity & neonates programme but
the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. In this PBC the generic all service measure of need
has been replaced with two other indicators of deprivation  the proportion of residents born outside the
EU and the proportion of those aged 16-74 without any qualifications  both of these are positively
associated with mortality.
Finally, expenditure and need have the anticipated effects on mortality in the trauma and injuries
programme. In addition, the proportion of households without access to a car is negatively associated
with mortality from fractures (perhaps access to a car facilitates involvement in serious road traffic
accidents), and the proportion of residents that are students is positively associated with mortality from
fractures.
The relevant statistical test suggests that expenditure is endogenous in six of the ten programmes but we
have retained the IV estimates for three of the other four programmes because they provide plausible
results. The Hansen-Sargen test suggests that the selected instruments are valid, and the Kleibergen-Paap
LM statistic suggests that they are relevant (i.e., correlated with the endogenous regressor). With the
23 The four programmes are: endocrine, infectious diseases, maternity/neonates and trauma/injuries.
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possible exception of the trauma and injuries programme, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic suggests that we
do not have a problem with weak instruments.24 Finally, the Pesaran-Taylor/Ramsey reset test statistics
reveal no evidence of misspecification.
3.6.2.2 Expenditure models
The majority of the expenditure models contain the three variables: the PCT budget, a proxy for the own
programme need for health care, and a proxy for the need for health care in other programmes. The
budget term is positive in all eleven models and it is statistically significant in eight of these eleven models.
The usual proxy for the own programme need for health care (i.e., the all service measure of need) is
present in six of the models and it is significant in five of them. Its presence is supplemented with the
addition of its squared value to improve model fit in the respiratory problems programme. In some
programmes (e.g., the endocrine, metabolic & nutritional programme and the neurological programme)25,
we have replaced and/or supplemented the all service measure of need with a more programme specific
measure (e.g., the diabetes prevalence rate and the epilepsy prevalence rate) and these measures of need
have the anticipated positive impact on expenditure.
In addition, in a couple of other programmes we have used alternative proxies for the own programme
need (e.g., with the use of the Department of Healths measure of maternity need in the
maternity/neonates expenditure equation). Full results for all programmes are presented in Table B10.2
Appendix B; below is a summary of the findings.
For eight of the eleven programmes we have used the all cause mortality rate less own programme
mortality rate as the proxy for the need for health care in other programmes, and the coefficient on this
term is negative in seven programmes and statistically significant in six of the seven. In three programmes
-- maternity/neonates, GMS/PMS and trauma & injuries programmes -- we have used the all cause
mortality rate as the proxy for the need for health care in other programmes due to difficulties associated
with the measurement of the own programme mortality rate. The coefficient on this term is not
significant in any of the three models.
The relevant statistical test suggests that expenditure is endogenous in six of the eleven programmes but
we have retained the IV estimates for two other programmes (GMS/PMS and trauma & injuries) because
the IV estimator provides more plausible results. In the other three programmes we report OLS results.
The Hansen-Sargen test suggests that the selected instruments are valid, and the Kleibergen-Paap LM
statistic suggests that they are relevant (i.e., correlated with the endogenous regressor). The Kleibergen-
Paap F statistic suggests that we do not have a problem with weak instruments. Finally, the Pesaran-
Taylor reset test statistics and the Ramsey reset F statistics reveal no evidence of model misspecification.
3.6.2.3 Calculation of the cost of a life and life year
Expenditure and outcome elasticities for preferred models are used to calculate the cost of a life year,
both for individual programmes and for all programmes collectively. The relevant figures are summarised
in Table 3.5.26 The cost per life year gained is £13,830 for the big four programmes and £28,983 for all
ten programmes with a mortality-based outcome indicator. These represent 30% and 45% increases on
the respective costs for the previous year (i.e., using expenditure data for 2006/7 and mortality data for
2006/2007/2008).
24 The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is very close to the target value of ten for both the genitor-urinary and infectious
diseases outcome models.
25 These are endocrine: all service measure of need and diabetes prevalence rate; neurological: epilepsy prevalence;
GMS/PMS: proportion of lone pensioner households; trauma/injuries: proportion of population working in
agriculture.
26 Full details of these calculations can be found in Tables B10.3 and B10.4 of Appendix B.
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If we assume that the other 13 programmes (all without a mortality based outcome indicator) offer no
health gain, then the cost per life year across all PCT expenditure is £82,765. This is up from £73,457
using data for the previous year (an increase of 13%).
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Table 3.5: Cost of life year estimates by PBC for PCT expenditure in 2006/7, 2007/8 and 2008/9
Expenditure 2006/07
Outcome 2006/08
Expenditure 2007/08
Outcome 2007/09
Expenditure 2008/09
Outcome 2008/10
PBC description
Spend (£m)
2006/7
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2006/08
Cost per life
year gained (£)
Cost per life year
gained adj for
YLL coverage
(£)
Spend (£m)
2007/8
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2007/09
Cost per life year
gained (£)
Cost per life
year gained
adj for YLL
coverage (£)
Spend (£m)
2008/9
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2008/10
Cost per life year
gained (£)
Cost per life year
gained adj for
YLL coverage
(£)
Cancer £4,122 2,207,021 £16,383 £16,121 £4,573 2,189,685 £17,165 £16,891 £4,843 2,170,660 £21,802 £21,454
Circulatory problems £6,161 1,361,634 £9,466 £9,390 £6,325 1,313,223 £11,315 £11,224 £6,655 1,285,026 £11,779 £11,685
Respiratory problems £3,285 324,223 £11,593 £8,961 £3,431 315,457 £14,798 £11,439 £3,994 311,034 £21,307 £16,470
Gastro-intestinal problems £3,700 345,908 £20,892 £11,929 £3,805 343,355 £25,034 £14,295 £3,989 341,884 £25,662 £14,653
Big four programmes summary: £17,268 4,238,786 £12,333 £10,604 £18,134 4,161,720 £16,345 £13,830 £19,481 4,108,604 £16,688 £14,650
Infectious diseases £1,053 106,552 £630,798 £630,798 £1,119 106,092 £57,742 £57,742 £1,201 100,078 £71,432 £71,432
Endocrine problems £1,852 57,672 £114,416 £72,539 £1,997 55,492 £190,745 £120,932 £2,222 54,779 £104,008 £65,941
Neurological problems £2,790 66,137 £1,129,960 £153,675 £3,165 64,873 £431,749 £58,718 £3,466 64,222 £388,267 £52,804
Genito-urinary problems £3,482 10,030 £20,421,090 £3,512,427 £3,439 8,529 £652,096 £112,160 £3,779 8,004 £877,038 £150,851
Trauma & injuries* £2,892 30,000 n/a n/a £2,918 21,273 £1,115,197 £195,159 £3,255 6,881 #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Maternity & neonates* £3,574 492,600 £45,158 £30,662 £3,662 489,170 £204,168 £138,630 £3,978 479,905 £198,939 £135,080
Other six programmes summary: £15,643 762,991 £258,046 £146,108 £16,300 745,429 £274,309 £99,428 £17,901 £713,869 £254,794 £112,674
All ten programmes summary: £32,911 5,001,777 £23,780 £19,965 £34,434 4,907,149 £38,110 £28,983 £37,382 4,822,473 £38,328 £30,883
Other 13 programmes summary: £34,985 £39,223 £41,016
All 23 programmes £67,896 £87,494 £73,457 £73,657 £108,829 £82,765 £78,398 £105,460 £84,974
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In addition, if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the gain attributable to the
remaining 12 programmes is, on average, the same as that attributable to those with a mortality outcome
measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes is £31,846 (it was £22,565 using data for the
previous year).
The next section presents outcome and expenditure models using PB data for 2008/9 and mortality data
for 2008/9/10, and it explores the reasons for the increase in the cost of an additional life year identified
in this section.
3.6.3 2008/9 expenditure data and mortality data for 2008/2010
Outcome and expenditure models were estimated using updated data for expenditure (from 2007/8 to
2008/9) and updated mortality data (from 2007/2008/2009 to 2008/2009/2010). Detailed results for the
outcome model and expenditure model are shown in Tables B11.1 and B11.2, Appendix B respectively.
First stage regressions for these IV models can be found in Tables BA.9 and BA.10 in the annex to
Appendix B.
3.6.3.1 Outcome models
The majority of the outcome models contain the two variables: own programme expenditure and a
measure of the need for health care (the measure of need as employed by the Department of Health for
resource allocation purposes27). For the respiratory disease programme we have added the square of the
need measure to improve the model fit. In other PBCs (e.g., for the endocrine, metabolic and nutritional
programme), we found that the all service measure of need performed poorly and we have replaced it
with a more programme specific measure (e.g., the diabetes prevalence rate) or with a better performing
proxy for need (e.g., the percentage of residents born outside the EU for maternity/neonate mortality).28
The relevant statistical test suggests that expenditure is endogenous in six of the ten programmes but we
have retained the IV estimates for the other four because they provide plausible results. The Hansen-
Sargen test suggests that the selected instruments are valid, and the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic suggests
that they are relevant (i.e., correlated with the endogenous regressor). The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic
suggests that we do not have a problem with weak instruments. Finally, the Pesaran-Taylor reset test
statistics reveal no evidence of misspecification.
In all of the big four programmes the need for health care variable has a positive and significant effect on
mortality, and expenditure has the anticipated negative effect. As we have noted before, the outcome
results for the other programmes are similar to but more diverse than those for the big four programmes.
This is to be anticipated because mortality is a much rarer outcome in these programmes than it is in the
big four programmes.
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the endocrine problems programme and
this is statistically significant. The all service measure of need is not relevant for this PBC; instead, we
find that the diabetes prevalence rate is positively associated with mortality, as is a measure of deprivation
(the IMD2007).
Expenditure has a negative but statistically insignificant impact on mortality from epilepsy in the
neurological programme, and the all service indicator of the need for health care is positively and
significantly associated with mortality in this programme.
27 The CARAN measure of service need.
28 The amendments are: respiratory diseases: all service need and all service need squared; endocrine: IMD07 and
diabetes prevalence rate; genitor-urinary: lone parent households; infectious diseases: IMD07 and HIV need per
head and its square; maternity and neonates: all service need and proportion born outside EU and proportion of
population with no qualification aged 16 to 74.
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Expenditure also has a negative but not statistically significant effect on mortality (from renal problems)
in the genitor-urinary problems programme. The prevalence of lone parent households is positively
associated with mortality.
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the infectious disease programme and this
is statistically significant. The all service measure of need is not relevant for this PBC; instead, we find
that a measure of need associated with HIV is positively associated with mortality, as is a measure of
deprivation (the IMD2007).
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the maternity & neonates programme. In
this PBC the coefficient on the generic all service measure of need is positive but not significant. It has
been supplemented with two other indicators of deprivation  the proportion of residents born outside
the EU and the proportion of those aged 16-74 without any qualifications  and both of these are
positively associated with mortality.
Finally, we were unable to develop a plausible outcome model for the trauma and injuries programme.
3.6.3.2 Expenditure models
The majority of expenditure models contain the three variables: the PCT budget, a proxy for the own
programme need for health care, and a proxy for the need for health care in other programmes.
The budget term is positive and statistically significant in ten of the eleven models.
The usual proxy for the own programme need for health care (i.e., the all service measure of need) is
positive and significant in five of the eleven results. In a couple of programmes (respiratory disease and
endocrine problems) we have added the squared value of need to improve the model fit and in both cases
this term is positive and significant. In some programmes (e.g., the endocrine PBC and the neurological
PBC), we have replaced and/or supplemented the all service measure of need with a more programme
specific measure (e.g., the diabetes and the epilepsy prevalence rates) and these usually have a positive and
significant impact on expenditure. In addition, in a couple of programmes we have used alternative
proxies for own programme need (e.g., with the use of the Department of Healths measure of maternity
need in the maternity/neonates expenditure equation and the use of HIV need in the infectious diseases
programme).29
For eight of the eleven programmes we have used the all cause mortality rate less the own programme
mortality rate as the proxy for the need for health care in other programmes, and the coefficient on this
term is negative in seven programmes and statistically significant in six of the seven. In three
programmes -- maternity/neonates, GMS/PMS and trauma & injuries programmes -- we have used the
all cause mortality rate as the proxy for the need for health care in other programmes due to difficulties
associated with the measurement of the own programme mortality rate. The coefficient on this term is
negative but not significant in these three models.
The relevant statistical test suggests that expenditure is endogenous in five of the eleven programmes but
we have retained the IV estimates for two further programmes (endocrine problems and
maternity/neonates) because the IV estimator provides more plausible results than the OLS estimator. In
the other four programmes we report OLS results.
29 These are infectious diseases: HIV need and its square; endocrine: all service measure of need, its square and
diabetes prevalence rate; genitor-urinary: all service measure of need and proportion of residence born outside EU;
maternity/neonates: maternity measure of need; GMS/PMS: all service measure of need, proportion of residents
reporting permanent sickness (16yrs  74yrs), proportion of lone pensioner households and proportion in
professional occupations; trauma/injuries: proportion of population working in agriculture.
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The Hansen-Sargen test suggests that the selected instruments are valid, and the Kleibergen-Paap LM
statistic suggests that they are relevant (i.e., correlated with the endogenous regressor). The Kleibergen-
Paap F statistic suggests that we do not have a problem with weak instruments. Finally, the Pesaran-
Taylor reset test statistics and the Ramsey reset F statistics reveal no evidence of model misspecification.
3.6.3.3 Calculation of the cost of a life and life year
Expenditure and outcome elasticities for our preferred models are used to calculate the cost of a life year,
both for individual programmes and for all programmes collectively. This results in the cost per life year
gained having increased slightly compared with that using the previous expenditure and mortality data set
(i.e., for 2007 and 2007/8/9 respectively): increasing from £13,830 to £14,650 for the big four
programmes and from £28,983 to £30,883 for all ten programmes with a mortality-based outcome
indicator. If we assume that the other 13 programmes offer no health gain, then the cost per life year
across all PCT expenditure has increased from £82,765 in 2007/8 to £84,974 in 2008/9.
In addition, if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the gain attributable to the
remaining 12 programmes is, on average, the same as that attributable to those with a mortality outcome
measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes in 2008/9 is £33,333. This is a 5% increase on
the figure (£31,846) for the previous year.
3.6.4 Comparing the cost of life year estimates associated with different data sets
Table 3.6 presents expenditure and outcome elasticities for the five combinations of expenditure and
outcome data that have been used to estimate our model. It also reports the corresponding unadjusted
cost of life year estimates (i.e., estimates that are unadjusted for the mismatch in the ICD10 coverage of
the expenditure and mortality data). It is clear from this Table (see row 13) that the (unadjusted) cost of a
life year for the ten programmes with a mortality based outcome indicator fluctuated around £22,000 for
the first three sets of estimations (see columns M-O). However, using the two most recent sets of
expenditure data (i.e., for 2007/8 and then for 2008/9), the figures in the table suggest that this cost has
increased to about £38,000.
What are the proximate causes of this increase? Recall that the cost of a life year is calculated as
the change in expenditure associated with a 1% budget increase
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
the change in the number of life years lost associated with this increase
For 2006/7 (using mortality data for 2006/7/8) and for the ten programmes with a mortality based
outcome indicator, the change in expenditure associated with a 1% budget increase is £184.53m and the
change in the number of life years lost associated with this increase is 7,760 (see Table B8.21 in the
appendix for the calculation of these figures). Thus the cost of a life year is £23,780 (=£184.53m/7,760).
For 2007/8 (using mortality data for 2007/8/9) and for the ten programmes with a mortality based
outcome indicator, the change in expenditure associated with a 1% budget increase is £257.94m and the
change in the number of life years lost associated with this increase is 6,768 (see Table B10.3 in the
appendix for the calculation of these figures). Thus the cost of a life year is £38,110 (=£257.94m/6,768).
It is clear that the 60% increase in the cost of a life year between 2006/7 and 2007/8 is largely attributable
(a) to the 40% increase in the additional expenditure (up from £184.53m to £257.94m) directed towards
these ten programmes following a 1% budget increase and (b) to the 12% decline in the number of life
years saved by this increase in expenditure (down from 7,760 to 6,768 life years).
The rise in the share of the budget increase directed towards these programmes can be attributed to the
increase in the implied expenditure elasticity associated with these ten programmes (up from 0.561 to
0.749). The decrease in the number of years of life saved appears to be due (a) to an overall reduction in
the (absolute) size of the outcome elasticities and (b) to a shift in the additional expenditure towards those
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programmes with a relatively high cost of a life year. For example, the cost of a life year for the small six
programmes is much larger than for the big four programmes. However, in 2007/8 the spend elasticity
for the small six increases from 0.561 to 0.961 (71%) while the expenditure elasticity for the big four rises
from 0.528 to 0.559 (6%). A similar pattern  of additional expenditure shifting away from the low cost
PBCs  can be seen within the big four programmes. However, it is not clear why such rather dramatic
changes should have taken place.
If we correct the cost of life year estimates adjusting for the mismatch in the ICD10 coverage of the
expenditure and mortality data, these reveal similar increases in the cost of a life year between 2006/7 on
the one hand and 2007/8 and 2008/9 on the other. The cost of a life year increased from £19,965 in
2006/7 to £28,983 in 2007/8 for the ten programmes with mortality rate, an increase of 45%; and it
increased from £22,565 to £31,846 for all programmes if we assume a zero health gain in PBC23 and the
same gain in the other 12 programmes as in the ten with a mortality rate (an increase of 41%).
A potential reason for this apparent step change in the cost of a life year is the adjustment that was made
to the methodology for the collection of the 2007/8 programme budgeting data. In previous years
expenditure that was not directly attributable to a particular programme category was apportioned using
admitted patient care percentages.30 In other words, if x% of total admitted patient care expenditure was
allocated to PBC 1, then x% of all expenditure that was not directly attributable to a particular
programme category was also allocated to PBC 1. With effect from 2007/8, however, NHS organisations
were asked to select an appropriate basis for the apportionment of this non-programme specific
expenditure and that, where no reasonable basis existed, such expenditure was to be allocated to the
Other  Miscellaneous (PBC 23X) category.
The Department of Health estimates that this allocation rule change increased the amount of expenditure
attributed to PBC 23X by £700 million. It will also, of course, have reduced expenditure across other
programmes by the same amount in total. However, not all programmes will have been equally affected;
PBCs that are more heavily inpatient based would have lost expenditure while others, such as learning
disabilities, social care, and mental health, will have lost considerably less. In addition, not all PCTs will
have been equally affected because each will have employed different apportionment rules for the non-
programme specific expenditure.[89]
Although this allocation rule change has considerably increased the estimated cost of a life year, we
believe that this rule change has led to a more accurate allocation of expenditure across PBCs, and that
the more recent estimates of the cost of a life year (for 2007/8 and 2008/9) are more accurate than those
for the earlier years (for 2005/6 and 2006/7).
3.6.5 Adjusting the cost of a life year estimates to constant prices
The estimates of the cost of a life year presented above are all at current prices. To put them on a
constant price basis, we need an index of pay and price inflation for the labour and goods/services
purchased by the NHS. Curtis[90] reports a pay and prices index for Hospital and Community Health
Services and this implies an inflation rate of 3.7% in 2006/7, 2.9% in 2007/8, and 3.9% in 2008/9.31 If
we assume that similar inflation rates also apply to the purchase of pharmaceuticals and the provision of
primary care (items that are excluded from the HCHS index), then we can use these figures to put the
estimates of the cost of a life year on a constant price basis.
30Expenditure on, for example, community care, A&E, ambulance services, and outpatients can be difficult to
attribute to a particular PBC. Critical care, rehabilitation, and specialised commissioning across care settings will
also be difficult to attribute to a particular programme.
31With the index for 1987/8 set equal to 100, then 2005/6=240.9, 2006/7=249.8, 2007/8=257.0, and 2008/9=267.0
(Curtis, 2011, p209).
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For example, if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the gain attributable to the 12
programmes without a mortality indicator is, on average, the same as that attributable to those with a
mortality outcome measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes in 2008/9 is £33,333 at
current (2008/9) prices. The cost for 2007/8 is £31,846 at current (2007/8) prices or £33,088 at constant
(2008/9) prices, and the figure for 2006/7 is £22,565 at current (2006/7) prices or £24,125 at constant
(2008/9) prices. The conversion of the costs from a current to constant price basis has relatively little
impact because the inflation rate over the relevant period is quite small.
40
Table 3.6: Expenditure and outcome elasticities for five combinations of expenditure and outcome data, and corresponding (unadjusted) cost of life
year estimates
A B C D E F G H I J
K L M N O P Q
spend elasticities outcome elasticities cost of an additional life year (unadjusted for YLL coverage)
PBC description
(a) using
spend for
2005 and
mortality
for 2002/4
(b) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2004/6
(c) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2006/8
(d) using
spend for
2007 and
mortality
for 2007/9
(e) using
spend for
2008 and
mortality
for
2008/10
(a) using
spend for
2005 and
mortality
for 2002/4
(b) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2004/6
(c) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2006/8
(d) using
spend for
2007 and
mortality
for 2007/9
(e) using
spend for
2008 and
mortality
for
2008/10
(a) using
spend for
2005 and
mortality
for 2002/4
(b) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2004/6
(c) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2006/8
(d) using
spend for
2007 and
mortality
for 2007/9
(e) using
spend for
2008 and
mortality
for 2008/10
1 Cancer 0.968 0.548 0.465 0.890 0.525 -0.394 -0.337 -0.342 -0.365 -0.307 £13,741 £16,518 £16,383 £17,165 £21,802
2 Circulatory problems 0.682 0.701 0.540 0.293 0.648 -1.370 -1.447 -1.434 -1.277 -1.319 £8,328 £8,725 £9,466 £11,315 £11,779
3 Respiratory problems 0.849 0.718 0.679 0.536 0.652 -1.574 -3.507 -2.622 -2.205 -1.808 £20,601 £8,747 £11,593 £14,798 £21,307
4 Gastro-intestinal problems 0.772 0.667 0.446 0.622 0.456 -2.018 -2.137 -1.536 -1.328 -1.364 £18,303 £15,795 £20,892 £25,034 £25,662
5 All big four PBCs 0.801 0.660 0.528 0.559 0.579 -0.941 -1.083 -0.965 -0.872 -0.825 £12,855 £10,783 £12,333 £16,345 £16,688
6 Infectious diseases 0.742 0.731 0.792 1.436 1.545 -0.152 -0.030 -0.047 -0.548 -0.504 £215,054 £1,036,377 £630,798 £57,742 £71,432
7 Endocrine problems 0.425 0.966 0.953 0.264 0.484 -0.244 -0.812 -0.842 -0.566 -1.170 £371,601 £112,882 £114,416 £190,745 £104,008
8 Neurological problems 1.111 0.648 0.616 1.035 0.98 -0.182 -0.098 -0.112 -0.339 -0.417 £503,201 £1,241,253 £1,129,960 £431,749 £388,267
9 Genito-urinary problems 1.041 0.837 0.912 1.004 0.697 -0.034 -0.073 -0.051 -1.855 -1.615 £29,144,918 £12,384,965 £20,421,090 £652,096 £877,038
10 Trauma & injuries* 0.627 0.617 0.358 1.686 1.344 -1.332 -0.527 0 -0.369 0 £282,132 £548,767 n/a £1,115,197 n/a
11 Maternity & neonates* 0.388 0.601 0.224 0.514 0.975 -0.237 -0.035 -0.482 -0.110 -0.125 £17,490 £631,700 £45,158 £204,168 £198,939
12 All small six PBCs 0.780 0.717 0.596 0.961 0.962 -0.262 -0.122 -0.392 -0.254 -0.300 £295,074 £449,706 £258,046 £274,309 £254,794
13 All 10 PBCs with mortality 0.792 0.687 0.561 0.749 0.762 -0.844 -0.940 -0.877 -0.778 -0.747 £21,256 £20,893 £23,780 £38,110 £38,328
14 All 23 PBCs assuming zero gain in PBCs without mortality indicator £56,799 £62,718 £87,494 £108,829 £105,460
15 GMS/PMS 0.926 0.759 0.739 0.563 0.494 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
16 All 23 PBCs assuming zero gain in PBC 23 but average gain in other PBCs without a mortality indicator £24,200 £23,697 £26,876 £41,875 £41,369
Notes:
L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LHJURXSVSHQGHODVWLFLW\ 3%&VSHQG3%&VSHQGHODVWLFLW\3%&VSHQGDQG
JURXSRXWFRPHHODVWLFLW\ 3%&PRUWDOLW\3%&RXWFRPHHODVWLFLW\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used to calculate directly the cost of a life (year) for a group of PBCs. Instead, the latter should be calculated by summing across the change in spend and the change in mortality for the individual PBCs within the group. For further details see, for example,
Table B8.21 in appendix B.
(ii) for each individual programme: the cost of an additional life year = expenditure elasticity*annual spend/(expenditure elasticity *outcome elasticity*annual life years lost)
LLL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3.7 Summary and concluding remarks
The findings presented in this report build on four previous studies. These studies and the results
presented here draw on the availability of two new data sets to obtain empirical estimates of the
relationship between mortality and expenditure across all English local health authorities.
In this research we have extended the previous studies in several ways. First, we have derived plausible
outcome and expenditure models for a larger number of programmes (ten) than previous studies.
Second, we relate expenditure in time period t to mortality in that period (t) and in the next two periods
(t+1 and t+2). In other words, we assume that the health benefits associated with expenditure occur
either in the same period as the expenditure or in the next two periods. This is an improvement on past
practice where data constraints forced researchers to relate expenditure to the current and two previous
periods.32 When we re-estimated our models using expenditure data for 2006/7 and mortality data for
2006/7/8, we found that the cost of a life year across the ten programmes with a mortality based
outcome indicator is £23,780 (up from £20,893 when expenditure data for 2006/7 is combined with
mortality data for 2004/5/6; an increase of 14%).
Third, we have noted the mismatch in the ICD10 coverage of the expenditure and mortality data. If we
adjust the calculation of the cost of a life year for 2006/7 for this mismatch then the cost of a life year
across the ten programmes with a mortality based outcome indicator declines from £23,780 to £19,965 (a
decrease of 16%).
Fourth, previous estimates of the cost of a life year have been for individual programmes of care. In this
report we have presented estimates of the cost of a life year for an enlarged number of programmes and,
with the aid of assumptions about the productivity (health gain) of programmes without a meaningful
mortality-based outcome indicator, we have extended our individual programme estimates to incorporate
expenditure across all programmes of care. Thus for 2006/7, the cost of a life year for those PBCs with a
mortality based outcome indicator is £19,965. If we assume that (a) that the health gain associated with
PBC23, which includes primary care and workforce training expenditure, are reflected in the mortality
rates for disease specific programmes and (b) that the average health gain across the other programmes
without a mortality based outcome indicator is the same as that for those PBCs with a mortality based
outcome indicator, then the cost of life year across all programmes is £22,565.
Fifth, we have extended our cost of life year estimates beyond 2006/7. Re-estimation of our model using
budgeting expenditure for 2007/8 generates an all programme cost of a life year estimate of £31,846, and
re-estimation of our model using budgeting expenditure for 2008/9 generates a similar cost of a life year
estimate (£33,333). Together, the last two estimates suggest that there has been step change in the cost of
a life year, and that this appears to have occurred between 2006/7 and 2007/8. The cost of a life year
estimates are very similar up to and including 2006/7, and they are very similar for 2007/8 and 2008/9.
However, there is a substantial difference between the figures for 2004/5, 2005/6 and 2006/7 on the one
hand (at about £22k), and for 2007/8 and 2008/9 on the other (at about £33k). The reason for this step
change is not obvious but it might be due to changes in the algorithm used by the Department of Health
to allocate non-admitted patient care activity to budget categories. Although this allocation rule change
has considerably increased the estimated cost of a life year, we believe that this rule change has led to a
more accurate allocation of expenditure across PBCs, and that the more recent estimates of the cost of a
life year (for 2007/8 and 2008/9) are more accurate than those for the earlier years (for 2005/6 and
2006/7). A summary of the estimates of the cost of a life year adjusted for the mismatch between ICD10
chapters for expenditure and mortality are provided in Table 3.7.
Virtually all of the cost of a life year estimates presented in this report are calculated at current prices.
However, it is possible to put them on a constant price basis using the Hospital and Community Health
32 Such studies assumed that PCTs had reached some sort of equilibrium in the expenditure choices they make and
the outcomes they secure.
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Services pay and prices index.[90] For 2006/7, 2007/8 and 2008/9 this index recorded an annual rate of
inflation of about 3.5% and so the impact of this constant price adjustment is fairly minimal. For
example, if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the gain attributable to the 12
programmes without a mortality indicator is, on average, the same as that attributable to those with a
mortality outcome measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes at constant 2008/9 prices is
£33,333 for 2008/9, £33,088 for 2007/8, and £24,125 for 2006/7.
Finally, although previous results and our current models pass the appropriate statistical tests and, in
particular, the Hansen-Sargen test for valid instruments, we are aware that this test might be unable to
detect the presence of invalid instruments in some circumstances and that the validity of instrumental
variables is often open to question. Responding to this, several studies [91, 92] have suggested that
researchers using IV techniques should subject the estimated coefficient on the endogenous variable to a
sensitivity analysis. We undertake a comprehensive sensitivity analysis for the outcome equation for each
of the big four models. This sensitivity analysis reveals that uncertainty associated with instrument
validity has little effect on our estimate of the cost of a life year but it does increase the degree of
uncertainty associated with this estimate.
We recognize that this study has a number of limitations. The estimates of the cost of an additional life
year for programmes with a mortality-based outcome indicator are unadjusted for the quality of life
during the additional year. Accordingly, the quoted costs will be an under-estimate of the QALY-adjusted
cost of a life year to the extent that additional life years are not in perfect health. In previous studies we
have noted that a rudimentary adjustment for this issue using HODaR data increased the cost of a life
year by about 50% to 60%.[63, 66]
At the same time, however, the estimated costs will exaggerate the cost of an additional QALY-adjusted
year for those programmes with a mortality-based outcome indicator because they ignore any health
benefits that are not associated with a reduction in mortality. In other words, expenditure that improves
the quality of life (e.g., cancer palliative care) but which does not extend the length of life is implicitly
given a zero health gain value.
In addition, the expenditure data relates to expenditure on all patients whereas the mortality data is based
on a life expectancy of 75 years. Thus implicitly our calculations attribute a zero health gain to all
expenditure on those aged over 75. To illustrate the magnitude of the potential health gain ignored by
this restriction, note that in a recent study of costs associated with all inpatient and outpatient activity
(excluding mental health), those aged over 75 years accounted for 25% of all costs in 2007/8[93] for
details of this study).
The results presented in this study are all from the estimation of the relationship between expenditure and
mortality using data for a single time period. With the availability of several years of data for both
expenditure and mortality, we wanted to estimate a panel data model because a panel can offer advantages
over a one period model (e.g., it is better able to handle any unobserved heterogeneity across PCTs).
However, most of the instruments employed here are based on the 2001 Census and thus time invariant
rendering them of little use in panel data modelling.
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Table 3.7: Adjusted cost of life year estimates for various combinations of programmes
A B C D E
Cost per life year
Programme budgeting category (adjusted for ICD10 coverage of spend and mortality data)
2006/7 2007/8 2008/9
1 Cancer £16,121 £16,891 £21,454
2 Circulatory disease £9,390 £11,224 £11,685
3 Respiratory problems £8,961 £11,439 £16,470
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £11,929 £14,295 £14,653
5 All big four programmes £10,604 £13,830 £14,650
6 Other six programme with a mortality rate £146,108 £99,428 £112,674
7 All ten PBCs with a mortality rate £19,965 £28,983 £30,883
(a) If we assume a zero health gain in those PBCs without a mortality rate
8 All 23 programmes £73,457 £82,765 £84,974
or (b) if we assume a zero gain in PBC23 and that the average gain from the
the 10 PBCs with a mortality rate is applied to the remaining programmes
9 All 23 programmes £22,565 £31,846 £33,333
Note that the figures for 2006/7 relate to the use of mortality for 2006/2007/2008 combined.
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Chapter 4: Translating mortality effects into life years and quality adjusted
life years
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of how the results of the econometric work undertaken to estimate the
link between NHS spending and mortality, which was summarised in the previous chapter and detailed in
Appendix B, can be translated in to effects on life years and quality adjusted life years (QALYs).
In this chapter we present three sequential steps of analysis which lead to estimates of the overall cost per
QALY threshold for the NHS:
i. In section 4.2 we reconsider how the estimated effects on mortality from the econometrics work
conducted in Chapter 3 might better translate in to life years by exploring the limitations of
mortality data available at PCT level and the published years of life lost (YLL) figures presented.
We explore how these estimates might be improved using additional data and analysis.
ii. In section 4.3 we consider how these estimates of life year effects might be adjusted for the
quality of life in which they are lived, taking account of the gender and the age at which life years
are gained or lost as well as the disutility associated with particular diseases.
iii. In section 4.4 we explore ways to also take account of those effects on health not directly
associated with mortality and life year affects (i.e., the pure quality of life effects) to estimate an
overall cost per QALY threshold.
This sequence of analysis is set out and explained based on the analysis of 2006 expenditure and mortality
data from 2006 to 2008. In section 5.2 we present estimates for 2008 expenditure and 2008 to 2010
mortality data using the same methods and discuss the uncertainties associated with these estimates. As
in the previous chapter much of the detail of data and analysis that supports this overview is presented in
an appendix (see Appendix C). At the end of each section we present a summary which includes a central
best estimate as well as extreme lower and upper bounds for the cost per life year and cost per QALY
threshold.
The core assumptions which underpin these three values are common across sections 4.2 to 4.4. The
central or best estimate is based on two assumptions; one conservative and the other more optimistic
with respect to the health effects associated with expenditure. The first is that the health effects of
changes in one year of expenditure are restricted to one year. This is implicit in the estimates of outcome
elasticities presented in the previous chapter.33 This is likely to underestimate effects on mortality since
expenditure that reduces mortality risk for an individual in one year may well also reduce their risk over
subsequent years; possibly over the whole of their remaining disease duration. Expenditure may also
prevent disease in future patient populations. Therefore, total health effects will be underestimated and
the cost per life year or QALY threshold will be overestimated. Although undoubtedly conservative, it
may be offset to some extent by the more optimistic assumption used to translate mortality effects into
life years. Any death averted by expenditure in one year is assumed to return the individual to the
mortality risk of the general population, i.e., the years of life gained associated with each death averted are
based on what would have been their life expectancy taking account of their of age and gender (using life
tables for the general population).
The extreme upper and lower bounds for cost per life year and cost per QALY thresholds are based on
making both assumptions either optimistic (providing the lower bound for the threshold) or both
33 Although 3 years of mortality data are used in the analysis of each year of expenditure, these are averaged to an
annual value prior to estimating outcome elasticities. Therefore, the estimated outcome elasticities represent the
proportionate effect on mortality in one year due to a proportionate change in expenditure.
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conservative (an upper bound for the threshold). The lower bound is based on assuming that health
effects are not restricted to one year but apply to the remaining disease duration for the population at risk
during the expenditure year (although this still does not account for the effects of expenditure on
preventing disease). The upper bound is based on the combination of assuming that health effects are
restricted to one year and that any death averted is only averted for the minimum duration consistent with
the mortality data used to estimate the outcome elasticities in Chapter 3 (see Section 4.2.5 for a more
detailed discussion). It is very important to note that the lower and upper bounds represent extreme
values rather than alternative but plausible views that could reasonably be taken. We discuss this in more
detail in Section 5.8 and explain why establishing narrower bounds, which might retain some plausibility,
has not been possible given the data available and therefore the analysis that has been feasible.
4.2 From mortality to life years
In this section we summarise our examination of a number of issues associated with available PCT-based
mortality data and the associated published estimates of YLL. We then examine how, given the limited
information available about the population at risk in each PBC, we might take proper account of the fact
that some of the observed deaths would have occurred anyway (had the same population not been at risk
in the particular PBC) when estimating YLL, i.e., taking account of unobserved counterfactual deaths.
This allows us to estimate the YLL that better reflects the effect of expenditure on the mortality observed
in each PBC, and infer the excess deaths associated with each PBC. Finally we present cost per death
averted and cost per life year which accounts for the issues raised in this section.
4.2.1 Mortality and YLL coverage
The mortality data that is available at PCT level does not offer full coverage of all deaths across all the
ICDs that make up each PBC (see Table B5.1 in Appendix B for how three-digit ICD-10 are mapped to
PBCs). However, national (English) data is available that covers all deaths associated with all the ICDs
that make up each PBC. Therefore, it is possible to adjust the incomplete reporting of mortality at PCT
level (see section 3.2 in Chapter 3) before applying the estimated outcome elasticities to calculate the
deaths averted due to expenditure.34 Applying published estimates of YLL per death to all the deaths
averted provides the estimate of the cost per life year reported in Chapter 3.
The published estimates of YLL (NHS IC) used in Chapter 3 only include deaths below 75 years (but
exclude deaths below 1 year) and are based on the difference between age 75 and the age of each death
below 75. These estimates have the same limited coverage as PCT level mortality data so are not available
for all the ICDs that make up each PBC. Therefore, applying the available estimates of YLL per death to
the estimated number of deaths averted requires an assumption that the YLL per death is similar for
those groups of ICDs covered and not covered by the published YLL figures.
This can be examined by using national ONS data to calculate YLL in the same way as NHS IC, but with
full coverage of all the ICDs that make up each PBC.35 Although ONS data provides complete coverage
and reports gender; age at death is only reported in 5 year ranges (these data are not available at PCT level
so could not be used when estimating outcome elasticities in Chapter 3). Therefore, using ONS data to
estimate YLL requires taking the midpoint of each range as the age of death, i.e., assuming reported
34 This does assume that the proportionate effects on mortality due to changes in expenditure are similar for
mortality that is and is not recorded at PCT level. This seems more reasonable than assuming no effect of
expenditure on mortality that happens not to be recorded at PCT level.
35
The estimated outcome elasticity for PBC 16 (Trauma and injuries) was zero for 2006 and could not be estimated
for 2008 expenditure. Therefore, this PBC does not contribute any changes in health outcomes, although the
changes in this expenditure are included in subsequent estimates of cost per life year and QALY thresholds.
However, there was a very limited coverage of mortality data recorded at PCT level and the expenditure data for this
PBC. In addition, the mortality data that was available (ICDs S72, S02, S06 and T90) was less likely to be associated
with changes expenditure in this PBC and more likely to be associated with changes in expenditure in others.
Consequently the health effects of changes in expenditure in PBC 16 may be underestimated.
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deaths are equally likely over the range in which they are reported. For this reason it is not possible to
precisely recover the published YLL figures using ONS data for those ICD groupings that can be
precisely matched to the NHS IC coverage. However, the differences are small (see Table C2, Appendix
C), suggesting that taking the midpoint of each range as the age of death may be a reasonable
approximation.
The differences between estimates of YLL based on ONS and NHS IC data are, however, much more
significant and are reported in Table 4.1. These reflect differences in the distribution of ages at death
between those groups of ICDs covered and not covered in the NHS IC figures. For example, NHS IC
figures available at PCT level for PBC7 (neurological problems) have low coverage of all deaths in this
PBC (0.136 in column 1). The deaths that are reported in NHS IC are associated with epilepsy and the
YLL (22,046 in column 2) reflects the generally younger age at death in this group. When adjusted for
full coverage (22,046/0.136 = 162,100 in column 3) the estimated YLL is much greater than the YLL
based directly on all deaths by age group reported in ONS. This difference in YLL reflects the fact that
the deaths in PBC7 which are not covered by NHS IC figures tend to be in older age groups so generate
fewer YLL.
Table 4.1: Estimates of YLL for NHS IC and ONS
PBC
Coverage of
mortality data
relative to
spend data
YLL<75
(NHS IC)
YLL<75
adjusted
(NHS IC)
YLL<75
no adjustment
needed
(ONS)
Difference
from adjusted
NHS IC to
ONS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1 Infectious diseases 1.00 35,517 35,517 40,928 15%
2 Cancer 0.98 735,674 747,636 758,804 1%
4 Endocrine problems 0.63 19,224 30,322 41,548 37%
7 Neurological problems 0.14 22,046 162,100 93,755 -42%
10 Circulatory 0.99 453,878 457,538 481,246 5%
11 Respiratory 0.77 108,074 139,812 147,465 6%
13 Gastro-intestinal 0.57 115,303 201,931 177,532 -12%
17 Genito-urinary 0.17 3,343 19,438 17,380 -11%
18+19 Maternity & neonates 0.68 164,200 241,826 15,409 -94%
Using ONS data also allows deaths under the age of one year to be appropriately assigned to PBCs via the
ICD in which they occurred (NHS IC YLL figures exclude deaths under one year), rather than assigning
them all to PBC18 & 19 as in the previous Chapter.36 This explains the large reduction in YLL for
PBC18 & 19 (Maternity and neonates) as much of the mortality is re-assigned to ICDs which contribute
to other PBCs. Since most of the deaths that are re-assigned are allocated to PBC1 (infectious diseases)
the YLL for this PBC increases despite complete reporting of deaths at PCT level and full coverage by
NHS IC figures (see also Table C4 in Appendix C).
4.2.2 Life expectancy and YLL
As noted above the NHS IC estimates of YLL only include deaths below 75 years and are based on the
difference between age 75 and the age of each death below 75. Implicitly this treats 75 as the appropriate
normal life expectancy for males and females for the population at risk in each PBC. However, with the
exception of maternity and neonates most deaths in PBCs occur above the age of 75 and life expectancies
are significantly greater than 75. For example, based on 2006 to 2008 data, life expectancy for the general
population is 80.7 for males and 84.4 for females (considering age distribution) and even life expectancy
at birth is greater than 75 (77.74 for males and 81.88 for females).37
36 The YLL available from NHS IC represented all deaths from maternity and all deaths under 28 days across PBCs.
The coverage factor (0.68 in column 1 of Table 4.1) adjusts this YLL to represent maternity and all deaths < 1year
across PBCs. The calculation is described in Appendix B, footnote (v) of Table B5.1.
37 Figures for England, from http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/subnational-health4/life-expec-at-birth-age-65/2004-
06-to-2008-10/statistical-bulletin.html#tab-National-life-expectancy
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Based on ONS data YLLs can be re-recalculated using gender specific life expectancy for the general
population.38 When increasing life expectancy (LE) two effects occur, both of which tend to increase
estimates of YLL. Firstly, more deaths are included in the YLL calculation (those that occur between age
75 and LE) and secondly, each death previously counted below 75 will generate 5.7 or 9.4 more YLL for
males and females respectively. The effect on the number of deaths and the YLL for each PBC of using
the life expectancy of the general population is reported in Table 4.2 (see columns 1, 2 and 3).
Table 4.2: The difference in YLL by life expectancy
PBC
Deaths<75
(ONS)
Deaths<LE
(ONS)
Difference in
deaths due to
increased LE
YLL<75
(ONS)
YLL<LE
(ONS)
Difference in
YLL due to
increased LE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1 Infectious diseases 2,050 3,710 81% 40,928 62,051 52%
2 Cancer 62,944 95,212 51% 758,804 1,345,013 77%
4 Endocrine 2,367 4,000 69% 41,548 65,015 56%
7 Neurological 5,095 8,975 76% 93,755 145,526 55%
10 Circulatory 41,487 82,098 98% 481,246 916,170 90%
11 Respiratory 14,000 30,500 118% 147,465 310,326 110%
13 Gastro-intestinal 10,611 15,827 49% 177,532 273,303 54%
17 Genito-urinary 1,588 4,197 164% 17,380 39,098 125%
18+19 Maternity & neonates 226 226 0% 15,409 17,167 11%
*LE male=80.7, female=84.4
The number of deaths counted below LE increases for every PBC except for maternity & neonates
because, as expected, all deaths are below age 75 in PBC18 & 19. However, YLL increases for all PBCs
reflecting the additional years otherwise expected to be lived to an older LE. Of course including more
of the deaths observed in each PBC and the greater YLL associated with them will generate more deaths
averted and more life years gained when applying the same proportionate effects from the outcome
elasticities estimated in Chapter 3. Therefore, the cost per death averted and cost per life year threshold
are lower using these figures than those reported in Chapter 3 (see Table 4.6 below and Table C7 in
Appendix C for a summary of the effects on the thresholds). However, there are good reasons why YLL
figures calculated as the difference between age of death and LE are likely to be overestimated. This is
dealt with in the next section (Section 4.2.3). In Section 4.2.4 we take account of the fact that some of
the deaths observed in a PBC would have occurred anyway in a similar normal population (i.e., the
counterfactual population not at risk through membership of the PBC) so not all observed deaths are
excess and generate YLL.
4.2.3 YLL and accounting for counterfactual deaths
The estimates of YLL based on ONS data overcome many of the limitations of the published NHS IC
figures. However, the YLLs reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, are calculated in the same way as the NHS IC
figures, by taking the difference between a fixed LE and the age at death of deaths observed below that
LE. This will tend to overestimate the YLL for two reasons: i) it does not account for the fact that not all
deaths observed below LE are excess deaths in the sense that some deaths would have occurred (at the
same age) in a similar population not at risk in the PBC and ii) some of the deaths observed above LE
may be excess deaths that would not otherwise have occurred at that age. The overall effect on YLL,
and the cost per life year, will depend on the number of deaths above and below LE that are excess.
Therefore, estimates of YLL are required which take account of the counterfactual deaths that would
have occurred even if the population in the PBC was not at risk through membership of the ICD codes
that make it up, but faced the same mortality risks as the general population, accounting for the age and
gender distribution of the PBC population.
38 This is the life expectancy that reflects the age distribution of the general population, i.e., the average of the sum
of the life expectancies conditional on age, over the current age distribution. It will always be higher than life
expectancy at birth.
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Ideally, with reliable information about the size of the population at risk in each PBC and its age and
gender distribution it would be possible to estimate the number of deaths that would be expected to
occur had this population not been at risk, based on mortality data for the general population. The
difference between deaths observed across all ages and the deaths expected to have occurred in this
matched normal population would provide the number of excess deaths by age and gender.39 The YLL
associated with each of these excess deaths is the life expectancy conditional on gender and on surviving
to the age at which the excess death occurred. The total YLL for the at risk population is simply the sum
of these YLLs over all excess deaths, which could occur at any age. This YLL is equivalent to the area
between the survival curve for the population at risk in a PBC and the counterfactual survival curve for
the same population but not at risk from membership of the PBC. The difficultly is that routinely
available data do not provide any information about the size of the population at risk or its age and
gender distribution. All that is routinely available are observed deaths (by age and gender). Therefore, it is
not possible to directly estimate excess deaths or compare survival curves.
Even if the size of the at risk population is unknown we can still use information that might be available
about its age and gender distribution (or make reasonable assumptions) to estimate a matched normal
LE using life tables for the general population - such a LE summarises the area under the counterfactual
survival curve. Unfortunately, it is not possible to also calculate the LE for the population at risk in the
PBC (or represent the survival curve) without information about the size of the at risk population - if it
was possible the difference between these life expectancies would approximate the YLL per patient at risk
in a PBC.
Fortunately, we can still recover a consistent estimate of YLL using observed deaths and a LE that
represents the normal LE of a matched population that is not at risk. This requires all observed deaths -
both those that occur below and those that occur above this LE to be taken into account. Those deaths
occurring below LE generate YLL - compared to the average of a matched population not at risk.
However, we must also account for those deaths that occur at ages above LE. These deaths generate life
years gained (YLG) compared to the average of a matched population not at risk. Therefore, the
appropriate estimate is a net YLL (i.e., YLL  YLG). In effect, by subtracting YLG from YLL we take
account of the fact that not all deaths below LE are excess deaths but some deaths above LE are (see
Appendix C for more formal explanation of the equivalence of these ways of calculating YLL).40
Using the life expectancy of the general population
Routinely available data provides the age and gender of observed deaths but no information about the age
and gender distribution of the at risk population itself. Using observed age and gender at death as an
indication of the distribution of the at risk population will significantly overestimate the LE of a normal
matched population insofar as a disease may be chronic (not all PBC mortality occurs on entry into the at
risk population), and that PBC related mortality risk may increase with age (see Table C14 Appendix C).41
39 These counterfactual deaths will occur in the other PBCs insofar as all deaths are recorded in an ICD codes.
Therefore, we take account of the unavoidable fact that everyone must die of something at some time. For
example, even if all observed cancer mortality was avoidable and could in principle be eliminated with sufficient
expenditure, lives would not be saved but deaths delayed and reallocated to other causes. Note that the outcome
elasticities are based on PBC mortality that is sensitive to changes in expenditure (i.e., is avoidable) at the margin so
no assumptions about how much of the PBC mortality is avoidable is required.
40 Simply taking the difference between a fixed LE and the age at death of deaths that occur below LE and ignoring
those death that occur above LE, would only provide the correct figure if it is reasonable to assume that no deaths
would have otherwise occurred prior to LE (so all normal deaths must occur at LE) and that there are no deaths
(survivors) beyond LE in the at risk population, i.e. all deaths below LE are excess deaths and there are no excess
deaths above LE.
41 If risk increases over the disease duration more deaths would be observed in groups that have been prevalent for
some time (i.e., are older) than those that are incident. Also if PBC related mortality is higher for older age groups
they will be overrepresented in observed deaths compared to a matched normal population. For both reasons LE,
YLL and cost per life year would be overestimated using age at death as a proxy for the age distribution of the at
risk population.
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In the absence of additional external information the net YLL could be based on the life expectancy of
the general population, reflecting its current age and gender distribution. These are reported in Table 4.3
and illustrate the impact of accounting for counterfactual deaths in the way described above. The YLL
reported in column 5 of Table 4.3 are calculated the same way and are the same as the figures previously
reported (column 5 of Table 4.2). That is, they do not account for deaths that would have otherwise
occurred below LE or the very many deaths that occur above LE. With the exception of PBC18&19
many death occur above the LE of the general population (see column 4 in Table 4.3) in all PBCs. As a
consequence there are LYG associated with all other PBCs (see column 6) so the net YLL in column 7
are lower than YLL based on the same life expectancy. Therefore, failure to account for counterfactual
deaths would lead to an overestimate of the YLL associated with a PBC and the effects of expenditure on
YLL. Consequently the cost per life year threshold would be underestimated (see Table 4.6).
Table 4.3: Net YLL using life expectancy of the general population
PBC
LE of
Males
LE of
Females
Average 2006-2008
Deaths Deaths
YLL YLG Net YLL
<LE >LE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
1 Infectious diseases 80.7 84.4 3,710 3,248 62,052 18,796 43,256
2 Cancer 80.7 84.4 95,213 35,597 1,345,038 175,350 1,169,689
4 Endocrine 80.7 84.4 4,000 2,764 65,016 15,864 49,152
7 Neurological 80.7 84.4 8,975 6,378 145,529 34,621 110,908
10 Circulatory 80.7 84.4 82,099 77,752 916,192 444,694 471,498
11 Respiratory 80.7 84.4 30,500 34,945 310,334 215,829 94,505
13 Gastro-intestinal 80.7 84.4 15,827 8,320 273,308 45,295 228,012
17 Genito-urinary 80.7 84.4 4,198 6,427 39,099 40,530 -1,431
18+19 Maternity & neonates 80.7 84.4 226 0 17,167 0 17,167
However, these figures are only correct insofar as the distribution of age and gender in each PBC is
similar to the general population. For example, if the at risk population tends to be younger the correct
LE for the PBC will be lower and the net YLL will also tend to be lower. Similarly if the at risk
population tends to be older than the general population the correct LE will be higher and net YLL will
also tend to be higher.42 This explains the apparent net gain in YLL (negative net YLL) for PBC17
(Genito-urinary) where most deaths occur at ages greater than the LE of the general population so that
LYG exceeds YLL. As we are able to show later (see Table 4.4) this is because the age distribution in this
PBC tends to be older than the general population, i.e., the LE for a matched normal population should
be higher with fewer deaths above and more below this LE.
Using additional information about age and gender distribution
It is evident that estimates of YLL require some account to be taken of counterfactual deaths. In the
absence of routinely available information this requires examination of alternative sources of information
which might provide a basis for more credible assumptions about the age and gender distribution of the
PBC population than either, the distribution of observed deaths or the general population.43 The WHO
Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study, updated in 2008 using 2004 data (see Addendum 1 in Appendix
C for more details)44 provides a range of summary health indicators for the UK, which are, in part, based
42 A higher (lower) LE will mean that there are more (less) deaths below LE, each generating more (fewer) YLL and
fewer (more) deaths above LE each generating fewer (more) LYG.
43 Although this research was not funded to purchase access to GPRD data we were able to examine a sample of it
which comprised of 22,313,086 rows/patientICD10 events (3 digit) representing 4,229,910 patients with data on
new diagnosis of diseases observed between 1 Jan 2006 and 24 June 2011 (see Addendum 1 in Appendix C).
Although GPRD data could, in principle, provide this type of information the difficulties of reliability, face validity
and interpretation of the sample data in the form available to us meant that it was not directly useful. We discuss
the potential value of other sources of information, including GPRD in Chapter 5.
44 We are aware that the 2000-2002 WHO GBD study and the update which was published in 2008 using 2004 data
has itself recently been updated. However, the report and tools where not publically available at the time this
research was conducted. We discuss the potential of future sources of information in Chapter 5.
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on estimates of the incidence of sequelae associated with different types of disease by age and gender45.
Therefore, the type of information used by WHO in the GBD Study to generate summary estimates for
the UK can also be used to improve the assumptions required about the age and gender distribution of
the PBC populations. Importantly, at this stage, we do not need to rely on estimates of the absolute size
of the at risk population, but only the relative share by age and gender.
GBD classifies diseases by U-codes, which are groups of three digit ICD-10 codes (see Addendum 1 in
Appendix C for details of how U-codes map to ICD-10 codes).46 Since we know which ICD codes
contribute to each PBC we can map information from U-codes to PBCs via the ICD codes that
contribute to each. The resulting average age and life expectancy for each PBC is reported in columns 3
and 4 of Table 4.4 using the information available from GBD in combination with life tables for the
general population.
Table 4.4: Average age and life expectancy for PBCs based on GBD
PBC Sex
Average age of
general
population
LE of general
population
Average age in
PBC (GBD)
LE of at risk
population
(GBD)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1 Infectious diseases
m 38.5 80.7 28.6 79.6
f 40.8 84.4 30.2 83.6
2 Cancer
m 38.5 80.7 61.3 83.0
f 40.8 84.4 52.3 84.7
4 Endocrine
m 38.5 80.7 44.2 81.0
f 40.8 84.4 50.8 84.7
7 Neurological
m 38.5 80.7 24.8 79.6
f 40.8 84.4 23.5 83.3
10 Circulatory
m 38.5 80.7 55.4 83.0
f 40.8 84.4 57.9 86.5
11 Respiratory
m 38.5 80.7 32.1 80.3
f 40.8 84.4 33.7 84.0
13 Gastro-intestinal
m 38.5 80.7 35.8 80.6
f 40.8 84.4 41.9 84.5
17 Genito-urinary
m 38.5 80.7 63.2 83.5
f 40.8 84.4 47.3 85.6
18+19 Maternity & neonates
m 38.5 80.7 3.0 78.7
f 40.8 84.4 24.1 83.1
These summary estimates suggest that some of the PBC populations may be on average be older than the
general population (e.g., Cancer, Circulatory and Genito-urinary PBCs) or younger (e.g., Maternity &
neonates, Infectious diseases and Neurological). However, when trying to interpret these summaries it
should be noted that the average age reported in Table 4.4 is the average over the ages at which sequelae
occur within the ICDs contributing to the PBC. Therefore, a similar average age can reflect very different
age distributions. Some reflect a markedly bimodal distribution, e.g., Respiratory, where there is high
incidence at very young and older ages, or very different age distributions across the type of diseases that
contribute to the PBC. For example PBC7 (Neurological) includes dementia which accounts for the vast
majority of the PBC population older than 70. However, a greater proportion of the population is in
45 WHO, through the National Burden of Disease toolkit reports UK specific information about the incidence and
duration of sequelae associated with different types of disease by age and gender. Since it is possible that a patient
may experience more than one of the types of sequelae reported in GBD we use the gender and age distribution of
the sequelae with the highest prevalence (evaluated as incidence x duration) to evaluate the age and gender
distribution within each disease, i.e., the minimum estimate of prevalence consistent with these figures (see Section
C2.1.3 and Addendum 1 in Appendix C).
46 Throughout the analysis in Chapter 4 mortality, life years and QALY were not assigned to procedural ICD codes
(Section C2.1.3 Appendix C) as these are likely to be evident in other ICD codes related to the procedure. This
means that no health effects are associated with PBC 22 Social Care (which only includes procedural ICD codes),
although changes in expenditure on PBC 22 are included. This is likely to overestimate the threshold because any
health effects associated with PBC 22 will not be reflected in the estimated outcome elasticities of other PBCs unless
the effects happen to be correlated with changes in expenditure in those other PBCs.
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much younger age groups with other conditions, especially migraine (see Addendum 1 Appendix C).
When interpreting these summary estimates it should also be noted that the reported life expectancies are
not the life expectancies at the average ages reported in column 3, but the average over the life
expectancies for each age group within the contributing ICDs weighted by the age distribution of
sequelae from GBD U-codes.
The implications for net YLL of using these PBC specific estimates of normal life expectancy are
reported in Table 4.5. As expected, the net YLL for those PBC with a LE greater than the general
population are higher than those reported in column 5 in Table 4.3 (e.g., PBC10 Circulatory and PBC17
Genito-urinary, which now has positive net YLL). Similarly those PBCs with a LE less than the general
population have lower net YLL than reported in column 5 in Table 4.3 (e.g., PBC1 Infectious diseases
and PBC18 & 19 Maternity & neonates, where the effect of a lower LE is more modest as there are no
deaths above either of the estimates of LE).
Table 4.5: Net YLL using life expectancy for each PBC
PBC
LE of
Males
LE of
Females
Average 2006-2008
Deaths
YLL YLG Net YLL
<LE >LE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
1 Infectious diseases 79.6 83.6 3,498 3,460 58,686 21,724 36,962
2 Cancer 83.0 84.7 101,203 29,607 1,473,733 126,549 1,347,184
4 Endocrine 81.0 84.7 4,068 2,696 66,283 15,058 51,225
7 Neurological 79.6 83.3 8,370 6,983 135,686 41,770 93,917
10 Circulatory 83.0 86.5 96,694 63,157 1,102,020 278,251 823,768
11 Respiratory 80.3 84.0 29,549 35,897 298,343 230,313 68,030
13 Gastro-intestinal 80.6 84.5 15,824 8,323 273,117 45,414 227,703
17 Genito-urinary 83.5 85.6 4,969 5,655 47,229 29,101 18,127
18+19 Maternity & neonates 78.7 83.1 226 0 16,801 0 16,801
The impact on the cost per life year threshold of the issues discussed in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 are
summarised in Table 4.6 (see Table C16 in Appendix C for detailed breakdown of changes in spend and
YLLs across PBCs).
Table 4.6: Summary of cost per life year threshold
Using cut-off in estimating YLL (ONS) Using net YLL estimates
cut-off of 75
cut-off of LE of
the GP
Using LE of the
GP
Using LE of the
PBC population
(GBD)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
big 4 PBCs £10,398 £5,487 £10,421 £8,080
11 PBCs (with mortality) £20,031 £10,660 £19,928 £15,628
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining
12 PBCs)
£73,697 £39,218 £73,317 £57,497
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for
remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)*
£22,639 £12,048 £22,523 £17,663
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
Using ONS data to calculate YLL in the same way as the published NHS IC figures, but overcoming
some of the issues associated with the reporting of mortality at PCT level and the coverage of published
estimates of YLL (see Section 4.2.1), generates similar estimates of a cost per life year threshold (see
column 1 Table 4.6) to those reported in Chapter 3. Calculating YLL in the same way, but based on the
life expectancy of the general population significantly overestimates YLL for the reasons set out in
Section 4.2.2 so underestimates the cost per life year threshold (see column 2). Taking account of
counterfactual deaths by calculating net YLL based on the life expectancy of the general population (see
column 3) provides similar estimates to those reported in Chapter 3. Assuming that PBC populations
have the same age and gender distribution as the general population when the, albeit limited, information
that is available suggests otherwise, seems inappropriate. Therefore, our preferred central estimate of the
cost per life year threshold is reported in column 4. These are lower than those based on the general
population, reflecting the impact on net YLL of evidence that the population at risk in some key PBCs
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(especially PBCs 2 and 10) tend to be older than the general population. In Section 4.2.5 we consider
extreme upper and lower bounds that might be placed on this central estimate.
4.2.4 Inferring excess deaths
We have been able to establish a measure of net YLL, which takes account of deaths that would have
occurred anyway below a normal LE for the PBC population (i.e., not all deaths observed in a PBC are
excess) and that some deaths observed above this LE would not otherwise have occurred at that age (i.e.,
some of these deaths are excess). As explained in Section 4.2.3, net YLL calculated in this way is
equivalent to first establishing the number of excess deaths at each age, then calculating YLL for each
excess death (based on the LE conditional on the age at which each excess death occurred) and then
summing these YLL across all excess deaths (i.e., across all ages). In other words, the estimates of net
YLL imply a number of excess deaths required to generate them in each PBC. Therefore, it is possible to
solve for the total number of excess deaths based on the net YLL and the average YLL per observed
death.47 The net YLL divided by the average YLL per death provides the number of excess deaths
required, which on average will generate the estimated net YLL.48
The implied excess deaths associated with net YLL based on the LE of the PBCs (see column 7 Table
4.5) are reported in Table 4.7. With the exception of PBC18&19, excess deaths are some proportion of
total observed deaths in each PBC. The proportion of excess deaths differs by PBC reflecting the
distribution of deaths relative to the LE of the PBC.49 For example, in those PBCs where a large
proportion of deaths occur below LE (see column 3 and 4) excess deaths tend to be greater proportion of
total deaths (e.g., PBC2, 13 and 10). Where most deaths occur above LE excess deaths as a proportion of
total deaths tend to be lower (e.g., PBC1, 11 and 17).
Table 4.7: Excess deaths implied by net YLL
PBC Net YLL
YLL per
observed
death
Excess
deaths
Total
deaths
% excess
deaths
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1 Infectious diseases 36,962 13.4 2,797 6 958 40%
2 Cancer 1,347,184 14.1 95,715 130 810 73%
4 Endocrine 51,225 13.7 3,769 6 764 56%
7 Neurological 93,917 13.7 6,909 15 353 45%
10 Circulatory 823,768 10.5 79,218 159 851 50%
11 Respiratory 68,030 9.2 7,386 65 445 11%
13 Gastro-intestinal 227,703 15.2 15,199 24 147 63%
17 Genito-urinary 18,127 8.3 2,172 10 625 20%
18+19 Maternity & neonates 16,801 73.9 226 226 100%
Estimates of net YLL and changes in life years due to expenditure (see Table 4.5 and 4.6) have already
accounted for the fact that not all deaths are excess and dont generate YLL. Nevertheless, solving for
the number of implied excess deaths associated with these net YLL estimates allows a comparison of the
cost per excess and observed PBC death avoided and an examination of the interpretation that can be
placed of the life years expected to be gained from an excess or observed death averted. Since only
deaths observed in the PBC can used to estimate the effects of expenditure (excess deaths are not directly
47 The average of the sum of the YLLs for every observed death where the YLL for each observed death is the
difference between age at death and LE conditional on age of death.
48 In the absence of information about the age distribution of excess death this assumes that the average YLL
associated with observed and excess deaths are similar. Insofar as excess deaths are thought likely to generate more
YLL than observed deaths the number of excess deaths will tend to be overestimated. This would tend to
underestimate the cost per excess death averted. However, the cost per life year estimates remain unchanged and do
not require such an assumption.
49 The impact of the age distribution of deaths and the age distribution of the at risk population (summarised as LE)
on the calculation of excess deaths is not always obvious as both will affect the numerator (net YLL) as well the
denominator (average YLL per death) in this calculation.
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observed since they rely on an unobserved counterfactual population and would occur outside the PBC),
the outcome elasticities can be interpreted as the proportionate change in observed PBC mortality due to
a proportionate change in PBC expenditure. Equally, however, they can also be interpreted as the
proportionate effect on excess death due to a proportionate change in expenditure so can be applied to
either total observed or total excess deaths.50
The cost per excess death and the cost per PBC death averted are reported in Table 4.8 (see Table C19 in
Appendix C for a detailed breakdown of changes in spend and excess or PBC deaths across PBCs). The
cost per PBC death averted is, of course; significantly lower than the cost per excess death as excess
deaths are only a proportion of total deaths (see Table 4.7). Also the cost per PBC death averted are
substantially lower than those reported in Chapter 3 (see, Tables B8.22 and B8.23 in Appendix B), since
these estimates do not restrict the effects of expenditure to PBC deaths under 75.51 The cost per PBC or
excess death averted (or life saved) should not be over interpreted because they are of little direct policy
interest since lives are never saved (death is only delayed) and the significance of a death averted depends
critically on how long it is averted for (the life years gained  see Table 4.6) and the quality of life in which
additional years are lived (see Section 4.3).
Table 4.8: Summary of the cost per death averted threshold
Cost per excess
death averted, £
Cost per PBC death
averted, £
[1] [2]
big 4 PBCs £91,129 £32,864
11 PBCs (with mortality) £177,692 £64,774
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs) £653,748 £238,310
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £200,829 £73,208
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
However, establishing the number of excess and PBC deaths averted which are associated with net YLL
is useful because it enables an assessment of the number of life years gained associated with each death
averted. On average across all 11 PBCs each excess death averted is associated with 11.4 life years gained.
These are reported for each PBC in Table C21 in Appendix C and range from 74.3 years per excess death
for PBC 18 & 19 Maternity & neonates to 8.3 for PBC17 Genito-urinary. However, clinicians or the
evaluative literature cannot distinguish whether an observed death is excess or not. What can be
observed is whether groups of similar patients with and without access to a treatment survive and for
how long. Therefore, it is the life years associated with each observed death that provides a context that
can be interpreted based on experience and evidence of how effective those interventions that could be
50 Observed PBC mortality that is sensitive to changes in expenditure can be regarded as avoidable and it is only
this mortality that contributes to the estimates of outcome elasticities (not all observed mortality is necessarily
avoidable and sensitive to expenditure - such mortality will not contribute to the estimates). Not all observed
mortality is excess when compared to the counterfactual population but this is unrelated to the question of how
sensitive it is to expenditure, i.e., observed mortality will be just as sensitive to expenditure whether or not it is
regarded as excess. Therefore, the estimated outcome elasticities can be applied to either observed PBC deaths or
excess PBC deaths
51 Recall from Chapter 3 and appendix B that the measure of mortality that is available at PCT level and used to
estimate the outcome elasticities is restricted to deaths under 75, as are the published estimates of YLL associated
with them (see Section 4.2.2). However, to restrict effects only to those under 75 would imply that there is no
excess mortality above 75 or equivalently that there are no health effects of PBC expenditure above 75. Rather than
assume no affects of NHS activity in older populations we apply the effects that can be observed to the whole PBC
but account for deaths that would otherwise occurred in our estimate of net YLL in Section 4.2.3. In many respects
whether or not PBC deaths at older ages are as sensitive to changes in expenditure is not critical since any observed
deaths that might be averted at older ages are less likely to generate life years gained because they are more likely to
have occurred anyway in that year (i.e., are excess so generate zero life years gained anyway). Therefore, they will
have very limited impact on cost per life year or subsequently on cost per QALY estimates in Sections 4.3 and 4.4).
For this, and the reasons given in the text, it is the cost per life year rather than cost per death averted, whether
excess or observed, that is of primary interest.
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invested or disinvested tend to be. The average life years expected to be gained associated with each
observed PBC deaths averted takes account of that fact that some deaths that are avoided in the PBC are
not delayed for very long but quickly occur52 elsewhere and do not generate LY gained (i.e., they were not
excess deaths). These are also reported for each PBC in Table C21 in Appendix C and range from 74.3
years per observed death for PBC 18 & 19 Maternity & neonates53 to 1.0 for PBC11 Respiratory
problems, i.e., the YLL per PBC death are much lower for those PBCs where a small proportion of
observed deaths are excess. On average across all 11 PBCs each PBC death averted is associated with 4.1
life years gained.
4.2.5 Summary of cost per life year estimates
The sequence of analysis set out above has enabled an examination of the impact of the limitations
associated with the incomplete reporting mortality data at PCT level and incomplete coverage of
published YLL estimates. We have also been able to consider effects above 75 while taking account of
that fact that many deaths would have occurred anyway, despite the limited information available about
the population at risk within a PBC. The GBD Study does provide some information about the age and
gender distribution of the population at risk in a PBC so offers some improvement over the other
assumptions that would otherwise be required (i.e., that the distribution of age and gender is the same as
the general population or follows the distribution of observed deaths). For this reason the cost per life
year threshold in column 4 of Table 4.6 and repeated in lines 1 to 4 in Table 4.9 are regarded as the
central or best estimates given the evidence available and the credibility of alternative assumption that
could be made. As explained in Section 4.1, these are based on the conservative assumption that any
health effects of changes in expenditure are restricted to one year, which, to some extent, may be offset
by the more optimistic assumption any death averted returns the individual to the mortality risk face by
the general population, matched for age and gender.
Table 4.9: Summary of the cost per life year threshold with upper and lower bounds
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year
YLL per PBC death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL **
big 4 PBCs £8,080 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 [2]
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs) £57,497 [3]
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £17,663 [4]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: Remainder of disease
YLL per PBC death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL **
big 4 PBCs £3,846 [5]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £6,106 [6]
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs) £22,463 [7]
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £6,901 [8]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year
YLL per PBC death averted: 2 YLL
big 4 PBCs £16,432 [9]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £32,387 [10]
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs) £119,155 [11]
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £36,604 [12]
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal. ** see Tables C14, C15 and C18 in Appendix C
52 What portion of observed deaths are regarded as excess depend on how time is discretised. The data available
reports deaths in annual intervals so in this context quickly means within one year. If deaths were reported in
narrower time intervals then a greater proportion of observed deaths would be regarded as excess and in the limit
with continuous time all observed deaths would be excess. Of course, the average YLL associated with them would
be smaller and is approximated by the net YLLs reported in Table 4.5 per observed death (the effects of
approximation is likely to be small but unavoidable as it is due to deaths being reported in annual intervals).
53 This is the same as life years associated with excess deaths since all observed deaths in this PBC are excess.
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It does not seem credible to imagine that NHS expenditure has no health effects in the 12 PBC which do
not have sufficient mortality reported at PCT level to estimate outcome elasticities - what is implied by
the estimate reported in line 3. Therefore, it is the estimates reported in lines 2 and 4 that are of policy
interest. The estimate of £15,628 per life year (line 2) is restricted to the effects of changes in expenditure
in the 11PBCs where outcome elasticities can be estimated. The threshold of £17,663 per life year uses
the estimated health effects of expenditure in these PBC as a surrogate for health effects in the others,
i.e., assuming that the effects that can be observed will be similar to those that cannot. However, no
health effects are assigned to PBC23 (General Medical Services) on the basis that any health effects of this
expenditure would be recorded in the other PBCs.54
The extreme upper and lower bounds for the cost per life year thresholds in Table 4.9 are based on
making the necessary assumptions about duration of health effects and how long a death might be
averted optimistic (providing the lower bound for the threshold) or conservative (an upper bound for the
threshold). The lower bound (lines 5 to 8) is based on assuming that health effects are not restricted to
one year but apply to the whole of the remaining disease duration of the population at risk in PBCs
during the expenditure year.55 Although this combines optimistic assumptions, it is possible, indeed likely,
that at least some expenditure may have effects on the health outcomes of future patients that are not
currently part of the population at risk in a PBC, e.g., investments or disinvestment in prevention will
have an impact on populations that are incident to PBCs in the future. Such effects are not captured in
any of the estimates presented in this chapter so all are conservative with respect to this type of health
effect of changes in expenditure.
The upper bound (lines 9 to 12) is based on the combination of assuming that health effects are restricted
to one year for the population currently at risk and that any death averted is only averted for the
minimum duration consistent with the mortality data. The econometrics work used the average of 3 years
of mortality (2006 to 2008), so the estimated outcome elasticities are based on differences in mortality
that remain after averaging over three years. Therefore the estimated effects are based on differences in
observed PBC deaths that must have been sustained, on average, for more than a minimum of 2 years.56
4.3 Adjusting life years for quality of life
The central or best estimates of the cost per life year threshold, which were presented in Table 4.9 (lines 2
and 4) take no account of the health related quality of life in which years of life, expected to be gained or
lost through changes in expenditure, are likely to be lived. Even if attention is restricted to the direct
health consequences of changes in mortality, estimates of the cost per life year will tend to overestimate
the effects of changes in expenditure (underestimate the threshold) compared to a more complete
54 It would be inappropriate to assign all the change in GMS expenditure to the estimate of cost per life year based
only on the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities because it would imply that GMS only contributes to these PBCs.
Restricting attention to the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities but allocating part of the change in GMS expenditure
to them based on their proportional share of changes in overall expenditure would yield the same cost per life year
as reported in line 4. It should be noted that including changes in GMS expenditure but not assigning health effects
to this PBC is likely to overestimate the threshold because any health effects associated with GMS will not be reflected in
the estimated outcome elasticities of other PBCs unless the effects happen to be correlated with changes in expenditure in those
PBCs.
55 Estimates of the duration of disease for each U-code are available from the GBD Study (see Table C22 and
Addendum 1 in Appendix C). This information is also used in Sections 4.4.
56 Variation in mortality the first year of data will only contribute to these estimates if differences are sustained for a
minimum of 3 years. Similarly variation in mortality in the second (third) year will only contribute if it is sustained
for a minimum of 2 (1) years. If differences in mortality are similar each year (contribute equally to the estimates)
then estimated effects must have been sustained on average for a minimum of 2 years. Since some of the variation
in mortality in 1st year that is not sustained to the 3rd year will nevertheless be sustained for 1 or 2 years, 2 life years
per death averted represents somewhat less than the minimum consistent with restricting life years gained to the
observed mortality data. Of course, this is minimum difference in observed rather than unobserved counterfactual
excess deaths. Nonetheless it can be interpreted as an upper bound given the data available and therefore the
analysis that has been feasible.
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measure of health that accounts for the quality in which of the years of life are expected to be lived. In
this Section we examine the ways in which the life years reported in Section 4.2 can be adjusted for
quality, taking account of information that is available about: i) how quality of life differs by age and
gender (see Section 4.3.1), and ii) how the quality of life years associated with mortality changes might be
effected by the types of diseases that make up each PBC (see Section 4.3.2). Throughout we continue to
take account for counterfactual deaths in the way described in Section 4.2.3 by making the adjustment for
quality to the life years associated with every observed death before calculating a quality adjusted net YLL.
The implications for a cost per quality adjusted life year (QALY) threshold that only accounts for the
health effects of mortality changes are presented in Section 4.3.3. In Section 4.4 we explore the ways in
which the likely direct effects of expenditure on quality of life (other than through mortality) might also
be taken into account.
4.3.1 Quality of life based on the general population
The most commonly used metric of health related quality of life in the UK is EQ5D,[94] which is
specified in the NICE reference case for methods of technology appraisal.[1] This metric has 5
dimensions of quality each with three possible levels. Each of these 243 possible health states is valued
relative to a score of one, which represents full or best imaginable health (the best score across all 5
dimensions), and a score of zero, which represents death, based on a representative sample of the UK
population.[95] Therefore, insofar as the years of life expected gained or lost through changes in
expenditure would be lived in this state of full health the cost per life year thresholds reported in Table
4.9 would also be the cost per QALY thresholds, albeit ones that only account for the health effects of
mortality changes. However, unsurprisingly, there is good evidence that, on average, the general
population is not in this state of full health. Therefore, the quality of life score associated with the health
states experienced by the general population are less than 1, decline with age and differ by gender. These
quality of life norms for the general population by age and gender are illustrated in Figure 4.1 based on
an analysis of data from the Health Survey for England (HSE).57
Figure 4.1: Quality of life for the general population by age and gender58
These quality of life norms can be applied to the YLL associated with all observed deaths in each PBC,
taking account of gender and age at death. The results are reported in column 4 to 6 of Table 4.10.
There are two effects of adjusting life years for quality: i) since quality of life norms are always less than 1
the adjusted YLL and YLG are always lower than the unadjusted values in columns 1 and 2 (previously
reported in Table 4.5); and ii) deaths above LE are necessarily at older ages with poorer quality of life
norms than those below, so the difference between adjusted and unadjusted values is greater for YLG
57 See Addendum 1 in Appendix C for a description on HSE data and section C2.2.1 of appendix C for the analysis
of quality of life norms illustrated in Figure 4.1.
58 Pooled quality of life estimates provided by Dr Anju Keetharuth, University of Sheffield.
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than YLL. The overall effect of quality adjustment on net YLL is the balance of these two effects. The
overall effect of quality adjustment is to reduce the net YLL (compare Colum 6 and 3).59
Table 4.10: Net YLL adjust for the quality of life norms
PBC
Unadjusted life years
YLL YLG Net YLL
[1] [2] [3]
Quality adjusted life years
YLL
[4]
YLG
[5]
Net YLL
[6]
1 Infectious diseases 58,686 21,724 36,962 47,481 14,618 32,864
2 Cancer 1,473,733 126,549 1,347,184 1,143,445 84,036 1,059,409
4 Endocrine 66,283 15,058 51,225 52,856 9,973 42,883
7 Neurological 135,686 41,770 93,917 109,349 28,262 81,087
10 Circulatory 1,102,020 278,251 823,768 848,046 183,330 664,717
11 Respiratory 298,343 230,313 68,030 231,578 154,743 76,835
13 Gastro-intestinal 273,117 45,414 227,703 216,256 30,277 185,979
17 Genito-urinary 47,229 29,101 18,127 35,929 18,947 16,982
18+19 Maternity & neonates 16,801 0 16,801 14,568 0 14,568
The quality adjusted net YLL figures in column 6 suggests that the health effects of mortality are lower
than when relying only on unadjusted life years in Section 4.2. Therefore, the health effects of changes in
expenditure on this more complete measure of health are lower. The implications of these adjustments
on a cost per QALY threshold that only accounts for the direct health effects of mortality are reported in
Table 4.11. As expected the cost per QALY threshold based on adjusting the life years gained or lost
(column 2) is higher than a threshold based on unadjusted life years (column 1 and previously reported in
Table 4.9).
Table 4.11: Summary of cost per QALY threshold based on population norms and mortality
effects
Cost per life year threshold Cost per QALY threshold
Population norms
[1] [2]
big 4 PBCs £8,080 £9,631
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £18,622
All 23 PBCs* £17,663 £21,047
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal except GMS.
4.3.2 Adjusting age related quality of life for disease decrements
Adjusting life years for age and gender related quality of life norms assumes that any life year gained
through a change in expenditure would be lived in a similar quality of life to the general population. It is
possible however, that patients benefiting from reduced mortality may, nevertheless, continue to be
effected by the type of diseases that make up each PBC and experience the quality of life associated with
the original disease.
The Health Outcome Data Repository (HODaR)[96] provides over 30,000 observations of EQ-5D
measures of quality of life by ICD code and the age and gender of the patients in the sample (see
Addendum 1 Appendix C). Although this is a rich UK data set, there were a limited number of
observations for some of the less common ICD codes. For this reason HODaR was supplemented with
information from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)[97] which also provides EQ-5D by
ICD and reports the average age of respondents (see Addendum 1 Appendix C). These data provided a
means of estimating the quality of life associated with each ICD code at the average age of respondents in
the pooled sample.60 The quality of life associated with each PBC can be expressed as an average of the
59 The only exception is PBC11 (Respiratory) which has a large proportion of deaths occurring above the life
expectancy of the PBC population (see Table 4.5).
60 ICD estimates of the quality of life score and age were pooled across datasets by considering the number of
patients from each dataset contributing to estimates, i.e. a weighted average.
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quality of life associated with its component ICDs.61 The quality of life effects of being in each PBC can
then be expressed as a disease related decrement compared to the population norms at the same age (see
Table C29 in Appendix C). This is illustrated for PBC1 (Infectious disease) in Figure 4.2, where the
weighted average of quality of life scores across the component ICD codes was 0.667, at an average age
average age of 54 for male respondents. Since the quality of life norms for males age 54 is 0.859 this
suggests a decrement associated with membership of PBC1 of 0.192, which can then be applied to quality
of life norms by age.62
Figure 4.2: Quality of life for males in PBC1 (Infectious disease) and the general population by
age
Quality of life norms adjusted for disease related decrements can be applied to the YLL associated with
observed deaths in each PBC, taking account of gender and age at death in the same way as Section
4.3.1.63 The results are reported in column 4 to 6 of Table 4.12. The overall effect of quality adjustment
that also applies a disease related decrement is to reduce the net YLL to a greater extent than adjustment
with population norms alone (compare column 6 in Table 4.12 to column 6 in Table 4.10).
61 The average quality of life scores across the ICDs which contribute to each PBC and the average age and gender
of respondents were used to calculate a PBC disease related decrement based on quality of life norms from the
general population. This PBC decrement could then be applied to each observed death and the age at which each
life year was gained or lost. In Section 4.4 information about the relative share of different types of disease (U-
codes) within a PBC and the information about which ICDs are more likely to contribute to the effects of changes
in PBC expenditure are explored.
62 In principle it would be possible to estimate disease related disutility by age rather than assume a fixed decrement.
HODaR does provide age for each reported quality of life score but MEPs only provides average age of
respondents in published summaries. However, even with access to raw scores and the age and gender of each, it
is very unlikely that there would be sufficient data to estimate age related decrements in each of the component
ICDs. It would, however, be possible to assume a proportionate rather than fixed decrement by age. Since the
average age of respondents in the pooled HODaR and MEPs sample tends to be older than the age distribution of
the PBC populations (see Table C29 and C13 in Appendix C) this would tend to increase the quality adjusted net
YLL and reduce the cost per QALY threshold compared to the fixed decrement applied here.
63
The quality of life score was applied to each observed death considering the age at which each life year was
gained or lost (from ONS) the PBC decrements from HODaR and MEPS.
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Table 4.12: Net YLL adjusted for disease and age related quality of life
PBC
Unadjusted life years
YLL YLG Net YLL
[1] [2] [3]
Quality adjusted life years
YLL
[4]
YLG
[5]
Net YLL
[6]
1 Infectious diseases 58,686 21,724 36,962 37,055 10,793 26,262
2 Cancer 1,473,733 126,549 1,347,184 955,690 67,930 887,760
4 Endocrine 66,283 15,058 51,225 43,394 7,844 35,550
7 Neurological 135,686 41,770 93,917 68,893 15,842 53,050
10 Circulatory 1,102,020 278,251 823,768 656,145 135,241 520,905
11 Respiratory 298,343 230,313 68,030 169,269 106,505 62,764
13 Gastro-intestinal 273,117 45,414 227,703 163,593 21,677 141,916
17 Genito-urinary 47,229 29,101 18,127 29,749 15,152 14,598
18+19 Maternity & neonates 16,801 0 16,801 13,662 0 13,662
It should be noted that combining quality of life adjustments for both population norms and disease
related decrements assumes that any life years gained due to a reduction in mortality will be lived in the
diseased state until life expectancy, i.e., that all diseases are not just chronic but disease duration is
lifelong. Inevitably this assumption means that the health effects of changes in mortality will be reduced.
Consequently the cost per QALY threshold reported in Table 4.13 (column 2) will be higher than
adjusting life years gained for population norms in Table 4.11.
Table 4.13: Summary of cost per QALY threshold based on disease related decrements
Cost per life year threshold Cost per QALY gained
[1]
Disease related decrements
[2]
big 4 PBCs £8,080
£15,628
£17,663
£12,109
£23,395
£26,441
11 PBCs (with mortality)
All 23 PBCs*
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal except GMS.
4.3.3 Summary of the cost per QALY threshold based only on mortality effects
The analysis to this point is summarised in Table 4.14. The three estimates of a cost per QALY threshold
are based on assuming that each life year gained is either: lived in full health (see column 1, equal to the
cost per life year estimates in Table 4.9), lived in a quality of life that reflects age and gender norms of the
general population (column 2); or lived in a quality of life that reflects the original disease state (column
3).
Assuming that life years gained are lived in full health is not credible and should be regarded as an
underestimate of the threshold, given what is known about quality of life norms for the general
population (see Figure 4.1). Equally, assuming that all life years gained are lived in the quality of life of
the original disease state does not seem credible either and is likely to overestimate the threshold since it
assumes that all disease is not only chronic but lifelong and all life years would be lived in the diseased
state until death.64 Although adjusting life years gained for the quality of life of the general population
taking account of age and gender (in column 2) is likely to underestimate a cost per QALY threshold
based only on mortality effects, it probably represents the best of the three alternative estimates available
at this stage of the analysis (see Section 4.4.2 for how analysis based on measures of QALY burden allows
this assumption to be relaxed).65 The lower and upper bounds are based on combining optimistic and
64 The information that is available about disease duration suggests that many types of disease that comprise the
PBCs are not chronic and certainty not lifelong (see Table C22 in Appendix C). In Section 4.4 we take account of
quality of life experienced while alive in the diseased state.
65 In section 4.4.2 measures of QALY burden are used as the basis of estimating the health effects of changes in
expenditure. This analysis applies the estimated proportionate effect of changes in expenditure on life year burden
of disease to measures of the total QALY burden. This is equivalent to assigning a proportional adjustment to the
quality of life with disease to life years gained.
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pessimistic assumptions about the duration of health effects and how long a death might be averted as
described in Section 4.2.5.
Table 4.14: Summary of QALY threshold estimates based only on mortality effects
[1]
(QoL score =1)
[2]
(QoL norm)
[3]
(QoL diseased)
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted:
QALYs per death averted
~4.1YLL **
~4.1QALYs
~4.1YLL **
~3.5QALYs
~4.1YLL **
~2.8QALYs
big 4 PBCs £8,080 £9,631 £12,109 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £18,622 £23,395 [2]
All 23 PBCs* £17,663 £21,047 £26,441 [3]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: Remainder of disease Remainder of disease Remainder of disease
YLL per PBC death averted:
QALYs per death averted
~4.1YLL **
~4.1QALYs
~4.1YLL **
~3.5QALYs
~4.1YLL **
~2.8QALYs
big 4 PBCs £3,846 £4,252 £5,319 [4]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £6,106 £6,852 £8,568 [5]
All 23 PBCs* £6,901 £7,744 £9,683 [6]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per PBC death averted:
QALYs per death averted
2 YLL
2QALYs
2 YLL
~1.9QALYs
2 YLL
~1.5QALYs
big 4 PBCs £16,432 £17,456 £21,747 [7]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £32,387 £34,492 £42,967 [8]
All 23 PBCs* £36,604 £38,983 £48,561 [9]
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal except GMS.
** see Tables C14, C15 and C18 in Appendix C
However, it should be noted that these cost per QALY thresholds only account for the direct health
effects of changes in mortality due to changes in expenditure. Insofar as much, or at least some, of NHS
activity and expenditure is intended to improve quality of life, not just mortality, then these estimates will
underestimate total health effects and overestimate a cost per QALY threshold based on a more complete
measure of possible health effects. In Section 4.4 we explore the ways in which the likely effects of
expenditure on quality of life (other than through mortality) might also be taken into account.
4.4 Including quality of life effects during disease
The cost per QALY thresholds presented in Section 4.3 only account for the health (QALY) effects of
changes in mortality due to changes in expenditure. It does not seem credible to suppose that all NHS
activity and expenditure only influences mortality with no effect on the quality of life while alive and
experiencing a disease. Insofar as changes in NHS expenditure will also affect quality of life as well as
mortality then total health effects will be underestimated and the thresholds presented in Table 4.14 will
overestimate the cost per QALY threshold. In this section we explore ways to also take account of those
effects on health not directly associated with mortality and life year affects (i.e., the pure quality of life
effects) to estimate an overall cost per QALY threshold.
The routine reporting of quality of life outcomes are increasingly available at PCT level (see Addendum 1
in Appendix C for a description of these data). In principle, the variation in such measures of outcome
across PCTs could be used to estimate outcome elasticities for quality of life rather than mortality effects
using similar econometric methods to those described in Chapter 3 (see Section B8.8 in Appendix B for
the results of an exploratory econometric analysis of these data). However, the currently limited coverage
of routine reporting of these outcomes means that it is not feasible to estimate quality of life effects
across all the PBCs using these data. In Section 5.8 we discuss how these data might be used to improve
estimates of the threshold as the coverage and routine reporting of quality of life outcomes improves and
how the analysis presented in Section 5.3 might help prioritise reporting in particular areas (i.e., those
PBCs and ICD codes that have the greatest influence on estimates of the threshold).
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Here we explore how estimates of effects of expenditure that can be observed (i.e., on mortality) can be
used to infer the likely effects on what cannot be directly observed (quality of life), rather than making
extreme assumptions that are not credible (e.g., assuming that changes in expenditure will have no effects
on quality of life outcomes).
In Section 4.4.1 we use three alternative estimates of the ratio of QALYs to life years lost due to different
types of disease as a means of inferring the change in QALYs that is likely to be associated with the
estimated change in YLL, i.e., applying the total QALYs lost associated with each YLL with disease. This
is consistent with regarding the estimates of the mortality and life year effects as a surrogate for a more
complete measure of the health effects of a change in expenditure.
However, these ratios of QALYs lost to life years lost due to disease in those PBC where outcome
elasticities could not be estimated cannot inform estimates of the threshold (there are no estimated life
year effects with which to apply the ratios). Nonetheless, the sources of information on which ratios are
based also provides much of the information required to calculate the QALY burden of disease in these
areas, which can be used to inform estimates of the threshold. Therefore, in section 4.4.2 we use
estimates of the QALY burden of disease, infer a proportionate effect on burden from the estimated
effects on life years, and then apply this proportionate effect to the measures of QALY burden for all the
other PBCs. In this way we can use all the information available about the mortality and quality of life
effects of the different types of disease that make up each PBC, including those where mortality based
outcome elasticities are not available.
4.4.1 Using ratios of QALYs to YLL
The ratio of the total QALYs to years of life lost (YLL) due to a disease indicates the number of QALYs
associated with each YLL. Therefore, any change in YLL is likely to generate a number of QALYs
indicated by the ratio - if it is reasonable to interpret the estimated effects on mortality and life years as a
surrogate for a more complete measure of total health effects. For example, a disease with a ratio greater
than 1 suggests that each YLL across the at risk population is associated with more than one QALY, i.e.,
where there are significant quality of life effects while experiencing the disease.66 Therefore, a change in
expenditure that leads to 1 life year gained in this type of disease maybe expected to generate more than
one QALY and a greater QALY effect than the same life year effects in a disease where this ratio is less
than 1, i.e., where most of the effect of disease is on mortality rather than quality of life. Therefore,
information which allows these ratios to be estimated for the diseases that make up each PBC provides a
means of accounting for the likely effect on quality of life other than through effects on mortality.
To understand the differences between the three ratios presented below it is useful to regard the total
QALY lost to YLL ratio (R) for a particular disease as the sum of two ratios: i) the QALYs lost due to
premature death to YLL ratio (Rdeath)67 and ii) the QALYs lost during disease (while alive) to YLL ratio
(Ralive) (see Section C2.3.1 in Appendix C for more detailed explanation).
DALY to YLL ratios
The WHO GBD study provides UK specific estimates of the years of life lived with disability and the
years of life lost due to different types of disease (classified by U-codes that can be mapped to ICD-10,
see Section 4.2 and Addendum 1 in Appendix C). GBD uses Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) as a
measure of the burden of disease. This DALY measure has two components: i) the years of life lived
with disability (YLD), which incorporates weights (between zero and one) to reflect the scale of disability
experienced each year and the number of years lived with disability over the durations of disease; and ii)
the years of life lost (YLL). The total DALY associated with a disease is simply YLL+YLD. Therefore,
66 Insofar as YLL would not have been lived in full health (see Section 4.3), the quality of life effects during disease
must offset the less than full quality of life of the YLL to generate a ratio greater than one. Therefore, ratios less
than one are possible even when disease has measurable quality of life effects for those experiencing it.
67 The analysis in Section 4.3 already implies an Rdeath ratio at PBC level  see the following main text.
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the DALY to YLL ratio is (YLL+YLD)/YLL or equivalently YLL/YLL + YLD/YLL. Since the first
term (YLL/YLL = Rdeath) must equal one and the second (Ralive </'<//PXVWEHDUDWLREDVHG
on DALYs must necessarily be bounded by below by one. This is illustrated in Table 4.15a for four
different types of diseases (classified by U-codes) which reflect diseases where mortality is the major
component (e.g., U016) and where the impact of disease on the quality of life while alive is the major
component (e.g., U141).
Table 4.15a: Examples of DALY to YLL ratios
Ucode DALY ratios (Rdeath + Ralive)
U037 (Other infectious diseases) 1.23 (1+0.23)
U016 (Tetanus) 1.00 (1+0)*
U061 (Mouth and oropharynx cancers) 1.05 (1+0.05)
U141 (Spina bifida) 2.34 (1+1.34)**
* Given the short disease duration, it is only mortality effects that contribute to the ratio
* Quality of life effects during disease contribute significantly to estimates of the ratio
Adjusting DALYs for quality of life norms
The use of DALY ratios bounded below by one essentially assumes that YLL would have otherwise been
lived in a state of full health. As was discussed in section 4.3.1 this is not credible given information
available about the quality of life in the general population (see Figure 4.1). It would lead to over
estimating the QALYs associated with mortality and life year effects and underestimating the cost per
QALY threshold. Therefore, it is important to adjust these DALY ratios for the quality of life norms by
age and gender in the same way as described in Section 4.3.1. The effect of this adjustment 68 is
illustrated in Table 4.15b. Now those types of disease where mortality rather than quality of life with the
disease is the major component can have ratios less than one. Indeed the first term of these ratios (Rdeath)
is consistent with, and is implied by, the analysis in Section 4.3.1 where the ratio of quality adjusted net
YLLs to unadjusted net YLLs represents this ratio on average for each PBC.
Table 4.15b: Examples of modified DALY to YLL ratios
Ucode
Modified
DALY ratios (Rdeath + Ralive)
U037 (Other infectious diseases) 1.01 (0.78+0.23)
U016 (Tetanus) 0.78 (0.78+0
U061 (Mouth and oropharynx cancers) 0.83 (0.78+0.05)
U141 (Spina bifida) 2.18 (0.85+1.34)
Using quality of life estimates (based on HODAR and MEPS)
The disability weights used in the DALY measure are not based on the same description of health states
as the EQ5D measure, nor are the weights based on a representative sample of the UK population
responding to choice based elicitation questions. EQ5D based quality of life decrements (adjustments to
age related quality of life norms) associated with different types of disease can be estimated from HODaR
and MEPS data (previously described in Section 4.3.2).69 These disease related quality of life decrements
be can be calculated for each U-code (based on the contributing ICD codes) so can be used to replace the
DALY disability weights in Ralive reported in Tables 4.14a and 4.14b.70 This final adjustment is illustrated
68 Reflecting the quality of life norms for the general population in Figure 4.1 and the distribution of ages and
gender within each U-code (see Addendum 1 in Appendix C).
69 Since quality of life effects of different disease states are expressed as age related decrements (see Figure 4.2) we
do not require the HODaR and MEPS samples to necessarily be representative of the age distribution of the
population at risk in the groups of ICD codes that make up each U-code.
70 The average quality of life scores across the ICDs which contribute to each U-code (see Addendum 1 for how
ICD codes map to U-codes) and the average age and gender of respondents from HODaR and MEPS were used to
calculate a disease decrement for each U-code, based on quality of life norms from the general population. These
U-code disease decrements can then be applied to the age and gender distribution of each U-code, based on
information from GBD about the prevalence and age distribution of each - using information about the incidence
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in Table 4.1.4c and turns, what were originally, DALY ratios into EQ5D QALY ratios.71 For these
reasons we regard the QALY to YLL ratios rather than DALY or modified DALY ratios as the preferred
basis of estimating a cost per QALY threshold that provides a more complete picture of the likely health
effects of changes in expenditure.
Table 4.15c: Examples of QALY to YLL ratios (HODaR and MEPS)
Ucode
QALY ratios
(HoDAR and
MEPs) (Rdeath + Ralive)
U037 (Other infectious diseases) 1.37 (0.78+0.60)
U016 (Tetanus) 0.78 (0.78+0
U061 (Mouth and oropharynx cancers) 0.80 (0.78+0.02)
U141 (Spina bifida) 1.88 (0.85+1.03)
Allocating effects at PBC level to ICD codes
Table 4.15 illustrate how QALY ratios can be calculated for and differ by U-code.72 Unsurprisingly, these
ratios differ across the type of diseases that make up each PBC (see Table C45 in Appendix C). When
using this information to estimate a cost per QALY threshold the mortality and life year effects observed
at PBC level must be allocated in some way to the component ICD codes before ratios are applied to LY
effects and the resulting QALY effects are summed across all the contributing ICD codes.73 For this
reason it is important to consider how other information might inform the different ways in which the
effects observed at PBC level might be generated by the distribution of impacts at ICD level, i.e., where
investment or disinvestment is likely to occur within the PBC and therefore which ICDs are likely to
contribute most to overall health effects.
An important and complementary element to the econometric analysis of routinely reported information
at PBC level was to investigate whether other information, commonly available at a local level within the
NHS, might provide a useful indication of where, within a PBC, investment or disinvestment is more
likely across the NHS. The details of this investigation are reported in Addendum 2 in Appendix C. The
review of local data sources suggested that there is very little routinely collected data on investment and
disinvestment by local NHS organisations beyond the high-level aggregate data on spending by PB which
are used in the econometric analysis. Although more disaggregated data on spending decisions about
specific services relevant to particular ICD codes could in principle be acquired through additional
of sequelae associated with them (as described in Section 4.2.3) and information about the durations of disease (see
Table C.22 Appendix C).
71
For example, the evidence about quality of life from HODaR and MEPS suggests that the impact of U037 on
quality of life is greater than indicated by DALY disability weights. The quality of life effects of U141, although still
very significant, are lower than indicated by DALY disability weights.
72 Information about the size and age and gender distribution is only available at U-code level. Therefore U-code
ratios are applied to all the ICD codes that contribute to a particular U-code. Note that, unlike ICD codes, U-codes
do not map directly to PBCs so some ICDs in different PBCs may belong to the same U-code and therefore have
the same U-code ratio. Some ICDs are not included in the U-code classification of disease. Most of these are
procedural codes where we do not assign life year and QALY effects anyway (any health effects would be evident in
other ICD codes), so it was not necessary to impute ratios for them (84 out of 1562). Of the others most were
associated with PBC16 with a zero outcome elasticity so did not require imputation either (186 out of 1562).
Imputation based on the median ratio across the ICDs within the PBC was required for the remaining (482 out of
1562). Eighty eight of these cannot be mapped into U-codes. The remaining 394 were associated with U-codes
where the ratio was undefined because the denominator (YLL) was zero. In both these cases, values were imputed
based on the median ratio across the ICDs within the PBC. Since the distribution of ratios within a PBC tend to be
highly positively skewed, imputation based on the median is likely to be conservative with respect to health effects
and especially in the latter case where mortality effects appear to be a much less important aspect of the disease.
73 It is important to note that it would be inappropriate to calculate an average of the ratios within a PBC and then
apply this average ratio to life year effects at PBC level, rather than calculate QALY effects at ICD level by applying
the relevant ratio. The results, however, can be presented as an implied PBC ratio (i.e., a ratio of averages), see
Table C.43 in Appendix C.
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primary research (surveys or Freedom of Information requests) this would be costly and with a risk that
information acquired in this way may not be complete, consistent or representative.
In the absence of useful information at a local level it is possible to assume that a change in PBC
expenditure will be allocated equally (on a per patient basis) across the component ICD codes, i.e., any
investment or disinvestment is equally likely across the population at risk within the PBC. Hospital
Episode Statistics (HES) (see Addendum 1 in Appendix C) provides information about the costs
associated with each ICD by PCT so it is possible to establish which ICDs contribute most to the
variability in HES costs within a PBC across PCTs. Those that contribute most to this variance might be
expected to be more likely to have been subject to differential investment or disinvestment across PCTs.74
There are differences in relative weight assigned to ICD based on the size of the population or its
contribution to variance in HES costs. If investment or disinvestment within a PBC tends to focus on
ICD codes representing areas of marginal value the health effects of a change in PBC expenditure maybe
overestimated and a cost per QALY threshold underestimated when allocating effects equally across the
population at risk within each PBC. However, weighting ICDs based on HES data is likely to favour
those ICDs which represent more severe disease requiring more hospital care. This may over represent
ICDs with lower QALY to YLL ratios if mortality effects tend to be a major component of these types of
disease and maybe conservative with respect to the health effects of changes in expenditure.
The implications for a cost per QALY threshold that uses the estimated mortality and life year effects as
a surrogate for a more compete measure of the likely health effects (i.e., that includes quality of life as well
as quality adjusted life year effects) is summarised in Table 4.16. These results use the contribution to
variance in HES costs to weight the different ICD codes within a PBC (allocate the life year effects),
before applying the QALY ratios associated with each ICD (see Table C41 in Appendix C).
Table 4.16: Summary of the QALY threshold using QALY to YLL ratios
DALY ratios Modified DALY ratios
QALY ratios,
(HODaR and MEPS)
[1] [2] [3]
big 4 PBCs £5,402
£9,958
£11,254
£6,419
£11,718
£13,244
£5,990
£10,297
£11,638*
11 PBCs (with mortality)
All 23 PBCs
* Preferred analysis
The QALY to YLL ratio implied by this analysis for all 11 PBC with outcome elasticities is 1.52, which
suggests that every (unadjusted) life year is associated with 1.52 QALYs on average across these PBCs.
However, this implied QALY ratio differs across these PBCs, ranging from 0.79 in PBC2 to 15.05 in
PBC18+19 (see Table C43 in Appendix C). Since all the analysis in this Section seeks to use the
estimated mortality and life year effects as a surrogate for a more complete measure of likely health
effects, it is the cost per QALY threshold for all 23 PBCs that is most relevant. As expected this
threshold (£11,638), is lower than a cost per QALY threshold based only the quality adjusted life year
effects (£21,047 in Table 4.14 that assumes no effects of NHS expenditure on quality of life itself). This
difference gives some indication of the relative importance of QALY effects due to avoidance of
premature death and the QALY effects of avoiding disability during disease.
Table 4.17 reports how the estimated QALY effects for each PBC can be decomposed into that part
associated with quality adjusted life year effects and that part associated with pure quality of life effects.
These results appear credible for the first 11PBCs, where those for which mortality is the major concern
74 Unfortunately total PBC costs are not available at ICD level across PCTs so could not be used for this purpose.
Costs from HES data are only a component of total PBC costs (41% of total PBC costs for the 11 PBCs where
mortality effect can be estimated) and contribute less to the variability in PBC costs across PCTs (HES contribute
only 23% of the variability for the 11 PBCs where mortality effect can be estimated)
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have a much greater share of total QALY effects associated with avoidance of premature death (e.g.,
PBC2 and PBC10) compared to those where quality of life is the major concern (e.g., PBC 7).75
Table 4.17: Decomposing estimated QALY effects by PBC
PBC
QALY
change
(total)
QALY
change
(death)
% QALY gained
due to avoidance
of premature
death
due to avoidance
of disability while
alive
2 Cancer 1,699 1,641 97% 3%
10 Circulatory 6,713 4,856 72% 28%
11 Respiratory 3,215 923 29% 71%
13 Gastro-intestinal 3,605 1,193 33% 67%
1 Infectious diseases 27 11 40% 60%
4 Endocrine 2,036 323 16% 84%
7 Neurological 342 52 15% 85%
17 Genito-urinary 12 6 52% 48%
16 Trauma & injuries* 0 0 NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 273 15 6% 94%
3 Disorders of Blood 1,087 547 50% 50%
5 Mental Health 19,828 9,979 50% 50%
6 Learning Disability 2,990 1,505 50% 50%
8 Problems of Vision 2,348 1,181 50% 50%
9 Problems of Hearing 621 313 50% 50%
12 Dental problems 2,282 1,148 50% 50%
14 Skin 1,021 514 50% 50%
15 Musculo skeletal 1,469 739 50% 50%
20 Poisoning and AE 426 215 50% 50%
21 Healthy Individuals 1,781 896 50% 50%
22 Social Care Needs 6,566 3,304 50% 50%
23 Other 0 0 NA NA
The ratios of QALYs to YLL due to disease in those PBC where outcome elasticities could not be
estimated cannot be used to inform estimates of the threshold because there are no estimated life year
effects with which to apply the ratios. Therefore, as in previous sections, the estimated effect of
expenditure on health for the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities is applied to the estimated changes in
PBC expenditure for the other 12 PBCs (excluding GMS for the reasons given in Section 4.2), i.e.,
assuming that the health effects that can be observed of a change in expenditure will be similar to those
that cannot. However, the use of QALY ratios also implies that the share of total health effects between
quality adjusted life year effects and that part associated with pure quality of life effects are also similar to
those PBC with estimated outcome elasticities. Summing the different types of health effects across these
11PBCs suggests that 50% is due to avoidance of premature death and 50% due to avoidance of
disability. This is clearly not credible when applied to the other PBCs, e.g., mental health, vision and
hearing are likely have a much greater share of total health effects associated with quality of life effects
and very little associated with premature mortality.
The problem is that using QALY to YLL ratios means that much of the information that is available
about the other 12 PBCs cannot be used to inform the estimates of the cost per QALY threshold.
Fortunately, the sources of information on which ratios are based also provide much of the information
required to calculate the QALY burden of disease in these areas. Section 4.4.2 explores how measures of
burden can be used to estimate a cost per QALY threshold that captures the likely effects of a change in
expenditure on all aspects of health while using all the information that is available about all the PBCs.
75 It should be noted that the implied QALY ratio of 1.52 for the 11 PBC with outcome elasticities is a ratio of
QALYs to unadjusted YLL. The proportion of total QALY effects due to premature deaths for the same PBCs
(50% in Table 4.17) also implies a ratio - equal to two. However, this is a ratio of total QALY effects to quality
adjusted YLL. The difference between these two ratios is the denominator, i.e., quality adjusted YLL are lower than
unadjusted YLL.
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4.4.2 Using estimates of the QALY burden of disease
In this Section we use estimates of the QALY burden of disease to infer QALY effects in those PBCs
where the mortality effects of changes in expenditure can be observed and then extrapolate the estimated
proportionate effects to those PBCs where the health effects of changes in expenditure cannot be
observed. The estimated proportionate effect of change in expenditure on the life year burden of disease
in the 11 PBCs where mortality based outcome elasticities could be estimated are applied to measures of
QALY burden in each of these PBCs (i.e., effects on the mortality burden of disease are used as a
surrogate for effects on QALY burden). The proportionate effect on burden of disease due to the change
in expenditure across these PBCs can then be applied to measures of QALY burden in the other 11 PBCs
where mortality effects could not be estimated (i.e., the observed effects of changes in expenditure on
burden of disease is extrapolated to the other PBCs where health effects cannot be observed). In this way
we can use all the information available about the mortality and quality of life effects of the different
types of disease that make up each PBC, particularly those where mortality based outcome elasticities are
not available. Applying a proportionate effect to measures of QALY burden of disease is equivalent to
assuming that any effects on life years are lived at quality of life that reflects a proportionate improvement
to the quality of life with disease76 It also allows quality of life effects of changes in expenditure to be
included; also based on proportionate improvement in the quality of life with disease.
Previously in Chapter 3 and Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.1, expenditure elasticities were not estimated for the
other 11 PBCs where outcome elasticities could not be estimated because the same health effect of
changes in expenditure was assumed, i.e., it did not matter how changes in expenditure was allocated
between them. However, in this section it does matter how the remaining change in expenditure is
allocated between the other 11 PBCs as they have different QALY burdens so different implied health
effects of expenditure. Therefore, expenditure elasticities are estimated for all 23 PBCs (see column 2 of
Table C8 in Appendix C). However, it is not possible to estimate expenditure equations for all 23 PBCs
simultaneously (see Section 5.8), so the 23 independently estimated expenditure elasticities do not account
for all of a change in overall spend, i.e., the sum of changes in PBC expenditure based on the estimated
PBC expenditure elasticities accounts for less than a 1% change in total spend. This remaining change in
total spend is allocated between all 23 PBCs reflecting their relative share of changes in expenditure based
on their estimated expenditure elasticities (see column 4 of Table C8 in Appendix C).77
The total QALY burden of disease for the population with disease in a particular year includes: i) the
quality adjusted years of life lost due to all the disease related mortality that could occur in this population
over their remaining duration of disease and ii) the reduction in quality of life while alive also for their
remaining disease duration. However, applying the estimated proportionate effects on mortality and life
years to such a measure of total burden would provide an estimate of the effects of a change in
expenditure, not just in one year, but in all the remaining years of disease for the population at risk in that
year. Recall from Section 4.2 that we have adopted the conservative assumption that changes in
expenditure will only have health effects in one year for the population with disease in that year.
Therefore, it is not a measure of total burden that is required, but a measure of the QALY burden of
76 In Section 4.3 each life year gained could be assumed to be lived in full health, lived in a quality of life that reflects
age and gender norms of the general population or lived in a quality of life that reflects the original disease state.
Applying an estimated proportionate effect on the life year burden of disease to measures of QALY burden of
disease implies a proportionate improvement in the quality of life with disease applied to any life year effects.
Therefore, basing estimates on measures of QALY burden provides are more conservative estimate of the QALY
effects of changes in mortality than the best estimate reported in Section 4.3, which was based on quality of life
norms.
77 Previously in Chapter 3 and Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.1 expenditure elasticities where only estimated for PBC 23
and the 11 PBCs where outcome elasticities could be estimated, with the remaining change in total spend assigned
to the other 11 PBCs. As a consequence, proportionally more of the share of a change in total spend was allocated
to these other PBCs in previous sections (see column 3 of Table C8 in Appendix C).
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disease during one year for the population with disease (prevalent and incident) in that year. The
estimated outcome elasticities can then be appropriately applied to this measure of burden.78
The information from GBD used to derive QALY ratios in Section 4.4.1 includes information about the
YLL and duration of disease for those incident to a U-code, i.e., the measure of QALY burden from the
information included in the ratios is a measure of the total burden of the disease but only for the
population that is incident (rather total population with disease) in one year. Assuming that incidence is
stable over the disease duration this is also equivalent to the QALY burden of disease during one year for
the population with disease (i.e., those that are incident and prevalent) in that year.79
However, in moving from ratios to absolute measures of burden it becomes more important to examine
and then adjust for any inconsistency between information about YLL and size of the incident population
from GBD (which is available by U-codes and can be mapped to ICDs), and the information about net
YLL and observed deaths for each PBC based on ONS data as described in Section 4.2.3 (see Table C44
in Appendix C).80
The implications for the cost per QALY threshold of using information about the QALY burden of
disease for all PBCs rather than QALY ratios for those where an outcome elasticity can be estimated are
reported in Table 4.18. The QALY effects of a change in PBC expenditure are a weighted average of the
QALY effects within each of the ICDs that contribute to the PBC. The figures reported in column 2 are
based on weighing the effects at ICD level by the proportion of the total PBC population within each
contributing ICD code, rather than the contribution to variance in HES costs.81
Table 4.18: Summary of the cost per QALY threshold
Cost per QALY gained*
QALY ratios,
(HoDAR and MEPs)
[1]
QALY Burden
(HoDAR and MEPs)
[2]
big 4 PBCs £5,990 £3,036
11 PBCs (with mortality) £10,297 £5,128
All 23 PBCs £11,638 £10,187*
* Preferred analysis
78 Of course it would be possible to solve for a lower outcome elasticity that could be applied to total burden which
would return the required estimate of total QALY effects restricted to one year - see Section 2.1 in Appendix C
79 So long as estimates of the quality of life decrement of disease from HODaR and MEPS are representative of
average effects across those earlier (incident) and later (prevalent) in their disease duration an assumption of
constant quality of life decrement with respect to disease duration is not required.
80 There are a number of reasons for potential inconsistencies: i) GBD is based on earlier years of mortality data; ii)
the imprecision of mapping from U-codes to PBC via ICD codes; and iii) the YLL reported in GBD are calculated
in the same way as published NHS IC estimates (see Section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3) and will tend to overestimate the net
YLL (see Table 52 in Appendix C). The YLL by U-code, reported in GBD, that are mapped to ICDs are adjusted
by these proportionate differences to ensure that the YLLs associated with all contributing ICD codes are consistent
with (do not over estimate) the net YLL for the PBC as a whole. However, due to the earlier years of data and
imprecision in mapping from U-codes to ICDs there might also be some inconsistency in estimates of the total
incidence of disease for a PBC. Insofar as disease related mortality risk is stable, the same number of deaths should
be observed in GBD and ONS data for the same at risk population. The PBC deaths recorded in GBD and those
observed in ONS data (see Table 52 in Appendix C) are similar but nonetheless the proportionate difference is used
to adjust the scale of quality of life burden while alive based on GBD information (equivalent to adjusting estimates
of incidence). Notable exceptions are PBC1 and PBC18+19 where the discrepancies are due to imperfect mapping
from U-code to PBC via ICD codes.
81 HES costs are a much smaller proportion of total PBC expenditure for the 11 PBCs where a mortality effects
could not be estimated (HES costs account for less than 15% of total PBC expenditure) and account for very little
of a the variability in PBC costs across PCTs (the contribution that variance in HES costs makes to variance in PBC
expenditure in this group of PBCs is less than 8%). Therefore, allocating PBC level effects to ICDs based on
contribution to variance in HES costs is less appropriate when information about QALY burden in this groups of
PBCs is used to inform the estimate of the overall threshold.
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The cost per QALY threshold for the 11PBCs with outcome elasticities is lower using a measure of
QALY burden (£5,128) rather than the QALY ratios (£10,297) described in Section 4.2.1. This is in part
because GBD calculates YLL in the same way as published NHS IC figures so will tend to overestimate a
net YLL which accounts for counter factual deaths (see Section 4.2.3). This will make little difference to
the first term in the QALY ratio (Rdeath) used in Section 4.2.1 since an overestimate of YLL affects both
denominator and numerator of the ratio. However, the second term (Ralive) is likely to be underestimated.
Therefore the ratios used in section 4.4.1 will tend to underestimate the QALY effects of expenditure and
overestimate the cost per QALY threshold (see Table 4.18). We are able to adjust the GBD based
measure of QALY burden for this overestimation of net YLL in calculating the QALY threshold
reported in column 2).82
Since the purpose of this Section is to use the estimated mortality and life year effects as a surrogate for a
more complete measure of likely health effects, it is the cost per QALY threshold for all 23 PBCs that is
of most relevance. The cost per QALY threshold for all 23 PBCs is based on applying the proportionate
effects on the QALY burden of disease, based on the observed effects of changes in expenditure on
mortality in the 11 PBC with outcome elasticities,83 to the QALY burden of disease in the other PBCs.
This generates a higher cost per QALY threshold (£10,187) than one based only on the 11 PBC with
outcome elasticities (£5,128). The reason is that the QALY burden of disease in the other PBC is, in
general, lower than the QALY burden of disease across those PBCs where outcome elasticities can be
estimated (see Table C45 in Appendix C). Therefore, applying the same proportionate effects to a lower
QALY burden generates a smaller health effect of a change in expenditure.84
In essence the difference between the estimates in Table 4.18 is that in column 1 the absolute effect on
health associated with an absolute change in expenditure is extrapolated to the other PBCs, whereas in
column 2 it is the relative effect on health of an absolute change in expenditure that is extrapolated. Since
we know that QALY burden differs between (and within) PBCs and especially between the groups of
PBCs with and without estimated outcome elasticities (see Table C45 in Appendix C85), it is the values
based on QALY burden in column 2 that are regarded as most credible and represent our central or best
estimate.
A detailed breakdown of changes in expenditure and changes in QALYs across all PBCs is provided in
Table C48 in Appendix C when the analysis is based on QALY ratios and when based on QALY burden
of disease. A comparison of these values suggests that QALY effects for the other PBC are generally
lower and therefore the cost per QALY for each of these PBCs are in general higher when based on a
proportionate effect on QALY burden. Of course, we have not directly observed quality of life effects in
these PBC but inferred them from the proportionate effects that we can observe. Insofar as investment
and disinvestment opportunities in these PBCs might have been more valuable (offered greater
improvement in quality of life)86 than suggested by the implied PBC thresholds, then overall QALY
effects will tend to be underestimated and the cost per QALY threshold overestimated. For the reasons
discussed in previous sections, we regard all the cost per QALY threshold reported in column 2 of Table
82 See previous footnote and Table 52 in Appendix C.
83 Note that this is the ratio of total change in health to total change in expenditure across these PBC (rather than an
average ratio) and the contribution that each of these PBCs make to these total effects on health and expenditure
depends on the estimated expenditure as well as outcome elasticities.
84 Applying the absolute health effect of expenditure from the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities implies different
(higher) proportionate effects in the other PBCs
85 The QALY burdens per incident patient are reported in this Table for each PBC, including the median and range
across the contributing ICD codes. However, these values should not be over interpreted as the average QALY
burden for the PBC depends on how PBC effects are allocated to ICDs and the average burden for groups of
PBCs depends on how a change in overall expenditure is shared between them, i.e., the expenditure elasticities
estimated for each PBC in Chapter 3 and Appendix B.
86 See Addendum 3 in Appendix C for an examination of the value of investment and disinvestments that may have
been available in PBC5 (Mental Health Disorders), which accounts for much of the change in overall expenditure.
This qualitative analysis suggests that these may well be more valuable than the implied PBC cost per QALY of
£60,111 reported in Table C56 in Appendix C.
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4.18 as on balance conservative with respect to overall health effects of a change in expenditure.
However, the estimate of £10,187 maybe conservative with respect to health effects (i.e., overestimated)
based, as it is on an extrapolation of the proportionate effects to measures of burden on these PBC,
rather than observations of the direct impact of changes in expenditure on quality of life in these types of
disease. This is especially important in PBC 5 Mental Health Disorders, which accounts for a large
proportion of the change in overall expenditure (22%) and where a review of the evidence suggests that
the investment and disinvestment opportunities in this PBC may have been more valuable than the
implied PBC cost per QALY of £13,876 (see Addendum 3 Appendix C)87. The lower cost per QALY
threshold for the 11PBCs with outcome elasticities (£5,128) might be regarded as more secure in this
respect but they only account for a proportion (38%) of any change in overall expenditure (see Table C53
in Appendix C).
Table 4.19 reports how the estimated QALY effects based on measures of QALY burden for each PBC
can be decomposed into that part associated with life year effects adjusted for quality and that part
associated with pure quality of life effects. These results are similar to those reported in Table 4.17 which
were based on QALY ratios for the 11 PBCs with an estimated outcome elasticity. Those PBCs for
which mortality is the major concern have a much greater share of total QALY effects associated with
avoidance of premature death (e.g., PBC2 and PBC10) compared to those where quality of life is the
major concern (e.g., PBC 7). The differences tend to favour QALYs gained though avoidance of
disability, which reflects the underestimation of the effects on pure quality of life when using QALY
ratios based on estimates of YLL from GBD (see the discussion above).88 The QALY to YLL ratios that
are implied by this analysis are reported in Table C50 Appendix C. As expected the implied QALY ratio
across all 11PBCs with outcome elasticities is higher (3.0589) then reported in Section 4.4.1 because the
previous bias against quality of life effects by using QALY ratios based on unadjusted GBD information
has been removed.
87 See footnote above.
88 The exception is PBC 18 &19. The reason is that there are significant adjustments made based on differences in
observed and recorded mortality (to adjust for differences in classification when mapping from U codes to PBCs via
ICDs) as well as differences in YLL due to the GBD method of calculation (see Table 52 in Appendix C).
89 The implied QALY ratios across these 11 PBCs range from 0.70 in PBC2 Cancer to 14.86 in PBC7 Neurological.
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Table 4.19: Decomposing estimated QALY effects by PBC
PBC
QALY
change
(total)
QALY
change
(death)
% QALY gained
for
premature
death
for disability
while alive
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 2 121 1 968 93% 7%
10 Circulatory 8 347 5 727 69% 31%
11 Respiratory 28 072 1 072 4% 96%
13 Gastro-intestinal 3 922 1 446 37% 63%
1 Infectious diseases 74 13 18% 82%
4 Endocrine 6 905 380 5% 95%
7 Neurological 1 361 60 4% 96%
17 Genito-urinary 34 8 22% 78%
16 Trauma & injuries* 0 0 NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 14 10 69% 31%
3 Disorders of Blood 1 215 62 5% 95%
5 Mental Health 10 878 949 9% 91%
6 Learning Disability 207 41 20% 80%
8 Problems of Vision 561 22 4% 96%
9 Problems of Hearing 1 168 9 1% 99%
12 Dental problems 578 1 0% 100%
14 Skin 103 38 37% 63%
15 Musculo skeletal 1 005 50 5% 95%
20 Poisoning and AE 42 7 16% 84%
21 Healthy Individuals 40 6 16% 84%
22 Social Care Needs 0 0 NA NA
23 Other 0 0 NA NA
In Section 4.4.1 the ratios of QALYs to YLL due to disease in those PBC where outcome elasticities
could not be estimated could not be used to inform estimates of the threshold or indicate how any total
health effects in these other PBCs are likely to be shared between life year effects adjusted for quality
and that part associated with pure quality of life effects (see Table 4.17). By applying the observed
proportionate effects of changes in expenditure to measures of QALY burden of disease in these other
PBCs the likely share of any effects on QALYs between avoidance of premature mortality and avoidance
of disability more closely reflect the nature of these types of diseases (see Table 4.19). As expected, a
much greater proportion of QALY effects are associated with quality of life during the disease compared
to the 11PBCs where mortality based outcome elasticities could be estimated. The share of effects in
particular PBCs are also much more credible. For example, in PBC5 Mental Health Disorders the
overwhelming share of QALY effects are associated with quality of life itself and for others, such as
PBC12 Dental problems, PBC9 Problems of Hearing and PBC8 Problems of Vision; almost all effects are
associated with quality of life rather than mortality and life years. For this, and the other reasons
discussed above, the analysis based on measures of QALY burden are regarded as the best estimate of a
cost per QALY ratio that reflects a more complete picture of the likely health effects of changes in overall
expenditure.
4.4.3 Summary of the cost per QALY threshold
The results of the three sequential steps of analysis described in this Chapter are summarised in Table
4.20. In Section 4.2 we explored ways in which the estimated effects on mortality from the econometrics
work in Chapter 3 might be better translated in to life year effects by overcoming some of the limitations
of mortality data available at PCT level and taking account of counterfactual deaths. The results of this
analysis were reported in Table 4.9 and are repeated in column 1 of Table 4.20.90 In Section 4.3 we
considered how the estimated life year effects might be adjusted for the quality of life in which they are
likely to be lived, taking account of the gender and the age at which life years are gained or lost (see Table
90 The cost per life year threshold in Table 4.9 can be interpreted as cost per QALY thresholds conditional on the
assumption that all life years are lived in full health and the quality of life with disease is zero (equivalent to death).
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4.14). The results of this analysis are repeated in column 2 below. Finally in Section 4.4 we explored ways
to also take account of the likely effects of changes in expenditure on quality of life during disease as well
as the effects associated with mortality and life years (see column 3). These estimates provide our central
estimate of a cost per QALY threshold, because they make best use of available information while the
assumptions required, which on balance are likely conservative with respect to health effects, appear more
reasonable than the other alternatives available.91
Table 4:20: Summary of cost per QALY threshold estimates
[1] [2] [3]
QoL associated with life extension: 1 Norm
QoL during disease: 0 0 Based on burden
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 4.1 QALY ~ 3.5 QALY1 ~ 14.9 QALY
big 4 PBC's £8,080 £9,631 £3,036 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £18,622 £5,128 [2]
All 23 PBCs £17,663 £21,047 £10,187 [3]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality:
Remainder of
disease duration
Remainder of
disease duration
Remainder of
disease duration
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 4.1 QALY ~ 3.5 QALY ~ 14.9 QALY
big 4 PBC's £3,846 £4,252 £674 [4]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £6,106 £6,852 £860 [5]
All 23 PBCs £6,901 £7,744 £1,843 [6]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted: 2 YLL 2 YLL 2 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 2 QALY ~ 1.9 QALY ~ 7.2 QALY
big 4 PBC's £16,432 £17,456 £6,292 [7]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £32,387 £34,492 £10,626 [8]
All 23 PBCs £36,604 £38,983 £21,111 [9]
The estimate of £5,128 per QALY (line 2) is restricted to the effects of changes in expenditure in the
11PBCs where outcome elasticities can be estimated. Although this might be regarded as more secure
these PBCs only account for a proportion of a change in overall expenditure (approximately 38%, see
column 6 in Table C8 in Appendix C). The threshold of £10,187 uses the estimated proportionate effects
of expenditure on the QALY burden of disease in these PBC as a surrogate for proportionate effects in
the others, i.e., assuming that the effects that can be observed will be similar to those that cannot. As
discussed in Section 4.4.2 there are reasons to suspect that this may underestimate health effects in these
PBCs which have most influence on the overall threshold. As in previous sections, no health effects are
assigned to PBC23 (General Medical Services) on the basis that any health effects of this expenditure
would be recorded in the other PBCs.92 Therefore, the best or central estimate of cost per QALY
threshold is £10,187 (column 3, line 3). However, this estimate reflects changes in undiscounted QALYs
91 Note that the proportionate difference between the estimates in column 3 and columns 1 and 2 are greater in lines
1 and 2, reflecting the additional health effects from considering the likely impact of changes in expenditure on
quality of life during disease. These differences are less marked in line 3 because the effects in those PBCs where an
outcome elasticity can be estimated are extrapolated to the other PBCs using proportionate effect on QALY burden
and measures of QALY burden in these other PBCs (see the discussion in Section 4.4.2 for a more details).
92 It would be inappropriate to assign all the change in GMS expenditure to the estimate of cost per QALY based
only on the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities because it would imply that GMS only contributes to these PBCs.
Restricting attention to the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities but allocating part of the change in GMS expenditure
to them based on their proportional share of changes in overall expenditure would yield a slightly higher cost per
QALY than reported in line 2. It should be noted that including changes in GMS expenditure but not assigning
health effects to this PBC is likely to overestimate the threshold because any health effects associated with GMS (or
PBC 22 see Footnote 46 and 54) will not be reflected in the estimated outcome elasticities of other PBCs unless the effects
happen to be correlated with changes in expenditure in those PBCs.
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associated with changes in expenditure. Although all the health effects of a change in expenditure are
restricted to one year (so no discounting is necessary) some of the quality adjusted life year effects of a
change in mortality in that year will occur in future years, so in principle should be discounted. However,
discounting these life year effects, even at the higher rate of 3.5% recommended by NICE, only increases
the cost per QALY threshold to £10,333 (see Table C52 in Appendix C for discounted values).
As in previous Sections of this Chapter, the upper and lower bounds for the cost per QALY thresholds in
column 3 are based on making the necessary assumptions about duration of health effects and how long a
death might be averted optimistic (providing the lower bound for the threshold) or conservative (an
upper bound for the threshold). The lower bound (lines 4 to 6) is based on assuming that health effects
are not restricted to one year but apply to the whole of the remaining disease duration of the population
at risk in PBCs during one year. Although this combines optimistic assumptions, it is possible that at least
some part of a change in expenditure may prevent disease so will have an impact on populations that are
incident to PBCs in the future. Such effects are not captured in any of the estimates presented in this
Chapter so all are conservative with respect to this type of health effects of expenditure. The upper
bound (lines 7 to 9) is based on the combination of assuming that health effects are restricted to one year
for the population currently at risk and that any death averted is only averted for 2 years (see Section
4.2.5).
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Chapter 5: Implications for a policy threshold
5.1 Introduction
The three sequential steps of analysis, which provide a cost per life year threshold (see Section 4.2 of
Chapter 4) through a cost per life year adjusted for quality (see Section 4.3) to a cost per QALY threshold
(see Section 4.4), have been explained in this Chapter using the analysis of 2006 expenditure and mortality
data from 2006 to 2008 (see Section 3.5.1 in Chapter 3 and Section B8.5 in Appendix B) to illustrate the
implications for the threshold estimates. At each step we explored the different ways that routinely
available data could be used and how additional information could improve our estimates. In doing so we
identified a preferred analysis at each stage based on which made the best use of available information,
whether the necessary assumptions appeared more reasonable than the alternatives available, and which
provided a more complete picture of the likely health effects of a change in expenditure. Although other
assumptions and judgments are possible that retain some level of plausibility, they do not necessarily
favour a higher threshold. Indeed, when considered together, they suggest that on balance the central or
best estimate presented in Chapter 4 and in Table 5.1 below is, if anything, likely to be an overestimate
(see Section 5.4 for a more detailed discussion and summary). In Section 5.8 we discuss how some of
these remaining uncertainties might be resolved through access to additional and better data and the type
of analysis that would then be possible.
5. 2 Re-estimating the cost per QALY threshold using more recent data
The same methods of analysis can be applied to the econometric analysis of the 2008 expenditure and
2008 to 2010 mortality data (see Section 3.5.3 in Chapter 3 and Section B11 in Appendix B). The
differences between the 2006 analysis reported in Chapter 4 and the analysis of expenditure in 2008
reported below are the: i) total PBC expenditure; ii) estimated expenditure elasticities; iii) estimated
outcome elasticities; iv) observed PBC deaths by age and gender; and v) life expectancy by age and
gender. The other information about quality of life norms (see Section 4.3.1), disease related decrements
in quality of life (see Section 4.3.2) and the information from GBD about incidence and duration of
disease remain unchanged between 2006 and 2008 (we discuss how these estimates might be improved
through access to more recent and better data in Section 5.8).
It should be noted that important improvements were made to the classification and collection of PBC
expenditure data that took place after the 2006 data were collected. Therefore, the differences in
threshold estimates between 2006 and 2008 partly reflect this (see Section 3.5.4 and B11.4 in Appendix B)
so should not be over interpreted. The results of the analysis of 2007 and 2008 expenditure are
comparable in this respect, providing insights into how the threshold might change over time and with
changes in the overall budget. The implications of this analysis on the need for periodic reassessment are
discussed in Section 5.6. For the purposes of this methodological research the 2008 expenditure and
2008 to 2010 mortality data were the latest to be analysed. Since it is the analysis of the most recent data
that is of most policy relevance, our discussion throughout this Section is based on analysis of 2008
expenditure, although the same sensitivity analysis (see Section 5.3) and analysis of uncertainty (see
Section 5.4) is available for 2006 and 2007 expenditure (see Section C.2.5 in Appendix C).
It is unnecessary to repeat all the analysis presented in Sections 4.2 to 4.4 (the details of each stage of the
analysis of 2008 data can be found in Appendix C). Instead the results of the three sequential steps of
analysis are summarised in Table 5.1. They include: i) the cost per life year (column 1)93 based on the
methods of analysis outlined in Section 4.2; ii) the cost per life year adjusted for quality of life (column
93 The cost per life year threshold in column 1 can be interpreted as cost per QALY thresholds conditional on the
assumption that all life years gained or lost are lived in full health but the quality of life with disease is zero
(equivalent to death).
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2)94 based on the methods of analysis outlined in Section 4.3; and iii) the cost per QALY (column 3)
based on the methods of analysis outlined in Section 4.4.2. These estimates, in column 3, take account of
the likely effects of changes in expenditure on quality of life during disease as well as the effects
associated with mortality and life years; making best use of available information, while the assumptions
required appear more reasonable than the other alternatives available. For this reason these estimates
remain our central or best estimates for all the waves of expenditure and mortality data.
Table 5.1: Summary of cost per QALY threshold estimates (expenditure in 2008)
[1] [2] [3]
QoL associated with life extension: 1 Norm
QoL during disease: 0 0 Based on burden
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 4.5 QALY ~ 3.8 QALY ~ 15.0 QALY
big 4 PBC's £10,220 £12,338 £4,872 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £23,360 £28,045 £8,308 [2]
All 23 PBCs £25,214 £30,270 £12,936 [3]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality:
Remainder of
disease duration
Remainder of
disease duration
Remainder of
disease duration
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 4.5 QALY ~ 3.8 QALY ~ 15.0 QALY
big 4 PBC's £5,083 £5,811 £1,194 [4]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £8,579 £9,861 £1,175 [5]
All 23 PBCs £9,260 £10,644 £2,018 [6]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted: 2 YLL 2 YLL 2 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 2 QALY ~ 1.4 QALY ~ 6.6 QALY
big 4 PBC's £23,346 £26,138 £11,040 [7]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £52,936 £59,151 £18,827 [8]
All 23 PBCs £57,136 £63,844 £29,314 [9]
The estimate of £8,308 per QALY (column 3, line 2) is restricted to the effects of changes in expenditure
in the 11 PBCs where outcome elasticities can be estimated. However, these PBCs only account for a
proportion of a change in overall expenditure (approximately 50%, see Table 5.2 below). As was
explained in Section 4.4.2 and 4.4.3; the QALY threshold of £12,936(column 3, line 3) uses the estimated
proportionate effects of expenditure on the QALY burden of disease in the 11 PBCs as a surrogate for
proportionate effects in the others, (i.e., assuming that the effects that can be observed will be similar to
those that cannot) and represents our central or best estimate. As in previous sections, no health effects
are assigned to PBC23 or 22 (General Medical Services and Social Care) on the basis that any health
effects of this expenditure would be recorded in the other PBCs.95 Although this estimate of £12,936
reflects changes in undiscounted QALYs associated with changes in expenditure, discounting the quality
adjusted life year effects only increases the cost per QALY threshold to £13,141.96
94 The cost per life year adjusted for quality of life in column 2 can be interpreted as cost per QALY threshold
conditional on the assumption that the quality of life with disease is zero (equivalent to death); effectively ignoring
any effects on those who survive with disease.
95 It would be inappropriate to assign all the change in GMS expenditure to the estimate of cost per QALY based
only on the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities because it would imply that GMS only contributes to these PBCs.
Restricting attention to the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities but allocating part of the change in GMS expenditure
to them based on their proportional share of changes in overall expenditure would yield a slightly higher cost per
QALY than reported in line 2. It should be noted that including changes in GMS expenditure but not assigning
health effects to this PBC is likely to overestimate the threshold because any health effects associated with GMS or
PBC 22, Social Care (see Footnote 48), will not be reflected in the estimated outcome elasticities of other PBCs unless the effects
happen to be correlated with changes in expenditure in those PBCs.
96
The effects of discounting are modest because: i) the health effects of a change in expenditure are restricted to
one year (where no discounting is necessary); ii) most of the total QALY effect occurs in that year; iii) it is only some
of the life year effects (adjusted for quality) of a change in mortality in that year that occur in future years that need
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The upper and lower bounds for the cost per QALY thresholds in column 3 in Table 5.1 are based on
making the necessary assumptions about duration of health effects of expenditure and how long a death
might be averted optimistic (providing the lower bound for the threshold) or conservative (an upper
bound for the threshold). The lower bound (lines 4 to 6) is based on assuming that the health effects of
expenditure are not restricted to one year but apply to the whole of the remaining disease duration of the
population at risk in PBCs during one year. Although this combines optimistic assumptions, it is possible
that at least some part of a change in expenditure may prevent disease so will have an impact on
populations that are incident to PBCs in the future. Such effects are not captured in any of the estimates
presented in this report so all estimates are conservative in this respect (the possibility of a longer and
more complex lag structure for the effects of expenditure are discussed in Section 5.8). The upper bound
(lines 7 to 9) is based on the combination of assuming that health effects are restricted to one year for the
population currently at risk and that any death averted is only averted for 2 years (see Section 4.2.5).
The estimated QALY effects associated with each PBC can be decomposed into that part due to life year
effects adjusted for quality and that part associated with effects on quality of life during disease. The
proportionate share of these different aspects of the total health effect are the same as reported in Table
4.19; where those PBCs for which mortality is the major concern have a much greater share of total
QALY effects associated with avoidance of premature death (e.g., PBC2 and PBC10) compared to those
where quality of life is the major concern (e.g., PBC 7).
5.3 Which PBCs matter most?
Which PBCs have the greatest influence on the overall threshold depends, to a large extent, on how a
change in overall expenditure is allocated to the different PBCs (see column 1 in Table 5.2),97 i.e., those
that account for a greater share of the change in expenditure will tend to have the greater influence.
However, it also depends on the proportionate effect of a change in PBC expenditure on the QALY
burden associated with the PBC98 and the scale of the QALY burden (for the population at risk)
associated with the type of diseases that make up each PBC99. These determine the cost per QALY
associated with each PBC (see column 4 below and Table C80 in Appendix C). The share, attributable to
each PBC, of the total health effects of a change in overall expenditure (see column 2 of Table 5.2) is the
combined effect of all of these. The proportionate impact on the overall cost per QALY threshold of a
10% change in PBC health effects in column 3 gives an indication of how sensitive the overall threshold
is to the estimate of health effects associated with each PBC. It starts to suggest where further efforts to
improve estimates of the overall threshold might be most usefully directed.
to be discounted; and iv) these need to be discounted only over 4.6 years on average (see Tables C89 and C90 in
Appendix C for discounted values).
97 Which is determined by the estimated expenditure elasticities (the proportionate change in PBC expenditure due
to a change in overall expenditure) and total PBC expenditure (see Chapter 3 and section B11 in Appendix B)
98 Which are determined by the outcome elasticities (the proportionate effects on mortality and YLL of a
proportionate change in PBC expenditure (see Section 4.4.2 for details of how these estimates can be applied to
measures of QALY burden in all PBCs).
99 See Section 4.4 for how PBC level effects can be allocated to the contributing ICD codes and how measures of
QALY burden for each ICD code can be established
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Table 5.2: Impact of each PBC on the overall cost per QALY threshold (2008)
PBC
% Share of
change in
overall
expenditure
% Share of total
health effects
(QALY)
Elasticity
of the
threshold*
PBC cost per
QALY
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 4.47 3.41 0.34 £16,997
10 Circulatory 7.59 13.95 1.40 £7,038
11 Respiratory 4.58 29.67 2.97 £1,998
13 Gastro-intestinal 3.20 5.68 0.57 £7,293
1 Infectious diseases 3.27 2.03 0.20 £20,829
4 Endocrine 1.89 7.84 0.78 £3,124
7 Neurological 5.98 14.11 1.41 £5,480
17 Genito-urinary 4.64 1.37 0.14 £43,813
16 Trauma & injuries* 7.70 0 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 6.83 0.03 <0.01 £2,969,208
3 Disorders of Blood 2.06 2.82 0.28 £9,419
5 Mental Health 17.86 12.32 1.23 £18,744
6 Learning Disability 1.04 0.09 0.01 £149,883
8 Problems of Vision 1.94 0.55 0.05 £45,788
9 Problems of Hearing 0.87 1.81 0.18 £6,239
12 Dental problems 2.89 0.88 0.09 £42,472
14 Skin 1.97 0.25 0.03 £101,042
15 Musculo skeletal 3.63 3.00 0.30 £15,628
20 Poisoning and AE 0.93 0.11 0.01 £113,546
21 Healthy Individuals 3.53 0.09 0.01 £526,771
22 Social Care Needs 3.00 0 0 NA
23 Other 10.14 0 0 NA
* The proportionate change in the overall cost per QALY threshold due to a 10% increase or decrease in the health effects
associated with the PBC. These elasticities are correct up to a 50% change in health effects.
Although the 11 PBCs where outcome elasticities could be estimated only account for 50% of the change
in overall expenditure they account for 78% of the overall health effects. Within this group some PBCs
contribute more than others. For example, PBC11 (Respiratory) accounts for a greater share of total
health effects and has a higher elasticity (2.97%) than PBC10 (Circulatory) even though the latter
accounts for a greater part of a change in overall expenditure. The reason is that the cost per QALY
associated with changes in expenditure in PBC11 is lower than PBC10 and much lower than the overall
threshold (so generates more health effects for the same, or even smaller, change in expenditure).100 The
elasticities in column 3 are instructive, e.g., the elasticity for PBC11 suggests that even if the health effects
of a change in expenditure in this PBC were over estimated by 30% the overall threshold would increase
by 8.90% to £14,089. All other PBCs have much less influence in this respect. Nonetheless PBC10 is
important compared to others as it does contribute a large share of total health effects and has one of the
highest elasticities (1.40%).101 Also PBC7 (Neurological), although accounting for a smaller share of a
change in overall expenditure, does contribute a large share of total health effects with an elasticity of
1.81% and a relatively low cost per QALY associated with changes in PBC expenditure.102
100 Within PBC11: Chronic lower respiratory diseases (J40-J47) accounts for 85% of the QALY effects of a change
in PBC expenditure; Lung diseases due to external agents (J60-J70), 4%; Other diseases of upper respiratory tract
(J30-J39), 4%; Other respiratory diseases principally affecting the interstitium (J80-J84), 1%; and Other diseases of
pleura (J90-J94), 1%. The other ICD codes each contribute less but together account for 4% of the health effects of
a change in PBC11 expenditure.
101
Within PBC10: Ischemic heart diseases (I20-I25) accounts for 55% of the QALY effects of a change in PBC
expenditure; Cerebrovascular diseases (I60-I69), 21%; Other forms of heart disease (I30-I52), 7%; Congenital
malformations and deformations circulatory system (Q20-Q28), 3%; and Diseases of veins, lymphatic vessels and
lymph nodes, not elsewhere classified (I80-I89), 3%. The other ICD codes each contribute less but together account
for 8% of the health effects of a change in PBC10 expenditure.
102
Within PBC7 Episodic and paroxysmal disorders (G40-G47) accounts for 73% of the QALY effects of a change
in PBC expenditure; Extrapyramidal and movement disorders (G20-G26), 8%; Other degenerative diseases of the
nervous system (G30-G32), 5%; Other disorders of the nervous system (G90-G99), 3%; and Nerve, nerve root and
plexus disorders (G50-G59), 2%. The other ICD codes each contribute less but together account for 9% of the
health effects of a change in PBC7 expenditure.
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The other 11 PBCs, where outcome elasticities could not be estimated (excluding PBC 23, GMS) account
for a large part of a change in overall expenditure (40%) but only 22% of the overall health effects, i.e.,
the cost per QALYs associated with a change in expenditure in these PBCs is, in general, higher. Of
course, we have not directly observed quality of life effects in these PBCs but inferred them from the
proportionate effects that we can observe. Insofar as investment and disinvestment opportunities in these
PBCs might have been more valuable (offered greater improvement in quality of life) than suggested by
the implied PBC thresholds in column 4, the overall QALY effects will tend to be underestimated and the
overall cost per QALY threshold will be overestimated.
PBC5 (Mental Health Disorders) accounts for a large proportion of the change in overall expenditure
(18%), contributes most to the overall health effects (12%) and has the highest elasticity (1.23%)
compared to these other PBCs. The cost per QALY associated with this PBC (£18,744) is based on an
extrapolation of estimated proportionate effects to a population based measures of QALY burden in this
PBC, rather than observations of the direct impact of changes in expenditure on quality of life in the
types of diseases that make up the PBC. Evidence that is available suggests that the investment and
disinvestment opportunities in this PBC may have been more valuable than this implied cost per QALY.
A review of the evidence of the cost effectiveness of the investment and disinvestment opportunities that
have been available in mental health during this period is reported in Addendum 3 Appendix C. A search
for evidence about interventions in those ICD codes that contribute most to the PBC (based on
prevalence or the contribution to the variance in PBC costs), suggests that pharmacological, psychological
and social interventions for depression are all more cost effective (in general much less than £10,000 per
QALY) than the overall threshold and significantly more valuable than the implied QALY threshold for
this PBC. Based on the contribution that each ICD makes to variance in HES costs across PCTs, it is
schizophrenia that contributes most.103 Although interventions that may have been invested or
disinvested in schizophrenia are, in general, less cost effective (in general less than £24,000 per QALY)
than those available for depression, they do not appear any less valuable than the implied cost per QALY
of this PBC in Table 5.2.104
It is very important not to misinterpret the cost per QALY associated with each PBC in column 4 of
Table 5.2. These are not cost effectiveness thresholds. That is, they do not represent the QALYs likely
to be forgone due to costs imposed (e.g., by the approval of a new and more costly technology by NICE)
in a particular PBC because NHS expenditure is not devolved and constrained to PBC specific budgets.
Rather the overall expenditure is constrained through government decisions about public expenditure,
but within the NHS resources (at the margin at least) can be reallocated in anything other than the very
short run across different activities and disease areas. For example, the additional net NHS costs of
approving a new but more costly technology in PBC10 (Circulatory) will not be restricted to the
circulatory PBC (7.6% will, see column 1 in Table 5.2) but are likely to be reallocated in the same way as
an equivalent reduction in overall expenditure (i.e., the shares of a change in overall expenditure in
103 HES costs only account for 16.8% of total costs in PBC5 and only explain 5.9% of the variance PBC in costs
across PCTs (see foot notes 73, 80 and 127), therefore it seems unlikely that a large proportion of investment and
disinvestment in this PBC has been associated with these ICD codes.
104 Although the published evidence suggests that investment and disinvestment opportunities in this PBC tend to
be much more valuable than the implied cost per QALY, we have little information on the particular investments
and disinvestments that were actually made by PCTs. The review of local data sources (see Addendum 2, Appendix
C) revealed very little routinely collected information about specific investments and disinvestments beyond more
aggregate measures of spending. In common with other PBCs, there will inevitably be inefficient, ineffective or
even iatrogenic practice (e.g., due to poor diagnosis and inappropriate prescribing). Insofar as these types of
activities are sensitive to changes in PBC expenditure this will tend to increase the cost per QALY associated with
changes in expenditure in this PBC. Whether both the extent of these inefficiencies and their sensitivity to changes
in expenditure are sufficient to increase the cost per QALY above £18,744 is unclear, although it seems unlikely.
Note that the effects of the scale and sensitivity to expenditure of inefficient or even harmful practice in the other
PBCs where outcome equations could be specified are already captured in the estimated outcome elasticities.
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column 1).105 Therefore, the relevant cost per QALY threshold for a technology in the Circulatory PBC
is not £7,038 but the overall threshold of £12,936.
The primary purpose of Table 5.2 is to identify which PBCs have greatest influence on the estimate of the
overall threshold and examine whether the implied values for the other PBCs is likely to lead to under or
over estimation. There are differences in the implied cost per QALY ratio between PBCs, including
some with very high implied cost per QALY (e.g., PBCs 18, 19, 20 and 21 reflecting small estimated
health effects in the denominator), although they have limited influence on the overall estimate of the
threshold. These differences in the implied cost per QALY across PBCs should not be over interpreted.
For example, these differences could be interpreted as evidence of a misallocation of resources (e.g.,
reallocating expenditure from PBCs with higher to lower cost per QALY would improve health) if the
purpose of the NHS and PCTs is to maximise unweighted QALYs. However, rather than a misallocation
these differences (between the first 11 PBCs) might indicate that the actual quality of life effects of
expenditure are proportionally greater (lower) than mortality effects in those with higher (lower) cost per
QALY, or that the health effects in these PBCs are more socially valuable with a greater implicit weight
attached to QALYs gained or lost in these areas (e.g., maternity and neonates). The higher cost per
QALY for the remaining PBCs may reflect that the actual quality of life effects of changes in expenditure
maybe more than proportional to QALY burden (e.g., evidence from mental health PBC suggests that
investment and disinvestment opportunities may have been more valuable that the implied PBC cost per
QALY of £18,744). Also it was not possible to estimate the health effects of changes in PBC expenditure
simultaneously across PBCs. Consequently the effects of changes in expenditure in one PBC may be
recorded in ICD codes relevant to other PBCs, so it is possible that PBCs with higher implied cost per
QALY may be contributing health effects to other (recipient) PBCs.106
Whether these differences are regarded as evidence of a misallocation or not, however, is unimportant for
an estimate of a cost per QALY threshold that reflects the health effects of how changes in overall
expenditure are currently expected to be allocated. Whether nor not PCTs do or should maximise
QALYs has no influence on the current estimate of the threshold, given that NICE currently uses an
unweighted QALY threshold.107 Also, insofar as local objectives do change or national policy does
reallocate expenditure, the impact of these and other changes that will take place over time will be
reflected in estimates of the threshold in subsequent periods once these changes have taken place (see
Section 5.6).
105 In principle at least, with sufficient panel data which would allow a more complex lag structure and simultaneous
estimation of expenditure and outcome elasticities across all PBCs; it might be possible to isolate the short run
effects of a change in expenditure in one PBC across all the others. In the absence of such data and so long as
adjustments are expected take place quickly relative to the time horizon of the effects of the new technology on
NHS cost and outcomes (i.e., marginal NHS resource can be reallocated in the medium term) using the overall cost
per QALY threshold for technologies relevant to any PBC is reasonable and more so than other alternative
assumptions that might be made.
106 The health effects of a change in expenditure in a contributory PBC will not be reflected in the estimated health
effects of change in expenditure in the recipient PBCs unless they happen to be correlated with changes in
expenditure in the recipient PBCs, i.e., all changes in expenditure are assigned to PBCs but all the health effects
may not be. This suggests that the health effects are likely to be underestimated and the overall threshold
underestimated.
107 The quite general theoretical framework in Chapter 3 assumes that PCTs maximise some unspecified welfare
function where health (not necessarily QALYs) is one of its arguments (see Section 3.3). The type of econometric
analysis conducted would remain the same irrespective of the measure of health or weights that might be place on
different type of health gained or lost. The assumption required is that mortality is related to the health argument
however health might be specified. We make no comment on whether QALY maximisation ought to be the
objective of PCTs, nor is that required to estimate a threshold for NICE which is currently based on cost per
(unweighted) QALY.
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5.4 How uncertain are the estimates and what are the implications?
There are a number of sources of uncertainty which contribute to an assessment of how uncertain a
central or best estimate of the cost per QALY threshold might be. There are three reasons why
uncertainty in the estimate of the threshold might be of policy interest: i) the uncertainty in the
parameters that determine the threshold might influence the mean or expected value of the threshold if
they have a non linear relationship to the threshold or when they have a multi linear relationship but are
correlated with each other; ii) the consequences of over or underestimating the threshold differ so the
uncertainty may have an influence on the extent to which a policy threshold (a single value that can be
compared to the incremental cost effectiveness ratio of a new technology) should differ from the mean or
expected value of the central or best estimate; and iii) in conjunction with other methods of analysis108[98]
it can indicate the potential value of gathering more information to improve these estimates in the future.
Of course, hypothesis testing and the traditional rules of inference associated with it, such as statistical
significance, p-values and confidence intervals, have no relevance when making unavoidable decisions
about policy relevant quantities based on information currently available and the best use thereof.[99]
An assessment of parameter uncertainty
Two sets of parameters are critical to the threshold, the expenditure elasticities estimated for each of the
23 PBCs, and the outcome elasticities estimated for 11 of these. These parameters are estimated with
uncertainty, indicated by the standard errors on the relevant coefficients in the econometric analysis
outlined in Chapter 3 and detailed in Appendix B. Since these statistical models estimate coefficients
using normality on the relevant scale, normal distributions can be assigned to each of these estimated
coefficients, each with a mean and standard deviation based on the results of the econometric analysis.109
These distributions, represent the uncertainty in the mean estimate of each of the parameters and can be
propagated through the various calculations required to estimate and overall cost per QALY threshold
(i.e., through the sequence of analysis detailed in Section 4.2 to 4.4) using Monte Carlo simulation which
randomly samples from the assigned distributions. The results of each random sample represent one
possible realisation of the overall threshold, given the uncertainty in estimates of the mean parameter
values that determine it. By repeatedly sampling, a distribution of potential values that the overall
threshold might take can be revealed. The results of this simulation are illustrated in Figure 4.3 which
illustrates the cumulative probability density function for a cost per QALY threshold based only on the
11 PBCs with estimated outcome elasticities and for all 23 PBCs. It represents the probability (on the y-
axis) that the threshold lies below a particular value.
It has already been noted that restricting attention only to changes in expenditure in those 11 PBCs where
an outcome elasticity can be estimated results in a much lower estimate of the threshold than considering
all changes in expenditure across all PBCs This lower estimate of £8,308 per QALY is much less
uncertain but these PBCs only account for 50% of a change in overall expenditure, so it is the higher
estimate, for all 23PBCs, that is of most relevance for policy (see Sections 4.4.3 and 5.2). The fact that
this estimate is more uncertain simply reflects the quality and quantity of data currently available. Since
useful analysis should endeavour to faithfully characterise uncertainty in policy relevant quantities, rather
than select those quantities or questions for which precise estimates are possible, it is the more uncertain
estimate for all 23 PBCs that should be of primarily interest. The values that are used to generate Figure
5.1 are available in Table C81 in Appendix C. They indicate that the probability that the overall threshold
is less than £20,000 per QALY is 0.89 and the probability that is less than £30,000 is 0.97.
108 A form of value of information analysis could be applied to these estimates in subsequent research, ideally
capturing some of the other sources of uncertainty. Such analysis has firm foundations in statistical decision theory
and has been applied to health care decisions. More recently it has been applied to the decisions faced by NICE
when considering whether there is sufficient evidence to support the approval of a new technology
109 The Monte Carlo simulation is in essence Bayesian, where the standard errors from the frequentist econometric
analysis are used to assign normal prior distributions with means equal to the point estimates and a standard
deviation equal to the estimated standard errors. This is equivalent to a fully Bayesian analysis with initially
uninformative priors which are updated through the analysis of expenditure and mortality data.
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Figure 5.1: Cumulative probability density function for the cost per QALY threshold
The implications of uncertainty
Integrating this parameter uncertainty into the estimates of the overall threshold does not change the
mean or expected value of the cost per QALY threshold.110 This is to be expected as the expenditure and
outcome elasticities have a multi linear relationship to the overall threshold and the analysis sampled
independently from the distributions assigned to estimated coefficient. We did investigate the potential
correlation between the expenditure and outcome elasticities by repeatedly re-estimating both based on
randomly sampling with replacement the 152 PCTs - creating bootstrapped data sets where the original
PCTs could appear more than once or not at all in the re-sampled data. This analysis indicated a small
positive correlation between outcome and expenditure elasticities in 4 PBCs using 2006 expenditure data
(see Section B.10 in Appendix B). Such levels of correlation will tend to have a modest but positive
influence on the mean value of the cost per QALY threshold.111
Uncertainty in the estimate of the overall threshold means that a policy threshold set at its mean or
expected value may be inappropriate. Insofar as the consequences (to the NHS) of under or over
estimation are symmetrical, then the expected or mean value would be the appropriate policy threshold
irrespective of the scale of uncertainty. However, the consequences of overestimating the threshold are
more serious than underestimating it. This is illustrated in Figure 5.2 which is similar to Figure 2.1
presented in Chapter 2.
110 Note that the mean of the simulated values is not the mean of the sampled ratios but the ratio of the mean
sampled values for the numerator and denominator. Deterministic and simulated values are the same for 2006, 2007
and 2008 expenditure data (other than negligible Monte Carlo error from 1000 samples). Also note that in
constructing the cumulative probability density function in Figure 5.1 and the histograms of values in Appendix C it
is important to identify whether sampled negative values favour a low value for the threshold or and unbounded one
(there were no negative values sampled in the simulation of values for all 23 PBCs).
111
Positive correlation suggests that a high spend elasticity will be associated with a high outcome elasticity (i.e., less
negative, implying a smaller heath effect of a change in expenditure) resulting in a higher estimate of the threshold.
It also suggests that when spend elasticity is low outcome elasticity will also tend to be lower (i.e., more
negative, implying a larger health effect of a change in expenditure) resulting in a lower estimate of the threshold.
Although realisations of spend elasticities higher and lower than the mean estimate are equally likely, higher spend
elasticities provide a greater weight associated with higher estimates of the threshold (where outcome elasticity is
also high) when calculating the mean threshold. For these reasons a positive correlation will tend to increase the
mean estimate of the threshold.
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Figure 5.2: Consequences of over and underestimating the overall threshold
It shows the impact on net health benefit if the central estimate of £20,000 is in fact an overestimate and
the threshold should be £10,000 per QALY. In these circumstances the technology should not have
been approved at price P2. This overestimation leads to a loss of net health benefit of 2 QALYs as a
consequence. Alternatively, the central estimate of £20,000 may be an underestimate and the threshold
should be £30,000 per QALY. In these circumstances the technology could just as easily have been
rejected or approved based on the central estimate and price P2. However, if the threshold is £30,000 per
QALY rather than £20,000 it should be approved. If it was rejected this underestimation leads to a loss
of net health benefit of 2/3 of a QALY as a consequence, i.e., less than the loss associated with the same
scale of overestimation. If the scale of under or overestimation of the central estimate is equally likely (the
distribution of possible values of the threshold is symmetrical) then using the mean or expected value as a
policy threshold (one that can be compared to the incremental cost effectiveness ratio of a new
technology) will lead to a loss of net benefit.112 A policy threshold that represents the maximum the NHS
can afford to pay for QALY gains offered by a technology will be lower than the mean of the cost per
QALY threshold (i.e., lower than £12,936) to compensate for the more serious consequences of
overestimating the true value.113 Importantly this remains the case even if effects are expressed in terms
of their equivalent consumption value (net money benefit based on willingness to pay) rather than a
measure of net health benefit.114
112 Only a negative skew in the distribution of the threshold would tend to offset the implications of the non linear
relationship between net health benefit and the value of the threshold. However, in this case the mean estimate is
very similar but slightly greater than median values (see Section C.2.3.1 in Appendix C) indicating a small positive
skew, which reinforces the implication that the policy threshold should be below the expected or mean value.
113 Rather than solve for this type of certainty equivalent a probabilistic analysis of the cost-effectiveness of a
technology which integrated the uncertainty associated with the cost per QALY threshold as well, would take
account of these issues, i.e., the technology would be cost-effective if it offered the highest expected net benefit
when averaged over all Monte Carlo simulations, including sampling from the distribution of the cost per QALY
threshold.
114
Although health benefits can be expressed in terms of consumption (in money) using some consumption value
of the health effects (willingness to pay), NHS costs must be first converted into health forgone, using an uncertain
estimate of the threshold, before these are also expressed in consumption (money terms) using the same
consumption value of health, i.e., the non linear effect of the threshold remains unavoidable. Failure to account for
the threshold and the implications of its uncertainty would only be reasonable in a heath care system where
expenditure was not constrained and/or all costs fell on private consumption.
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How much lower a policy threshold should be set below the mean or expected value depends on three
considerations: i) the scale of uncertainty in the estimate of the threshold (greater the uncertainty implies a
lower policy threshold); ii) the scale of the incremental costs relative to incremental health benefits
offered by the technology (policy threshold should only be equal to mean estimate if there are no
additional NHS costs associated with the technology); and iii) the skewness of the distribution of cost per
QALY threshold (a positive skew tends to offset these effects - see Figure C8 in Appendix C). The
overall scale of the impact on a policy threshold will be specific to the additional NHS costs associated
with a technology as well as the other sources of uncertainty discussed below and possible correlations
between expenditure and outcome elasticities discussed above. We have not quantitatively integrated all
these considerations in to an analysis of an appropriate policy threshold, although this may be possible in
future research.
Structural uncertainty
The uncertainty associated with the parameters estimated in the econometric models is only one, and not
necessarily the most important, source of uncertainty associated with the cost per QALY threshold. The
parameter uncertainty presented above is conditional on the econometric model being correct. In
particular, that the instruments used to identify the causal effect on health of changes in expenditure are
valid. Although all the models passed the relevant tests of validity, there remains some uncertainty about
the validity of the instruments used, i.e., there remains structural or model uncertainty (see Chapter 3 for
an overview).[100] For this reason we undertook an analysis of how sensitive estimates of outcome
elasticities might be to instrumental validity (see Section B9.4 in Appendix B). We were also able to
specify a distribution for the measure of instrumental validity used in this sensitivity analysis, i.e., how
likely each value might be (see Section B9.5 in Appendix B). Therefore, there are two levels of
uncertainty: i) the parameter uncertainty (uncertainty in estimated coefficients given a particular level of
instrumental validity) and the structural uncertainty in the level of instrumental validity. Both sources of
uncertainty were integrated by randomly sampling the distribution of measures of instrumental validity
and then, conditional on this sampled value, re-estimating outcome equations and sampling the estimated
coefficients. This analysis in Section B9.5 of Appendix B shows that model or structural uncertainty
constitutes a greater part of the overall uncertainty associated with the outcome elasticities, so fully
integrating this source of uncertainty is likely to have a significant impact on the extent to which a policy
threshold should be lower than the mean or expected value of the cost per QALY threshold.
Importantly, this additional structural uncertainty has little effect on the point estimates of the outcome
elasticities, i.e., the central estimate of the cost per QALY threshold is robust to uncertainty in
instrumental validity in the econometric models.115
Other sources of uncertainty
Of course the parameter and structural uncertainty associated with the econometrics work outlined in
Chapter 3 is itself only one source of uncertainty associated with the estimated cost per QALY threshold.
Each of the steps of analysis in Section 4.2 to 4.4 explored the different ways routinely available data
could be used and how additional information could improve the estimates. We identified a preferred
analysis (or scenario) at each stage based on which made the best use of available information, whether
the assumptions required appeared more reasonable than the other alternatives available, and which
provided a more complete picture of the likely health effects of a change in expenditure. Insofar as the
preferred analysis is the only plausible scenario, there would be no other sources of uncertainty.
115
There are of course other unquantified sources of structural uncerinty in any statistical model. In this case the
underling model is based on a production function for health consistent with Cobb-Douglas, which has firm
theoretical foundations and has been widely used in health and elsewhere. Although it might be possible to test
more flexible function forms (also founded in economic theory) to quantify this other source of structural
uncertainty, there are no reason to believe that more flexible functional forms would necessarily increase or reduce
the estimates of outcome elasticities.
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However, other assumptions and judgments are possible, which although they may be judged less credible
might nonetheless have some probability of being the most credible (given evidence currently available).
Therefore, there will be uncertainty between these alternative scenarios as well as within each (the
parameter and model uncertainty described above).[98] Although in principle this can be integrated into
the analysis even in the absence of data to test alternative views[101] we do not do so here since
assigning probabilities to alternative scenarios would be somewhat speculative and inevitably disputed.
Instead we offer a summary of the qualitative considerations. Of course any increase in the uncertainty
associated with the central estimate of the cost per QALY will impact on the extent to which a policy
threshold should be lower than the mean. However, a critical issue is whether consideration of other
scenarios might change this central estimate, e.g., if scenarios that lead to a lower estimate are judged
more credible than those that lead to higher ones. In other words the question is whether on balance the
central or best estimate of £12,936 in Table 5.1 is likely to be an under or overestimate of the cost per
QALY threshold.
Most of the considerations have been discussed in detail throughout Chapter 4 so are only briefly
summarised here. The key assumptions made in Chapter 4 that underpin the central estimate of the cost
per QALY threshold reported in Table 5.1 are briefly summarised in Box 1, including brief indication
why such an assumption was required, the likely qualitative effect that each is likely to have on estimates
for the health effects of changes in expenditure and where these are introduced in Chapter 4.
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Box 5.1: Summary of assumptions and their likely impact on the central estimate of £12,936 per QALY
Assumption Justification Likely impact on estimates Reference
1. Deaths averted by a change in
expenditure returns an individual to
the mortality risk of the general
population (matched for age and
gender).
No data to directly estimate the effects on survival.
Appears more credible than restricting life year effects of
changes in mortality to the period of observed variation
in mortality outcomes.
Overestimate health effects Sections 4.1 and
4.2.5
Footnotes 34, 56
and 129
2. Expenditure and outcome elasticities
are uncorrelated.
Expenditure and outcome equations where estimated
separately.
If the small but positive correlation between outcome
and expenditure elasticises found in 4 PBCs was applied
to all PBCs it is likely to have a modest but positive
impact on the expected value of the threshold.
Section 5.6
Footnote 112
3. Mortality effects of changes in
expenditure (reported at PCT level)
can be applied to all mortality
recorded in a PBC.
Assuming no health effects of expenditure in areas of
disease where mortality is not recorded as PCT level or in
over 75 age groups appears arbitrary and less plausible
than basing estimates of effects that cannot be observed
on what can.
Although including over 75 mortality may overestimate
the effects on observed PBC deaths (if mortality in older
ages groups is less sensitive to changes in expenditure) it
has a much more limited impact on life year effects (i.e.,
including mortality above life expectancy reduces Net
YLL)
Sections 4.2.1,
4.2.2, 4.2.3 and
4.2.4
Footnotes 34, 50,
52
4. The PBC QALY effects are a
weighted average of effects within
each of the ICDs that contribute to
the PBC based on the proportion of
the total PBC population within each
contributing ICD codes.
PBC costs are not available at ICD level across PCTs.
Although costs from HES data are available at ICD level
they are only a small component of total PBC costs and
contribute very little to the variability in PBC costs across
PCTs especially when considering PBCs where mortality
effects could not be estimated.
There is no information about how changes in PBC
expenditure are allocated to particular ICD codes so the
effect is unclear. However, it may overestimate health
effects if investment within a PBC is focused on ICD
codes where expenditure has greater health effects and
disinvestment focuses on ICD codes with less health
effects.
Sections 4.4.1 and
4.4.2
Footnotes 73, 80
and 127
5. Health effects of changes in
expenditure are restricted to the
population at risk during one year.
It was not possible to estimate a longer and more
complex lag structure. Assuming that estimated health
effects could be applied to the whole remaining duration
of disease for the population at risk appears less
plausible.
Underestimate health effects Sections 4.1, 4.2.5,
4.4.3 and 5.8
Footnotes 33, 128
and 133
6. Health effects restricted to the PBC
in which expenditure changes. No
health effects associated with changes
in GMS expenditure (or PBC22,
Social Care).
It was not possible to estimate outcome equations for
PBCs simultaneously so estimated outcome elasticities do
not account for health effects due to changes in
expenditure in other PBCs.
Likely to underestimate health effects because effects of
changes in expenditure in contributory PBCs will not be
reflected in estimates of health effects in other (recipient)
PBCs unless they happen to be correlated with changes
in expenditure in these PBCs.
Sections 4.2.3,
4.2.5, 5.3 and 5.8
Footnotes 35, 46,
54, 93, 96, 107,
132 and 136
7.
8. Same proportional effect on QALY
burden of disease as the estimated
proportional effect on the life year
burden of disease.
Estimates of effects on mortality and life years are used
as a surrogate for effects on quality of life. Appears more
plausible than assuming no effects of NHS expenditure
on quality of life outcomes
May under estimate the quality of life effects of changes
in expenditure in these PBCs if effects are more than
proportional to mortality and life year effects or over
estimate them if they are less then proportional.
Sections 4.3.3 and
4.4.2
Footnote 64
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9. Life year effects are lived at a quality
of life that reflects a proportionate
improvement to the quality of life
with disease.
Consistent with using estimated mortality and life year
effects as a surrogate for more complete measure of
health outcome (QALYs). Appears more plausible than
assigning quality of life norms or a quality of life with
disease to life year effects.
This assumption is more conservative than assigning
quality of life norms to life years (assuming that all
disease is acute) but less conservative than assigning
quality of life with disease (assuming that all life years
would be lived in the diseased state until death)
Sections 4.3.3 and
4.4.2
Footnotes 64 and
75
10. Proportional effect on QALY burden
of disease in PBCs where mortality
effects could not be estimated is
assumed to be the same as the overall
proportional effect on the life year
burden of disease across those PBCs
where mortality effects could be
estimated.
Consistent with using estimated mortality and life year
effects as a surrogate for health effects (QALYs) where
mortality effects cannot be directly estimated. Appears
more plausible than assuming no health effects of NHS
expenditure in these PBCs.
May under estimate the QALY effects of changes in
expenditure in these PBCs if effects are more than
proportional to QALY burden of disease. Other
evidence suggests that the effect of this assumption
maybe to underestimate health effects in key PBCs
(Mental Health).
Sections 4.4.2,
4.4.3 and 5.3
Footnotes 82, 83
98, 130, 131 and
138
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On the one hand, there are some reasons why the health effects might be overestimated and the central
estimate of the QALY threshold underestimated (e.g., see items 1 to 4 in Box 5.1). Calculating the life
years lost that account for deaths that would have otherwise occurred as described in Section 4.2.3 and
4.2.4 is equivalent to assuming that those deaths averted by a change in expenditure returns the
individuals to the mortality risk of the general population (matched for age and gender) Although this
appears more credible than the alternative assumptions that could be made (e.g., restricting life year
effects of changes in mortality to the period of observed variation in mortality outcomes), it is likely to be
optimistic with respect to the life year effects of a changes in mortality, tending to underestimate the cost
per QALY threshold.
On the other hand there are a number of reasons why the central estimate might be overestimated (e.g.,
see assumptions 5 and 6 in Box 5.1). The health effects of a change in expenditure are restricted to the
population at risk during one year. This is undoubtedly pessimistic in three respects: i) it means that
effect on quality of life during disease only occur for one year (the effect of investment that might have
long term effects on quality of life, e.g., hip replacement are excluded); ii) mortality effects are also
restricted to one year, so the full effect investments that reduce mortality for patients throughout their
disease duration, not just in the first year, will not be captured; and iii) changes in expenditure that reduce
incidence into the at risk population in the future (i.e., prevention of disease) will not be captured either.
A more formal and longer lag structure in the estimation of outcome elasticities would be likely to capture
more health effects of a change in expenditure.
The effect of other assumptions that have been necessary are more ambiguous although some evidence
suggests their net effect maybe conservative with respect to health effects of changes in expenditure (e.g.,
assumptions 7 to 9 in Box 5.1). The observed effects of a change in expenditure on mortality and life
years in the 11 PBCs where outcome elasticities could be estimated was used as a surrogate for health
effects in the other 12 PBCs (excluding GMS), i.e., the estimated effects of a change in expenditure that
could be observed were used to inform those effects that currently, at least, cannot. This approach is not
necessarily optimistic with respect to overall health effects. In fact there are reasons to believe it may
underestimate them (overestimate the threshold). As discussed previously in Sections 4.4.3 and 5.2; if this
means of extrapolating from observed to unobserved effects is rejected then threshold estimate could be
based only on the health effects of changes in expenditure in those PBCs where outcome elasticities can
be estimated. This generates a much lower cost per QALY threshold (£8,308) even if that portion of
GMS expenditure was allocated to these 11 PBCs (see Section 4.2.5). Alternatively, taking account of the
large proportion of the change in expenditure allocated to the other 11 PBCs but assuming that there are
no health effects of expenditure in all these other PBCs is not plausible. The evidence that is available
about the value of investment and disinvestment opportunities in the most important of these other
PBCs (PBC 7 Mental Health Disorders), suggests that the health effects of changes in expenditure in this
PBC might be underestimated and the central estimate of the threshold overestimated (see Section 5.3
and Addendum 3 in Appendix C).
In addition, we have also shown that the uncertainty associated with our central estimate (from all
sources) means that an appropriate policy threshold is likely to be below its mean or expected value.
Finally, in Section 5.5 we explore how the threshold is likely to differ when considering opportunities to
make investments (i.e., an increase in overall expenditure, or cost saving accruing to the NHS) and when
disinvestment is required (a reduction in overall expenditure or costs imposed on the NHS). This analysis
shows that a cost per QALY threshold relevant to technologies which impose costs on the NHS is likely
to be less than our central estimate of £12,936. Therefore, although other assumptions and judgments
are possible that retain some level of plausibility, they do not all favour a higher threshold. Indeed, when
considered together, they suggest that on balance the central or best estimate of £12,936presented in
Table 5.1 is, if anything, likely to be an overestimate. In Section 5.8 we discuss how some of these
remaining uncertainties might be resolved through access to additional and better data and the type of
analysis that would then be possible.
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5.5 Impact of investment, disinvestment and non marginal effects
The central estimate of the cost per QALY threshold in Table 5.1 is based estimates of the health effects
of changes in expenditure across all 152 PCTs, some of which will be making investments (where
expenditure is increasing) and others making disinvestments (where expenditure is reduced or growing
more slowly). The cost per QALY threshold, however, is likely to differ across these different types of
PCTs. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3 where the total observed variation in expenditure includes the
LPSDFWRIGLVLQYHVWPHQW¨(HJZKHUHFRVWVDUHLPSRVHGRQWKH1+6E\WKHDSSURYDORIDPRUH
FRVWO\WHFKQRORJ\DQGLQYHVWPHQW¨(HJZKHUHFRVWVDYLQJVDUHDFFUXLQJWRWKH1+67KHFHQWUDO
estimate of the cost per QALY threshold is the health effect of a change in expenditure across this
variation in expenditure (k1)116. One would expect that, other things equal, more expenditure (expanding
the budget from B1) would increase health but at a diminishing rate. Therefore, the amount of health
displaced by disinvestment, or a reduction in expenditure, would be expected to be greater, i.e., the
WKUHVKROGDVVRFLDWHGZLWK¨(N1-) will be lower than the central estimate, k1. Equally, the health gained
from investments, or an increase in expenditure, would be expected to be lower, i.e., the threshold
DVVRFLDWHGZLWK¨(N1+) will be higher than k1.
Figure 5.3: Investment, disinvestment and budget impact
We have been able to examine this by re-estimating the outcome and expenditure elasticities separately
for those PCTs where their actual budget is under the target allocation from the Department of Health
resource allocation formula (i.e., those under greater financial pressure and more likely to be disinvesting
than investing), and those that are over target (under less financial pressure and more likely to be
investing than disinvesting). The detail of this analysis (based on 2006 expenditure and restricted to the
big 4 PBCs) are reported in Section B8.9 in Appendix B. The results confirm what would be expected
given Figure 5.3 and the discussion above - the outcome elasticities are smaller (in absolute terms) for all
4 PBCs in the group of PCTs above their target allocation and larger for all 4 PBCs in those below.
Therefore, the health effects of changes in expenditure are greater in all these PBCs when PCTs are under
more financial pressure and are more likely to be disinvesting then investing. The cost per life year
estimates for these PBCs are reported in Appendix B: £10,604 for all PCTs combined (k1); £8,441 for
those PCTs under their target allocation (i.e., k1DVVRFLDWHGZLWK²¨(DQGIRU3&7VRYHUWKHLU
116 What can be estimated is the health effect over the observed variation in expenditure. This will also be the true
marginal effect (tangency at a budget of B1) if health returns to expenditure diminish at a constant rate (the second
derivative is constant) as illustrated in Figure 5.3. Since nothing is truly marginal the important question is how the
threshold changes with the sign and scale of the non marginal budget impact associated with approval of a new
technology.
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target allocation (i.e., k1DVVRFLDWHGZLWK¨($OWKRXJKWKHVHFRVWSHUOLIH\HDUHVWLPDWHVDUHQRWEDVHG
on the same calculations as Section 4.2, they do start to indicate the scale of the effect on a threshold that
is most relevant for new technologies that impose net costs on the NHS.
Expenditure elasticities for these PBCs also differ between these groups of PCTs - they are higher for
those under their target allocation. These PBCs together consistently offer the greatest value in terms of
cost per death averted, life year or QALY (see Table 5.1 and 5.2). This suggests that budget impact not
only displaces more valuable activities within each PBC (outcome elasticities are larger) but that overall
expenditure tends to be reallocated to more valuable PBCs. The effect of this reallocation on the overall
threshold is not captured in the cost per life year estimate reported above, which are restricted to these 4
PBCs. Therefore, extending this type of analysis to all PBCs in future research is likely to show that the
effect on the cost per QALY threshold of both the sign and scale of changes in overall expenditure will
be greater. Subsequent work might enable a quantitative assessment of how the relevant threshold should
be adjusted for the scale of the budget impact of technologies appraised by NICE.
Although further work is needed to fully specify the quantitative effect of the scale of non marginal
impact of new technologies on an appropriate threshold, the qualitative impact seems clear. Firstly, the
central estimate of the threshold is likely to be an overestimate for all technologies which impose net
costs on the NHS (almost all technologies appraised by NICE have positive incremental NHS costs and
all effective technologies that will be subject to value based pricing will impose net costs on the NHS).[4,
5, 16] Secondly the appropriate threshold to apply should be lower for technologies which have a greater
impact on NHS costs.
5.6 How does the threshold change with overall expenditure?
The same methods of analysis can be applied to the econometric analysis of the 2007 expenditure and
2007 to 2009 mortality data (see Section B10 in Appendix B). This provides an opportunity to consider
how the cost per QALY threshold is likely to have changed from 2007 to 2008 as overall expenditure has
increased. This can provide some insights into how the threshold might be expected to change over time,
as, for example, overall expenditure changes and productivity in the NHS might be expected to rise with
innovation in health technologies, clinical practice and service delivery. This has implications for a
judgement about the appropriate the frequency of periodic reassessment of the cost per QALY threshold.
It is not necessary the case that the threshold will rise with overall expenditure or even with NHS prices.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.4 where the threshold at budget B1 is represented by k1. If overall
expenditure increases to B2 then, over things equal, the threshold would also be expected to increase (i.e.,
k1 now overestimates the health effects of a change in expenditure at B2).117 Increasing overall
expenditure from B1 to B2 is equivalent to eliminating the same amount of waste in Figure 5.4, i.e., by
reallocating resources devoted to activities unproductive of health. Again, other things equal, the
threshold would be expected to increase (k1 now overestimates the health effects of a change in
expenditure at B1) once the waste has been eliminated. However, insofar as the productivity of those
activities that are valuable to the NHS also improve through innovation in health technologies, clinical
practice and service delivery, the threshold will tend to fall. Figure 5.4 illustrates a situation where the
effects of eliminating waste (NHS stopping doing things it should not be doing) and, at the same time,
improving productivity (NHS getting better at doing things it should do) means that the overall threshold
is unchanged.
In making an assessment of whether the threshold is likely to increase with the NHS budget it is also
necessary to consider whether there is discretion over how additional resources can be spent. For
example, if any growth in the overall budget is spent on national initiatives or other activities that cannot
or cannot easily be disinvested, then the additional costs of technologies approved by NICE must be
accommodated by displacing other activities elsewhere. Therefore, it is growth in expenditure on more
117 Due to the diminishing marginal returns illustrated in Figure 5.4 (see section 5.5 for further explanation).
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discretionary parts of NHS expenditure and changes in the productivity and input prices of those health
care activities which more likely to be displaced which are most relevant.
Over recent years much of the real budget growth in the UK NHS has been devoted to national
initiatives that are not easily displaced, e.g. new contracts for General Practitioners and consultants,
national waiting time targets, information technology initiatives, etc.[102] It also includes Technology
Appraisal guidance issued by NICE itself, which has a funding mandate. Therefore, any real growth in
what remains may have been more modest, so it is more likely to have been offset by any growth in the
productivity of displaceable activities, e.g. drugs, devices, procedures and other services. Similarly,
although there has been a general rise in input prices for the UK NHS, much of this inflation has been
driven by staff as well as capital and overhead costs, some of which cannot be easily displaced. What are
more relevant are the prices of inputs which could be displaced, an important element of which is drug
prices. Although branded drug prices have tended to rise, at the same time there has been generic entry
on patent expiry with dramatic reductions in prices for important classes of drugs.[103] Therefore, it is
not self evident that the threshold has grown over recent years, despite real increases in the NHS budget.
Figure 5.4: Impact of changes in budget and productivity
The central estimates of the cost per QALY threshold for 2007 and 2008 expenditure years are reported
in Table 5.3. In comparing these estimates of the QALY threshold it should be noted that important
improvements were made to the classification and collection of PBC expenditure data that took place
after the 2006 data were collected. Therefore, the differences in threshold estimates for 2006 and 2007
partly reflect this (see 3.5.4 in Chapter 3 and B11.4 in Appendix B) so should not be over interpreted.
The results of the analysis of 2007 and 2008 expenditure are comparable in this respect.
Although overall expenditure increased by 6% between 2007 and 2008 which represented real growth of
2% in 2007 prices,118 the overall threshold for all 23 PBCs fell by 5% in nominal terms and by 8% in real
terms.
1182008 expenditure expressed in 2007 NHS prices based on 3.9% NHS inflation from the HCHS index  see
Section B11.5 in Appendix B.
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Table 5.3: Growth in the cost per QALY threshold (2007 to 2008)
The reasons are complex but reflect changes in productivity, which differs across PBCs (changes in
outcome elasticities), but also a general reallocation of a change in overall expenditure (changes in
expenditure elasticities) towards those PBCs that appear more valuable in 2008.119 Given the sources of
uncertainty described above, subtle differences between 2007 and 2008 should not be over interpreted.
However, this analysis does suggest that the overall threshold will not necessary increase with growth in
the real or even nominal NHS budget. In conjunction with the results of the analysis described in Section
5.4 it does suggest that the threshold is more likely to fall at a time when real budget growth is flat or
falling and PCTs find themselves under increasing financial pressure.
Within the NICE Technology Appraisal process, the future incremental costs of a technology are
expressed in real terms (at current prices) prior to discounting. Therefore, the estimates that are relevant
to NICE decisions are: i) the nominal threshold in the current year120 and ii) some assessment of the real
growth in the threshold over the time horizon where incremental NHS costs are incurred. If there is an
expectation of real growth (or fall) in the threshold over time then one way to incorporate this is through
a higher (lower) discount rate applied to future cost.[104] Indeed, an expectation of changes in the real
threshold over time also suggests something about the social rate of time preference heath revealed by
budget allocations decisions.[105] However, incorporating an expected growth or decline in the
threshold over time by adjusting discount rates is likely to be problematic once it is recognised that the
expected incremental costs imposed by a technology are rarely uniform over time.
This discussion and the results reported in Table 5.3 suggest that there is little empirical support for an
assumption that there will have been growth in the nominal threshold between 2008 and 2012.121 Growth
in the nominal or real threshold seems much less likely in the future with the prospect of reduced budget
growth, increased pressures to improve productivity and downward pressure on input prices. Since how
the nominal or real threshold is likely to change over time cannot be assumed to follow prices or overall
expenditure nor empirical estimates or theoretical predictions of a growth in the private consumption
value of health (willingness to pay), it becomes especially important to be able to regularly update
estimates of the cost per QALY threshold based on routinely available data (see section 5.8).
5.7 What type of health is forgone by approval of a new technology?
The methods of analysis described in Chapters 3 and 4 and discussed in this chapter can identify, not only
how many QALYs are likely to be forgone across the NHS as a consequence of approving a technology
which imposes incremental costs on the NHS, it can also indicate where those QALYs are likely to be
forgone and how they are made up, i.e., the additional deaths, life years lost (unadjusted and adjusted for
quality of life) and the quality of life impacts on those with disease.
For example, in 2011, NICE considered whether ranibizumab for the treatment of diabetic macular
oedema should be approved for widespread use in the NHS (TA237).[106] Initially this technology was
rejected by NICE on the grounds that, at its current price, it would be unlikely to be cost effective. In
119 See Table C55 and C82 in Appendix C for a summary of outcome and expenditure elasticities and total
expenditure by PBC in 2007 and 2008. Also compare Table C80 in Appendix C to Table 5.2 above for an indication
of these net effects on the share of health effects and changes in expenditure.
120 If the growth rate in the nominal threshold between 2007 and 2008 was applied the current 2012 threshold
would be expected to be £10,536
121 See above
Cost per QALY
threshold
(2007)
Cost per QALY
threshold
(2008)
Nominal
growth
(%)
Cost per QALY
threshold (2008)
2007 NHS prices
Real
growth
(%)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
big 4 PBC's £4,549 £4,872 7% £4,689 3%
11 PBCs (with mortality) £8,513 £8,308 -2% £7,996 -6%
All 23 PBCs £13,554 £12,936 -5% £12,450 -8%
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2012, however, a rapid review of TA237 approved ranibizumab if use was restricted to the most cost
HIIHFWLYHVXEJURXSWKRVHZLWKFHQWUDOUHWLQDOWKLFNQHVVPLFURPHWUHVDQGDIWHUD3DWLHQW$FFHVV
Scheme (PAS) for this subgroup of patients was offered (details of the PAS which provides a discounts
to the NHS is commercial in confidence).[107]
The appraisal and guidance documents[106-108]122 provide the information required to estimate the
additional NHS costs of treating this sub group of patients each year (see Addendum 4 to Appendix C for
details of this example). Up to 44,000 NHS patients would be eligible for treatment with ranibizumab
each year based on its licensed indication.[108] However, the subgroup of patients where ranibizumab
was ultimately approved is likely to be 23,000 each year. This suggests that the approval of ranibizumab
in this subgroup at the original appraisal price set in 2011 (i.e., without a PAS) would impose just over
£80m of additional NHS costs for treating the eligible population each year.
Based on the 2008 central estimate of the cost per QALY threshold (£12,936in Table 5.1) the approval of
ranibizumab without a PAS would have been likely to displace 6,184 QALYs elsewhere in the NHS.
However, the analysis which underpins the threshold estimate can also be used to identify where the
additional NHS cost of £80m are likely to impact and where and what type of health effects are likely to
be forgone. This is illustrated in Table 5.4. For example, the estimated expenditure elasticities and total
PBC expenditure indicates how these costs will tend to effect spending in each of the 23 PBCs (see
column 1). The estimated outcome elasticities allow this change in spending in each PBC to be translated
into a change in deaths and life year effects for the 11PBCs where mortality effects could be estimated
(see columns 2 and 3). Applying the estimated proportional effect on the mortality burden of disease to
measures of QALY (including the other PBCs) provides an estimate of the total QALY effect of the
change in spend in each PBC (see Column 4).123 The comparison of life year and total QALY effects
allows the distinction to be made between QALY effects due the life year effects of additional deaths and
QALY effects due only to quality of life (see column 5 and 6).
122 All relevant documentation is available at http://guidance.nice.org.uk/TA237 and
http://guidance.nice.org.uk/TA/Wave23/41
123 Although there was insufficient mortality available at PCT level to estimate outcome elasticities for the other
PBCs, the measure of QALY burden in some of these PBCs does include some mortality (based on ONS data).
Therefore, applying a proportionate effect to measures of QALY burden of will include some mortality and life year
effects although they represent only a small proportion of the total QALY effects.
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Table 5.4: Heath forgone across PBCs due to the approval of ranibizumab (£80m budget
impact)
change
in spend
(m)
Additional
Deaths
Life
years
forgone QALYs forgone
PBC PBC description
Total
QALYs
forgone
Due to
premature
death
Quality of
life effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
2 Cancer £3.58 30 300 211 195 16
10 Circulatory problems £6.07 182 928 863 590 273
11 Respiratory problems £3.67 107 129 1,835 80 1,754
13 Gastro-intestinal £2.56 21 197 351 129 222
Big 4 £16 340 1554 3259 995 2265
1 Infectious diseases £2.61 6 43 125 29 97
4 Endocrine problems £1.51 5 40 485 26 459
7 Neurological problems £4.78 10 52 873 34 838
17 Genito-urinary problems £3.71 18 26 85 17 68
16 Trauma & injuries £6.16 0 0 0 0 0
18+19 Maternity & neonates £5.46 0 3 2 1 1
11 PBCs £40 389 1717 4828 1101 3727
3 Disorders of Blood £1.65 3 13 175 9 166
5 Mental Health Disorders £14.29 23 103 762 67 696
6 Learning Disability £0.83 0 2 6 1 4
8 Problems of Vision £1.55 0 2 34 1 33
9 Problems of Hearing £0.70 0 1 112 1 111
12 Dental problems £2.31 0 0 54 0 54
14 Skin £1.57 2 9 16 6 10
15 Musculo skeletal system £2.90 3 14 186 9 176
20 Poisoning and AE £0.74 0 2 7 1 5
21 Healthy Individuals £2.83 0 1 5 1 5
22 Social Care Needs £2.40 0 0 0 0 0
23 Other £8.11 0 0 0 0 0
All (23 PBCs) £80 411 1864 6184 1197 4987
The results reported in Table 5.4 suggests that approval is likely to result in 411 additional deaths (most of
which are likely to occur in Circulatory, Respiratory and Cancer PBCs  see column 2), and 1,864 life
years forgone (most of which are likely to occur in Circulatory, Cancer and Gastro-intestinal PBCs  see
column 3).124 However, the impact of approval of this technology on QALYs forgone due to premature
death (column 5) only accounts for a proportion of the total QALY effects (column 4). Most (4,987) are
associated with quality of life forgone during disease (column 6). These quality of life impacts are most
likely to occur in Respiratory, Neurological and Mental Health PBCs. The PBC level effects in Table 5.4
can also be examined at ICD level, whilst recognising the caveats discussed in Section 4.3 and 4.4.125 For
example within in the respiratory PBC it appears to be Chronic lower respiratory diseases (J40-J47) where
most additional deaths, life years and quality of life are forgone. In the Mental Health PBC the additional
deaths appear to be associated with disorders due to psychoactive substance use (F10-F19) and Mood
(affective) disorders (F30-F39) (see Addendum 4 in Appendix C). However, it should be recognised that
these effects which are based on the central estimate in Table 5.1 are likely to underestimate the health
forgone given the discussion in Section 5.4 and especially in 5.5.
124 The differences in contribution to deaths compared to life years reflects the distribution of age at death and the
age and gender distribution of the population at risk in the ICD codes that contribute to each PBC (see Section 4.2
and addendum 1 in Appendix C).
125 Information about the age, gender and the incidence of sequelae associated with different diseases within a PBC
are only available for u-codes which can be mapped to groups of three digit ICD codes. Also allocating PBC level
effects to ICD codes was based on the proportion of the total PBC population within each contributing ICD codes
because PBC costs are not available at ICD level across PCTs. Although costs from HES data are available at ICD
level they are only a small component of total PBC costs and contribute very little to the variability in PBC costs
across PCTs especially in those PBCs where mortality effects could not be estimated (also see Footnote 75 and 81
and Addendum 1 in Appendix A).
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The impact of a reduction in the price of this technology, either through value based pricing or the PAS
that was offered during the rapid review,[107] can also be examined in the same way. The PAS was
commercial in confidence but we will consider a scenario where a 30% reduction in NHS costs was
applied for this subgroup of patients. Such a discount would be expected to save 1,855 QALYs including
126 deaths averted, 559 life years (359 when adjusted for quality) and quality of life effects during disease
equivalent to 1,496 QALYs, when compared to approval of the technology at the original price (see
Addendum 4 Appendix C for more details on this scenario analysis).
In many respects this starts to make real the previously abstract notion that additional NHS costs are the
health and opportunities of other unknown NHS patients. The methods of analysis presented in this
report go some way to proving a empirically based and explicit quantification of the scale of opportunity
costs the NHS faces when considering whether the health benefits associated with new technologies are
expected to offset the health that is likely to be forgone elsewhere in the NHS. It also starts to make the
other NHS patients, who ultimately bear the opportunity costs of such decisions, less abstract and more
known in social decisions. Since who happens to be known or unknown is only a matter of perspective,
time and ignorance,[109] ethical and coherent social decisions require that both should be treated in the
same way. The methods of analysis discussed in this chapter have contributed to removing some of the
ignorance and making the unknown more real.
5.8 Future research and improving estimates of the threshold
There are a number of ways in which this research could be usefully extended based on existing data and
the information currently available, most of which have been discussed in previous sections of this
chapter. Here we consider the scale of the evaluation problem in this context, examining what, in
principle, would be required to resolve some of the key uncertainties discussed in Section 5.4, before a
more detailed examination on of how additional routine data, greater access to existing data or data that
are likely to become available might improve estimates of the cost per QALY threshold in the future.
Two important questions remain when attempting to translate the estimated proportionate effects on
mortality due to a change in expenditure into a more complete measure of the health effects (see Section
4.1 and 5.4). These are: i) whether the health effects of a change in expenditure in one year should be
restricted to one year or extend over a longer period; and ii) the extent to which any death averted by
expenditure in one year returns an individual to the mortality risk of the general population matched for
age and gender. The central or best estimates presented in Chapter 4 and 5 are based on combining the
conservative assumption that the health effects of changes in one year of expenditure are restricted to one
year126 with the more optimistic assumption that any death averted by expenditure in one year returns the
individual to the mortality risk of the general population.127 The combination of assumptions that
underpin the central estimates appear to be on balance conservative (see Box 5.1 and discussion in
Section 5.4) and are certainty more credible than the implausibly pessimistic or optimistic assumptions
that underpin the upper and lower bounds for the threshold that are also reported in Chapter 4 and 5.
Key questions remain, however: why cannot routine data resolve some of these remaining uncertainties
and what would be required to found a central estimate of the cost per life year or cost per QALY
126 This is implicit in the estimates of outcome elasticities presented in Chapter 3. Although 3 years of mortality data
are used in the analysis of each year of expenditure, these are averaged to an annual value prior to estimating
outcome elasticities, so the estimated outcome elasticities represent the proportionate effect on mortality in one year
due to a proportionate change in expenditure. This is likely to underestimate effects on mortality since expenditure
that reduces mortality risk (or reduces the QALY burden of disease) for an individual in one year may well also
reduce their risk (reduce QALY burden) over subsequent years; possibly over the whole of their remaining disease
duration. Expenditure may also prevent disease in future patient populations. Therefore, total health effects will be
underestimated and the cost per life year or QALY threshold will be overestimated.
127 The years of life gained associated with each death averted are based on what would have been their life
expectancy taking account of their age and gender (using life tables for the general population).
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threshold only on econometric estimates rather than, in part at least, resting on judgments about the
credibility of these alternative assumptions?128
A brief reiteration of the scale of this evaluation problem and the approaches to estimation that might be
taken illustrates the quite profound difficulties and, therefore, the unavoidable need for explicit and
accountable judgement and assumptions.129
A longer and more complex lag structure
Of course, a longer and more complex lag structure exploiting the PBC panel data set (i.e., both cross
section and time series observations) that is becoming available over time, could in principle at least,
identify the effect of a change in expenditure taking place in year t on health in years t, t+1,.., t+n.
However, the health effects in subsequent years would need to be isolated from the effects of change in
expenditure also occurring in subsequent years (which would also have both immediate and lagged health
effects). The health effects of changes in expenditure in year t would need to be isolated from the lagged
effects of changes in expenditure in previous years. Depending on the length of time series data available
it may be possible to specify and estimate a richer empirical model to account for the lagged health effects
of past expenditure and of lagged expenditure effects of past health outcomes.130
Although this is not a problem of principle it does pose difficulties as there are very real limits to the
current time series because: i) there are a limited number of observations in the cross section (152 PCTs);
ii) the definition (and boundaries) of PCTs has changed and has recently changed again with the
formation of Clinical Commissioning Groups; iii) there are a limited number of years of observation in
the time series (especially if lags are long); and iv) as noted in Chapter 3 and 5, the quality of PBC
reporting has changed over time (recall that estimates from 2006 and 2007 PBC expenditure were not as
comparable as 2007 and 2008). Nonetheless, as the panel data evolves over time there will be more
opportunities to explore whether judgments about the duration of effects on mortality can be informed
using the type of analysis presented in the report. Insofar as there are later lagged health effects this will
tend to reduce the estimate of the cost per death averted and cost per life year and cost per QALY
threshold.131
In many respects the problem of duration of mortality effects is a relatively straight-forward one
compared to the second issue of how changes in mortality (whether immediate or lagged) translate into
life years. In principle, estimating the effect of change in expenditure on life years is really estimating the
effect of changes on expenditure on the survival curves of the population at risk through membership of
ICD codes that contribute to each PBC. Even if the issue of lags is set aside, and attention is restricted to
mortality effects in the expenditure year, translating these effects into life years would require
observations on the entire survival curve of the at-risk population. This poses two profound difficulties i)
we would need detailed information about the members of the at-risk population (patient identifiers) and
ii) sufficient time to follow up the entire cohort from expenditure change to death (also accounting for
128 It should be recognised that the purpose is to inform an assessment of the threshold for decisions that have not
yet been made (i.e., prediction for decisions not yet made rather than a description of the past). Therefore,
irrespective of the availability of evidence or the sophistication of analytic methods, the need for assumptions or
scientific value judgements can never be avoided but only better informed.
129 The nature of prediction to inform decisions and combined with the reality of a forever unobserved
counterfactual makes judgement unavoidable - see footnote above.
130 For example, a more structural approach of estimating an outcome equation jointly with an expenditure equation,
both with appropriately specified lag structures and controlling for unobserved PCT effects might be possible
although changes to PCT boundaries, recording of PBC data and the recent formation of Clinical Commissioning
Groups makes the time series problematic.
131 The health effects of previous changes in expenditure in t-n will not be reflected in estimates of the health effect
of changes in expenditure in t unless they happen to be correlated with changes in expenditure in t. Therefore,
excluding a longer lag structure for the health effects of changes in expenditure in t-n,..t,..,t+n is likely to
underestimate the effects of changes in expenditure in t.
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other changes that are likely to take place during that time). Even if these data were available and such
heroic estimation was possible, any estimate would be so historic that it would be of limited policy
relevance. This is not a problem unique to this research but remains a problem for all estimates of the
years of life lost due to disease. It may be possible to use external, non-routine, historic data sources
where patient identifiers are available to inform a judgement about whether changes in mortality in critical
ICD codes (e.g., respiratory) tend to return patients to mortality risks similar to those of the general
population or not. If historic evidence suggests that they remain at higher mortality risk it might indicate
the likely scale of over-estimation if life year effects are based on the mortality risk of the general
population. However, this would not be without major problems of distinguishing causality from
selection effects.
The evolving panel data do have another advantage that could be exploited in the future. Currently it is
only cross sectional variation (i.e., between PCTs) that contributes to the estimates of outcome elasticities.
This means that changes in expenditure that all PCTs tend to make together, that might have very large
health effects (they all tend to invest in obviously valuable activities at the same time) or limited health
effects (they all disinvest in some activities that are not valuable at the same time) may not be fully
reflected in the current estimates.132 However, using variation in expenditure and outcome in both cross
section and time series could more confidently pick up the full effects of simultaneous investment and
disinvestment. The likely net effect on the overall threshold is unclear and will depend on whether PCTs
tend to be more coordinated when investing in valuable activities (tending to reduce the threshold) or
when disinvesting in ineffective ones (tending to increase the threshold).133
Simultaneous estimation across PBCs
Although expenditure equations are estimated for all 23 PBCs and outcome equations for the 11 PBCs
where there are sufficient mortality data, these are estimated separately; each accounting for other PBC
expenditure and other PBC need (see Section 3.3). The correlations between expenditure and outcome
elasticities within each PBC were also estimated by repeatedly re-sampling the data set and re-estimating
expenditure and outcome elasticities (see B8.11 in Appendix B). Although the estimate of the overall
threshold accounts for changes in expenditure across all 23 PBCs with health effects estimated in 11 and
inferred in the others, it is possible that changes in expenditure in one PBC may have health effects in
others. Although total deaths across all 23 PBCs are accounted for, unless the possible external
mortality effects in other PBCs happen to be associated with variation in expenditure in those PBCs then
these health effects will not be reflected in the estimated outcome elasticities. This seems likely to
underestimate the total health effects of changes in expenditure unless positive health effects are thought
to be offset by expenditure in one PBC damaging health outcome in others (e.g., adverse events
associated with treatment or other iatrogenic effects).134 To account properly for these possible effects
would require estimating the interaction of changes in expenditure in each PBC on all the others while
still accounting for possible endogeneity. Unfortunately, with only 152 observations in the cross section
(PCTs), this type of simultaneous estimation is currently not feasible.
Throughout Chapters 3, 4 and 5 we have not imputed health effects for PBC 23 (General Medical
Services) or procedural ICD codes on the grounds that the health effects of this type of expenditure will
appear in ICD codes that contribute to other PBCs. However, the health effects of this type of
expenditure (PBC23 and 22) will only be reflected in the estimated outcome elasticities insofar as the
132 These effects will be picked up in the cross sectional variation, at least partially, so long as there is some variation
in the health effects achieved and scale of simultaneous investment or disinvestment across PCTs.
133 This would be particularly interesting when re-considering the subgroup analysis in Section 5.5 with panel data.
134 We have taken account of competing risks or counterfactual deaths (which might appear in any of the PBCs in
our calculation of net years of like lost - see Section 4.2.3). The health effects of a change in expenditure in a
contributory PBCs will not be reflected in the estimated health effects of change in expenditure in the recipient
PBCs unless they happen to be correlated with changes in expenditure in the recipient PBCs, i.e., all changes in
expenditure are assigned to PBCs but all the health effects may not be. This suggests that the health effects are likely
to be underestimated and the overall threshold underestimated (see Section 5.3 and Footnote 107).
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variation in outcomes reported in other PBCs, due to variation in GMS expenditure, happens to be
associated with variation in expenditure in those other PBCs. Therefore our approach to GMS (and
Social Care, PBC 22) expenditure is likely to be conservative with respect to overall health effects; tending
to overestimate the cost per life year and cost per QALY threshold.
Exogenous shocks and quasi experiments
One response to these difficulties would be to look for exogenous budgetary shocks to the whole health
care system and then estimate the health effects of the shock at a macro level. In principle this is very
attractive since it would avoid all the difficulties of endogeneity and identifying valid instruments,
exploring sensitivity and structural uncertainty. If a complete measure of health outcome were available
at a health system level it would also avoid much of the complexity of working at a PBC and ultimately at
ICD level.
Unfortunately there are a number of difficulties. Although the NHS budget is set each year through an
essentially political process (so each years change in budget might be regarded as an exogenous shock),
insofar as public expenditure decisions are to some extent influenced by public sector performance then
these apparent shocks are endogenous in a very similar way to PCT expenditure decisions about
particular PBCs but just at a higher level of aggregation. However, even if some arbitrary exogenous
change to overall expenditure could be identified there are other serious difficulties. There is no
comprehensive measure of outcome relevant to all NHS activities currently reported. This has two
implications: i) the mortality data that are available is only relevant to approximately 36% of a change in
overall expenditure (see Section 5.3); and ii) how mortality translates into life years and QALY depends
critically on where those effects occur (the ICD codes that contribute to each PBC). In addition there are
very good reasons why one would expect covariates (especially measures on need) and instruments to
differ between different programmes of care. For all these reasons this research has focused on using
routinely available data at its lowest level of aggregation.
By doing so we not only provide an estimates of a threshold based on a more complete measure of health
effects, we are also able to indicate what type of health is effected and where they are most likely to occur.
This provides a means to update estimates of the threshold should other aspects of social value be applied
to measures of health or other aspects of social value be included in the future (e.g., consumption and
other public expenditure effects). For example any weights that might be assigned to different types of
QALY gains or consumption and other public expenditure effects associated with health effects and the
patient characteristics associated with ICD codes (e.g., QALY burden, years of life lost or other patient
characteristics, such as age and gender) can be included in the current framework and a threshold re-
estimated for weighted QALYs or, give an estimate of the consumption value of a QALY, a threshold
benefit cost ratio that includes consumption as well as health effects.
Evolving Programme Budget Category Data
Each year offers another wave of PBC expenditure data which means that a potentially useful panel data
set is developing. This offers some useful opportunities that have been described above. However, with
only 152 PCTs in the cross section, there is a limit to how much of the remaining uncertainty might be
resolved. The utility of this evolving panel will also be limited by the formation of Clinical
Commissioning Groups (CCGs) rather than PCTs as an important locus of expenditure decisions.
Changes in PCT boundaries and the formation of CCGs will make the time series problematic unless
CCGs can be mapped to previous PCT boundaries. However, updating expenditure and outcome
elasticities based on variation in expenditure and outcomes across CCG would be possible (it would
provide more observations in the cross section) so long as PBC expenditure and mortality outcomes are
reported at CCG level.
Of course it would also be useful to be able to observe PBC expenditure at a lower level of aggregation
(ideally at ICD code) as this would avoid the assumption necessary to allocate PBC level effects to ICD
codes based on either estimates of the size of the at risk population or the crude (unadjusted for
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covariates) contribution to variance in PBC expenditure. Since the only expenditure data that are
available by ICD (and therefore PBC) for each PCT are HES based estimates of cost, the relevance of
measures of contribution to variance in PBC expenditure depends on what proportion of PBC costs are
accounted for by HES. However, HES cost are only a small component of total PBC expenditure and
contribute very little to the variability in PBC expenditure across PCTs especially when considering PBCs
where mortality effects could not be estimated (see Section 4.4 and Footnotes 73 and 80). Greater
disaggregation within PBCs would be particularly useful as the examination of information routinely
collected by PCTs was not particularly helpful in identifying what investment and disinvestments within a
PBC explain the variation in PBC expenditure across PCTs (see Addendum C2 in Appendix C).
Extending measures of health outcome
Currently the only routinely collected health outcome data that can be matched to expenditure by PBC
category at PCT level is mortality. For this reason outcome equations could only be estimated for 11 of
the 23 PBCs. As discussed in Sections 4.3 and 4.4, this represents only one aspect of health outcome and
is not particularly relevant to many disease categories and much of the care that the NHS offers when the
primary purpose is to improve health experience and quality of life rather than to extend survival.
Therefore, the estimated proportionate effects of expenditure on the QALY burden of disease in these 11
PBCs) were used as a surrogate for proportionate effects in the others, i.e., assuming that the
proportionate effects that can be observed will be similar to those that cannot (see Section 5.2).
Of course, with access to a more complete measure of health outcome, which is routinely reported at
PCT level and that can also be associated with PBC expenditure, it would be possible to use the same
econometric methods to estimate the health effects of a change in expenditure across all PBCs, rather
than imputing them in those PBCs where mortality is not the most relevant measure of health outcome.
The English NHS Patient Reported Outcomes (PROMs) programme was introduced in 2009 and
routinely collects self-reported health status of patients receiving surgery for four elective procedures:
knee and hip replacement, groin hernia repair, and varicose vein surgery. The data that are collected
include both condition specific questions (the Oxford Hip Score, Oxford Knee Score and the Aberdeen
Varicose Vein score; no condition specific instrument is available for hernia) as well as the generic
instrument, the EQ-5D (both the EQ-5D profile, and the patient's global assessment of their health, the
EQ-VAS. Patient-level data from the PROMs programme are freely available and can be linked to the
HES database which provides a potential link to PBCs. Standardised reports on the PROMs data,
including the average (case-mix adjusted) performance of providers, are regularly published by the NHS
Information Centre, currently on a quarterly basis. Although currently offering very limited coverage for
our purposes, there are plans to extend the PROMs programme in the future, with work underway or
being planned around the potential use of PROMs in a wide range of long term conditions, primary care,
in cancer survivorship, cardiovascular services, muscular skeletal, and cosmetic surgery.
In Appendix B, Section B8.8 we demonstrate how the econometric methods set out in Chapter 3 can be
extended to these other non-mortality based outcome measures. EQ-5D utility scores (pre and post an
operative procedure) from the PROMs programme are used to generate a non-mortality-based outcome
measure, which we use to estimate our outcome model. Although the Department of Health does not
report the number of patients undergoing an eligible operation by commissioner (PCT) it was possible to
use the HES dataset to obtain this information. Routine reporting of procedure or intervention by
commissioner in the PROMs data-set would seem a simple but important and valuable extension,
especially as data are extended to primary care where HES cannot be used to substitute for this omission.
With data for both the average health gain per operation and the number of operations, we were able to
estimate the health gain per head of population for hip and knee replacements as defined above. This
estimated outcome elasticity can then be used as an outcome measure for changes in expenditure in the
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problems of the musculoskeletal system programme (i.e., PBC15)135. However, translating the short
term impact of an intervention on quality of life, which can be estimated from PROMs data, into an
estimate of the longer term effects on quality of life remains problematic.
Table B8.26 in Appendix B reports the estimated outcome equation for PBC15 (musculoskeletal system)
using the PROMs based outcome measure. The result is intuitively plausible; an increase in expenditure
improves health outcomes but, for a given spend, more need reduces the gain. The diagnostic statistics
suggest that expenditure is endogenous and that the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the
instruments are relevant and there is no evidence that the instruments are weak. Therefore, it is feasible
to extend our modelling approach beyond those programmes with mortality outcomes should PROMs be
extended more widely. Insofar as PROMs can contribute to a more secure estimate of the overall cost
per QALY threshold in the future, the sensitivity analysis discussed in Section 5.3 starts to indicate where
this type of information might be most useful.
Musculoskeletal is an important PBC, accounting for over 5% of a change on overall expenditure and
almost 5% of the change in health outcomes. However, of those PBCs without mortality outcomes, it is
PBC5 (Mental Health) that is most critical (see Table 5.2 in Section 5.3).
Measures of anxiety and depression are already routinely collected before, during and at the end of
interventions as part of Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT), which is an NHS
programme rolling out services across England offering interventions approved by NICE for the
treatment of depression and anxiety disorders. By March 2011 IAPT services were offered in 142 of 151
PCTs. A requirement of the programme is to complete the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ9, a
measure of depression)[110] and Generalised Anxiety Disorder Assessment 7 (GAD7, a measure of
anxiety)[111]. Both of these disease-specific measures can be linked to SF20 and further work could, in
principle, link these scores to EQ5D. This is a rich, valuable and evolving data-set which potentially
provides much of the information required to extend the econometric modelling to the mental health
PBC. The experience with PROMs data suggests that this would be feasible, and the analysis in Section
5.3 indicates that this could make a significant contribution to strengthening the assessment of the overall
threshold. It would also contribute to an assessment of the cost effectiveness of this programme both
nationally and by PCT, which would be of value in its own right. Unfortunately, despite the collection of
these data for every patient encounter for a number of years, unlike PROMs, these data have not yet been
made publically available.136 Of course, the services offered by the IAPT programme do not account for
all the variation in expenditure in the mental health PBC. Nevertheless, access to data that have been and
continues to be collected by practitioners and NHS patients, could provide estimates of changes in mental
health outcomes due to changes in some types of mental health expenditure, which would be a significant
advance.137
Incidence and duration of disease
Section 4.2 sets out the series of steps required to translate mortality effects into life years while taking
account of competing risks or counterfactual deaths. This analysis used ONS data on deaths by age and
135 The vast majority of hip and knee replacements are for osteoarthritis which is included in PBC15
136 These data have only been collated centrally since April 2012 despite IAPT sites collecting these data at individual
patient encounters for many years. In April 2012, the IAPT data standard was approved by the NHS Information
Standards Board as a nationally mandated data standard. Data is now collected centrally on a monthly basis from
over 200 service locations. The first report on the quality of IAPT data was published in November 2012 but the
quarterly IAPT data reports, which were scheduled to be released at the same time, do not appear to have been
made available. There is a commitment to make the dataset publicly available during 2012/13, although the timing
and details of what will be available (summaries or patient level data and whether it will include the waves of data
collected since 2006) and who might have access (commissioners, service providers or independent researchers)
remains unclear (see www.iapt.nhs.uk and www.ic.nhs.uk/iapt).
137 Similar difficulties will arise, however, when translating the observed impact of a therapy on quality of life, before
and immediately after the intervention, into longer term effects.
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gender in the ICD codes that contribute to each PBC, as well as life expectancies by age and gender for
the general population. Some information was also required about the age and gender distribution of the
population at risk in the ICD codes that contribute to each PBC (see Table 4.4 and 4.5). In Section 4.2.3
this was based on age and gender distribution of estimates of incidence from the WHO Global Burden
and Disease (GBD) study. The same information was also used in Section 4.3.1 to adjust life years for the
quality of life norms of the general population by age and gender. In Section 4.4.2 the measures of
QALY burden of disease also used information about the duration as well as incidence of disease from
the same GBD study. These estimates, published in 2008, were based on 2004 UK data and proved to be
the best available source of this type of information given the resources available for this research.
However, the GBD study has recently been updated with the findings first publically presented in
December 2012.[112] The methodology of the new study as well as sources of information used have
been much improved and any subsequent research on the threshold could integrate these new and
improved estimates.
However, the GBD study is not the only potential source of information about estimates of incidence of
disease by age and gender and disease duration across all the ICD codes that contribute to the 23 PBCs.
For example, the General Practice Research Database (GPRD) (recently renamed the Clinical Practice
Research Datalink (CPRD)) contains over 3 million active patient records drawn from approximately 400
primary care practices in the UK. GPRD is jointly funded by the NHS National Institute for Health
Research (NIHR) and the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA).The database
has clinical and prescription data and can provide information to support pharmaco-vigilance (indication,
utilization, and risk/benefit profiles of drugs) and formal pharmaco-epidemiologic studies, including
information on demographics, medical symptoms, therapy (medicines, vaccines, devices), and treatment
outcomes.
Although this research was not funded to purchase access to GPRD data, we were able to examine a
sample which comprised of 22,313,086 rows/patientICD10 events (3 digit) representing 4,229,910
patients with data on diagnosis of diseases observed between 1 Jan 2006 and 24 June 2011 (see
Addendum C1 in Appendix C). Although GPRD data could, in principle, provide the type of information
required the difficulties faced and the interpretation of the sample of data in the form available to us
meant that it was not directly useful. The particular problems faced included: i) read rather than ICD
codes reported in the data set, although mapping is and was possible; ii) being able to identify when an
episode of disease ended; iii) estimating duration of disease from the sample of data when observations
were censored by the limited years of data available to us; and iv) confidently identifying incident patients
in diseases of longer duration despite two years of wash out prior to extracting the sample. GPRD is quite
clearly a rich and valuable data set. However, our experience suggests that, to make best use of these
data, specialist knowledge and experience of these data is really needed as well as access to a much larger
sample than we were able to acquire with the limited resources available. Therefore, although GPRD
could well help to improve estimates of incidence by age and gender and duration of disease, it would
require additional well-resourced research including excess to specialist expertise and experience with this
particular data set.
Recommendations for research
The priorities for further research that may be feasible based on data which are, or will become, available
can be summarised as follows:
1. Any growth in the nominal or real threshold cannot be assumed (see Sections 5.5 and 5.6), so it
will be important to update estimates of the threshold with more recent and future waves of
expenditure and mortality data.
2. If other aspects of social value are applied to health benefits of a new technology they must also
be attached to the type of health that is likely to be forgone due to additional NHS costs. For
example, the value based pricing scheme due to be introduced by the Government in 2014 may
include some additional weight for health benefits in diseases which impose a large health burden
and/or where there are wider social benefits for patients, their carers and the wider economy.
The methods developed in this research can be extended to allow the same weights to be also
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attached to the type of health that is forgone and estimate the wider social benefits that are likely
to be lost when the NHS must accommodate the additional costs of new drugs.
3. We have demonstrated that these methods of analysis can be applied to quality of life data
collected as part of PROMs. This type of analysis could be applied to these data in key PBCs as
PROMs is rolled out providing some evidence about the quality of life effects of changes in PBC
expenditure.
4. A key PBC is Mental Health. Currently outcomes data that could be linked to measures of quality
of life are routinely collected in primary care. In principle the same methods of analysis can be
applied to these data once they are made available providing some evidence about the quality of
life effects of changes in mental health expenditure.
5. Improved and more recent estimates of incidence (by age and gender) and duration of disease
will soon be available from the recently published updated Global Burden of Disease study.
These data could be used when the threshold is re-estimated for later waves of expenditure data.
Alternatively, estimates could be based on CPRD data. However, our experience suggests that
utilising CPRD data would need research that is well resourced with access to specialist expertise
and experience with this particular data set.
6. Estimating a more complex lag structure based on the evolving panel data would provide
valuable evidence about the duration of the health effects of changes in expenditure. The recent
release of census data for 2011 may allow a panel model to be estimated allowing better control
for unobserved heterogeneity across PCTs as well as exploiting variation in outcomes,
expenditure and other covariates over time. There are, however, significant challenges including
the formation of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG) in 2013, which will make the time series
problematic for waves of expenditure and outcomes after 2012.
7. If PBC expenditure and outcome data are available at CCG level (as well as covariates and
suitable instruments), it might become possible to estimate outcome and expenditure equations
simultaneously across PBCs. This would enable more of the likely health effects of changes in
expenditure to be reflected in the analysis.
5.9 Conclusions and implications for practice
The methods of analysis presented here go some way to providing an empirically-based and explicit
quantification of the scale of opportunity costs the NHS faces when considering whether the health
benefits associated with new technologies are expected to offset the health that is likely to be forgone
elsewhere in the NHS. As such it provides a basis for determining the appropriate threshold for NICE
decisions as well as those made centrally by the NHS and Department of Health more generally.
Since 2004 NICE has used a threshold range of £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY. It has been widely
recognised for many years that this range is not based on evidence. The central estimate of the cost per
QALY threshold (£12,936 per QALY based on 2008 expenditure) suggests that the upper bound to this
range is almost certainty too high and the lower bound is also likely to be an overestimate (see Section
5.2). For example, the analysis of the uncertainty associated with the estimated expenditure and outcome
elasticities indicates that the chance the threshold is less than £20,000 per QALY is 89 per cent and the
chance that it is less than £30,000 is 97 per cent (see Section 5.4).
The central estimate is based on identifying a preferred analysis at each stage based on the analysis that
made the best use of available information, whether the assumptions required appeared more reasonable
than the other alternatives available, and which provided a more complete picture of the likely health
effects of a change in expenditure. Although other assumptions and judgments are possible that retain
some level of plausibility, they do not all favour a higher threshold. Indeed, when considered together,
they suggest that on balance the central estimate of £12,936is, if anything, likely to be an overestimate
(see Section 5.4).
Although there is substantial uncertainty associated with the estimate of the overall threshold (including
parameter, structural and other sources of uncertainty), a policy threshold set at its mean or expected
value may be inappropriate because the consequences for the NHS of overestimating the threshold are
more serious than underestimating it (see Section 5.4). In principle, a policy threshold (a single value that
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can be compared to an ICER) should be set below its mean value to take account of the non linear
relationship between the threshold and the additional net health benefit offered by a technology.
The analysis of PCTs that are under more or less financial pressure (above or below their target resource
allocation) starts to indicate the quantitative effect of the scale of the non marginal impact of new
technologies on an appropriate threshold (see Section 5.5). It suggests that the central estimate of the
threshold is likely to be an overestimate for all technologies which impose net costs on the NHS (almost
all technologies appraised by NICE have positive incremental NHS costs and all effective technologies
that will be subject to value based pricing will impose net costs on the NHS) and that the threshold might
be lower for technologies which have a greater impact on NHS costs.
The research found no evidence that the threshold had increased with real growth in the NHS budget or
with NHS prices (2007 to 2008) (see Section 5.6). There is little empirical support for an assumption that
there will have been growth in the nominal threshold between 2008 and 2012. Since how the nominal or
real threshold is likely to change over time cannot be assumed to follow prices or overall expenditure nor
empirical estimates or theoretical predictions of a growth in the private consumption value of health
(willingness to pay), it becomes especially important to be able to regularly update estimates of the cost
per QALY threshold based on routinely available data (see section 5.8).
The methods of analysis can identify, not only how many QALYs are likely to be forgone across the NHS
as a consequence of approving a technology which imposes incremental costs on the NHS, it can also
indicate where those QALYs are likely to be forgone and how they are made up, i.e., the additional
deaths, life years lost (unadjusted and adjusted for quality of life) and the quality of life impacts on those
with disease (see Section 5.7). In doing so the study starts to make the other NHS patients, who
ultimately bear the opportunity costs of such decisions, less abstract and more known in social decisions.
Since who happens to be known or unknown is only a matter of perspective, time and ignorance, ethical
and coherent social decisions require that both should be treated in the same way. These methods
contribute to removing some of the ignorance and making the unknown more real.
These methods also allow other aspects of health outcome to be incorporated in the estimate of the
threshold. This has implications for the Government's proposals to move to a system of value-based
pricing for new prescription pharmaceuticals, which may include some additional weight for health
benefits in diseases which impose a large health burden and/or where there are wider social benefits for
patients, their carers and the wider economy. The methods developed in this research will allow the same
weights to be also attached to the type of health that is lost and estimate the wider social benefits that are
likely to be lost when the NHS must accommodate the additional costs of new drugs.
The methods of analysis can be used as a framework for further empirical work as additional and more
appropriate data emerge in the NHS (see Section 5.8). They also offer a basis for threshold estimation in
other health care systems which face constraints on the growth of health care expenditure and use cost
effectiveness analysis to inform resource allocation decisions.
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A.        Systematic review approach  
A1. Introduction 
The aim of the systematic review was to inform the development of the conceptual framework, as well as  
the design, implementation and interpretation of the empirical analyses.  Rather than define a set of very 
specific questions to answer through the review, objective was to characterise the existing literature in 
terms of  the questions addressed and approaches taken.  However, it was hoped that insights would be 
provided on topics including: 
 
x General conceptualisation of the cost effectiveness threshold 
x How NICE's cost effectiveness threshold should be defined, characterised and operationalised 
x Approaches to estimating cost effectiveness thresholds in general and the NICE threshold in 
particular 
 
,QWKHLQLWLDOVWDJHVRIWKLVV\VWHPDWLFUHYLHZLWEHFDPHFOHDUWKDWWKH´WUDGLWLRQDOµPHWKRGRIFRQGXFWLQJ
systematic searches of existing literature on the topic of the cost-effectiveness threshold would be 
insufficient to deal with the requirements of this particular study+HUHZHUHIHUWRWKH´WUDGLWLRQDOµ
method as the practice of finding key terms and Medical Subject Headings (MeSH) that most accurately 
capture the range of literature relevant to the topic, while attempting to include as few  irrelevant studies 
as is possible (making use of programs such as Medline).   
 
The main weaknesses of using such an approach for a systematic review of this topic is that it requires a 
pre-existing knowledge of the terms used and topics covered in the current literature. This process has 
always required a degree of expertise (and luck) as to the strategy taken, including both knowledge of the 
literature to find likely search terms and skill in the construction of the strategies.  The implications of 
excluding a single key term are potentially equivalent to ignoring vast areas of the literature. In addition, 
the traditional approach relies on key terms existing that suitably encapsulate the relevant literature. 
Finding common terms used in literature with potential relevance to the cost effectiveness threshold was 
found to be a significant problem as many relevant topics were not specifically aimed at issues relating to 
the NICE cost-effective threshold (for example the Martin et al. Papers (1-3) which provide a precursor 
to this project,QDGGLWLRQGXHWRWKHZLGHUDQJHRIFRYHUDJHRIWRSLFVVXFKD´WKUHVKROGµDQG´FRVW-
effectiYHµDQ\DWWHPSWVDWDV\VWHPDWLFUHYLHZwould be either excessively large or result in a clearly 
limited snap-shot of the existing literature.  
 
$VDUHVXOWDSUDJPDWLFDSSURDFKZDVWDNHQWRWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIUHOHYDQWSDSHUVRQHRI´SHDUO
growingµ which can be defined here as the use of existing collections of studies to identify additional 
UHOHYDQWSDUWVRIWKHOLWHUDWXUH7KHDSSURDFKXVHVDSRRORI´LQLWLDOSHDUOVµWRJURZWKHOLWHUDWXUHERWK
through references and citations until all relevant papers have been discovered. This approach therefore 
relies on the expertise of the authors of the exiting literature to populate the pool of studies rather than 
WKHVHDUFKHU·VSRWHQWLDOO\OLPLWHGNQRZOHGJH 
 
While this DSSURDFKRI´SHDUOJURZLQJµZDVVLJQLILFantly limited by the existing software available and has 
a time consuming element, it represents an approach that corrects for many of the failings of traditional 
searches for topics that share the characteristics of the cost-effectiveness threshold.  
 
A2. Systematic Review Methods 
7KH´SHDUOJURZLQJµPHWKRGRIV\VWHPDWLFUHYLHZFDQEHFKDUDFWHULVHGLQWRILYHVWHSVIRUWKH
identification of relevant papers. 
 
1. ,GHQWLILFDWLRQDQGH[WUDFWLRQRI´LQLWLDOSHDUOVµ 
- ´,QLWLDOSHDUOVµZHUHLQGHQWLILHGWKURXJKFRQVXOWDWLRn with researchers with experience of the 
cost-effectiveness threshold literature. Fourteen initial pearls were indentified through this 
process. These publications were chosen for their wide ranging coverage of the topic as well 
as their anticipated significance 
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2. ([WUDFWLRQRI&LWDWLRQVDQG5HIHUHQFHVIURP´LQLWLDOSHDUOVµ 
- Citations: Web of Knowledge was selected to perform the citation searches. The reason for 
this selection was in part due to expert advice from an information specialist as well as brief 
and non-systematic investigations of citation results from a range of alternative software 
packages.  
- References: Web of Knowledge was also used for the collection of papers' references.  
- Both citations and references were exported into an EndNote library for the purpose of 
collection and further analysis (exclusion of repeats, title searching and review of the 
abstracts). 
 
3. ,GHQWLILFDWLRQRIIXUWKHU´SHDUOVµIURPFLWHGDQGUHIHUHQFHGSDSHUV 
- 2QFHFLWDWLRQVDQGUHIHUHQFHVRIWKH´LQLWLDOSHDUOVµKDGEHHQFROOHFWHGWKH\ZHUHVXEMHFWHG
to a set of investigations to identify further ´SHDUOVµ 
- Papers were excluded based on whether the titles or abstracts suggested the paper contained 
information on five topics of interest.  These topics had been previously identified given the 
REMHFWLYHVRIWKHSURMHFWDQGIURPDUHYLHZRIWKH´LQLWLDOSHDUOVµDQGLQFOXGHGSDSHUVZHUH
classified by whether they could inform, 
i) introduction to the cost-effectiveness threshold topic and policy context,   
ii) discussion and debate around the current value use of the threshold,  
iii) potential methods suggested to find a suitable threshold value,  
iv) specific values proposed,  
v) the use of individual and societal valuations of health gains to inform the value of the 
threshold 
 
4. Repetition of citation and reference searches. 
- The process was then UHSHDWHGIRUWKH´SHDUOVµLGHQWLILHGLQVWHS 
- 7KLVSURFHVVZDVUHSHDWHGXQWLOQRQHZ´SHDUOVµZHUHGLVFRYHUHGE\DGGLWLRQDOLWHUDWLRQV 
 
5. Manual search of references 
- To ensure as complete a search had been conducted as possible a retrospective manual 
VHDUFKRIDOORIWKH´SHDUOV'µUHIHUHQFHVZDVFRQGXFWHG$Q\SRWHQWLDOO\UHOHYDQWUHIHUHQFHV
not discovered previously (most likely due to a mix of user error and limitations with the 
software used) were added to the analysis at the relevant step and further pearl growing 
methods applied to them to ensure completeness of results. 
-  
 
A3. Systematic review results 
7KH´SHDUOJURZLQJµPHWKRGRf systematic review revealed 76 papers deemed relevant. The results from 
each stage of the process are reported in Figure A.1. The figure highlights that after four iterations no 
new relevant papers were identified by the systematic process. 
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Abstract review N=42 
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See next page 
Figure A.1: graph showing process results from pearl growing systematic review 
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B. Review of literature 
A4. Introduction and policy context 
Due to the broad range of context which the relevant literature covers it is necessary to break down the 
literature review into several topics, these will be discussed independently. The 76 papers (see section E 
for all of these papers) identified by the systematic review were defined into five different categories:  
 
1. literature covering the introduction to the cost-effectiveness threshold topic and policy context,  
2. discussion and debate around the current value use of the threshold,  
3. potential methods suggested to find a suitable threshold value,  
 
These categories were chosen to reflect the broad range of relevant topics and areas of discussion covered 
by the cost-effectiveness threshold literature. It should be noted that the majority of the literature 
identified by the literature review fell into the first and last categories, with very few covering multiple 
categories sufficiently completely to be discussed in more than one section. The final category will only be 
discussed briefly as it can be seen as a separate, unrelated approach to the threshold required for purposes 
of decision making by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE). 
 
The majority of papers (34 of the 76 papers discovered) identified in the literature review could be 
characterised as introducing the idea of a cost-effectiveness threshold (these consist of the very early 
literature pre-dating NICE) or discussing the policy context through the years (4-37). This section will 
characterise the main areas of discussion in the literature and briefly describe the key parts of the 
literature development. 
 
 
A4.1. Definition of the cost effectiveness threshold 
An important place to start is the consideration of how the literature has defined the cost-effectiveness 
threshold. This is important to analyse in the review as not only is it worth ensuring that a good definition 
has been presented; but it also allows us to assess whether the existing literature uses a definition that is 
both consistent and accurate.  
 
One of the earliest definitions of something resembling the modern interpretation of the cost-effective 
threshold comes from Weinstein and Zeckhauser(36)7KHLUSDSHULGHQWLILHVD´FULWLFDOUDWLRµEHWZHHQ
PRQHWDU\FRVWVDQGDPHDVXUHRIKHDOWKJDLQV7KLVFULWLFDOUDWLRZDVDUJXHGWRUHSUHVHQW¶DFXW-off point 
IRUDOORFDWLRQ·RIDQDFWLYLW\Ln a budget constrained public sector entity ((36), p.1.).  
 
A similar, more recent approach to define the threshold is that taken by Devlin (35) where the author 
considered a hypothetical budget constrained health care sector, with a perfectly informed decision maker 
who only considers the cost per QALY of health technologies.  Assuming perfect information, the 
decision maker is able to rank all of the potential health care activities based on their cost per QALY.  A 
decision maker will implement as many of the relatively low cost per QALY activities as possible until the 
budget is used up. Eventually a point will be reached where society is not willing to pay for a further 
marginal increase in QALYs and would rather the funding used on other consumption. The cost per 
QALY at which this cut-off occurs can be described as the cost-effectiveness threshold as it represents 
the switching point between an activity being funded and not. As the budget is assumed to be fully 
responsive, any new technologies with a cost per QALY below this threshold will be funded in the future. 
 
 
A4.2. NICE and the cost effectiveness threshold 
The use and valuation of a cost-effectiveness threshold by NICE has been controversial. Williams (37) 
highlighted three events that may be argued to have particularly muddied the water. Firstly, NICE did not 
set a threshold value by the government at the time of its inception in 1999.  This meant that NICE was 
obliged to come up with a de novo estimate fairly rapidly. Through his set of discussions with NICE, 
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Williams stated WKDWDWWKHSRLQWRILQFHSWLRQ1,&(FDPHXSZLWKDYDOXHRI¶URXJKO\NSHU4$/<
SOXVRUPLQXVNGHSHQGLQJRQWKHVSHFLILFFLUFXPVWDQFHV·((37), p.7.)  
 
The second event which Williams refers to ZDV1,&(·Vinitial resistance to acknowledging that any form 
of threshold value existed. Following analyses such as Towse and Pritchard (35) and Devlin(38) 
investigating previous NICE decisions and inferring an implicit threshold, NICE began to publish details 
of its approach to an ICER threshold. The major step was the 2004 Guide to the Methods of Technology 
Appraisal (30) that provided these details, although the definition of the £20,000 to £30,000 threshold 
range may be considered loose and open to interpretation. While the 2004 Guide was one of the first 
official references to the threshold, Sir Michael Rawlins did state at the 2001 NICE Annual General 
0HHWLQJWKDWWKH,QVWLWXWHZRXOG¶QHHGWREHYHU\FOHDULQLWVUHDVRQVIRUVXSSRUWLQJWHFKQRORJLHVZLWK
cost-HIIHFWLYHQHVVUDWLRVKLJKHUWKDQSHU4$/<·/LWWOHMRKQV in (35)).   
 
:LOOLDPV·ILQal event is the often quoted £20,000 to £30,000 threshold range having never been 
scientifically justified. Authors such as Rawlins and Culyer(39) have argued that there has never been an 
empirical basis for the values or any definitive meaning behind the range.  They therefore argued that the 
threshold should not be the only tool for NICE to draw conclusions about new technologies. 
 
 
A4.3. The threshold as a range 
The idea of such a threshold range has been part of the literature for some time. Kaplan and Bush (24) 
considered the idea of a less abrupt approach than that suggested by Weinstein and Zeckhauser(36). 
Kaplan and Bush (24) investigated a set of early Medicare adoption decisions and presented broad criteria 
of acceptance based on a set of threshold ranges in terms of cost per additional well year. These were 
defined as <$20k/well year (cost effective), $20k-$100k (possibly controversial but justifiable), >$100k 
questionable when compared with other expenditure).  However, the authors noted that a$100k cut-off 
was not relevant to the policy decisions at the time and that all results would need significant future 
investigation. Similarly Laupacis(26) SUHVHQWHGILYH´JUDGHVRIUHFRPPHQGDWLRQµfor decisions about 
technological reimbursement in Canada.   
 
The conclusions of both of these papers can be represented graphically by Figure A.2, which is also 
described or presented in much of the literature (see (39), Littlejohn in (35), (29), (38)). This graph 
represents the probability of rejection of a new technology as a function of technology's ICER. The graph 
clearly shows two points of inflection (A and B in Figure A.2), these two points represent an 
interpretation of the lower and upper bounds of a cost-effectiveness threshold range. 
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Figure A.2: Probability of rejection with a 'soft' cost-effectiveness threshold 
 
 
 
 
7KHOLWHUDWXUHRIWHQPDNHVXVHRIWKHWHUPV´VRIWµDQG´KDUGµZKHQUHIHUULQJWRWKHWKUHVKROG7KHWHUP
´VRIWµLVRIWHQXVHGLQDVLPLODUZD\WRWKHWKUHVKROG´UDQJHµDOWHUQDWLYHO\$NHKXUVW·V´VPXGJHµ
(Akehurst in (35)). While the underlying idea is the same, D´VRIWµWKUHVKROGKDValso been used to refer to 
a single threshold. For example, McCabe et al. (29) argued that it is both feasible and probably desirable 
to use a single threshold rather than a range, as the threshold should represent the point beyond which 
factors other than cost effectiveness are considered. This approach would suggest that all new 
technologies with an ICER below the threshold should receive funding (regardless of their impact on 
other factors such as equity of health). It is, however, unclear from this paper what the implications are 
for technologies with an ICER beyond the single threshold value. 
 
In contrast, D´KDUGµWKUHVKROGUHSUHVHQWVWKHVLWXDWLRQZKHUHWKH,&(5YDOXDWLRQLVWKHVROHUHOHYDQW
variable in an adoption decision, as demonstrated in Figure A.3(15). It is an important point that if a 
´KDUGµWKUHVKROGLVVHWQRRWKHUIDFWRUVFDQEHFRQVLGHUHGLQ WKHGHFLVLRQPDNHU·VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIDQHZ
technology. The differencHEHWZHHQD´KDUGµDQGD´VRIWµWKUHVKROGLVWKHUHIRUHlargely based on whether 
the ICER reflects all considerations.  As, assuming the decision maker is optimising health, it should 
represent the most effective allocation of a health care budget but cannot account for any equity concerns 
(such as the severity of the condition, unmet need and orphan diseases) that are not included in the 
calculation of the ICER. Authors such as Dolan et al. (40) KDYHGHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWD´KDUGµWKUHVKRld 
may  not be able to suitably reflect the non-linearity of social or political values of QALYs to factors such 
as quality and length of life and for those with worse health prospects or dependents. 
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Figure A.JUDSKVKRZLQJD´KDUGµFRVW-effectiveness threshold 
 
 
A4.4. What does the threshold represent? 
Two broad lines of thought have developed on what the threshold represents, social willingness to pay 
(WTP) and shadow pricing.(13, 29, 36, 37, 41, 42) The key difference between the two is the budget that 
should be considered by those accepting or rejecting health technologies. The social WTP approach 
(usually implicitly) assumes that the budget of the health care sector is flexible to the value of health gains 
determined by society. So in this case it is the value society places on the health benefits (for example in 
QALYs) generated by new health care programmes and technologies is estimated first, and then the 
health care budget is the sum of society's willingness to pay for all treatments.  In other words, the 
threshold is set exogenously with no reference to a budget constraint. 
 
In contrast, the shadow pricing approach takes the budget as given (at least beyond the control of those 
who determine the cost-effectiveness threshold) (13, 29).  The threshold is, therefore, endogenous based 
on the services currently provided within the system. When a new programme or technology is accepted 
into the system and imposes an additional cost onto the budget, the only way to meet those costs is to 
remove or down-scale existing services which will incur opportunity costs in terms of population health.  
Hence the threshold represents the ICER of the least cost effective existing service covered by the budget.  
In principle, it is this service which is removed to fund a new programme or technology.  In practice, a 
range of criteria is likely to be used to identify appropriate services for displacement to make room in the 
budget for new interventions.    
 
In the UK the main source of debate about which of these concepts of the threshold is the correct one 
lies in NICE's remit. Authors such as Culyer (13) have GLVFXVVHG1,&(·VSRVLWLRQDVD´VHDUFKHUµRUD
´VHWWHUµRIWKHWKUHVKROG7KHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHVHWZRUROHVLVWKDWDWKUHVKROG´VHDUFKHUµGRHVQRW
set a threshold with the motivation of maximising social welfare under the assumption of a flexible NHS 
budget, but instead investigates the threshold value that is appropriate given current NHS activities and 
the fixed budget as set down by Parliament.  
 
Much of the literature on this topic is founded in the discussion of the correct constitutional role of 
NICE, the potential negative implications of setting a threshold and the feasibility of identifying displaced 
activities. In 2007, Culyer et al. (13) argued that it is not appropriate for NICE to be characterised as a 
threshold setter. The authors argued that the setting of a threshold would effectively imply that NICE 
sets the NHS budget. The setting of the NHS budget, they highlight, is the constitutional responsibility of 
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Parliament, not NICE. Hence the paper argues that NICE should concern themselves with being 
WKUHVKROG´VHDUFKHUVµVHHNLQJWRLGHQWLI\¶DQRSWLPDOWKUHVKROG,&(5DWWKHUXOLQJUDWHRIH[SHQGLWXUH
WKDWLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHDLPRIWKHKHDOWKVHUYLFHWRPD[LPLVHSRSXODWLRQKHDOWK·((13), p.4). 
 
In a similar vein Appleby et al. (43) concluded that the threshold used by NICE should be consistent with 
the decisions made by local commissioners within the NHS.   This is important given that NICE provides 
little guidance to the NHS regarding interventions suitable for disinvestment to release the funding 
necessary to cover the new technologies it recommends.  If the threshold is set too high NICE may well 
accept new technologies which are less cost effective than the services which local commissioners 
displace to fund those technologies.  Conversely, if the threshold is set too low, NICE is likely to reject 
services that are cost effective relative to existing services delivered from the NHS budget. The authors 
conclude that, in the short term, 1,&(KDYHWRDFWDVDWKUHVKROG´VHDUFKHUµWRHQVXUHFRQWLQXLW\LQWKH
NHS. 
 
Alternative arguments have been put forward which reject the idea of 1,&(DVDWKUHVKROG´VHDUFKHUµ. 
Firstly, some authors (such as Gafni and Birch (17, 18)) have made the case that an implicit threshold has 
the potential to lead to spiralling inflation if new cost effective technologies are funded without sufficient 
disinvestment. However, McCabe et al.(29) DUJXHGWKDW&XO\HU·VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIthe NICE threshold 
could overcome this challenge if it were regularly reviewed so as to be flexible over time to changes in the 
NHS budget and the productivity of the sector, and if the threshold for new activities with a non-
marginal budget impact was greater than those with a marginal impact. The issue of the inflationary 
pressure of a threshold is discussed further below. 
 
Another concern raised about Culyer et al.·VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIWKH1,&(WKUHVKROG is that of Towse et al. 
(44). They argue that a lack of knowledge of the true opportunity cost of new activities makes us unable 
to identify the value of those activities being displaced and, therefore, it is impossible for NICE to 
´VHDUFKµIRUDWKUHVKROGrelating to  activities displaced at the margin. The issue of the difficulty of 
identifying current activities at the margin in terms of cost-effectiveness will be dealt with later in this 
chapter.   
 
 
A4.5. Factors considered by NICE other than the comparison of the ICER and threshold 
As was discussed in the section the threshold range, the suitable threshold approach is dependent on the 
policy context around it, specifically if the comparison of the ICER with the threshold represents the only 
UHOHYDQWSLHFHRILQIRUPDWLRQWKDWLQIRUPVDQDGRSWLRQGHFLVLRQD´KDUGµWKUHVKROGRULILWLVVLPSO\RQH
of many factors considered ´VRIWµWKUHshold).  In the case of the UK, NICE has openly stated the ICER 
of a technology is not the sole consideration of the committee in its adoption decisions (30).  
 
Both NICE and a number of other authors have provided overviews of the other factors that are 
considered by NICE in the adoption decision, these are provided in Table A.1. 
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Table A.1: table showing factors other than ICER considered by NICE 
NICE (30, 31) Rawlins et al. (45) Tappenden et al. (34) Devlin et al. (38) 
Uncertainty of variables Severity of illness Uncertainty of the 
ICER 
Uncertainty of the 
ICER 
Availability of 
comparators 
End of life treatment Availability of 
comparators 
Burden of disease 
Clinical priorities (as set 
by Secretary of State) 
Stakeholder opinion Severity of illness  
Clinical need Innovation *age not significant  
Availability of resources Population 
characteristics 
(disadvantaged and 
children) 
  
Innovation    
Disease characteristics 
and population size 
   
Wider social costs and 
benefits 
   
Length of benefit    
 
This table suggests that the threshold is only one consideration to decisions makers at NICE.  However, , 
in principle, these other types of benefits could be added to health benefits and compared to potential 
treatments for displacement which also have wider social benefits.   In other words, this wider set of 
considerations relating to the benefits of new technologies should arguably also be reflected in the 
threshold.1 
 
 
A4.6. Multiple thresholds 
Similarly some have argued for using different thresholds for different situations (29, 47).  The two main 
cases for using different thresholds are the size of the budgetary impact, or depending on if the decision 
represents an investment in additional activities or a disinvestment in current activities.  
 
The topic of different thresholds for different budgetary impacts of a proposed technology has received 
very little analytical attention from the literature. McCabe et al. (29) argue that technologies with a large 
budgetary impact should be evaluated against a lower threshold than those with a relatively small impact. 
The reason for this is a large budgetary impact will require a greater displacement of current activities 
(assuming a fixed overall budget); this may result in displacement of non-marginal activities which may be 
associated with a lower ICER than those at the margin. 
 
Several authors have suggested the use of different threshold values depending on whether the decision 
UHSUHVHQWVDQLQYHVWPHQWLQDGGLWLRQDODFWLYLWLHVRUDGLVLQYHVWPHQWLQFXUUHQWDFWLYLWLHV2·%ULHQHWDO·V
2002 (47) paper considers the difference in willingness to accept monetary compensation to forgo a 
health care program and willingness to pay for the same benefit and link it to the cost effectiveness 
threshold.  This paper came from the perspective of the threshold representing social preferences rather 
than the shadow price of a fixed budget constraint and highlights that from a traditional 'welfarist' 
economics standpoint; a greater threshold value for disinvestment may be welfare maximising.   Similarly 
both Devlin et al. (38) and Speight et al. (48) have suggested a threshold for disinvestment of currently 
                                                     
1 This is the aim of the new Value Based Pricing approach currently under development by the Department of 
Health [10, 44]46. Health Do. A new value-based approach to the pricing of branded medicines: A consultation. 
2010. 
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performed activities could be lower than for new activities, however, neither present any methodology for 
calculating the weight of a disinvested activity.  
 
This is in contrast with the view that cost effectiveness analysis guides the decisions of health systems 
with the objective of maximising some measure of health benefit subject to a budget constraint.  Hughes 
et al. (21) has argued that differential threshold with respect to investment and disinvestment would result 
in sub-optimal levels of population health. This is because a new technology that would improve health 
may be rejected under a policy of having different thresholds for investment and disinvestment but not if 
the threshold values were the same. The authors argue that this failure to maximise population health 
represents an avoidable inefficiency not related to the aim of the health care sector to maximise health 
and thus making the case for a single threshold value for disinvestment and investment. This point can be 
seen as a further case for the shadow price approach as opposed to the social WTP perspective as it 
highlights that, given a fixed NHS budget, the social WTP approach will not lead to a maximisation of 
health. 
  
 
A4.7. The need for an independent threshold panel 
Related to the discussion over the correct role of NICE in determining a suitable cost effectiveness 
threshold for the NHS is the literature on the potential for an independent threshold panel. Such a panel 
has been characterised in a similar manner to the Monetary Policy Committee (the setters of Bank of 
England's interest rate who act independently of the Government of the United Kingdom), as an 
independent committee responsible for the setting and updating of the cost-effectiveness threshold used 
by NICE.  
 
The papers covering this topic are consistent in their call for an independent threshold panel, with no 
papers identified arguing against it. The main case provided in the literature for an independent setter is 
the removal of political influence; Claxton et al. (10) argue that political influence may drive the threshold 
up as politicians seek to use the threshold as a means to encourage investment by pharmaceutical 
companies. Williams (37) suggests that NICE is biased in the setting of a threshold, as its political 
connections mean a higher threshold makes LWLVPRUHSRSXODUZLWKWKH´VHOOHUVµWKHDXWKRUGHILQHV
sellers as not only the pharmaceutical industry but health care professionals and patient groups) by 
allowing more technologies to be approved. Similarly papers by Appleby et al. (43) and Raftery et al. (49) 
call for the creation of an independent threshold setter. 2008 Health Select Committee (50) recommended 
that a body independent of NICE should be established to set and review the threshold. However, it is 
unclear if such a body would also be independent of political influence or just of the NICE structure. 
 
 
A4.8. Arguments against the use of a cost effectiveness threshold  
A number of authors have argued against the use of a threshold.  As mentioned earlier authors such as 
Gafni and Birch (17, 18) have suggested that the threshold approach risks leading to spiralling increases in 
inflationary pressures on health care spending, and present an alternative approach based on the use of 
league tables of cost-effectiveness. The reason, they argue, is that there is no guarantee that the activities 
displaced are less cost-effective than those new technologies imposing cost on the health system budget. 
This observation is coupled with the expectation of authors such as Cohen et al. (11) that pharmaceutical 
firms will inevitably price their drugs so as to ensure the ICER of their proposed new technology is 
sufficiently close to the threshold to ensure adoption and thereby gain maximum producer surplus. This 
observation implies that providers such as the NHS may be forced to pay above market costs of new 
technologies by revealing their maximum willingness to pay, in the form of the threshold. In addition the 
point raised in McCabe et al. (29) that the threshold should be adjusted regularly over time to ensure its 
efficiency seeks to address both of these arguments. 
 
Other authors such as Eichler et al. (15) have raised and debated the issues around the theoretical base for 
the cost-effectiveness threshold, namely the assumption of perfect divisibility of healthcare programs, 
constant returns to scale and constant marginal opportunity costs(15, 17, 19, 51, 52).  
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Bridges et al. (53) argues that a unique threshold value imposes impractical assumptions in the case of the 
US health care sector, and fails to account for supply and demand side variations in the market. As an 
alternative the authors propose a series of thresholds that reflect regional, dynamic, budgeting and general 
methodological differences. They conclude that the case for abandoning a fixed threshold outweighs 
those for keeping one in the US and that any threshold should vary across payer, over time, in the true 
budget impact of interventions and in the measurement of the effectiveness of interventions. This 
argument has clear links to the argument for shadow pricing of the threshold rather than the social WTP 
approach, as the shadow price approach is based on the view that the threshold is determined by budget 
and current efficiency which can be seen to differ over time and across payers. The unresolved issue here 
is the degree to which different sub-groups (e.g. by region or budget) require different threshold values.  
 
 
A4.9. Identification of activities under the threshold 
An important part of the literature is the discussion around the identification of activities with an ICER 
greater than the proposed threshold. The importance of this discussion stems from the requirement of 
new activities to displace current activities that are at the margin of what is cost-effective. If it is not 
possible to identify these activities separately from others then threshold analysis is methodologically 
flawed, as the funding of a new activity may impact on an activity with an ICER above the proposed 
threshold.  
 
Most literature on this topic focuses on the importance of identifying activities to be displaced rather than 
the process and feasibility of doing so. For example, Hughes et al. (21) and McCabe et al. (29) highlight 
the implications of inconsistent displacement on geographic variations in health care provision and that 
the lack of consistency in the displacement process undercuts the use of a single cost effectiveness 
threshold for the evaluation of new technologies.  Similarly Buxton et al. (54) suggests that, in order to 
fully appreciate the opportunity cost of the implementation of a new technology, we must have a clear 
knowledge of those activities displaced at the cost effectiveness margin. 
 
Few authors have sought to develop methods to identify the activities that should be displaced to free-up 
budget for new more cost-effective activities. Elshaug et al. (16) outlines a set of criteria for the 
identification of existing, potentially non-cost-effective practices which could then be further assessed to 
assess their cost-effectiveness using health technology assessment. The criteria suggested include factors 
such as: new evidence on safety; efficacy or cost-effectiveness, geographic variation that have become 
apparent since technology adoption, clinical heterogeneity in the clinical procedure, and technological 
development.
 
 
A5. The current value of the threshold 
Since it became evident that decision making bodies such as NICE are using (more or less explicit) cost-
effectiveness thresholds, there has been a significant level of debate over its appropriate value (35, 37-39, 
43-45, 47-49, 53-58). In this section we will present three areas of the debate: 
 
- The lack of empirical basis to the current value 
- Arguments over the value being generally too high or too low 
- If and how the threshold should change over time 
 
 
A5.1. Lack of empirical base to the current value 
Since NICE made it clear that it uses an explicit threshold (30) there has been little hiding the lack  of 
evidential justification behind the £20,000 to £30,000 range. Indeed the Health Select Committee (50) 
heard (during their enquiry into NICE in 2008) that the NICE threshold has no basis in hard science. 
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Similarly Appleby (43) QRWHGWKDW´WKHXQFRPIRUWDEOHWUXWKLVWKDW1,&(·VWKUHVKROGKDVQREDVLVLQHLWKHU
WKHRU\RUHYLGHQFHµ 
 
Similarly the US value of $50,000 per QALY, which is often cited as the cost-effectiveness threshold 
relevant to resource allocation decisions in that country, is often attacked for its lack of empirical 
founding (20, 23, 32, 55). Some have suggested that the US figure is rooted in the cost-effectiveness of 
Hospital Renal Dialysis (20), although why this makes it suitable for use more generally is unclear. 
 
A5.2. The threshold changing over time 
Another concern of current NICE practice is the apparent lack of change in the threshold value used 
VLQFHWKHERG\·Vinception. Many authors have argued that factors such as the NHS budget, price 
inflation, technological developments in the NHS and the discount rate applied to economic evaluations 
(20, 24, 25, 59) have all changed since the first use of the cost-effectiveness threshold.  As such, the 
threshold should have changed to reflect this fact. Braithwaite et al. (55) sought to demonstrate the 
impact of budget and technological growth on the optimal threshold. By creating a computer simulation 
of the US Medicare system, the authors were able to demonstrate the impact of these factors. While there 
is no doubt in the literature that the NICE threshold should potentially change over time2 no papers have 
been identified which model the impact of any changes on the threshold. 
 
Both Ubel et al. (57) and Raftery (49) discuss the principles behind the directional change the threshold 
should take over time. Ubel et al. (57) have argued that the optimal threshold value needs to fall over time 
assuming medical innovation continues at roughly its current rate. Raftery (49) has noted that, in real 
terms, the threshold has been falling since 1999 as, in order to stay constant in real terms, it should have 
increased given inflation (up 40% in the time period) and increased NHS spending (up 90%). The authors 
argue that this decline in the threshold should have been observed in the value used by NICE in decision 
making.  They describe the suggestion of a rise in the threshold being linked to the observed growth of 
the NHS budget over the last decade DV´DXGDFLRXVµ (49). It is unclear to what extent the authors disagree 
with this interpretation of NHS efficiency as a relevant factor affecting the optimal threshold. 
 
 
A5.3. Threshold value generally too high or low 
The majority of the debate over the current use of the threshold in the UK (and elsewhere) has been 
centred on whether the current value is too low or too high. The papers that will be discussed in this 
section focus on the general discussion of necessary directional change in the value rather than the 
presentation of a specific value; the latter is discussed in more detail in the following section on the 
proposed values of the threshold in the literature. 
 
Vernon et al. (58) presented an analysis of the implications of the threshold being above or below its 
optimum value in terms of signals to the companies involved in research and development of new 
medical products. The authors concluded that if the threshold is set too low (below the economic value 
of the health benefit) it will result in research and development investment levels that are too low relative 
to their economic value (at the margin). The reason for this lies in a lack of returns to investments for the 
pharmaceutical companies.  However, in the isolated case of the threshold relevant to the NHS (a small 
proportion of the world pharmaceutical market), the impact of changes to the threshold on the 
international pharmaceutical market equilibrium is unknown but likely to be small. 
 
Similarly, thresholds set too high (above the economic value of the health benefit) will result in 
inefficiently high levels of research and development spending, such that the health care provider is 
funding projects that do not have a sufficient impact on social welfare.  
 
                                                     
2 ,QIDFWLQWKH1,&(0HWKRGV*XLGH>@QRWHGWKDW´WKHWKUHVKROGZLOOFKDQJHRYHUWLPHDVWKHEXGJet for 
KHDOWKFDUHFKDQJHVµ(p. 33). However, there is no clear reference to this change in the 2008 Methods Guide [31]. 
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The literature that argued the threshold is too high in the UK can be broadly characterised into three key 
papers. Alan Williams (37) made the case that, intuitively, the threshold should not be significantly greater 
than the GDP per capita (roughly £18,000 in the UK in 2004). He made the case that, while it may be 
possible to provide a lot of the population with health care when the threshold is above the GDP per 
capita, it is not possible to provide health care for much of the population without imposing great 
hardship on those expected to foot the bill (the tax payer or government debt). 
 
Secondly, Raftery (49) argued that, while the UK threshold has been historically too high, it does not need 
reducing as the real value has decreased since 1999 due to inflationary pressure and increases in the NHS 
budget. He also suggests that recent policies implemented by NICE, such as greater weight being given to 
the benefits of treatment accruing to patients at the end of their life, need to be offset by reductions in 
the threshold for all other treatments for expenditure to remain within the NHS budget. Finally, Raftery 
cites the opportunity cost analysis of trastuzumab (4) which showed that more cost-effective oncology 
services were being sacrificed to fund trastuzumab in breast cancer. This result suggests directly that, in 
some cases at least, the threshold value is too high. 
 
Work by Martin et al. (1, 3) investigated the cost per life year saved in a selection of the 23 programme 
budgeting categories used in the NHS; these results are presented in Table A.2.  It is important to note 
that these results are presented as the cost per life year gained rather than the cost per QALY of the least 
cost-effective current activity. The authors and others have used these results to argue that the threshold 
used by NICE may be too high (28)6LPLODUO\&ROOLHU·V(12) report of the Health Select Committee 
suggests that the threshold used by NICE is higher than that used by PCTs.  
 
Table A.2: table showing cost per life year gained results of Martin et al.(1-3) papers 
Programme budgeting category cost per life year gained 
2005/6 data 2004/5 data 
Cancer £13,137 £13,931 
Circulation problems £8,426 £7,979 
Respiratory problems £7,397 N/A 
Gastro-intestinal problems £18,999 N/A 
Diabetes £26,453 N/A 
 
In contrast, a range of authors have argued that the current NICE threshold is too low. Both Speight et 
al. (48) and Towse (44) argued that the inclusion of wider social costs/benefits and full consideration of 
social willingness to pay for additional health gains show that the threshold should be significantly larger. 
Both cite recent NICE work by Mason et al. (56, 60) which suggested the threshold should be between 
£30,000 and £75,000 per QALY based on attempts to model a willingness to pay based value of a QALY 
based on observations of the value of avoiding a statistical fatality. Similarly in the US Ubel et al. (57) 
have argued that, if inflation and willingness to pay valuations are taken into account, the relevant 
threshold in the US should be closer to $200,000 per QALY that the regularly cited $50,000.  
 
Those analyses which conclude the UK and US thresholds should be significantly higher have, at the core 
of their argument, the assumption that the respective health care budget is fully capable of responding to 
VRFLHW\·VZLOOLQJQHVVWRSD\IRUDGGLWLRQDOKHDOWKJDLQV 
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6. Potential methods for threshold estimation 
There are broadly three approaches that can be taken to determine the threshold value (43, 54): social 
WTP, shadow pricing of the budget constraint and non analytical approaches such as expert elicitation.    
This project is concerned with the latter approach to estimating the cost effectiveness threshold.  This is 
entirely consistent with the remit of the NHS in general and NICE in particular - they do not set the 
NHS budget but have to allocate those finite resources appropriately.   
 
 
A6.1. Papers seeking to elicit social WTP and non-analytical approaches 
The majority of the literature that has presented a proposed value for the threshold (in the UK, US and 
elsewhere) has done so using valuation methods based on willingness to pay for an additional health 
benefit (40, 59-76).  However other approaches have been suggested. For example the World Health 
2UJDQLVDWLRQ·V:+2UHSRUW(77) suggested that interventions costing less than three times GDP 
per capita for each DALY averted represent good value for money.  
 
Lee et al. (78) VRXJKWWRXSGDWHWKH86´GLDO\VLVVWDQGDUGµRIWHQFODLPHGWREHWKHEDVHRIWKH86
Medicare threshold (20). The authors present a valuation of $129,090 per QALY based on current dialysis 
practice in the US.  Finally in an appendix to their edited book, Towse et al. (35) provide an interesting set 
of results drawn from a set of participants to the associated workshop (the majority of which were health 
economists). The participants were asked to anonymously record their view on what threshold NICE 
should apply. Eighteen responses were recorded with the average of all responses being £29,000 per 
QALY. 
 
 
A6.2 Papers considering the shadow price of the budget constraint 
The systematic review only identified four different papers by three different authors that suitably fell into 
the category of shadow pricing of the budget constraint.  
 
Williams (37) suggested investigating the cost effectiveness of NHS interventions that represent the 
majority of the budget (he speculated that some 300 interventions accounted for about 90% of the cost 
incurred by the NHS).  The purpose of this would be to identify current NHS activities that might not be 
cost-effective. He acknowledged the implausibility of conducting full technological appraisals on such a 
large number of interventions (estimating this would take 10 years, at which point it would be necessary 
to re-evaluate the initial appraisals), and thus suggested relying on expert opinion and existing patient data 
to speed up the process.  
 
While Williams' recommendations related to identifying current interventions with a high cost per QALY 
as the basis for disinvestment, there is the potential to take this approach further and use it for a method 
to determine the cost effectiveness threshold even down to the level of a local decision maker. This was 
attempted by Appleby et al. (79) who conducted a feasibility experiment into the estimation of the 
appropriate NHS threshold by examining decision making in the NHS at a local level. The authors 
SURSRVHDVWUXFWXUHGPRGHOFRQVLGHULQJQHZWHFKQRORJ\·VFRVWSHUZHLJKWHG4$/<JDLQLQDWDEOHRIDOO
existing services. In an attempt to test the feasibility of this model they conducted interviews with senior 
NHS staff as well as investigating information on public health to construct a list of healthcare services 
introduced or discontinued in 2006/7. The authors found that it was feasible to identify decisions and to 
make the important step of estimating their cost-effectiveness; however, they noted that any attempts to 
fully evaluate sufficient decisions as to estimate a threshold would require a detailed understanding of the 
understanding of the decision structure at a local level as well as a significant number of observations. 
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The other key papers seeking to develop and implement methods for estimating the NHS threshold were 
those of Martin et al. (1-3).  They aimed to establish a link between health care spending and health 
outcomes in the NHS after having adjusted for the need of the patient population. They made use data 
around the observed mortality at PCT level in the NHS alongside data expenditure data on health care 
across 23 programmes of care based on ICD010 disease categories. As has been mentioned earlier in this 
chapter these papers present the cost per life year of a range of programme budgeting categories, 
however, the key result of these papers is that it is possible to make use of existing data to determine such 
valuations for current NHS interventions. The authors concluded that while their results are highly 
OLPLWHGDQGGRQRWSUHVHQWDVLQJOHFRVWSHU4$/<HVWLPDWHIRUWKHRSWLPDOWKUHVKROGWKH\FDQ´LQIRUP
the decisions of NICE on whether their current threshold for accepting new technologies is set at an 
DSSURSULDWHOHYHOµ(p.37).  These studies are the precursor of analyses presented in this report, and further 
details can be found in Appendix B and in Chapter 3 of the main report. 
 
In the area of the efficient allocation of healthcare it is also important to note the contribution of the 
earlier mathematical papers such as Stinnett and Paltiel (41) who outlined mathematical techniques to 
approach the problem through the use of a mixed integer programming approach. While there approach 
differs from the interpretation of the threshold as used in this study it represented an important step in 
the evaluation of the methodology of seeking to solve the optimisation problem apparent in healthcare. 
 
 
 
C.  Conclusion  
This systematic review of the literature surrounding the cost-effectiveness threshold has highlighted the 
significant range and diversity of the literature. Despite the international and mature nature of the 
literature there are significant differences in the suggested methods to represent a cost-effectiveness 
threshold. The main areas of debate relevant to this report have revolved around the role of NICE as a 
´VHDUFKHUµRU´VHWWHUµRIWKHWKUHVKROG(13, 29). While some authors have implicitly argued for NICE to 
IXOILODUROHRIDWKUHVKROG´VHWWHUµE\VXJJHVWLQJPHWhod of elicitation of social WTP valuations of a 
QALY, death or life year (40, 59-76) the literature of most relevance to this research has sought to 
FRQVLGHUHVWLPDWLRQPHWKRGVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKLWVUROHDVD´VHDUFKHUµ(1-3, 43).
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3THE LINK BETWEEN NHS SPENDING AND MORTALITY:
ESTIMATING THE COST OF A LIFE YEAR IN ENGLAND1
Prologue
This report presents, in a linear fashion, details of the econometric work undertaken to estimate the link
between NHS spending and mortality. It also presents details of how the econometric work is used to
calculate the cost of a life year. This report is designed to serve as a reference document in support of the
main project report, which highlights the major findings from the project. As a supporting document this
report provides far more detail than most interested parties will require. Nevertheless, those who seek
more detail than that contained in the main project report may find the material here useful.
1 This study builds on previous work that was undertaken as part of the Quest for Quality and Improved
Performance, a five-year initiative of the Health Foundation.
4A BACKGROUND, MODEL, DATA, AND ESTIMATION APPROACH
B1. Introduction
In a recent White Paper the new British Conservative government emphasized the importance of clinical
outcomes. It notes that, in future, success will be measured, not through the achievement of process
targets, such as short waiting times, but against outcomes such as cancer and stroke survival rates [1].
Although the NHS budget is ring-fenced against the on-going public sector deficit reduction programme,
its budget is still likely to be under considerable pressure, and attention is likely to focus on the extent to
which any additional health care expenditure yields genuine patient benefits in the form of improved
health outcomes.
However, one of the most fundamental yet unresolved issues in health policy is the extent to which
additional health care expenditure yields patient benefits, in the form of improved health outcomes. The
work of health technology agencies, such as the English National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE), has greatly improved our understanding at the micro-level of the costs and benefits
of individual therapeutic technologies. However, there remains a dearth of evidence at the macro-level
on the benefits of increased health system expenditure.
Recently a series of studies has taken advantage of the availability of two new datasets to examine the
relationship between NHS expenditure and mortality rates for various disease categories[2-5]. One
dataset contains mortality rates for various disease categories at the level of geographically defined local
health authorities, known as Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). The other dataset presents NHS expenditure
by PCT on 23 broad programmes of care. This dataset embraces most items of publicly funded
expenditure, including inpatient, outpatient and community care, and pharmaceutical prescriptions.
Like previous studies, we employ a model that assumes that each PCT receives an annual financial lump
sum budget from the national ministry and allocates its resources across the 23 programmes of care to
maximize the health benefits associated with that expenditure. Estimation of this model using the
expenditure and mortality data facilitates two related studies: first, a study of how changes in the NHS
budget impact on expenditure in each care programme; and second, a study of the link between
expenditure in a programme and the health outcomes achieved, notably in the form of disease specific
mortality rates. The latter study also permits the calculation of the cost of an additional life year for
individual programmes of expenditure.
The work presented here draws heavily upon previous studies. These were constrained in a number of
ways and, in this analysis; we build on and improve these previous studies in four major ways:
x first, due to data limitations previous studies related expenditure in time period t to mortality in
periods t, t-1, and t-2 combined. In doing this, such studies assumed that PCTs had reached
some sort of equilibrium in the expenditure choices they make and the outcomes they secure.
This is probably not an unreasonable assumption given the relatively slow pace at which both
types of variable change but, with more recent mortality data now available, here we relate
expenditure in time period t to mortality in periods t, t+1, and t+2 combined (see section B8.5).
x second, previous studies have tended to focus on a very limited number of care programmes
(e.g., for cancer, circulatory disease, gastro-intestinal problems and respiratory problems). Here
we present plausible outcome models for a larger number of budgeting categories.
x third, previous estimates of the cost of a life year have been for individual programmes of care.
Here we present estimates of the cost of a life year for an enlarged number of programmes and,
importantly, with the aid of assumptions about the productivity of programmes without a
meaningful mortality-based outcome indicator, we extend our individual programme estimates to
incorporate expenditure across all programmes of care.
5x finally, although previous results and our current models pass the appropriate statistical tests, we
subject our latest results to a substantial sensitivity analysis.
The structure of this report is as follows. Section B2 presents a brief review of previous empirical studies
in this domain, which have often yielded conflicting results. A straightforward theoretical model of the
budgetary problem faced by a PCT manager seeking to allocate limited funds between competing
programmes of care is presented in section B3. The programme budgeting and health outcome
(mortality) data are described in sections B4 and B5 respectively. Section B6 outlines our estimation
methods and some of the issues surrounding them.
In section B7 we commence our empirical work by estimating well specified econometric models that
outline (a) the budgetary expenditure choices and (b) the health outcomes achieved by PCTs using
expenditure data for 2005/6 and mortality data for 2002/3/4. Section B8 presents results using
expenditure data for 2006/7 and mortality data for 2004/5/6. It also presents results using the same
expenditure data but updating the mortality data to 2006/7/8. Several pieces of sensitivity analysis are
also included in section B8, but the major piece of sensitivity analysis  examining the impact of relaxing
the instrument validity restriction  is reported in section B9.
In section B10 we re-estimate our model using updated expenditure and mortality data. In particular, we
use the programme budgeting expenditure for 2007/8 and mortality data for 2007/2008/2009 to re-
estimate our outcome and expenditure equations. In section B11 we update the dataset again, and this
time we employ programme budgeting expenditure data for 2008/9 and mortality data for
2008/2009/2010. We also compare the elasticities and cost of a life year estimates that we have obtained
using expenditure and mortality data for different years.
Finally, section B12 presents a summary of our findings and some conclu
6B2. Previous studies
There is a large literature on the determinants of international variations in health care spending in which
income levels often play a central role [6]. However, whether more expenditure generates better
outcomes  for example, in terms of reduced mortality  remains a matter of debate. For example,
Fisher and Welch [7] note various ways in which more health care might harm patients and they cite
various studies supporting their arguments. In a comprehensive review, Nolte and McKee [8] discuss
many studies that examine the impact of health care and other explanatory variables on some measure of
health care outcome. Nolte and McKee point out that researchers usually combine a production function
approach with the application of regression analysis. For example, in an early cross-sectional study of 18
developed countries, Cochrane et al.[9] use regression analysis to examine the statistical relationship
between mortality rates on the one hand and per capita GNP and per capita consumption of inputs such
as health care provision on the other. They find that the indicators of health care provision were
generally not associated with outcomes in the form of mortality rates. Thereafter, the failure to identify
strong and consistent relationships between health care expenditure and health outcomes (after
controlling for other factors) has become a consistent theme in the literature, whilst, in contrast,
socioeconomic factors are often found to be good determinants of health outcomes[8, 10, 11].
This failure to detect a significant positive relationship between expenditure and health outcome might
reflect the difficulties associated with any such study rather than the absence of such a relationship. For
example, Gravelle and Backhouse [12] examine some of the methodological difficulties associated with
empirical investigation of the determinants of mortality rates. These include simultaneous equation bias
and the associated endogeneity problem (that the level of health care input might reflect the level of
health outcome achieved in the past), and that a lag may occur between expenditure and outcomes
(studies typically assume that expenditure has an immediate effect on mortality). To avoid the difficulties
imposed by data heterogeneity inherent in international analyses, the study by Cremieux et al[13]
examines the relationship between expenditure and outcomes across ten Canadian provinces over the
fifteen-year period 1978-1992. They find that lower healthcare spending is associated with a significant
increase in infant mortality and a decrease in life expectancy.
Although challenging the received empirical wisdom, one difficulty with the Cremieux et al[13] study is
that the estimated regression equation consists of a mixture of potentially endogenous variables (such as
the number of physicians, health spending, alcohol and tobacco consumption, expenditure on meat and
fat) and exogenous variables (such as income and population density). The authors chosen estimation
technique (GLS) does not allow for this endogeneity and consequently the coefficients on the
endogenous variables may be biased [12]. Ors [14] study of the determinants of variations in mortality
rates across 21 OECD countries between 1970 and 1995 may suffer from the same weakness. She finds
that the contribution of the number of doctors to reducing mortality in OECD countries is substantial
but her estimation technique assumes that the number of doctors is exogenous to the health system.
Nixon and Ulmann[15] provide a detailed review of 16 studies that have examined the relationship
between health care inputs and health outcomes, using macro-level data. They also undertake their own
study using data for 15 EU countries over the period 1980-1995. They employ three health outcomes
measures  life expectancy at birth for males and females, and the infant mortality rate  and a dozen or
more explanatory variables including: per capita health expenditure, number of physicians (per 10,000
head of population), number of hospital beds (per 1,000 head of population), the average length of stay in
hospital, the in-patient admission rate, alcohol and tobacco consumption, nutritional characteristics, and
environmental pollution indicators. Nixon and Ulmann conclude that although health expenditure and
the number of physicians have made a significant contribution to improvements in infant mortality,
...health care expenditure has made a relatively marginal contribution to the improvements in life
expectancy in the EU countries over the period of the analysis. Again, however, the study does not allow
for the possibility that some of the explanatory variables may be endogenous.
Although loosely based on the notion of a health production function, the traditional empirical study
described above has rarely been informed by an explicit theoretical model. This is understandable, as the
processes giving rise to the observed health outcome are likely to be very complex, and any theoretical
7model might become rather unwieldy. However, this absence of a model has usually led to an
atheoretical search for measures of health inputs demonstrating a statistically significant association with
health outcomes. In contrast, in this study we inform our empirical modelling with a theoretical
framework. We believe that this may lead to a more convincing and better specified model of health
outcomes than that used in many previous studies, and this model is outlined in the next section.
8B3. Theoretical model
Our modelling framework assumes that each PCT i receives an annual financial lump sum budget yi from
the national ministry, and that annual total expenditure cannot exceed this amount. The PCT must then
decide how to allocate its budget across the J programmes of care (J=23 in this case). For each
programme of care there is a health production function fi(.) that indicates the link between local
spending xij on programme j and health outcomes in that programme hij. Health outcomes might be
measured in a variety of ways, but the most obvious is to consider some measure of improvement in life
expectancy, possibly adjusted for quality of life, in the form of a quality adjusted life year.
The nature of the specific health production function confronted by a PCT will depend on two types of
local factors: the clinical needs of the local population relevant to the programme of care (which we
denote nij) and broader local environmental factors zij relevant to delivering the programme of care (such
as input prices, geographical factors, or other uncontrollable influences on outcomes). Both clinical and
environmental factors may be multidimensional in nature. Increased expenditure then yields
improvements in health outcomes, as expressed for example in improved local mortality rates, but at a
diminishing rate. That is:
0;0);,,( 22 ww!ww xfxfznxfh jjijijijjij (3.1)
We assume there is a PCT social welfare function W(.) that embodies health outcomes across the J
programmes of care. Assuming no interaction between programmes of care, each PCT allocates its
budget so as to maximise total welfare subject to the local budget constraint and the health production
function for each programme of care:
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It can of course quite plausibly be argued that decision-makers do not discriminate between health
outcomes in different programmes of care, and that W (.) is merely the sum of such outcomes. However,
there is no need for that assumption in our formulation.
Each PCT allocates expenditure across the 23 programmes of care so that the marginal benefit of the last
pound spent in each programme of care is the same. This is represented diagrammatically in Figure B3.1,
which illustrates the trade-off between just two programmes of care. The top left hand quadrant indicates
the health production function for programme 1, whilst the bottom right hand quadrant indicates the
health production function for programme 2, albeit in transposed form. The bottom left hand quadrant
indicates the budget constraint: the expenditure choice must lie on the budget line. This means that for
each feasible pair of expenditure choices (points on the budget constraint line), a pair of health outcomes
in the two programmes emerges, which is traced out as the health production possibility frontier in the
top right quadrant. The PCT will choose the point on this frontier that maximizes welfare. In this
example, we have indicated a simple health maximizing approach (the maximum health summing across
the two programmes), leading to optimal health outcomes (H1*, H2*) and expenditure (X1*, X2*).
9Figure B3.1: graph showing optimal trade-off between two programmes of care
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Solving the constrained maximisation problem yields the result that the optimal level of expenditure in
each category, xij*, is a function of the need for health care in each category (ni1, ni2,..., niJ), environmental
variables affecting the production of health outcomes in each category (zi1, zi2,..., ziJ), and PCT income (yi).
Thus
J1,...,j);,,,,( 11
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Thus, for each programme of care there exists an expenditure equation (3.3) explaining expenditure
choice of PCTs and a health outcome equation (3.1) that models the associated health outcomes
achieved.
Our model is static in the sense that the health production function (3.1) assumes that all health benefits
occur contemporaneously with expenditure. We acknowledge that for some programmes of care benefits
might occur one or more years after expenditure has occurred. This is particularly likely to be the case for
those programmes aimed at encouraging healthy lifestyles, where some benefits may occur decades after
the actual programme expenditure. For other programmes, such as maternity/reproductive conditions
and neonate conditions, benefits may be largely contemporaneous with expenditure. Furthermore, we do
not model the decision makers time preferences.
For our empirical modelling, however, we are constrained by the data we have available, which are largely
cross-sectional in nature. Due to data limitations, previous studies have had to relate expenditure in
period t to mortality data in periods t, t-1, and t-2 combined so that the mortality data precedes the
expenditure data. This is not ideal. Implicitly previous studies have had to assume that the data represent
a quasi long-run equilibrium position, and that relative expenditure levels and health outcomes within
each PCT have been reasonably stable over a period of time. As we shall see, this appears to be a
reasonable assumption because we obtain similar results when we estimate our models using expenditure
for period t with either mortality data for periods t, t-1, and t-2 combined (section B8.4) or with mortality
data for periods t, t+1, and t+2 combined (section B8.5).
Having outlined our model, the next section discusses the datasets used to estimate this model.
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B4. NHS programme budgeting in England
The English National Health Service (NHS) is the archetypal centrally planned and publicly funded health
care system. Its revenue derives almost entirely from national taxation, and access to the system is
generally free to the patient. Primary care is an important element of the system, and general practitioners
act as gatekeepers to secondary care and pharmaceuticals. The system is organized geographically, with
responsibility for the local administration of the NHS devolved to local health authorities known as
Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).2 For the purposes of this study, there were 303 PCTs with an average
population of about 160,000 people until October 2006. In October 2006 the 303 PCTs became 152
PCTs. Some PCT boundaries remained unchanged while other PCTs were merged with one or more
neighbours to form a new, larger, PCT. In a few cases the geographic area covered by an existing PCT
was split between two or more new PCTs. These 152 PCTs have an average population of about 330,000
people.3 PCTs are allocated fixed annual budgets by the national ministry, within which they are
expected to meet expenditure on most aspects of health care, including inpatient, outpatient and
community care, primary care and pharmaceutical prescriptions.
B4.1 The rationale behind the construction of programme budget data
Traditionally, PCTs and their predecessors have reported expenditure on the basis of inputs (for example,
total expenditure on pay and non-pay items). However, NHS policy makers have for some time realized
that this approach does not create clinically meaningful financial data or help in the design and evaluation
of programmes of patient care. The Department of Health therefore initiated a Programme Budgeting
project. This has sought to create an accounting system that is more aligned with the distinct outputs and
health outcomes of the health care system. Since April 2003, in addition to its conventional accounting
data, each PCT has prepared expenditure data disaggregated according to 23 programmes of health care.
These programmes are defined by reference to the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) Version
10 codes at the four digit level, and most programme budget categories reflect ICD 10 chapter headings
(e.g., cancer and tumours, circulation problems, renal problems, neonates, problems associated with the
skin, problems associated with vision, problems associated with hearing, etc). In some cases, the 23
categories are broken down into further sub-areas to achieve a closer match with the various National
Service Frameworks (NSFs): for example, the large mental health category is broken down into substance
abuse, dementia, and other.
Programme budgeting seeks to allocate all types of PCT expenditure to the various programme budget
categories, including secondary care, community care and prescribing. However, the system acknowledges
that a medical model of care may not always be appropriate, and two specific non-clinical groups --
Healthy Individuals and Social Care Needs -- have been created. These are intended to capture the
costs of disease prevention programmes and the costs of services that support individuals with social
rather than health care needs. In addition, in some cases it is not possible to assign activity by medical
condition, preventative activity, or social care need and, in these cases, expenditure is assigned to a
residual category (PBC 23) entitled Other. The most important element of this residual programme is
expenditure on general practitioner services (PBC 23a). In principle, it should be possible to allocate each
GP consultation to a particular care programme. However, at the moment the available data information
systems do not permit such an allocation and so all primary care expenditure is allocated to this residual
programme. The use of this residual category ensures that all expenditure is assigned to a programme of
care [16].
The aim of the programme budget classifications is to identify the entire volume of health care resources
assigned to broad areas of illness according to the primary diagnosis associated with an intervention. It
serves a number of purposes, most notably to assist in the local planning of health care. But for this
2 Strictly speaking, these local health authorities are Primary Care Organisations (PCOs) but the vast majority of
these are Trusts and we retain this terminology throughout.
3 In April 2010 two PCTs (East & North Hertfordshire (5P3) and West Hertfordshire (5P4)) merged to form a
single organisation (Hertfordshire PCT (5QV)) so that, since this date, there have been 151 PCTs. At the same time
Blackburn and Darwen PCT (5CC) became Blackburn and Darwen Teaching Care Trust Plus (TAP). In April 2011
Solihull Care Trust (TAM) became a PCT (5QW).
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study its crucial merit is that it opens up the possibility of examining the statistical relationship between
local programme spending and the associated disease-specific outcome.
B4.2 The collection of programme budgeting data
Programme budgeting information is collected centrally by the Department of Health as part of the
annual accounts process. Each PCT is required to submit an annual programme budgeting return to the
Department which shows how their total expenditure is allocated across the 23 programme budgeting
categories.
Various forms of data collection and analysis are required to map PCT expenditure onto acute,
community and other services to the 23 programme budget categories. From the PCT perspective,
however, the construction of each PCTs return largely involves collating information provided by other
bodies and drawing on other information already in the PCTs own annual accounts. Thus
General/Personal Medical Service expenditure, which is already reported in PCT accounts, relates to
direct primary care and is mapped in its entirety to programme budget category 23a (Other: GMS/PMS);
General Ophthalmic Service expenditure (again from PCT accounts) maps directly to programme budget
category 8 (eye/vision problems); and General Dental Service expenditure maps directly to programme
budget category 12 (dental problems). Prescribing and pharmaceutical services expenditure is allocated to
programme budget categories on the basis of an annual apportionment report provided by the
Prescription Pricing Authority for each PCT as part of the annual accounts process. This apportionment
report allocates each PCTs annual FHS prescribing expenditure across the 23 programme budget
categories. The balance of any primary healthcare purchased by the PCT is allocated /apportioned across
the 23 programme budget categories on the basis of local records, with any remaining expenditure
allocated/apportioned in line with the distributions already made across the budget categories.
It is the responsibility of all NHS providers  which includes PCTs, NHS Trusts, and Foundation
Hospitals  to allocate admitted patient care expenditure across the programme budgeting categories,
specific to each PCT that utilises its services. These allocations are constructed using finished consultant
episodes (from the mandatory administrative Hospital Episode Statistics data set returned by each
provider) each of which is assigned to a Healthcare Resource Group (HRG), an English version of
DRGs. National grouping software automatically assigns each HRG to one of the 23 programme
budgeting categories and attaches the providers average reference cost for the relevant HRG to each
record. For each PCT this information generates a split of inpatient care expenditure by programme
budget category for each of its secondary healthcare providers.
There are numerous difficulties faced when attempting to allocate non-admitted patient care activity (that
is, outpatients, community services, direct access, A&E etc) to programme budget categories. The
difficulties are primarily due to the absence of clear diagnostic codes. The primary reason for care
(equivalent to a diagnosis code) is not information that is routinely collected for community patients.
Because of this, the approach prescribed is for service providers to produce a generic allocation
analysis/report, for all PCTs making use of their services, for all non-admitted patient care costs across
the 23 programme budget categories. Once derived, this generic allocation analysis/report is made
available to PCTs at the same time as the unique (PCT specific) inpatient care information described
above. Unlike the first apportionment report relating to admitted patient care, the non-admitted patient
care apportionment report will not be unique to the PCT, but will represent the providers overall
experience. PCTs are expected to use this data to inform the apportionment of their own spend on non-
admitted patient care across the 23 programme budget categories.
The Department of Health recognises that this approach  the provision of a PCT specific breakdown of
admitted patient care costs and a generic allocation of all PCTs non-admitted patient care spend by
providers  is likely to generate a crude method for apportioning non-admitted patient care costs. PCTs
and their providers are therefore encouraged to put in place other arrangements that allow a more
sophisticated analysis of non-admitted patient care expenditure. Such arrangements may well rely on an
activity sampling approach [16].
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Mental Health providers may not need to complete and forward detailed admitted and non-admitted
patient care apportionment reports to PCTs. The nature of the services they provide may be such that
the entire spend with them relates exclusively to the Mental Health programme (budget category 5).
Ambulance Trusts are required to provide non-admitted patient care information to those PCTs for
whom they provide services. Where it is not possible to split the activity by PCT, a generic non-admitted
patient care report is produced for all purchasers [16].
The Department of Health has been criticised for the rather simplistic way in which it has apportioned
certain costs among categories, and there are obvious issues with the allocation of costs associated with
patients who have multiple disorders. However, the programme budgeting project is very much work-in-
progress and the Department is investigating ways to improve the accuracy with which costs are allocated
across programmes (for example, the Department is investigating the possibility of allocating training
expenditures to specific programmes rather than to the generic medical training programme PBC 23b).4
B4.3 Programme budgeting expenditure, 2003/4 - 2008/9
National (all PCT) expenditure per head and the growth in this expenditure are shown for each
programme budget category for 2003/04 to 2008/09 in Table B4.1. Comparable data for each
programme budget sub-category is shown in Table BA.1 in the annex. Year on year comparisons of
expenditure in each group are complicated by the fact that the algorithms used to allocate activity to
PBCs are regularly revised. For example, for 2006/7 two major changes were made to the methods
employed to construct the programme budgeting data. First, expert medical opinion was employed to
re-evaluate the existing mapping from inpatient diagnosis codes to programme budget category. This led
to the re-assignment of just over 10% of all diagnosis (ICD10) codes from one programme budgeting
category to another.5 6 Second, activity to be costed used the newly introduced version 4 of the
Healthcare Resource Group (HRG) software which, among other things, changed the methodology for
calculating non-admitted patient care costs. HRG4 reflected advances in clinical practice and was
designed to generate a much more accurate costing of complex cases. Other developments, such as the
transfer of responsibility for dental funding from local dental boards to PCTs, also complicate the
interpretation of comparisons through time (for example, per capita dental expenditure by PCTs
increased from £13.55 in 2004/5 to £51.93 in 2006/7).
The expenditure figures for the first year (2003/4) are calculated on a slightly different basis to those for
the other years (2004/5-2008/9). In particular, the figures for 2003/4 are on a net expenditure basis
while the figures for 2004/5-2008/9 are on an own population basis. The own population figure starts
with net expenditure; it adds any expenditure funded from sources outside of the NHS; and then deducts
any expenditure on other PCTs populations incurred through lead/host commissioning arrangements.
In 2006/7 and across all PBCs, expenditure per head on an own population basis was 2.3% greater than
expenditure on a net population basis.
In 2004/5 total PCT expenditure per person was £1,200. The category attracting the most expenditure
was the other category (programme budget category 23) with per capita expenditure of almost £158
(13.2%). This category included primary care expenditure, workforce training expenditure, and a range of
4 Some commentators have suggested that some of the within programme variation in expenditure observed across
PCTs reflects different accounting conventions or unknown local factors. One way of reducing the impact of such
unobserved heterogeneity is to construct a longitudinal data set with expenditure and mortality for each PCT for
several years. With the availability of several years of data for both expenditure and mortality, we wanted to estimate
a panel data model. However, most of the instruments employed here are based on the 2001 Census and thus
estimation of a panel model will not be possible until these too become time variant; this should occur later this year
with release of the 2011 Census data at PCT level. The same difficulty arises with the estimation of an incremental
model.
5 This figure ignores intra-category changes (for example, where an ICD10 code is re-allocated from category 1A to
1B) and only counts cross-category changes (for example, where the code is switched from category 1 to category 2).
6 This expert review also led to the introduction of 40 additional sub-categories including 10 sub-categories for the
cancer and tumour programme.
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other miscellaneous expenditure items. Of these components, primary care expenditure was by far the
largest element at £127 per head.
In 2004/5 there were two other categories with a budget share of over 10%: mental health (budget
category 5) attracted 12.2% of expenditure (£147 per person), and circulation problems (budget category
10) recorded 10.2% of expenditure (£122 per person). Seven programme budget categories  cancers and
tumours (£76), gastro-intestinal problems (£73), trauma and injuries (£72), musculo-skeletal problems
(£72), respiratory problems (£63), genito-urinary problems (£62), and maternity and reproductive
conditions (£55)  had expenditure shares of between 4.6% and 6.3%. Finally, the 13 remaining
categories  from hearing problems (£6) to learning disability (£43)  each account for between 0.5% and
3.6% of total expenditure.
By 2008/9 total PCT expenditure per person had increased to £1,531 (up 28% from 2004/5). The
residual other category (programme budget category 23) still accounted for the largest share of
expenditure (14.9%) with per capita expenditure of almost £228, of which £145 was accounted for by
primary care expenditure. Mental health (budget category 5) still accounted for just over 12% of
expenditure, but the expenditure share recorded by circulation problems (budget category 10) had fallen
from 10.2% to 8.5%. Other categories recording a fall in budget share of more than one half of one
percentage point included: the gastro-intestinal system (down from 6.1% to 5.1%), the musculo-skeletal
system (down from 6% to 5.2%), trauma and injuries (down from 6% to 4.2%), and maternity (down
from 4.6% to 3.9%).
Categories recording an increase in budget share of more than one half of one percentage point included
neurological problems (up from 2.9% to 4.4%) and dental problems (up from 1.1% to 4.1%).
Some of these changes will partly reflect revisions to the algorithms used to allocate expenditure to
particular PBCs. For example in 2006/7 expenditure per person on musculo-skeletal problems fell by
11% and expenditure on trauma and injuries fell by 25%. In the same year, expenditure on neurological
problems increased by 35%. This suggests that some types of activity, which were previously allocated to
musculo-skeletal problems and/or trauma and injuries, were re-allocated to neurological problems.
Similarly, up to and including 2006/7, expenditure that was not directly attributable to a particular
programme category was apportioned using admitted patient care percentages.7 In other words, if x% of
total admitted patient care expenditure was allocated to PBC 1, then x% of all expenditure that was not
directly attributable to a particular programme category was also allocated to PBC 1. With effect from
2007/8, however, NHS organisations were asked to select an appropriate basis for the apportionment of
this non-programme specific expenditure and that, where no reasonable basis existed, such expenditure
was to be allocated to the Other  Miscellaneous (PBC 23X) category.
These two changes to the algorithm used to allocate expenditure to particular PBCs illustrate that year-
on-year comparisons of expenditure need to be interpreted with care.
Obviously, expenditure per head on any given programme varies from one PCT to another and Table
B4.2 presents some statistics that indicate the degree of variation in expenditure levels across PCTs by
programme budget category. The first four columns of Table B4.2 present descriptive statistics for PCT
expenditure per person by PBC. These reveal that, for example, PCT per capita expenditure in the cancer
programme averaged £96.30 across all PCTs, with the minimum spend being £62.90 and the maximum
being £155.70.
Some PCTs will be spending more than other PCTs simply because they face higher input costs. The
second set of four columns in Table B4.2 present descriptive statistics for PCT per capita expenditure
7Expenditure on, for example, community care, A&E, ambulance services, and outpatients can be difficult to
attribute a particular PBC. Critical care, rehabilitation, and specialised commissioning across care settings will also
be difficult to attribute to a particular programme.
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that has been adjusted for the unavoidable geographical variation in costs (input prices) faced by PCTs.8
However, if anything this adjustment appears to increase the variation in expenditure across PCTs; for
example, the range of per capita expenditure on cancer increases from between £62.90 and £155.70
(unadjusted) to between £59.10 and £163.10 (adjusted for local health care input prices).
Another cause of the variation in expenditure levels will be the fact that the need for health care will vary
from one PCT to another. For example, areas with a relatively large proportion of elderly residents, or
PCTs operating in relatively deprived locations, can be expected to experience relatively high levels of
spending. The Department of Health has a well-developed methodology for estimating the relative
health care needs of PCTs, which it uses as the basis for allocating health care funds to PCTs[17]. Recent
needs formulae have been derived from an adjustment for the demographic profile of the PCT and a
series of econometric analyses of the link between health care expenditure and other socio-economic
factors at a small area level within England[18].
The final set of four columns in Table B4.2 present descriptive statistics for PCT per capita expenditure
that has been adjusted for both the unavoidable geographical variation in costs and the local need for
health care faced by PCTs.9 For virtually every PBC, this adjustment reduces the variation in expenditure
across PCTs; for example, the standard deviation of PCT per capita expenditure falls from £19.70 to
£15.30 for the cancer programme. Although this adjustment reduces the variation in expenditure levels
across PCTs, this decline is quite modest and there are still substantial differences in expenditure even
after allowing for differences in local cost and need. For example, expenditure per head in the circulation
problems category varies between £78 and £328 using cost adjusted expenditure data, but falls between
£76 and £327 using cost and need adjusted population data.
This variation in expenditure across PCTs has led some commentators to question the reliability of the
programme budgeting data. In a good governance report, the National Audit Office [19] sought to
examine the quality, timeliness and suitability of Programme Budgeting data to support [their] audit of
the Department of Health Resource Account and determine whether the systems and processes in place
to provide the data are accurate. The NAO undertook a survey of Trusts, PCTs and SHAs. The NAO
noted that a number of PCTs expressed concern about the accuracy of data supplied to them by their
service providers and noted that this was believed to be because most Trusts did not use or find the data
they supply to PCTs of any use to themselves. Overall, the NAOs main conclusion was that while the
processes for collecting the budgeting data were well defined in most areas, there remained scope for
improvement to the robustness of some of the data (such as the non-admitted patient care data).
Appleby, Harrison, Foot, Smith and Gilmour [20] also considered the issue of data reliability in their
study of variations in PCT spending on cancer services. They noted a rather dramatic variation in
spending across PCTs for any given year, and that a relatively large number of PCTs report relatively large
year-on-year changes in cancer expenditure. However, and as the authors point out, it is difficult to
define what might be either an implausible level of expenditure or an implausibly large change in
expenditure. Moreover, the interpretation of a large change in expenditure is complicated by the fact that
the Department of Health makes regular changes (improvements) to the algorithm used to allocated
activity to programme budget categories (as detailed above).
As a case study of the reliability of the programme budgeting data, Appleby et al [20] report the results of
West Kent PCTs use of an alternative approach to producing the programme budgeting data for cancer
and tumours. This alternative approach identified similar levels of expenditure to the traditional method
at the aggregate level, but there were differences between the two approaches at the sub-programme level
(that is, for expenditure on specific cancer sites and in the residual other cancers category).
8 This cost adjustment reflects the fact that health economy input prices vary considerably across the country and,
for some inputs, are up to 40% higher in London and the south east of England than elsewhere. We have used a
weighted average of the three Market Forces Factor Indices (MFFs) for HCHS, for prescribing, and for GMS/PMS
to adjust the raw expenditure figures in Table 4.2 for local input prices (see Department of Health, 2009).
9 This needs adjustment incorporates the AREA resource allocation formula for HCHS (see Department of Health,
2005c).
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As with any dataset, there are likely to be recording and other errors associated with the programme
budgeting data. However, there is no evidence on the magnitude of such errors and we have no reason
to believe that such errors are likely to bias our estimates in one particular direction (for example, we have
no reason to believe that measurement errors are systematically related to other relevant factors such as
mortality rates). In this study, our focus is on whole programme expenditure and thus we avoid the data
reliability issues inherent in any analysis of the sub-programme expenditure data.10 Moreover, although
we present estimates of the cost of a life year for individual programmes, our primary focus is on the cost
of a life year across all programmes combined. The advantage of this is that the impact of a PCT
reporting, for example, too little expenditure in one category might be offset by reporting too much
expenditure in another.
While we note that the allocation of expenditure might not be consistent across PCTs there is no
systematic evidence that the magnitude of any inconsistency is sufficiently large to cause concern.
Accordingly, for each disease category, the observed variation in expenditure per person  holding
constant input prices and the need for health care - offers the opportunity to examine whether PCTs that
spend more on health care achieve a better outcome and, if so, at what cost. Empirical estimates of the
strength of this relationship for both individual and all programmes of care are presented later in this
report.
10 The ACCA/Audit Commission (2011) looked at the reliability of the programme budgeting data for the diabetes
sub-group within the endocrine and metabolic problems category. The ACCA/Audit Commission noted that
programme budgeting data includes inpatient and prescribing expenditure, which are thought to be relatively reliably
allocated to PBCs and to be consistently costed across PCTs, and outpatient and community service expenditure,
which are thought to be less reliably allocated to PBCs and to be less consistently costed across PCTs. The
ACCA/Audit Commission compared the variation in expenditure for inpatient and prescribing expenditure with
that for total programme budget expenditure and found that the latter was far greater than the former. However,
the interpretation of this result is not straightforward: as the ACCA/Audit Commission noted, it is difficult to know
whether differences in programme budget spend are attributable to variation in service provision and efficiency, or
simply to different approaches to cost allocation.
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Table B4.1: table showing national (all PCT) expenditure per head (£) and growth in expenditure (%) by PBC group, 2003/4 - 2008/9
PBC # PBC description
Spend
(£) per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Spend
(£)per
head
Growth
(%)
Growth
(%)
Growth
(%)
Growth
(%)
Growth
(%)
Share of
total
spend
(%)
Share of
total
spend
(%)
2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2004/5 2008/9
1 Infectious diseases 17.95 20.22 23.61 20.88 22.08 23.46 13 17 -12 6 6 1.7% 1.5%
2 Cancers and tumours 64.95 75.54 83.24 81.67 90.21 94.55 16 10 -2 10 5 6.3% 6.2%
3 Blood disorders 14.08 17.00 17.48 16.58 19.44 19.50 21 3 -5 17 0 1.4% 1.3%
4 Endocrine, nutritional 28.96 31.86 37.26 36.70 39.39 43.38 10 17 -1 7 10 2.7% 2.8%
5 Mental health 133.31 146.83 158.95 166.53 180.90 191.21 10 8 5 9 6 12.2% 12.5%
6 Learning disability 37.93 43.37 46.54 48.36 54.20 56.11 14 7 4 12 4 3.6% 3.7%
7 Neurological 29.83 35.09 41.06 55.27 62.43 67.64 18 17 35 13 8 2.9% 4.4%
8 Vision problems 24.61 27.65 28.24 26.97 30.69 32.95 12 2 -4 14 7 2.3% 2.2%
9 Hearing problems 5.73 6.32 6.27 6.21 8.07 8.16 10 -1 -1 30 1 0.5% 0.5%
10 Circulatory disease 110.12 122.37 124.28 122.06 124.77 129.94 11 2 -2 2 4 10.2% 8.5%
11 Respiratory system 54.60 62.71 69.56 65.07 67.68 77.97 15 11 -6 4 15 5.2% 5.1%
12 Dental problems 10.78 13.55 24.91 51.93 59.45 62.44 26 84 108 14 5 1.1% 4.1%
13 Gastro intestinal system 63.56 73.22 81.30 73.30 75.05 77.89 15 11 -10 2 4 6.1% 5.1%
14 Skin problems 20.98 24.90 26.84 28.31 30.41 32.34 19 8 5 7 6 2.1% 2.1%
15 Musculo Skeletal system 61.36 71.72 74.74 66.75 75.91 79.68 17 4 -11 14 5 6.0% 5.2%
16 Trauma and Injuries 62.31 72.13 76.41 57.29 57.56 63.54 16 6 -25 0 10 6.0% 4.2%
17 Genito Urinary system 55.32 62.38 67.38 68.98 67.83 73.78 13 8 2 -2 9 5.2% 4.8%
18 Maternity 52.28 55.04 60.42 57.64 57.09 60.44 5 10 -5 -1 6 4.6% 3.9%
19 Neonate conditions 11.72 13.93 13.42 13.17 15.15 17.23 19 -4 -2 15 14 1.2% 1.1%
20 Poisoning 9.68 12.32 14.25 14.59 15.84 18.31 27 16 2 9 16 1.0% 1.2%
21 Healthy individuals 20.29 22.77 26.18 26.85 31.44 35.74 12 15 3 17 14 1.9% 2.3%
22 Social care needs 24.81 30.93 33.59 30.29 35.29 36.58 25 9 -10 17 4 2.6% 2.4%
23 Other (includes GMS/PMS) 136.94 157.75 171.82 209.70 232.02 227.71 15 9 22 11 -2 13.2% 14.9%
1 to 23 All PBCs 1052.12 1199.60 1307.76 1345.10 1452.91 1530.59 14 9 3 8 5
Notes: (i) The population figures for 2003/4, 2004/5 and 2005/6 are identical (the total for England is 49,175,998).
(ii) The corresponding figure for 2006/7 is 50,476,231, for 2007/8 it is 50,695,989, and for 2008/9 it is 51,220,531.
(iii) The spend per head figures are calculated by summing expenditure across all PCTs and dividing by the national population.
(iv) All figures are at current prices.
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Table B4.2: table showing PCT expenditure per head by PBC, 2008/9: (a) unadjusted; (b) adjusted for local costs; and (c) adjusted for local costs and
local need
Spend per head (unadjusted), £ Spend per head (cost adjusted), £ Spend per head (cost and need adjusted), £
Programme budget category Mean StdDev Min Max Mean StdDev Min Max Mean StdDev Min Max
1 Infectious diseases 26.5 24.6 8.6 151.8 25.7 21.7 8.6 136.7 25.0 21.4 9.5 139.5
2 Cancers and tumours 96.3 16.9 62.9 155.7 96.7 19.7 59.1 163.1 94.2 15.3 55.2 154.0
3 Blood disorders 20.3 7.0 7.7 49.4 20.2 6.5 8.0 49.1 19.7 6.0 8.2 44.2
4 Endocrine, nutritional 44.6 8.8 28.9 74.8 44.7 9.5 27.4 77.0 43.3 6.1 29.9 61.5
5 Mental health 201.4 60.0 118.9 474.1 200.3 54.0 122.8 422.8 194.0 41.9 132.3 362.0
6 Learning disability 56.8 18.8 7.7 125.9 57.0 19.4 6.8 123.6 55.7 18.8 6.7 136.6
7 Neurological 68.5 13.8 41.1 133.8 68.8 15.6 38.4 137.5 66.9 12.1 41.5 125.2
8 Vision problems 33.2 6.7 16.7 57.7 33.4 7.5 14.8 59.2 32.5 6.1 15.6 48.3
9 Hearing problems 8.6 3.7 0.9 24.0 8.7 3.9 0.9 25.5 8.3 3.3 0.8 22.0
10 Circulatory disease 131.6 26.7 88.0 317.3 132.2 30.5 78.2 327.6 128.5 24.4 75.7 326.9
11 Respiratory system 80.5 17.4 48.0 141.2 80.9 19.8 42.7 145.3 78.1 12.4 48.2 126.0
12 Dental problems 64.8 13.4 28.0 111.9 64.9 14.1 24.9 115.8 63.0 10.7 28.1 97.1
13 Gastro intestinal system 80.0 14.5 46.7 119.6 80.4 16.8 41.5 124.6 78.0 11.3 41.6 114.4
14 Skin problems 33.1 8.0 18.1 66.4 33.3 8.6 16.5 69.1 32.2 6.3 16.0 57.7
15 Musculo Skeletal system 79.9 17.6 43.3 127.3 80.4 19.9 39.6 132.5 78.2 16.6 41.0 116.4
16 Trauma and Injuries 63.2 16.7 12.5 139.3 63.4 17.4 11.5 125.0 61.8 15.6 10.4 103.6
17 Genito Urinary system 75.7 13.7 49.9 112.3 75.6 13.6 48.4 108.9 73.7 10.1 50.6 105.5
18 Maternity 63.3 16.7 24.6 124.4 63.1 15.8 21.9 117.9 61.4 12.8 24.4 96.5
19 Neonate conditions 18.4 7.3 6.4 46.4 18.2 6.8 6.6 43.7 17.8 6.6 5.8 47.8
20 Poisoning 18.6 4.2 10.8 31.2 18.7 4.7 9.6 32.3 18.2 3.9 10.1 33.1
21 Healthy individuals 38.4 18.1 9.7 125.0 38.4 17.8 8.9 115.6 36.7 14.5 9.4 104.5
22 Social care needs 40.8 56.6 0.1 415.2 41.2 59.2 0.1 432.9 39.7 55.0 0.0 411.5
23 Other (includes GMS/PMS) 230.8 44.5 138.2 396.1 230.2 42.4 140.7 356.5 226.8 45.8 134.1 346.0
All All PBCs 1,575.6 196.7 1,225.7 2,079.9 1,576.3 217.3 1,183.0 2,173.1 1,534.0 86.2 1,390.1 1,987.0
Note: the above statistics relate to 152 PCTs and the mean expenditure figures will differ slightly from the national ones in Table B4.1 because the statistics across PCTs are not
weighted for the size of each PCTs population.
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B5. Health outcome and other data
B5.1 Health outcome data
Most studies of the relationship between expenditure and outcome have used some measure of mortality
as an indicator of the latter. We too employ mortality as our outcome measure for two reasons: first, it is
a relevant (but admittedly not comprehensive) measure of the outcome of health care expenditure; and
second, it is available for more disease areas than any other outcome measure at PCT level.
Although mortality is available (by PCT) for several disease areas, it is not available for just over one-half
of all programmes not least because it is simply not relevant for these programmes (e.g., for learning
disabilities, vision problems, hearing problems, dental problems, and skin problems). Moreover, even
where a mortality measure is available, the ICD10 coverage of the mortality data often falls short of the
coverage of the expenditure data. For some programmes, therefore, we have combined the published
mortality rates for two or more disease areas in an attempt to match the ICD10 coverage of the mortality
data with that of the expenditure data.
Table B5.1 shows how we have attempted to marry the mortality data (column c) and the expenditure
data (column a). However, and as Table B5.1 shows, the ICD10 coverage of the component mortality
rates for some PBCs still falls short that of the expenditure data and the extent of this shortfall is
illustrated by the ratio reported in the final column of Table B5.1. For example, the cancers and tumours
programme covers all expenditure associated with ICD10 codes C00-C97 and D00-D49 but the PCT-
based mortality data only relates to ICD10 codes C00-C97. At the national (all England) level, figures are
available which show that, in 2008, there were 62,072 deaths of those aged under 75 years from codes
C00-C97 and that there were 63,076 deaths from codes C00-C97 and D00-D49 combined. In other
words, the PCT level mortality data reflects 98.4% of all deaths associated with the expenditure codes.
Initially, we did not adjust our cost of life (year) estimates for this mismatch but, as we will see in section
B8.6, an adjustment has been made for this mismatch in the final calculation of the cost of a life (year)
associated with expenditure for 2006/7. The same adjustment has also been applied to the cost of a life
(year) estimates associated with expenditure for 2007/8 and for 2008/9.
Of course, we acknowledge that mortality is a more relevant outcome indicator for some programmes
(e.g., for circulatory problems) than for others (e.g., for epilepsy) and, for this reason, we would expect
better results in some programmes than others. We also acknowledge that this focus on mortality ignores
the impact of expenditure aimed at chronic care and at palliative care. Nevertheless, our focus on
mortality is purely practical: it is both a widely available measure and it is clearly a relevant outcome
indicator. Moreover, the approach adopted here is extendable in principle to other non-mortality based
outcome indicators. We illustrate such an application in section B8.8 where we use EQ-5D utility scores
pre- and post- an operative procedure from the PROMs programme to generate a non-mortality-based
outcome indicator, and we use this indicator to estimate our outcome model.
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Table B5.1: table showing ICD10 coverage of the expenditure and outcome measures
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICD 10 coverage of Number of deaths, ICD 10 coverage of Number of deaths, Ratio
programme budgeting category <75years, 2008, best match PCT based <75years, 2008, (d/b)
England (ONS, VS3) mortality rate(s) England (ONS, VS3)
corresponding to corresponding to
column aICD10 codes column c ICD10 codes
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
column a column b column c column d column e
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PBC 1 Infectious diseases 1,968 Infectious diseases 1,968 1.000
(large parts of A00-B99)* (A00-B99)
PBC 2 Cancers and tumours 63,076 All cancers 62,072 0.984
(C00-C97, D00-D49) (C00-C97)
PBC 3 Blood disorders 393 No relevant mortality rate by PCT available n/a n/a
(D500-D899)
PBC 4 Endocrine, nutritional and
metabolic problems 2,368 Diabetes 1,501 0.634
(E000-E899) (E10-E14)
PBC 5 Mental health n/a No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
(F00-F69, Z55, Z56)
PBC 6 Learning disability n/a No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
(F700-F739, F780-F849,
F88-F90, Q90, Q91)
PBC 7 Neurological system 5,238 Epilepsy* 713 0.136
(G000-G999, Q000-Q079, R200-R999) (G40-G41)
PBC 8 Eye and vision problems n/a No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
(H000-H599, Q100-Q159)
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICD 10 coverage of Number of deaths, ICD 10 coverage of Number of deaths, Ratio
programme budgeting category <75years, 2008, best match mortality rate(s) <75years, 2008, (d/b)
England (ONS, VS3) England (ONS, VS3)
corresponding to corresponding to
column aICD10 codes column c ICD10 codes
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
column a column b column c column d column e
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PBC 9 Hearing problems n/a No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
(H600-H999, Q160-Q179)
PBC10 Circulation problems 39,923 Circulatory diseases 39,590 0.992
(I00-I99, Q20-Q28) (I00-I99)
               ɉ
PBC11 Respiratory problems 14,417 Asthma 382 |
(A150-A169,* A190-A199, J000-J989, (J45-J46) |
Q300-Q349, R000-R099) Bronchitis, emphysema, other COPD 7,174 |11,147 0.773
(J40-J44) |
Pneumonia 3,591 |
        --     ɋ
PBC12 Dental problems n/a No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
(K000-K099)
               ɉ
PBC13 Gastro-intestinal problems 10,656 Liver disease* 5,195 |
(I840-I859, K091-K929, (K70, K73-K74) | 6,082 0.571
Q380-Q459, R100-R198) Ulcers 887 |
        ..     ɋ
PBC14 Skin problems 367 No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
(L000-L999, Q351-Q379, Q800-Q859)
PBC15 Musculo-skeletal problems
(M00-M99, Q18, Q650-Q799) 933 No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICD 10 coverage of Number of deaths, ICD 10 coverage of Number of deaths, Ratio
programme budgeting category <75years, 2008, best match mortality rate(s) <75years, 2008, (d/b)
England (ONS, VS3) England (ONS, VS3)
corresponding to corresponding to
column aICD10 codes column c ICD10 codes
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
column a column b column c column d column e
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PBC16 Trauma, burns and injuries 5,809* Fracture of thighbone* (S72) 174 ]
(S000-S999, T000-T357, T79, T90-T98) Skull, cranial injury* (S02, S06, T90) 840 ] 1,014 0.175
PBC17 Genito-urinary problems 1,565 Chronic renal failure* (N18) 269 0.172
(A50-A64, N00-N99, Q500-Q649,
R30-R39, R86-R87)
3%& 0DWHUQLW\DQGUHSURGXFWLYHSUREOHPV    1RUHOHYDQWPRUWDOLW\UDWHDYDLODEOH  QD ɉ  
(N96-N98, O000-O999, Z300-Z391) |
|2,193 8.213
PBC19 Neonate conditions 226 Infant mortality rate* 2,152 | but see
(P000-P299, P350-P399, P500-P619, per 1,000 live births, aged under 28 days | note below
3333      DOO,&'FRGHV     ɋ
PBC20 Poisoning n/a No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
(Q86, R78, R82, T360-T888)
PBC21 Healthy individuals n/a No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
PBC22 Social care needs n/a No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
PBC23 Other areas n/a No relevant mortality rate available n/a n/a
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes: (i) the listed ICD10 coverage of the programme budgeting expenditure data includes the major ICD10 codes covered.
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(ii) the ICD10 coverage of PBC 1 includes large elements of codes A00-B99 but a substantial minority of these codes map to the respiratory (PBC 11) and gastro-intestinal (PBC
13) programmes. We do not have the detailed deaths data to remove them from the total for A00-B99 and then to add them to the respiratory and gastro-intestinal programmes.
Instead, we acknowledge that the number of deaths attributed to PBC 1 will be overstated (and that the adjustment ratio in column e will be too low), and that the number of
deaths attributed to PBCs 11 and 13 will be understated (and that their adjustment ratios in column e will be too high) but this is the best that can be achieved given the available
data.
(iii) the ICD10 coverage of the all England mortality data does not always match precisely that of the expenditure data or the PCT level mortality data; again, we have done the best
that can be achieved given the available data. In particular: the national epilepsy mortality data relates to ICD10 G40 (687 deaths) but the PCT level data relates to G40 and G41
(annual average over 2007/8/9 is 713 deaths) ; the national renal failure mortality data relates to ICD10 N17-N19 (415 deaths) but the PCT level data relates to N18 (annual
average over 2007/8/9 is 269 deaths); the national liver disease mortality data relates to ICD10 K70-K77 (6,020 deaths) but the PCT level data relates to K70, K73-K74 (annual
average over 2007/8/9 is 5,195 deaths); and there is no good ICD10 match for femur and skull fracture deaths using national VS3 data (the PCT level data relates to S72, S02, S06,
T90: annual average over 2007/8/9 is 1,014 deaths). For these four cases we use the annual average number of deaths over 2007/8/9 from the PCT-level data as the numerator
when calculating the coverage adjustment factor (column e).
(iv) the number of deaths in England for those aged under 75 years for the trauma, burns and injuries programme (column b) relates to 2004 and is for the secondary cause of death
(Martin, Rice and Smith, 2012).
(v) the mortality rate for neonate conditions relates to deaths aged under 28 days for all ICD10 codes but the expenditure data relates only to P ICD 10 codes. Hence the large
adjustment factor of 8.213 because the coverage of the expenditure data is much smaller than that of the mortality data. However, at the very end of the project it became clear that
although the number of deaths data for those aged under 75 years includes those dying at all ages under 75 years (including those at under 1 year), the disease specific years of life
lost totals for those aged under 75 years excludes those dying at under 1 year of age and actually refers to those dying at ages 1 to 74 (the argument is that infant deaths are mostly a
result of causes specific to the age and have different causes to disease specific deaths later in life). We therefore have two adjustment factors for the maternity and neonates
programme: first, an adjustment factor for the number of deaths derived on the same basis as the adjustment factors for other programmes; and second an adjustment factor for
the YLL that reflects both the YLL in the maternity and neonates programme, as well as the YLL associated with deaths that would have been attributed to other programmes had
the individual died over 1 year of age. (NB The total number of deaths in England in 2008 of those aged under 1 year is 3,184 and if we divide 2,193 by (3,184+41) we obtain the
YLL coverage adjustment factor (=0.679) for maternity and neonates.
(vi) the PCT level mortality rates are available from the NHS Information Centre website.
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Previous studies using the programme budgeting data have employed two alternative mortality based
outcome indicators: the under 75 years of age standardised mortality rate (SMR) and the under 75 years
standardised years of life lost rate (SYLLR). The SMR gives equal weight to all deaths irrespective of the
age at which they occur but the SYLLR gives greater weight to deaths that occur at earlier ages.
We employed both the SMR and the SYLLR when undertaking some preliminary sensitivity analysis (i.e.,
in section B8.2 when considering, for example, which measure of need to use), but elsewhere we have
focussed solely on a measure of the avoidable years of life lost (YLL).11 This is calculated by summing
over ages 1 to 74 years the number of deaths at each age multiplied by the number of years of life
remaining up to age 75 years. The crude YLL rate is simply the number of years of life lost divided by the
resident population aged under 75 years. Like conventional mortality rates, the crude YLL rate can be age
standardised to eliminate the effects of differences in population age structures between areas, and this
(age) standardised YLL rate is the health outcome variable generally employed in this study (Lakhani et
al., 2006, p379).
Descriptive statistics for the SYLLRs employed in this study are shown in Table B5.2. For example, for
all deaths over the three year period from 2006 to 2008, the annual SYLLR across all PCTs for those aged
under 75 years averaged 467 years of life lost per 10,000 population, but this rate varied considerably
across PCTs, ranging between 288 and 749 years of life lost per 10,000 population. Similarly large
variations in the mortality rate across PCTs are evident for other disease groups.12
11 One exception to this is the mortality rate for the trauma and injuries programme where initially only SMRs were
available.
12 The NHS IC reports mortality rates using deaths pooled over a three year period because the relatively small
number of annual deaths in some disease categories might lead to large year-on-year fluctuations in death rates at
PCT level.
24
Table B5.2: table showing descriptive statistics for the mortality variables
Variable Obs Mean StdDev Min Max
all causes of death, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 489.2 94.2 320.3 889.5
all causes of death, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 483.4 83.9 318.1 742.5
all causes of death, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 467.3 83.7 287.8 748.9
all causes of death, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 457.1 81.8 297.2 731.6
all causes of death, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 446.4 78.6 290.8 736.9
cancer, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 161.9 20.8 115.6 263.4
cancer, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 158.4 18.3 103.4 218.8
cancer, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 154.2 19.0 90.5 212.2
cancer, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 151.0 18.5 98.3 201.9
cancer, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 147.9 17.5 100.2 193.9
circulatory disease, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 114.4 31.3 57.7 225.7
circulatory disease, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 108.6 25.2 65.2 177.8
circulatory disease, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 99.0 23.7 54.4 156.7
circulatory disease, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 94.4 22.6 51.4 149.9
circulatory disease, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 91.1 21.7 50.9 154.8
asthma, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 2.7 2.0 0.0 12.2
asthma, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 2.4 1.3 0.1 6.3
asthma, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 2.0 1.1 0.0 5.0
asthma, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 1.9 1.1 0.0 5.7
asthma, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 1.7 1.1 0.0 4.6
bronchitis, emphysema, other COPD, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 12.5 5.7 2.6 35.5
bronchitis, emphysema & other COPD, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 12.0 4.8 3.7 26.1
bronchitis, emphysema & other COPD, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 12.0 4.8 4.0 24.4
bronchitis, emphysema & other COPD, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 11.8 4.7 4.1 24.8
bronchitis, emphysema & other COPD, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 11.6 4.9 4.2 26.6
pneumonia, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 9.1 4.1 1.4 24.6
pneumonia, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 9.7 3.7 3.6 21.9
pneumonia, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 9.7 3.9 3.6 32.4
pneumonia, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 9.8 4.0 3.9 34.4
pneumonia, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 9.3 4.0 2.8 36.1
tuberculosis, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 n/a
tuberculosis, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 0.8 1.1 0.0 5.2
tuberculosis, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 0.8 1.0 0.0 7.6
tuberculosis, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 n/a
tuberculosis, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 n/a
respiratory problems, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 (exc TB) 303 24.3 9.7 5.4 64.2
respiratory problems, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 (inc TB) 152 24.9 8.9 9.7 51.7
respiratory problems, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 (inc TB) 152 24.6 8.5 11.3 56.4
respiratory problems, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 (exc TB) 151 23.4 8.1 8.5 57.4
respiratory problems, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 (exc TB) 151 22.6 8.5 8.5 65.0
liver disease, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 20.1 10.0 3.6 70.9
liver disease, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 22.9 9.9 8.2 75.0
liver disease, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 23.9 10.8 7.0 81.7
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liver disease, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 23.7 10.6 9.4 81.1
liver disease, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 23.5 9.9 8.4 77.4
gastric, duodenal & peptic ulcers, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 2.6 1.6 0.0 10.2
gastric, duodenal & peptic ulcers, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 2.7 1.5 0.1 11.6
gastric, duodenal & peptic ulcers, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 2.4 1.3 0.5 8.5
gastric, duodenal & peptic ulcers, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 2.4 1.3 0.4 7.0
gastric, duodenal & peptic ulcers, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 2.3 1.4 0.4 7.6
gastro-intestinal problems, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 22.7 11.0 4.7 77.8
gastro-intestinal problems, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 25.6 10.7 9.3 80.3
gastro-intestinal problems, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 26.3 11.5 8.1 87.6
gastro-intestinal problems, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 26.1 11.1 10.7 86.3
gastro-intestinal problems, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 25.8 10.5 9.2 82.5
infectious diseases, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 7.0 4.2 0.1 28.1
infectious diseases, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 8.1 4.3 2.4 24.9
infectious diseases, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 8.3 4.4 0.6 26.1
infectious diseases, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 8.2 4.2 2.1 25.1
infectious diseases, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 7.7 4.0 1.6 22.6
diabetes, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 4.7 2.3 0.0 13.4
diabetes, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 4.5 2.1 1.3 15.3
diabetes, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 4.3 2.0 0.5 14.6
diabetes, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 4.0 1.8 0.3 11.2
diabetes, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 4.0 1.7 0.4 10.0
epilepsy, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 5.2 2.7 0.3 16.1
epilepsy, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 5.3 2.1 0.5 13.1
epilepsy, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 5.1 2.1 0.9 12.7
epilepsy, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 4.9 1.9 1.3 14.5
epilepsy, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 4.8 2.0 1.1 13.7
renal failure, SYLLR, 2002/3/4 303 0.9 0.9 0.0 6.0
renal failure, SYLLR, 2004/5/6 152 0.9 0.7 0.0 4.0
renal failure, SYLLR, 2006/7/8 152 0.8 0.7 0.0 5.5
renal failure, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 151 0.7 0.6 0.0 4.3
renal failure, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 151 0.6 0.6 0.0 3.0
fracture of femur (S72), SMR, 2002/3/4 (ages 65 to 84) 303 8.9 6.9 0.0 39.3
fracture of femur (S72), SMR, 2004/5/6 (ages 65 to 84) 152 10.1 6.6 0.0 30.6
fracture of femur (S72), SMR, 2006/7/8 (ages under 75) 152 0.4 0.3 0.0 1.4
fracture of femur (S72), SYLLR, 2007/8/9 (ages under 75) 151 0.3 0.3 0.0 1.7
fracture of femur (S72), SYLLR, 2008/9/10 (ages under 75) 151 0.3 0.3 0.0 2.1
skull fracture/injury, SMR, 2002/3/4 (ages under 75) 303 2.8 1.2 0.4 7.6
skull fracture/injury, SMR, 2004/5/6 (ages under 75) 152 1.9 0.8 0.4 4.4
skull fracture/injury, SMR, 2006/7/8 (ages under 75) 152 1.8 0.7 0.5 4.2
skull fracture/injury, SYLLR, 2007/8/9 (ages under 75) 151 1.7 0.7 0.2 4.2
skull fracture/injury, SYLLR, 2008/9/10 (ages under 75) 151 1.6 0.6 0.1 3.0
trauma, SMR, 2002/3/4 (w/average of femur and skull fractures) 303 4.8 2.4 0.3 15.3
trauma, SMR, 2004/5/6 (sum of femur and skull fracture rates) 152 12.0 6.8 1.9 32.8
trauma, SMR, 2006/7/8 (sum of femur and skull fracture rates) 152 2.1 0.8 0.6 4.7
trauma, SMR, 2007/8/9 (sum of femur and skull fracture rates) 151 2.1 0.8 0.2 4.6
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trauma, SMR, 2008/9/10 (sum of femur and skull fracture rates) 151 1.9 0.8 0.1 4.4
infant mortality rate, <28 days per 1,000 live births, 2002/3/4 303 3.4 1.3 0.9 7.8
infant mortality rate, <28 days per 1,000 live births, 2004/5/6 130 3.4 0.9 1.2 6.2
infant mortality rate, <28 days per 1,000 live births, 2006/7/8 152 3.3 1.0 1.4 6.4
infant mortality rate, <28 days per 1,000 live births, 2007/8/9 151 3.2 1.0 1.2 6.9
infant mortality rate, <28 days per 1,000 live births, 2008/9/10 151 3.2 1.0 1.2 6.9
Note: the SYLLRs are directly age-standardised rates and are expressed as rates per 10,000 European Standard
population. Source: NHS Information Centre website.
B5.2 Other variables
We employ an instrumental variable (IV) estimation technique to estimate our outcome and expenditure
equations because (i) own programme expenditure is likely to be endogenous in the outcome equation
and (ii) other programme need is likely to be endogenous in the own programme expenditure equation.
IV estimation is described in section B6.2 but basically it involves replacing the endogenous variable in
the equation of interest with its predicted value from an OLS regression which regresses the endogenous
variable on a set of instrumental variables. These instruments should be good predictors of the
endogenous variable (i.e., they should be relevant and strong predictors) but should be appropriately
excluded from the equation of interest (i.e., they should be valid instruments).
We have a number of potential instruments available, mostly derived from 2001 Population Census. In
our earlier studies we found that a small sub-set of these instruments proved sufficient to generate
plausible results and these included:
x the proportion of the population providing unpaid care
x the proportion of households that are one pensioner households
x the index of multiple deprivation
x the proportion of the population in the white ethnic group.
We also had available a further set of potential instruments and, where our more limited set of
instruments failed to generate plausible results, we extended our instrument search to include this wider
set of variables. This extended set of instruments included:
x the proportion of residents born outside the European Union
x the proportion of the population of working age (16-74) with a limiting long term illness
x the proportion of the population aged 16-74 with no qualifications
x the proportion of the population aged 16-74 that are full-time students
x the proportion of households without a car
x the proportion of households that are owner occupied
x the proportion of households that are rented from a LA or HA
x the proportion of households that are rented from private landlords
x the proportion of households that are lone parent households with dependent children
x the proportion of the population aged 16-74 that are permanently sick
x the proportion of those aged 16-74 that are long-term unemployed
x the proportion of those aged 16-74 in employment that are working in agriculture
x the proportion of those aged 16-74 in managerial and professional occupations.
Details of the construction of all instruments are shown in Table BA.2 in the Annex.
Our instruments reflect factors, such as socio-economic deprivation and the availability of informal care
in the community, which might indirectly impact upon mortality rates and/or health care expenditure
levels. As we shall see, although our instruments pass the appropriate statistical tests, some
commentators claim that such tests may have low power to detect the presence of invalid instruments.
Consequently in section B9 we examine how sensitive our results are to the presence of invalid
instruments.
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Table B5.3 reports descriptive statistics for the socio-economic and needs variables as available for the
regression analysis of programme budgeting (PB) expenditure data for 2007/8 and for 2008/9 (these
statistics are for the variables in absolute form). For example, on average, lone pensioner households
comprise 14% of all households, the 'white ethnic' group accounts for 89% of the population, and 10%
of the population provide unpaid care.
In addition to the instrumental variables, Table B5.3 also report descriptive statistics for various other
variables available for the regression analysis including the of Department of Healths need for health
care index (this incorporates the CARAN formula for HCHS and reflects need across all health care
services), its need for HIV services index, and its need for maternity services index. The latter two
indices are used to either supplement or replace the all service measure of need when estimating our
models. The 'need for health care' index averages about 1 but varies substantially, with some PCTs
having a needs index more than 25% below the national average and others facing a need for health care
more than 30% above the national average.
Table B5.3 also reports descriptive statistics for some disease prevalence rates (e.g., for diabetes and for
epilepsy) and, again, these are used to either supplement or replace the all service measure of need when
estimating our models
Finally, the MFF index shows that input prices in the most expensive PCT are almost 20% above those in
the least expensive PCT.
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Table B5.3: table showing descriptive statistics for the instrumental and other variables
Description Obs Mean
Std.
Dev. Min Max
Proportion of residents born outside the European Union 151 0.0794 0.0876 0.0088 0.3817
Proportion of population in white ethnic group 151 0.8927 0.1299 0.3942 0.9926
Proportion of population of working age (16-74) with LLT illness 151 0.1182 0.0250 0.0709 0.1798
Proportion of population providing unpaid care 151 0.0990 0.0118 0.0662 0.1221
Proportion of population providing unpaid care (<20 hrs week) 151 0.0667 0.0079 0.0461 0.0817
Proportion of population providing unpaid care (20-49 hrs week) 151 0.0113 0.0025 0.0065 0.0195
Proportion of population providing unpaid care (>50 hrs week) 151 0.0210 0.0051 0.0093 0.0353
Proportion of population aged 16-74 with no qualifications 151 0.2960 0.0642 0.1301 0.4555
Proportion of population aged 16-74 that are full-time students 151 0.0720 0.0270 0.0425 0.1626
Proportion of households without a car 151 0.2932 0.1046 0.1325 0.5761
Proportion of owner occupied households 151 0.6692 0.1128 0.2891 0.8205
Proportion of households in rented social (LA/HA) housing 151 0.2071 0.0918 0.0817 0.5356
Proportion of households in rented private housing 151 0.0924 0.0449 0.0349 0.2961
Proportion of lone pensioner households 151 0.1434 0.0184 0.0979 0.1942
Proportion of one parent households 151 0.0684 0.0180 0.0401 0.1207
Proportion of population aged 16-74 that are permanently sick 151 0.0574 0.0213 0.0242 0.1215
Proportion of population aged 16-74 are long-term unemployed 151 0.0113 0.0052 0.0036 0.0287
Proportion of 16-74 in employment that are in agriculture 151 0.0117 0.0119 0.0016 0.0668
Proportion of those aged 16-74 that are in professional occupations 151 0.2672 0.0688 0.1470 0.4958
Index of Multiple Deprivation 2007 151 23.8098 9.1168 8.0857 48.2627
Need index (incorporates CARAN formula) 151 1.0253 0.1334 0.7311 1.3479
MFF index for HCHS and prescribing 151 1.0021 0.0559 0.9410 1.1243
Diabetes prevalence rate 2007/8 (%, over 17 years) 151 5.4872 0.7982 3.22 8.51
Epilepsy prevalence rate 2007/8 (%, over 18 years) 151 0.7884 0.1489 0.41 1.09
HIV need index 151 1.1848 1.4984 0.1648 8.3332
Chronic kidney disease 2007/8 (%, over 18 years) 151 4.1687 1.2711 1.35 8.41
Maternity need index 151 1.0345 0.2106 0.6845 1.8129
Raw (unadjusted) population 2007/8 151 335,735 196,501 90,142 1,264,298
Note: these statistics are unweighted across PCTs and reflect the values for these variables as available for the
regression analysis of PB expenditure data for 2007/8 and for 2008/9.
Sources: Population Census 2001, Department of Health (2009), NHS Information Centre website.
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B6. Estimation issues and strategy
B6.1 Introduction
The theoretical framework suggests the specification and estimation of a system of equations, with an
expenditure and health outcome equation for each of the 23 programmes of care. However, this
approach makes infeasible data demands, requiring variables to identify expenditure, need, environmental
factors and health outcomes in each of the 23 programmes of care. Moreover, mortality rates are
available for less than half of the 23 programmes. Rather than estimate a system of equations, we
proceed on a programme-by-programme basis, estimating health outcome and expenditure equations for
those programmes for which mortality data is available.
In line with the theoretical framework presented in section B3, we specify the following expenditure (6.1)
and health outcome (6.2) models for each of the J programmes of care (J=23)
xi = a1E1 j . n i j + dyi + e1i j=1,,23 (6.1)
hi = a2 + b2ni + fxi + e2i (6.2)
where xi is the expenditure in PCT i in the selected programme
n i j is the need for care in PCT i in programme j
yi is the total budget for PCT i
hi is the health gain in PCT i in the selected programme
ni is the need for care in PCT i in the selected programme.
Ideally we should employ a programme specific indicator of the level of need for each care programme
but these are not readily available. When estimating both the outcome and expenditure models we
therefore proxy the own programme health care need using the needs component of the Department of
Healths resource allocation formula.13 This needs element is specifically designed to adjust PCT
allocations for local health care needs and accordingly, ceteris paribus, we would expect a positive
relationship between expenditure xi and need ni for each programme of care. We would also expect a
positive relationship between need ni and adverse health outcomes hi.14
The expenditure model includes both the own programme health care need (which is proxied using the
needs component of the Department of Healths resource allocation formula) and the need for health
care in all other programmes. When estimating the expenditure model previous studies have proxied the
need for health care in other (competing) programmes using the mortality rate in those other
programmes. The precise definition of the programmes included in the other programme mortality rate
has varied a little, but here all of our preferred results from 2006/7 onwards use the all cause mortality
rate excluding the mortality rate in the programme of interest as the proxy for need in other
programmes.15
B6.2 IV estimation
We do not use OLS to estimate equations (6.1) and (6.2) because both are likely to contain an
endogenous regressor. Expenditure in the outcome equation (6.2) and other programme need in the
expenditure equation (6.1) are both likely to be endogenous and, in the presence of an endogenous
13 However, we do experiment with replacing and supplementing this all service measure of need with more
programme specific measures where these are available (e.g., using the diabetes and epilepsy prevalence rates).
14 Whilst need is a function of mortality/morbidity in the resource allocation formula, the relationship is not
sufficiently strong enough for us to be concerned about the endogeneity of the need in any individual care
programme.
15 When estimating expenditure equations using PB data for 2005/6 for cancer and circulatory disease we persevere
(for continuity with previous studies) with the use of the circulatory disease SYLLR as the proxy for other
programme need in the cancer programme, and we use the cancer SYLLR as the proxy for other programme need
in the circulatory disease programme (see Martin, Rice and Smith, 2008a & 2012).
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regressor, OLS is both a biased and an inconsistent estimator. Instead, we use instrumental variable (IV)
estimation and implement two-stage least squares (2SLS) using the -ivreg2- routine in Stata v11[21].
Unlike OLS, IV is a consistent estimator in the presence of an endogenous regressor and, although in
finite samples the IV estimator will be biased, the belief is that (providing certain assumptions are met)
this bias will be less than that associated with OLS.
For the health outcome equation, IV estimation can be viewed as finding variables (instruments) that are
good predictors of programme expenditure but which are appropriately excluded from the equation of
interest (that is, from equation 6.2). The assumption is that the instruments and exogenous variables
from the equation of interest impact upon the health outcome through their impact on expenditure only,
and that they do not have a direct effect on the outcome.16 If, on the other hand, an instrument reflects
unobserved factors that affect both expenditure and mortality directly, then the IV estimator becomes
both biased and inconsistent. Such an instrument is said to be invalid because it belongs in the equation
of interest in its own right.
We have a number of potential instruments available, mostly derived from 2001 Population Census, and
these are described in section B5.2. In our earlier studies we found that a small sub-set (four) of these
instruments often proved sufficient to generate plausible results and we commenced our empirical work
with these. If plausible results were not obtainable with some combination of these four instruments, we
employed an extended instrument set. Further details of the identification of suitable instruments for
each model can be found in section B7.3.
The available instruments reflect factors, such as socio-economic deprivation and the availability of
informal care in the community, which might indirectly impact upon mortality rates and/or health care
expenditure levels. The set of instruments associated with each estimated equation was selected on both
technical and pragmatic grounds. From a pragmatic point of view, we require a parsimonious set of
instruments that satisfy the necessary technical criteria. These are, firstly, that they have face validity, that
is, that they are plausible determinants of the endogenous variable being instrumented, and secondly, that
the instruments are both relevant and valid. The relevance of an instrument set refers to its ability to
predict the endogenous variable of concern, whereas validity refers to the requirement that instruments
should be uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest. The set of instruments was
modified if, for example, the Hansen-Sargan test suggested that the set under test was not valid.
Should the instrument set be strong, relevant and valid, 2SLS will produce consistent estimates of the
parameters of the reduced form models. We subject the instrument sets to tests for validity using the
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are
valid instruments, i.e., they are uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection of the null hypothesis casts doubt on the
validity of the instruments. We test for instrument relevance using Sheas[22] partial R-squared measure;
this reflects the correlation between the excluded instruments and the endogenous regressor. However,
even if valid and relevant, non-zero but small correlations between the instruments and the endogenous
regressors can lead to the problem of weak instruments. This can be the case even where correlations are
shown to be significant at conventional levels of testing and sample sizes are large[23]. The IV estimator
becomes a biased estimator if the instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors, and
the extent of the bias can be specified relative to the bias of the OLS estimator.
For the case of a single regressor, Staiger and Stock[24] suggest applying the criterion that if the first-stage
F-statistic, testing the null hypothesis that the instrument set does not significantly predict the
endogenous regressor, is less than 10 then the instruments can be thought to be weak. Stock and
Yogo[25] extend these ideas to the case where there can be multiple endogenous regressors and propose a
test for the null that the instruments are weak and provide appropriate critical values. This is an extension
of the Cragg and Donald [26] test for instrument relevance. For the case of a single endogenous
16 The IV procedure involves the estimation of the second-stage expenditure equation as specified in equation 6.1
and the estimation of a first-stage expenditure equation associated with equation 6.2. The same variable might have
different coefficients in these two equations because the equations will have different sets of covariates.
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regressor, the Cragg-Donald statistic is simply the F-statistic of the test of the hypothesis that the
instruments do not enter the first-stage regression. Stock and Yogo provide critical values of the F-
statistic (and the Cragg-Donald statistic for multiple endogenous regressors) that tabulates the ratio of
2SLS bias to the bias of OLS. The weakness or otherwise of the instruments can then be assessed by the
relative bias exceeding a given threshold (for example, 2SLS bias exceeding 5% of OLS bias).17
To ensure the robustness of our estimates to arbitrary heteroskedasticity, we estimate our models with
Statas -robust- option. The Cragg-Donald statistics are not valid in the presence of heteroskedascity. We
therefore report the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic (testing instrument relevance) and the Kleibergen-Paap
F statistic (testing for weak instruments) which are valid in the presence of heteroskedascity. For further
details of these tests see Baum, Schaffer and Stillman[21].
A general test of model specification is provided through the use of Ramseys [27] reset test for OLS and
an adapted version of the test for instrumental variables [28].18 The tests are more properly thought of as
tests of a linearity assumption in the mean function or a test of functional form restrictions and omitted
variables[29] and can be useful as a general check of model specification.
Finally, we check that the presumed endogenous variable is in fact endogenous using the test proposed by
Durbin [30]. If the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected, then we also use the OLS estimator.
And, although our instruments pass the appropriate statistical tests, some commentators claim that such
tests may have low power to detect the presence of invalid instruments. Consequently in section B9 we
examine how sensitive our results are to the relaxation of the assumption that the instruments are valid.
B6.3 Other estimation issues
In this research we build on previous studies that have used the PB data to estimate the outcome and
expenditure models described in section B6.1. This previous research was undertaken over a period of
years and a number of changes were made between these studies (these were sometimes forced on the
researchers by, for example, data availability considerations). Here we persevere with the previous
approach used to analyse the 2005/6 PB data [5], but we make some changes to the way in which the
2006/7 (and subsequent) PB data are analysed.
In the next section we start by re-visiting the results obtained by Martin, Rice and Smith [5] who used the
2005/6 PB data. In 2005/6 there were 303 PCTs but a series of mergers reduced this total to 152 in
2006/7. These mergers exacerbated greatly the difference in size between the PCTs and so from 2006/7
it makes less sense to give each PCT equal weight in any regression. This is discussed further in section
B8.2 when we come to estimate our model using 2006/7 PB data.
Different PCTs face different costs when buying health care inputs. For example, some health economy
input prices are up to 40% higher in London and the south east of England than elsewhere. In a previous
study[3], we used the Market Forces Factor Index (MFF) that feeds into the Payment by Results tariffs
for 2007/8 to adjust programme budgeting expenditure in 2006/7 for local input prices[31]. This index
only reflects costs associated with the purchase of HCHS services but this was the only index available for
the new (post October 2006) set of PCTs at the time of that study. Since then, a more comprehensive set
of MFF indices for the 152 PCTs has been published [32]. In section B8.2 we investigate the use of
alternative weighted averages of the HCHS, prescribing, and GMS/PMS MFF indices with weights
reflecting the national share of expenditure across these three categories (these weights are 76.3%, 12.4%,
and 11.3% respectively).19 For 2005/6, however, we persevere with the MFF employed in the original
Martin, Rice and Smith study [5], namely the HCHS MFF [33].
17 For the case of a single endogenous regressor and three excluded instruments, Stock and Yogo (2002) critical
values are as follows in term of the bias of 2SLS relative to bias of OLS as follows: relative bias 5% critical value =
13.9; relative bias 10%, critical value = 9.08; relative bias 20%, critical value = 6.46; relative bias 30%, critical value
= 5.39.
18 The OLS version of Ramseys reset test was invoked using Statas -ovtest- command, and the IV equivalent was
invoked using -ivreset-.
19 As all PCTs face the same prescribing costs, the prescribing MFF is 1 for all PCTs.
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Estimation of the expenditure equation for any individual programme requires a proxy for the need for
health care across all other programmes. Previous studies of PB expenditure in 2004/5, 2005/6 and
2006/7 have used the circulatory disease mortality rate as a proxy for the need for health care in other
programmes in the cancer expenditure equation, and the cancer mortality rate as the proxy for need in
other programmes in the circulatory disease expenditure equation[2, 3, 5]. As these are both programmes
that attract considerable expenditure and record considerable mortality, it is not implausible that mortality
and expenditure in one of the programmes will impact upon expenditure in the other. For other
programmes (e.g., respiratory problems and gastro-intestinal problems) Martin, Rice and Smith[3, 5] used
the all cause mortality rate as a proxy for the need in other programmes variable when analysing
expenditure in both 2005/6 and 2006/7. Here, however, we persevere with the previous approach when
using 2005/6 PB data but, from 2006/7, in all programmes we proxy the need for health care in other
(competing) programmes using the mortality rate in those other programmes (i.e., the all cause mortality
rate minus the own programme mortality rate).
Finally, one data transformation that has been applied in all previous studies and is applied here too is to
log transform all variables so that parameter estimates can be interpreted as elasticities. In other words, a
regression coefficient of 0.5 implies that a 1% increase in the regressor is associated with a 0.5% increase
in the dependent variable.
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B. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
B7. Analysis of programme budgeting expenditure for 2005/6
This work builds on previous studies. Martin, Rice and Smith [2] reported outcome elasticities for two
programmes (cancer and circulatory disease) using expenditure data for 2004/5 and pooled mortality data
for 2002, 2003 and 2004. Martin, Rice and Smith [5] extended their preliminary analysis to include several
other programmes and, in this extension, they used updated expenditure data (for 2005/6). However, the
authors found it difficult to obtain sensible outcome models for some programmes of care. Here we
commence our empirical work with an attempt to obtain plausible outcome models for those
programmes that defeated Martin, Rice and Smith in their study. [5]
B 7.1 Construction of an alternative measure of need
Our preferred measure of the need for health care is calculated from the Department Healths
programme budgeting (PB) dataset. This dataset includes programme budgeting expenditure for each
care programme as well as the raw population and the unified weighted population for each PCT. The
unified weighted population incorporates adjustments to the raw population for both the need for health
care as well unavoidable variations in local input costs. The latter are captured via an index which is
known as the market forces factor (MFF). By removing the raw population and MFF adjustment from
the unified weighted population we are left with the implied level of need, and this is the measure of need
that was initially used in the estimation of the model.[5]
The Department of Health PB measure of need associated with expenditure for 2005/6 incorporates the
AREA resource allocation formula. This has since been replaced with the CARAN formula and recent
work by colleagues at York and the Nuffield Trust has investigated the possibility of constructing a
person based resource allocation (PBRA) measure of need [34]. We therefore decided to investigate the
possibility of applying PBRA methods to the construction of an alternative measure of need.
The construction of all of these measures of need involves two steps. The first step requires the
estimation of the econometric relationship between the previous utilisation of services and the
characteristics of the local areas as existed at the time of the utilisation (e.g., their demographic profile and
other indicators of service need such as socio-economic measures of deprivation). The second step
involves the use of this relationship to predict future health care use given predictions about future
demographic characteristics and socio-economic measures of deprivation.
The major difference between the AREA and CARAN formulae and the PBRA formula is that the
former largely use small area based indicators of socio-economic characteristics as indicators of the need
for health care, whereas the latter largely obviates the requirement for these through the extensive use of
individual based indicators of need. In particular, the PBRA formula employed here is based on an
analysis of inpatient and outpatient cost data for 2007/8 for 10% of the entire population of England
[34]. As regressors the PBRA utilisation model includes:
(a) 38 age/gender dummies;
(b) 150 ICD10 morbidity markers for each patient reflecting their use of inpatient services in the previous
two years (that is, in 2005/6 and 2006/7 combined);
(c) 4 hospital encounter variables for each patient reflecting the intensity of their use of both outpatient
and inpatient services in the previous two years (that is, in 2005/6 and 2006/7 combined);
(d) 10 small area based indicators of either local deprivation or health care supply characteristics; and
(e) 151 PCT dummies (reflecting variations in health care supply).
The coefficients from this modelling procedure are applied to patient registration data as at 1 April of the
year for which the measure of need is required. Here we are studying expenditure in 2005/6 and so we
applied the results of the modelling to patient registration data as at 1 April 2005. This requires the
construction of a dataset containing the patient registration details of all 50 million patients registered
with an English practice as at this date. To this we added the patient's age and gender as at April 2005.
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We also added each patients ICD10 morbidity markers and their encounter variables for 2003/4 and
2004/5 combined. Each patient's address (LSOA) is also added to the dataset and this is used to attach
the small number of indicators reflecting the LSOA's socio-economic and health care supply
characteristics.
Given this dataset, the calculation of PCT need (given supply) proceeds as follows. First, calculate the
national average supply effect. This is the sum of the products of the national average values of the
supply variables for the population as at 1 April 2005 and the relevant the regression coefficients.
Second, ignore supply and calculate PCT need. This involves calculating the PCT average values of the
needs variables by age and gender group for the population as at 1 April 2005. Next, for each PCT,
calculate need by age and gender as the sum of the products of the mean values of the needs variables
and their respective regression coefficients. Then total PCT need is the sum of (need in each age/gender
group multiplied by the number of patients in that age/gender group).
Finally, need given supply is calculated as total PCT need plus the number of patients multiplied by the
national average supply effect. PCT need per person is simply total PCT need divided by the PCT
population. Further details of how to use the results of the PBRA modelling to derive PCT weighted
needs indices are presented in Dixon et al.[34]
B7.2 Re-estimation of models using a new measure of need
We re-estimated the outcome and expenditure models for the big four programmes as reported by
Martin, Rice and Smith [5] using the new (PBRA based) measure of need.20 In summary, the results for
the cancer programme were acceptable but not quite as good as previously obtained, and the results for
circulation problems, gastro-intestinal problems, and respiratory problems were poor (e.g., the signs on
the expenditure and need variables in the outcome equation were counter-intuitive). These were
unanticipated results and we were curious to know why our alternative measure of need performed less
well than the more established measure.
We undertook a brief comparison of the two measures of need. Figure B7.1 provides a scatter plot of the
PB and PBRA measures of need. There is a clear positive correlation between the two measures
(correlation coefficient=0.6146), and the summary statistics in Table B7.1 suggest that they have similar
ranges.
20 The big four programmes are the cancer, circulatory disease, respiratory problems, and gastro-intestinal problems
programmes. They are big programmes in terms of the number of deaths associated with each programme.
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Figure B7.1: graph showing scatter plot of PB measure of need and PBRA measure of need
Table B7.1: table showing summary statistics for PB and PBRA based measures of need
Variable
Number
of PCTs
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min Max
PB need 295 1.0062 0.1511 0.6883 1.4889
PBRA need 303 1.0146 0.1448 0.6884 1.4554
Note that there are only 295 PCTs with a PB based measure of need because
only 295 of the 303 PCTs were used to estimate our outcome and expenditure
models (due to a lack of data for some PCTs).
Table B7.2 reports values for the PB and PBRA based measures of need for selected types of PCTs.
These figures suggest that:
x the PBRA measure attributes more need to the least needy areas as defined by the PB measure
(see Table B7.2a);
x the PBRA measure attributes more need to the coastal/retirement areas than does the PB
measure (see Table B7.2b); and
x the PBRA measure attributes far less need to inner city areas than does the PB measure (see
Table B7.2c).
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Table B7.2: table showing values for the PB and PBRA based measures of need for selected
types of PCT
(a) Examples of more affluent areas PB need PBRA need
Wokingham PCT 0.6883 0.7703
Blackwater Valley and Hart PCT 0.7376 0.8395
Bracknell Forest PCT 0.7410 0.8262
Royston, Buntingford and Bishop's Stortford PCT 0.7426 0.8484
Windsor, Ascot and Maidenhead PCT 0.7460 0.8404
Woking PCT 0.7499 0.8097
Chiltern and South Bucks PCT 0.7515 0.8530
Uttlesford PCT 0.7583 0.8861
North East Oxfordshire PCT 0.7588 0.8372
South Cambridgeshire PCT 0.7619 0.9647
(b) Examples of coastal/retirement areas PB need PBRA need
Suffolk Coastal PCT 0.9159 1.0815
Western Sussex PCT 0.9613 1.3248
North Somerset PCT 0.9651 1.1746
Poole PCT 0.9860 1.2045
South and East Dorset PCT 1.0079 1.2439
Fylde PCT 1.0304 1.2157
Southport and Formby PCT 1.0657 1.2141
North Norfolk PCT 1.0658 1.3684
Adur, Arun and Worthing PCT 1.0716 1.2641
East Devon PCT 1.0870 1.3325
(c) Examples of inner city areas PB need PBRA need
Brent PCT 0.9848 0.6991
Lambeth PCT 1.0454 0.7512
Islington PCT 1.1222 0.9014
Southwark PCT 1.1412 0.8163
Newham PCT 1.1746 0.7897
City and Hackney PCT 1.1849 0.8472
Bradford City PCT 1.2131 0.8757
Tower Hamlets PCT 1.2192 0.9299
Heart of Birmingham Teaching PCT 1.2466 0.9052
Central Manchester PCT 1.2965 0.9262
Central Liverpool PCT 1.4065 1.0948
Although these differences are at first perplexing, they become more understandable when it is noted that
the PB and PBRA measures record the level of need across different baskets of services. The PB
measure of need refers to all health care activity, that is, Hospital and Community Services (HCHS),
prescribing, and GMS/PMS (primary care), but the PBRA model only incorporates hospital activity (and
it excludes mental health and maternity from this).
The need for hospital based services is less related to deprivation than are other health care services.
Hence the PBRA measure of need  because it only relates to hospital services  re-distributes need away
from the more deprived PCTs and towards the more affluent ones. Moreover, expenditure on cancer
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services is largely hospital based and hence a measure of need based on HCHS spend alone will be
reasonably satisfactory for cancer (as indeed we found). However, such a measure of need will perform
less well for other programmes (e.g., circulatory disease), where more of the expenditure is on prescribing
and/or primary care.
To test these hypotheses we need to compare our PBRA measure of need with a PB measure of need that
only relates to acute services (i.e., that excludes maternity and mental health, and all prescribing and
GMS/PMS). The Department of Healths measure of need used for the 2005/6 allocations employs the
AREA formula for HCHS. This formula does not permit a separation of acute and maternity need and
so we cannot compare the PBRA measure of need for 2005/6 with the PB measure for 2005/6 for the
same group of specialties (i.e., for acute services excluding maternity and mental health).
However, the CARAN formula, first implemented for the 2009/10 allocations, does distinguish between
acute and maternity. But this formula has only been applied to the new (post October 2006, n=152)
PCTs whereas our PBRA-based measure is for the old (pre October 2006, n=303) PCTs because we are
modelling PB expenditure in 2005/6. However, not all of the old PCTs were involved in mergers in
October 2006. Thus for about half of all PCTs, we can compare our PBRA based measure of need for
2005/6 with the CARAN-based measure of need for 2009/10 for the same set of HCHS services (i.e., for
acute excluding maternity and mental health).
The correlation between PBRA need and CARAN acute need is much higher (correlation
coefficient=0.8722) than that between the PBRA and PB need measures. And an inspection of the values
taken by the various need indices (e.g., for acute, maternity, and mental health) for the inner city PCTs
(where the PBRA and PB measures of need diverge the most) supports the hypothesis that it is the
different service coverage of the PBRA and PB measures of need that explains why they are so poorly
correlated (see Table B7.3).
For example, the PB index suggests that per capita need in Newham PCT is 17% above the national
average but the PBRA index suggests that it is 21% below the national average. We believe that this
difference is due to the fact that the PB index relates to all services whereas the PBRA index only relates
to acute services. The separate figures for acute, maternity and mental health need from the CARAN
formula confirm this hypothesis: CARAN acute need, like PBRA acute need, is well below the national
average, but maternity and mental health need are well above it.
Table B7.3: table showing comparing PB, PBRA and CARAN need indexes for selected inner
city PCTs
PCT PB need PBRA need CARAN need
(all
services)
(acute) acute maternity mental health
City and Hackney PCT 1.1849 0.8472 0.8751 1.6783 1.5340
Tower Hamlets PCT 1.2192 0.9299 0.8451 1.4988 1.6663
Newham PCT 1.1746 0.7897 0.8683 1.8130 1.4486
Haringey PCT 1.0448 0.8347 0.8471 1.4023 1.2886
Brent PCT 0.9848 0.6991 0.8558 1.3420 1.2608
Camden PCT 1.0336 0.8402 0.7667 0.9163 1.3209
Islington PCT 1.1222 0.9014 0.8842 1.1399 1.4516
Lambeth PCT 1.0454 0.7512 0.8111 1.3916 1.3349
Southwark PCT 1.1412 0.8163 0.8445 1.3755 1.3905
Lewisham PCT 1.0402 0.7793 0.8549 1.4253 1.2236
Heart of Birmingham PCT 1.2466 0.9052 0.9078 1.5976 1.5621
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B7.3 Re-estimation of poorly performing models with an extended instrument set
Martin, Rice and Smith [5] found it difficult to obtain sensible outcome models for some programmes of
care. As we were unable to find an improved measure of need, we sought to improve the outcome and
expenditure models reported in Martin, Rice and Smith[5] through the use of an extended set of
regressors/instruments. Martin, Rice and Smith[5] had focussed on the use of four instruments but here
we extend the modelling to include an additional 13 regressors/instruments (born outside EU, limiting
long-term illness, no qualifications, full-time students, no car households, owner occupiers, privately
rented, socially rented, lone parents, permanently sick, long-term unemployed, work in agriculture, work
in professional occupation). Further details about these variables can be found in section B5.2 and
precise details about how they were constructed can be found in Table BA.2 in the annex.
For each PBC, our modelling strategy with these additional regressors/instruments was the same:
(a) first, estimate an IV model using our preferred set of regressors (with need, budget, and other
programme need for the own programme spend model, and with need and spend for the outcome
model) and preferred set of instruments (proportion of households that are lone pensioner households,
per cent of the population providing unpaid care, the IMD 2000, and the per cent of the population in
the white ethnic group). Then adjust this set of instruments if necessary (e.g., remove from the
instrument set or add an instrument to the regressor set if the Hansen-Sargan test indicates that this is
appropriate). Estimate an OLS version of the IV model if the theoretically endogenous regressor is
exogenous according to the relevant statistical test.
(b) second, if (a) fails to generate a reasonable model, add the same additional variables to both the
regressor and instrument sets. Then eliminate insignificant regressors (least significant first, but always
retaining e.g., the budget and other need variables in the expenditure model, and own programme spend
in the outcome model). Then eliminate insignificant instruments until a reasonable model is obtained.
Again, estimate an OLS version of the IV model if the theoretically endogenous regressor is exogenous
according to the relevant statistical test.
B7.4 IV estimates of outcome and expenditure models
The above approach generates preferred outcome and expenditure models for each of the programmes
with a mortality based outcome indicator. Outcome models are shown in Table B7.4 with expenditure
models in Table B7.5. The corresponding first-stage regression results can be found in Tables BA.3 and
BA.4 respectively in the annex.
The first four results in Table B7.4 show the outcome model for the big four programmes (i.e., for
cancer, circulatory disease, respiratory problems and gastro-intestinal problems). In all four programmes
the need variable has a positive and significant effect on mortality, and expenditure has the anticipated
negative effect. The diagnostic statistics reveal that, in all four cases, own programme expenditure is
endogenous and that the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are relevant and
there is no evidence that the instruments are weak. The Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no
evidence of model mis-specification.
The results for the other programmes are similar to but more diverse than those for the big four
programmes. This is to be anticipated because mortality is a much rarer outcome in these programmes
than it is in, say, the cancer programme. Own programme expenditure is not endogenous in the next two
programmes (infectious diseases and neurological problems) and we revert to the use of the OLS
estimator. Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the infectious disease
programme but this is not statistically significant. The all service measure of need is not relevant for this
PBC; instead, we find that a measure of need associated with HIV is positively associated with mortality,
as is a measure of deprivation (households with no car). Mortality from epilepsy is negatively associated
with expenditure in the neurological programme. The need for health care variables has a positive and
significant effect on mortality.
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Expenditure and need have the anticipated effects on mortality in the trauma and injuries programme. In
addition, the provision of unpaid care appears to be associated with an increase in mortality from
fractures. This might be because the availability of care allows the elderly to continue to live in their own
home and that they are more likely to fall and die from a fall at home than they are in alternative
accommodation (such as in a residential home or sheltered housing).
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the neonates programme where the
generic all service measure of need has been replaced with two more programme specific indicators of
need (the proportion of births that are low birth weight births and the proportion of households that are
lone parent households).
The final two results both employ the OLS estimator. Expenditure in the genitor-urinary programme has
a small negative effect on mortality (from renal problems). The prevalence of one parent households and
non-white residents both seem to be positively associated with mortality.
Finally, expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the endocrine problems
programme where the generic all service measure of need has again been replaced with a more
programme specific indicator of need (the diabetes prevalence rate). Mortality in this programme is also
positively associated with the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2000.
The first four results in Table B7.5 show the expenditure model for the big four programmes (i.e., for
cancer, circulatory disease, respiratory problems and gastro-intestinal problems). In all four programmes
both the need and budget variables have a positive and significant effect on own programme expenditure.
In addition, the proxy for need in other programmes is negative and significant in all four cases. In the
circulatory expenditure programme the provision of unpaid care is associated with more expenditure
(patients may buy care in more affluent areas), as is the proportion of residents in the white ethnic group
(there might be some unmet need associated with circulatory problems in the non-white ethnic groups).
The PCT budget variable is positive in all of the remaining seven programmes and this variable is
significant in six of the seven. The proxy for other programme need (SYLLR all deaths) has the
anticipated negative sign in five of the seven programmes and, where it is positive, it is never statistically
significant.
The all service proxy for own programme need is positive and significant in three programmes. In the
other four programmes, however, it has been replaced various other socio-economic indicators of need:
in the trauma programme, for example, with the provision of unpaid care is associated with a reduction in
NHS expenditure and, in the neonates programme, the proportion of residents in the white ethnic group
is negatively associated with expenditure.
The diagnostic statistics reveal that, for all seven IV models, expenditure is endogenous and the
instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are relevant and there is no evidence that
the instruments are weak. The Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no evidence of model mis-
specification.
B7.5 IV estimates of outcome and expenditure models: the first-stage equations
For the health outcome equation, IV estimation involves finding variables (instruments) that are good
predictors of programme expenditure but which are appropriately excluded from the equation of interest
(that is, from the outcome equation). The assumption is that the instruments impact upon the health
outcome through their impact on expenditure only, and that they do not have a direct effect on the
outcome. If, on the other hand, an instrument reflects unobserved factors that affect both expenditure
and mortality directly, then the IV estimator becomes both biased and inconsistent. Such an instrument
is said to be invalid because it belongs in the equation of interest in its own right.
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In our outcome model we typically employ two instruments (call these z1 and z2) for expenditure. IV
estimation assumes that these instruments do not belong in the outcome equation. In other words, IV
estimation assumes that the coefficients ߛ1 and ߛ2 in the outcome modelݕ ൌן ൅ߚ1ݔ + ߚ2݊ + ߛ1ݖ1 + ߛ2ݖ2 + ߳ (7.1)
are identically zero (where y is mortality, x is expenditure, and n is a measure of the own programme
need for health care and all variables relate to a particular programme of care). Such exclusion restrictions
can be debatable and researchers who employ IV techniques often devote considerable effort towards
convincing the reader that their assumed exclusion restrictions are a good approximation [35, 36]. These
efforts usually take two forms: first, researchers often offer a strong theoretical economic argument why
their instruments do not belong in the equation of interest; and, second, statistical tests for the validity of
the exclusion restrictions (Sargan 2SLS, Hansen J-test GMM) are routinely reported as part of the results
for any study that employs IV techniques.
It is difficult for us to identify clear theoretical reasons why our instruments (such as the proportion of
lone pensioner households, the provision of unpaid care, and an index of multiple deprivation) do not
belong in the equation of interest (that is, that they will not directly affect mortality). Of necessity,
therefore, we must be guided by the available statistical tests for the validity of the exclusion restrictions.
However, although our outcome models pass the relevant statistical test, some commentators have
argued that the Sargan/Hansen test may have weak power and may fail to reject the null hypothesis of
instrument validity even when an exclusion restriction is not valid. As we shall see in section B9, this is
likely to be the case when the induced biases in the estimates of ߚ1 (the coefficient on the endogenous
variable) are the same across all instruments. The Hansen-Sargan J test statistic will be small when the
null hypothesis of valid instruments is correct; but it will also be small if the biases induced in ߚ1෢ by
invalid instruments all coincide (i.e., the instruments all identify the same wrong parameter)[37]. In other
words, for the Hansen-Sargan J test to have low power the use of any subset of instruments should
generate the same asymptotic bias inߚ1෢ .
Our approach, implemented below, is to identify theoretical reasons why our instruments might belong in
the first-stage expenditure equation but not in the second-stage outcome equation. Even if our
arguments are thought unconvincing, a critic would also have to argue that any subset of our selected
instruments will each induce the same bias in the coefficient on the endogenous variable. This is because
it is only in these circumstances that the Hansen-Sargan test will be unable to reject the null hypothesis of
instrument validity even when an exclusion restriction is not valid.
The first stage regressions associated with the IV outcome results in Table B7.4 can be found in Table
BA.3 in the annex. A brief summary of the first-stage regressions is provided below.
Cancer programme of care
The instrument set for the cancer programme of care (see column 1 in Table BA.3) includes the
proportion of households that are lone pensioner households and the proportion of the population
providing unpaid care. These instruments have intuitive appeal. The first stage regression of cancer
expenditure on the instruments and the need for health care (as an exogenous regressor in the 2SLS
model) reveals a positive and significant coefficient on lone pensioners and a negative but non-significant
coefficient on the proportion of unpaid carers. The proportion of lone pensioners is likely to reflect an
additional adjustment for health care need specific to an elderly and needy population. The omission of
this variable from the second-stage regression is plausible as the dependent variable relates to mortality
under 75 years of age and some of the lone pensioners will be aged over 75 years, and members of this
group are, by definition, relatively healthy individuals. Unpaid care might act as a substitute for the
provision of health care services and, in these circumstances, a negative relationship with expenditure is to
be expected. There is no obvious relationship between the provision of unpaid care and mortality.
Circulatory disease programme of care
The two instruments used for cancer were also employed to predict expenditure in the circulatory disease
programme and they were augmented with the addition of the population weighted index of multiple
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deprivation (IMD 2000). The relevance of the latter variable is theoretically plausible as circulatory
disease is more related to disadvantage than is cancer. In addition, we also employed the proportion of
residents in the white ethnic group as an additional instrument for expenditure but its coefficient is very
small and it is not statistically significant.
Increased expenditure on circulatory disease in the first stage regression is associated with a greater
proportion of pensioners living alone and a greater proportion of unpaid carers. The latter may reflect an
increased awareness and compliance with medical intervention, particularly preventative measures,
brought about by carers but this will not affect our outcome model if the impact of this additional
support is largely on the mortality of those aged over 75 years. Expenditure on circulatory problems is
also negatively associated with the IMD 2000. As the IMD incorporates an access to medical services
domain, this negative association might reflect some unmet need which largely affects mortality in those
aged over 75 years.
Respiratory problems programme of care
The IMD 2000 is negatively associated with expenditure on respiratory problems. As the IMD
incorporates an access to medical services domain, this negative association might reflect some unmet
need which largely affects mortality in those aged over 75 years. The proportion of the population aged
16-74 that is permanently sick has a positive association with expenditure but might not affect mortality
in the under 75s if expenditure is largely directed towards managing chronic disease.
Gastro-intestinal problems programme of care
Increased expenditure on gastro-intestinal problems in the first stage regression is positively associated
with the proportion of residents providing unpaid care. This may reflect an increased awareness and
compliance with medical intervention, particularly preventative measures, brought about by carers but
this will not affect our outcome model if the impact of this additional support is largely on the mortality
of those aged over 75 years.
Trauma, burns and injuries programme of care
Increased expenditure on trauma, burns and injuries in the first stage regression is positively associated
with the proportion of pensioners living alone. This may reflect longer stays in hospital and an increased
need for community care. However, the proportion of pensioners living alone will have little effect on
our mortality measure if most of this expenditure is associated with patients aged over 75 years of age.
Neonate programme of care
The percentage of those aged 16-74 that are long-term unemployed and the proportion of households
that are in social rented housing are both positively associated with expenditure on neonate care. These
are both indicators of socio- economic deprivation and might be associated with the presence of larger
families (i.e., more children per family). This would affect expenditure per head of population but not
necessarily mortality per 1,000 live births. The negative coefficient on the proportion of those aged 16-74
with no qualifications might reflect the emigration of young adults from those areas that are particularly
deprived. This would reduce expenditure per head of population but would have no impact on the
mortality measure.
The first stage regressions associated with the IV expenditure results in Table B7.5 can be found in Table
BA.4 in the annex.
Cancer programme of care
The first-stage equation for the cancer expenditure model includes two instruments  lone pensioners,
and unpaid carers -- that are excluded as regressors from the second stage of estimation. In this model
the first stage regression of other programme need (as proxied here by the circulatory disease mortality
rate) on the instrument set generates a negative coefficient on both instruments excluded from the
second-stage regression. A greater proportion of unpaid carers might reflect an increased level of care
(and perhaps increased compliance with care programmes and drug regimes) resulting in a decrease in
other programme deaths. The availability of unpaid care in the community might not have a direct effect
on cancer expenditure if such care supplements rather than substitutes for NHS funded care. Conditional
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on need and the total PCT budget, the negative coefficient on the proportion of lone pensioners may be
indicative of the presence of increased networks of social support. If this additional support reduces
other programme mortality but does not substitute for NHS care, then the lone pensioner variable will
not belong in the expenditure equation.
Circulatory disease programme of care
In the circulatory disease expenditure model, the first stage regression of other programme need (as
proxied here by cancer mortality rate) on the instrument set results in a negative coefficient on one
instrument (lone pensioners) and a positive coefficient on the other (the IMD 2000). As noted above, the
negative coefficient on the proportion of lone pensioners may be indicative of areas with increased
networks of social support. If this additional support does not substitute for NHS care then the lone
pensioner variable will not belong in the expenditure equation. It is plausible that the IMD 2000 should
have a positive effect on other programme need but not belong in the expenditure equation if, for
example, there is some unmet need in another (but not the circulatory disease) care programme.
Respiratory problems programme of care
In the respiratory disease expenditure model, the first stage regression of other programme need (as
proxied here by the all cause SYLL rate) on the instrument set results in a negative coefficient on one
instrument (unpaid care) and a positive coefficient on another (i.e., on the IMD2000). A greater
proportion of unpaid carers might reflect an increased level of care (and perhaps increased compliance
with care programmes and drug regimes) resulting in a decrease in other programme deaths. The
availability of unpaid care might not have a direct effect on own programme expenditure if such care does
not substitute for NHS funded care. It is plausible that the IMD 2000 should have a positive effect on
other programme need but not belong in the expenditure equation if, for example, there is some unmet
need in another (but not the respiratory disease) care programme.
Gastro-intestinal problems programme of care
In the gastro-intestinal problems expenditure model, the first stage regression of other programme need
(as proxied here by the all cause SYLL rate) on the instrument set (including need and total budget)
results in a negative coefficient on one instrument (lone pensioners) and a positive coefficient on the
other (IMD2000). As noted above, the negative coefficient on the proportion of lone pensioners may be
indicative of areas with increased networks of social support. If this additional support does not
substitute for NHS care then the lone pensioner variable will not belong in the expenditure equation. It is
plausible that the IMD 2000 should have a positive effect on other programme need but not belong in
the expenditure equation if, for example, there is some unmet need in another (but not the gastro-
intestinal) care programme.
Neurological problems programme of care
The first-stage equation for the neurological expenditure model includes three instruments  lone
pensioners, unpaid carers and IMD2000 -- that are excluded as regressors from the second stage of
estimation. Explanations for the signs on these variables have been outlined above when discussing the
other first stage regressions.
Trauma and injuries programme of care
The first-stage equation for the trauma expenditure model includes two instruments  lone pensioners
and the IMD2000 -- that are excluded as regressors from the second stage of estimation. Explanations
for the signs on these variables have been outlined above when discussing the other first stage
regressions.
GMS/PMS programme of care
The first-stage equation for the GMS/PMS expenditure model includes three instruments  households
with no car, lone parents, and permanently sick -- that are excluded as regressors from the second stage of
estimation. All three are plausibly positively associated with other programme need (as proxied here by
the all cause SYLL rate) but do not occur as regressors in the second stage GMS/PMS expenditure
model. The latter includes at least one measure of deprivation  the proportion of people aged 16-74
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without any qualification  and the Hansen-Sargan test suggests that three excluded instruments offer no
additional explanatory power for observed variations in GMS/PMS expenditure.
We appreciate that not everyone will be convinced by our arguments about the validity of our instruments
and so in section B9 we undertake a sensitivity analysis that examines the impact of weakening the
instrument exclusion restriction.
44
Table B7.4: table showing preferred outcome models using 2005/6 expenditure data and mortality for 2002/2003/2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 1 PBC 7 PBC 16 PBC 19 PBC 17 PBC 4
cancer circulation respiratory gastro-intestinal infectious disease neurological trauma neonates genito-urinary endocrine
2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6
outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model
instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend spend exogenous spend exogenous instrument spend instrument spend spend exogenous spend exogenous
unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted
VARIABLES second stage second stage second stage second stage OLS OLS second stage second stage OLS OLS
own programme spend p/head -0.394*** -1.370*** -1.574*** -2.018*** -0.152 -0.182 -1.332*** -0.237* -0.034 -0.244*
[0.100] [0.156] [0.483] [0.364] [0.117] [0.143] [0.469] [0.127] [0.220] [0.129]
need per head 0.905*** 2.628*** 4.076*** 4.254*** 1.157*** 1.588***
[0.083] [0.163] [0.562] [0.412] [0.252] [0.445]
lone pensioner households -0.930***
[0.158]
born outside EU 0.111*
[0.063]
no car households 0.701***
[0.114]
HIV need per head 0.212**
[0.082]
unpaid carers 1.164***
[0.392]
low birth weight births 0.919***
[0.223]
lone parents households 0.549*** 1.035***
[0.121] [0.211]
white ethic group -1.246***
[0.329]
population weighted IMD 2000 0.421***
[0.076]
diabetes prevalence rate 2004/5 14.236***
[5.195]
diabetes prevalence rate squared 2.026***
[0.759]
constant 4.101*** 1.849*** -2.892** -2.052** 2.654*** 0.917** 0.689 1.621*** 2.188*** 24.258***
[0.248] [0.324] [1.250] [0.916] [0.443] [0.459] [1.462] [0.455] [0.681] [8.859]
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 294 295 294 267 294
R-squared 0.328 0.068 0.169 0.203
Endogeneity test statistic 29.216 65.024 12.630 39.106 3.542 4.071
Endogeneity p-value 6.47e-08 0 0.000380 4.01e-10 0.0598 0.0436
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.786 7.209 1.877 2.468 1.200 5.976
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.375 0.0655 0.171 0.291 0.273 0.0504
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Shea's partial R-squared 0.133 0.311 0.0376 0.173 0.112 0.0735
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statisti 26.59 42.31 20.56 34.83 26.97 19.04
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 1.68e-06 1.44e-08 3.44e-05 1.32e-07 1.39e-06 0.000268
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 16.94 29.51 10.29 23.32 17.76 11.49
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.0347 0.162 0.0929 2.196 0.756 1.388
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.852 0.688 0.761 0.138 0.385 0.239
Ramsey reset F statistic 2.089 0.665 1.075 1.118
Probability > F 0.102 0.574 0.360 0.342
Notes: (i) Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
(ii) for the endogeneity test the null is that the specified endogenous regressors can actually be treated as exogenous;
(iii) the instrument validity test is based on the Hansen-Sargan test. The joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and
that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation.
(iv) Sheas partial R-squared is an indicator of the degree of instrument relevance (i.e., of the correlation between the instruments and the endogenous regressor). It is the value of
R-squared from a regression of the endogenous variable on the excluded instruments.
(v) A statistical test of instrument relevance is provided by the Kleibergen-Paap LM test. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not relevant.
(vi) Weak identification arises when the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regressor, but only weakly. Estimators can perform poorly when instruments are
weak. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic provides a formal test of weak identification. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are weak.
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Table B7.5: table showing preferred expenditure models using 2005/6 expenditure data and mortality for 2002/2003/2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 1 PBC 7 PBC 16 PBC 19 PBC 17 PBC 4 PBC 23
cancer circulation respiratory gastro-intestinal
infectious
disease neurological trauma neonates genito-urinary endocrine GMS/PMS
2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
o/need
exogenous
instrument
spend
instrument
o/need
o/need
exogenous
o/need
exogenous
o/need
exogenous
instrument
spend
unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted
VARIABLES second stage second stage second stage second stage OLS second stage second stage OLS OLS OLS second stage
SYLLR cancer -0.954***
[0.249]
PCT budget per head 0.968*** 0.682*** 0.849*** 0.772*** 0.742*** 1.111*** 0.627*** 0.388 1.041*** 0.425** 0.926***
[0.191] [0.161] [0.223] [0.166] [0.180] [0.244] [0.173] [0.391] [0.141] [0.175] [0.199]
need per head 0.703*** 0.885*** 2.226*** 1.115*** 0.773*** 1.720*** 0.570***
[0.248] [0.261] [0.436] [0.230] [0.298] [0.401] [0.207]
white ethnic group 0.198*** -0.739***
[0.066] [0.181]
provision of unpaid care 0.364*** -0.339*
[0.136] [0.190]
SYLLR circulatory disease -0.577***
[0.107]
lone pensioners -0.612*** -0.257**
[0.165] [0.101]
SYLLR all deaths -1.367*** -0.639*** -0.437*** -0.899*** -1.157*** 0.121 0.035 -0.158 -1.003***
[0.328] [0.149] [0.157] [0.182] [0.274] [0.307] [0.099] [0.116] [0.276]
born outside EU 0.069**
[0.029]
full-time students -0.165*** 0.127***
[0.053] [0.031]
no car households 0.444***
[0.099]
HIV need per head 0.142***
[0.034]
London boroughs dummy 0.942***
[0.106]
LA/HA rented housing 0.377***
[0.126]
no qualifications 0.521***
[0.140]
private rented housing 0.102**
[0.041]
work in agriculture -0.058***
[0.022]
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Constant -0.020 3.440*** 4.368** 1.241 -0.969 2.066* 3.631** -4.760** -2.854*** -2.435*** 4.320**
[0.517] [1.111] [1.757] [0.930] [1.037] [1.131] [1.414] [1.920] [0.604] [0.726] [1.703]
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295 295
Endogeneity test statistic 6.465 12.921 19.325 7.218 13.865 12.690 5.273
Endogeneity p-value 0.0110 0.000325 1.10e-05 0.00722 0.000196 0.000368 0.0217
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.416 1.925 0.00232 2.441 0.826 3.577 3.213
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.519 0.165 0.962 0.118 0.662 0.0586 0.201
Shea's partial R-squared 0.450 0.141 0.168 0.416 0.450 0.239 0.290
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 63.99 31.27 33.11 57.16 64.15 39.80 47.98
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0 1.62e-07 6.47e-08 0 0 2.28e-09 2.15e-10
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 109.7 21.74 19.08 98.29 70.14 40.01 43.10
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 2.679 0.231 0.848 0.987 0.0184 0.912 0.668
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.102 0.631 0.357 0.320 0.892 0.340 0.414
R-squared 0.709 0.177 0.399 0.267
Ramsey reset F statistic 1.572 0.250 1.358 0.765
Probability > F 0.196 0.861 0.256 0.514
See notes to Table B7.4.
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B7.6 Calculation of the cost of a life and life year
The preferred models identified in Tables B7.4 and B7.5 indicate the responsiveness of mortality to
changes in expenditure, and of own programme expenditure to changes in budget, using expenditure data
for 2005/6. Together with information about programme expenditure and mortality, the coefficients on
the own programme expenditure and PCT budget variables listed in Tables B7.4 and B7.5 can be used to
calculate the cost of an additional life year for the ten programmes for which outcome and expenditure
models are available.21 For a relatively small budget change:
the cost of an additional life in a particular programme
= the change in expenditure in that programme / the change in mortality in that programme
= (annual spend * expenditure elasticity) / (annual mortality * outcome elasticity
* expenditure elasticity)
and
the cost of an additional life year in a particular programme
= the change in expenditure in that programme / the change in life years lost in that programme
= (annual spend * expenditure elasticity) / (annual life years lost * outcome elasticity
* expenditure elasticity).
Table B7.6 presents the necessary information to calculate the cost of an additional life (or life year) for
each of these ten programmes. There is an assumed small (1%) increase in the national budget and it is
also assumed that this increase is applied to each PCTs budget. The total additional spend in each
programme associated with this injection (column E) is determined by the initial level of expenditure in
the programme (column B) and the programmes expenditure elasticity (column D). And this additional
spend, in conjunction with the outcome elasticity (column H) and the number of deaths in the
programme (column G), determine the number of lives saved that is associated with the additional
expenditure. If we divide the change in programme expenditure (column E) by the change in the number
of lives lost (column I) we obtain the cost per life gained (column K).
Alternatively, we can apply the outcome elasticity (column H) to the annual number of life years lost in
the programme (column G) to determine the number of life years saved that is associated with the
additional expenditure. If we divide the change in programme expenditure (column E) by the change in
the number of life years lost (column N) we obtain the cost per life year gained (column O). Note that
none of these figures are QALY adjusted and that all costs are at current (2005/6) prices.
The cost per life year associated with the cancer programme is £13,741 and this is almost identical to that
calculated using expenditure data for 2004/5 but with the same mortality data as that employed here [2].
Similarly, the cost per life year associated with the circulatory disease programme is £8,328 and this is also
almost identical to that calculated using expenditure data for 2004/5 but with the same mortality data as
that employed here [2]. The cost per life year for the respiratory programme (£20,601) and for the
gastro-intestinal programme (£18,303) are a little larger than these figures but are still of the same order
of magnitude. Taken together, the cost per life year for these big four programmes is £12,855.22 23
Table B7.6 also contains cost per life year estimates for the six other programmes for which a mortality-
based outcome indicator is available. These cost estimates are much larger than those for the big four
21 The programme specific cost per life and life year estimates presented here will underestimate the true programme
specific costs because not all PCT expenditure can be allocated to a specific programme (for example, all GMS
expenditure is allocated to PBC23 rather than being split between cancer, circulatory disease, respiratory problems,
etc). However, this more generic expenditure is incorporated into the calculation of the cost of a life year when this
calculation is undertaken across all programmes.
22 These are the big four programmes in terms of the number of lives (or life years) lost.
23 The cost of a life year for a group of PBCs is calculated by dividing (a) the sum of the change in spend on the
component PBCs by (b) the sum of the change in the number of lives/life years lost for the component PBCs.
49
programmes. This is to be expected as mortality is a less relevant outcome indicator for these PBCs than
for the big four programmes. The cost per life year across all ten programmes for which a mortality-
based outcome indicator is available is £21,256.
Although we have an estimate of the cost per life year for ten programmes, it is unclear how we should
adjust this estimate for the expenditure associated with the other 13 programmes. We attempted to
estimate an outcome and expenditure model for expenditure and mortality in all 13 of these programmes
combined.24 However, this was not successful with, for example, counter-intuitive signs on some
variables.25
Instead, we decided to make some assumption about the cost per life year associated with the other 13
programmes. We examined two possibilities. First, we assumed that the other 13 programmes generate
no mortality gain at all. This is clearly unrealistic but it does provide an upper bound for the cost per life
year across all programmes of care. Table B7.7 is similar to Table B7.6 but it incorporates this zero gain
assumption for the 13 other programmes.26 It shows that the cost per life year across all 23 programmes
 assuming a zero mortality gain in the 13 programmes without a mortality based indicator  is £56,799.
Second, the zero mortality gain assumption is an extreme one but possibly relevant for the residual
programme (PBC 23) -- where about two-thirds of the expenditure is attributable to primary care -- if we
assume that any mortality gain associated with primary care expenditure is reflected in mortality rates
associated with other, more disease specific, programmes (e.g., cancer, circulatory disease, etc). But if we
assume a zero mortality gain in PBC 23, what assumption should we make about the mortality gain
associated with the remaining 12 programmes?
One possibility is to assume that the cost per life (year) in the remaining 12 programmes is on average the
same as that associated with the ten programmes for which a mortality-based outcome indicator is
available. At first this may sound strange as we have already noted that mortality is not regularly
associated with these programmes whereas it is a normal outcome for the ten programmes for which a
mortality-based outcome indicator is available (and this is of course why mortality data at PCT level is
available for these ten PBCs). However, if we broaden our interpretation of health gain to include non-
mortality effects (such as those on the quality of life), then this assumption  that the cost per life (year) in
the remaining 12 programmes is on average the same as that associated with the ten programmes for
which a mortality-based outcome indicator is available  becomes far more plausible.
Thus Table B7.8 is similar to Table B7.7 but incorporates: (a) a zero gain assumption for the residual
(including primary care) programme (PBC23); and (b) an average gain assumption for the remaining 12
programmes for which no mortality based outcome indicator is available. Table B7.8 shows that the cost
per life year across all 23 programmes (see row 15) is £24,200. This is, of course, slightly greater than the
cost of a life year for the ten programmes for which a mortality-based outcome indicator is available
(£21,256) because a small proportion of expenditure (that on primary care) is assumed to have no health
benefit beyond that captured by the more disease specific programmes (e.g., in cancer, circulatory disease,
etc).
The costs quoted in Tables B7.6, B7.7, and B7.8 make no QALY adjustment but such an adjustment
would add between 50% and 66% to the costs quoted [5].
24 We are grateful to Steve Morris for this suggestion.
25Instead of estimating programme specific models we also tried estimating an outcome model using the all cause
mortality rate and expenditure across all programmes combined but this was not successful (again, counter-intuitive
signs were obtained on some variables). We also investigated the possibility of using an overall measure of health
derived from the Health Survey for England. Apart from sample size issues at PCT level (4,645 adults in England
were interviewed for the 2009 survey), such surveys by definition only provide information about the health status
of the living population and reveal nothing about the level of mortality.
26 The cost of a life year for those 13 programmes where there is no health gain is, of course, undefined.
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Table B7.6: table showing cost of life and life year estimates for 2005/6 for the ten programmes for which we have outcome and expenditure elasticities
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
(=0.01*
B*D)
(=0.01*
D*G*H) (=E/I)
(=0.01*D*
H*M/3) (=E/N)
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2005/6
Spend
elasticity
Change
in
spend
(£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2002/04
Outcome
elasticity
Change
in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2002/04
Change in
annual life
years lost
Cost per life
year gained
(£)
1 Cancer £4,094 0.968 £39.63 62,259 0.394 237.45 £166,897 2,268,541 2,884 £13,741
2 Circulatory problems £6,112 0.682 £41.68 45,504 1.370 425.16 £98,042 1,607,171 5,005 £8,328
3 Respiratory problems £3,421 0.849 £29.04 11,601 1.574 155.03 £187,350 316,506 1,410 £20,601
4
Gastro-intestinal
problems £3,998 0.772 £30.86 5,926 2.018 92.32 £334,318 324,735 1,686 £18,303
5 Big four programmes £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
6 Infectious diseases £1,161 0.742 £8.61 2,050 0.152 2.31 £3,725,931 106,552 40 £215,054
7 Endocrine problems £1,832 0.425 £7.79 1,690 0.244 1.75 £4,442,720 60,615 21 £371,601
8 Neurological problems £2,019 1.111 £22.43 729 0.182 1.47 £15,217,293 66,137 45 £503,201
9 Genito-urinary problems £3,313 1.041 £34.49 294 0.034 0.10 £331,432,573 10,030 1 £29,144,918
10 Trauma & injuries £3,758 0.627 £23.56 1,037 1.332 8.66 £2,720,657 30,000 84 £282,132
11 Neonate conditions £660 0.388 £2.56 2,123 0.237 1.95 £1,311,733 477,675 146 £17,490
12 All ten programmes £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Note:
All 23 programmes £64,310
% change in budget 1.00
proportionate change 0.01
Change in budget £643.10
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Table B7.7: table showing cost of life and life year estimates for 2005/6 for all programmes (assumes that 13 PBCs offer no health gain)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
(=0.01*
B*D)
(=0.01*
D*G*H) (=E/I)
(=0.01*D*
H*M/3) (=E/N)
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2005/6
Spend
elasticity
Change
in
spend
(£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2002/04
Outcome
elasticity
Change
in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Total life
years
lost,
<75years,
2002/04
Change in
annual life
years lost
Cost per life
year gained
(£)
1 Cancer £4,094 0.968 £39.63 62,259 0.394 237.45 £166,897 2,268,541 2,884 £13,741
2 Circulatory problems £6,112 0.682 £41.68 45,504 1.370 425.16 £98,042 1,607,171 5,005 £8,328
3 Respiratory problems £3,421 0.849 £29.04 11,601 1.574 155.03 £187,350 316,506 1,410 £20,601
4
Gastro-intestinal
problems £3,998 0.772 £30.86 5,926 2.018 92.32 £334,318 324,735 1,686 £18,303
5 Big four programmes £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
6 Infectious diseases £1,161 0.742 £8.61 2,050 0.152 2.31 £3,725,931 106,552 40 £215,054
7 Endocrine problems £1,832 0.425 £7.79 1,690 0.244 1.75 £4,442,720 60,615 21 £371,601
8 Neurological problems £2,019 1.111 £22.43 729 0.182 1.47 £15,217,293 66,137 45 £503,201
9 Genito-urinary problems £3,313 1.041 £34.49 294 0.034 0.10 £331,432,573 10,030 1 £29,144,918
10 Trauma & injuries £3,758 0.627 £23.56 1,037 1.332 8.66 £2,720,657 30,000 84 £282,132
11 Neonate conditions £660 0.388 £2.56 2,123 0.237 1.95 £1,311,733 477,675 146 £17,490
12 All ten programmes £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Other 13 programmes?
13 Assume no health gain £33,942 £402.43 0.00 0
14 All 23 programmes £64,310 £643.10 926.22 £694,330 11,322 £56,799
Note:
All 23 programmes £64,310
% change in budget 1.00
proportionate change 0.01
Change in budget £643.10
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Table B7.8: table showing cost of life and life year estimates for 2005/6 for all programmes (assumes GMS/PMS provides no gain, other PBCs provide
average gain)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
(=0.01*
B*D)
(=0.01*
D*G*H) (=E/I)
(=0.01*D*
H*M/3) (=E/N)
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2005/6
Spend
elasticity
Change
in spend
(£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2002/04
Outcome
elasticity
Change
in annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2002/04
Change in
annual life
years lost
Cost per life
year gained
(£)
1 Cancer £4,094 0.968 £39.63 62,259 0.394 237.45 £166,897 2,268,541 2,884 £13,741
2 Circulatory problems £6,112 0.682 £41.68 45,504 1.370 425.16 £98,042 1,607,171 5,005 £8,328
3 Respiratory problems £3,421 0.849 £29.04 11,601 1.574 155.03 £187,350 316,506 1,410 £20,601
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,998 0.772 £30.86 5,926 2.018 92.32 £334,318 324,735 1,686 £18,303
5 Big four programmes £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
6 Infectious diseases £1,161 0.742 £8.61 2,050 0.152 2.31 £3,725,931 106,552 40 £215,054
7 Endocrine problems £1,832 0.425 £7.79 1,690 0.244 1.75 £4,442,720 60,615 21 £371,601
8 Neurological problems £2,019 1.111 £22.43 729 0.182 1.47 £15,217,293 66,137 45 £503,201
9 Genito-urinary problems £3,313 1.041 £34.49 294 0.034 0.10 £331,432,573 10,030 1 £29,144,918
10 Trauma & injuries £3,758 0.627 £23.56 1,037 1.332 8.66 £2,720,657 30,000 84 £282,132
11 Neonate conditions £660 0.388 £2.56 2,123 0.237 1.95 £1,311,733 477,675 146 £17,490
12 All ten programmes £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Other 13 programmes?
13
(a) assume no health gain
for GMS/PMS £8,449 0.926 £78.24 0.00 0
14
(b) assume average gain in
the other 12 PBCs £25,493 1.272 £324.20 1,247.69 £259,838 15,252 £21,256
15 All 23 programmes £64,310 £643.10 2,173.90 £295,827 26,575 £24,200
Note:
All 23 programmes £64,310
% change in budget 1.00
proportionate change 0.01
Change in budget £643.10
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B7.7 Summary and conclusion
In this section we have extended the results reported by Martin, Rice and Smith[5] by obtaining plausible
outcome and expenditure models for all ten programmes of care with a mortality based outcome
indicator. In addition, we have, for the first time, calculated the cost of a life year across the big four
programmes combined (£12,855) and across all ten programmes (£21,256). Moreover, with the aid of an
assumption about the productivity (health gain) of programmes without a meaningful mortality based
outcome indicator, we have extended our individual programme estimates to incorporate expenditure
across all programmes of care.
If we assume that the other 13 programmes without a mortality-based outcome indicator generate no
health gain then the cost of an additional life year across all expenditure for 2005/6 is £56,799.
Alternatively, if we assume that any health care gain associated with primary care expenditure is reflected
in mortality rates associated with other, more disease specific, and that the health gain associated with the
remaining 12 programmes is, on average, the same as that recorded by the PBCs with a mortality based
indicator, then the cost per life year across all expenditure for 2005/6 is £24,200.
This concludes our analysis of the 2005/6 programme budgeting data. In the next section we apply our
model to the 2006/7 programme budgeting data.
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B8. Analysis of programme budgeting expenditure for 2006/7
B8.1 Construction of an alternative measure of need
The analysis of the 2005/6 programme budgeting data employed a measure of the need for health care
that incorporated the AREA resource allocation formula for acute services. As was described in section
B6.2, we attempted to construct a better measure of need using a recently developed person-based
approach [34]. However, we were unable to construct a viable alternative PBRA based measure of need
for use with the PB data for 2005/6 because the PBRA formula only relates to acute services yet the PB
data incorporates elements for acute, maternity, mental health, prescribing and primary care, and we were
unable to separate these components parts.
The construction of an alternative measure of need is, however, possible for use with the 2006/7 PB data.
Spend and mortality data are available for the new (152) PCTs, and the Department of Healths resource
allocation exposition book for 2009/10 (which employs the CARAN model) provides separate measures
of need for acute, maternity, mental health, prescribing and GMS/PMS services. We can therefore
replace the (CARAN-based) measure of acute need for the 2009/10 allocation with our own PBRA based
measure of acute need (albeit for 2006/7) to calculate an alternative to the AREA based measure of need
across all health care services.
The PBRA model was applied to all patients on Practice lists as at 1 April 2006 to generate a PCT level
measure of acute need (see section B7.1 for a description of this approach as applied to patients on
Practice lists as at 1 April 2005). The resulting PBRA measure of acute need can be compared with the
CARAN based measure of acute need as reported in the Department of Healths resource allocation
exposition book for 2009/10. The correlation coefficient for these two measures is 0.8514 and
descriptive statistics for the two measures are shown below in Table B8.1.
Table B8.1: table showing summary statistics for the CARAN and PBRA based measures of
acute need
Variable
Number
of PCTs
Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min Max
CARAN_acute need 152 1.0033 0.1113 0.7659 1.2153
PBRA_acute need 152 1.0037 0.1218 0.7606 1.3420
The all service measure of need (which is a weighted average of the acute, maternity, mental health,
prescribing and GMS/PMS measures) as reported in the Department of Healths resource allocation
exposition book for 2009/10 can be re-calculated by replacing the CARAN-based acute measure with the
PBRA-based acute measure of need. The correlation coefficient for these two all service measures of
need is 0.9714 and Figure B8.1 shows a scatter plot of these two measures. Descriptive statistics for
these two all service measures of need along with the (AREA-based) PB measure of need are shown
below in Table B8.2.
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Figure B8.1: graph showing scatter plot of all service measures of need: incorporating CARAN or
PBRA based measures of acute need
Table B8.2: table showing all service measures of need: incorporating CARAN, PBRA or AREA
based measures of acute need
Variable Obs Mean
Std.
Dev.
Min Max
PCTneed_CARAN 152 1.0240 0.1339 0.7311 1.3479
PCTneed_PBRA 152 1.0242 0.1395 0.7287 1.3769
PCTneed_AREA 152 1.0293 0.1380 0.7165 1.4006
The correlation coefficients for the three measures are shown in Table B8.3.
Table B8.3: table showing correlation coefficients for alternative measures of all service need
Variable PCTneed_AREA PCTneed_PBRA PCTneed_CARAN
PCTneed_AREA 1
PCTneed_PBRA 0.9583 1
PCTneed_CARAN 0.9839 0.9714 1
B8.2 Estimation issues associated with the use of 2006/7 expenditure data
As well as having to select a preferred measure of need from the three available, the estimation of our
model using PB data for 2006/7 requires the resolution of several other issues.
Estimation issue 1: net spend or own population spend?
The Department of Health reports two sets of PB spend data: the first is on a net spend basis and the
second is on an own population basis. The own population data starts with the net spend figure, adds
any expenditure funded from non-NHS sources, and adjusts for expenditure made under PCT lead/host
commissioning arrangements. These adjustments are usually very small. For 2005/6 we used the net
spend data (because only net spend data was produced in the first year and we were hoping to build a
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panel) but given the now regular production of own population data this would seem to be the more
appropriate data set to use as, for example, it includes all expenditure irrespective of its funding source.
Estimation issue 2: to weight or not to weight?
OLS and IV estimation implicitly gives the same weight to each PCT when estimating our expenditure
and outcome models. With the re-organisation of PCTs in October 2006, the number of such
organisations was reduced from 303 to 152. However, far from making them more similar in terms of
size (as measured by their population), this re-organisation actually increased the disparity in size between
the largest and the smallest PCTs, with the largest PCT now being 14 times the size of the smallest.
Unless we explicitly weight each observation (PCT) by its size, we will be giving the same weight
(influence) to PCTs that are much smaller than other PCTs.
Estimation issue 3: which MFF?
This study builds on previous work using PB data. Martin, Rice and Smith[3] report the results of the
estimation of our model using PB data for 2006/7. One essential step in this estimation is the removal of
the impact of unavoidable variations in local costs from the reported measure of the unified weighted
population. At the time of the earlier study the authors only had access to an MFF based on HCHS for
the new 152 PCTs. Now, however, a more broadly-based MFF is available, that is, one based on a
weighted average of MFFs for HCHS, prescribing, and GMS/PMS. Should we use an MFF for HCHS
only, or one that incorporates HCHS and prescribing, or one that incorporates HCHS, prescribing and
GMS/PMS?
Estimation issue 4: SMRs or SYLLRs, and which proxy for the other programme need variable?
Previous studies have reported results using both SMRs and SYLLRs but the sheer number of models
being estimated requires that we focus on one measure only. Various proxies for other programme need
have been employed in previous studies (see section B6.3 for further discussion). In this sub-section we
persevere with this variety but consistency demands that we focus in on a preferred proxy for other
programme need.
This study builds on previous work using PB data. Martin, Rice and Smith[3] report the results of the
estimation of our model using PB data for 2006/7. With several alternative measures of need and MFF
available, we undertook a preliminary empirical analysis of the 2006/7 PB data using the outcome and
expenditure models for the big four programmes as reported in Martin, Rice and Smith[3] as our starting
point. These models incorporated the AREA-based measure of need and an MFF based on HCHS only.
We first re-estimated the outcome and expenditure models by replacing the AREA based measure of
need with one incorporating the PBRA formula. Then we re-estimated these models again with a
measure of need incorporating the CARAN model. The results suggest that: (a) for the outcome models,
the use of the PBRA measure of need generates a smaller coefficient on expenditure than does the AREA
measure of need; and (b) that for the spend models, the use of the PBRA measure of need generates a
larger coefficient on PCT budget than does the AREA measure of need. For both the outcome and
expenditure models, the use of the CARAN measure of need generates outcome and expenditure
elasticities that lie between those generated by the AREA and PBRA measures.
Next, the results reported by Martin, Rice and Smith[3] employ an MFF based on HCHS only to remove
unavoidable variations in local costs from the reported measure of the (unified weighted) need for health
care services. This was the only MFF available for the new PCTs at the time of that study. Now,
however, a more broadly-based MFF is available (that is, one based on a weighted average of MFFs for
HCHS, prescribing, and GMS/PMS).
To examine the consequences of using the CARAN MFF (i.e., a weighted average of the HCHS,
prescribing, and GMS/PMS MFFs), this MFF was used to calculate the implied level of need given the
unified weighted populations for 2006/7 which are reported alongside the PB spend data by the
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Department of Health.27 We found that the use of an extended set of MFFs can sometimes affect the
coefficient on the variable of interest.
Models were also estimated using a weighted average of the CARAN MFFs for HCHS and prescribing
only. The latter results were very similar to those using all three of the CARAN MFFs (i.e., a weighted
average of the HCHS, prescribing, and GMS/PMS MFFs).
We also tried re-estimating the outcome and expenditure models from Martin, Rice and Smith [3] using
the own population expenditure data rather than the net spend data but this adjustment had very little
effect on the results. In addition, the impact of weighting each observation by PCT size was usually
rather modest.
Because of the sheer number of variations possible, we decided to estimate 13 particular variants of our
model and details of these variants are summarised in Table B8.4. These variants were estimated for each
of the big four programmes using both the outcome and expenditure equations. The results are
presented in Tables B8.5 to B8.12.
Table B8.4: table showing variants of the outcome and expenditure models estimated using
2006/7 spend data
Variant
PCTs
weighted? MFF indicator Indicator of need
Mortality
indicator
1 No weights HCHS AREA-based UWP/HCHS MFF SMR
2 No weights HCHS PBRA model applied to patients on list at 1 April 2006 SMR
3 No weights HCHS CARAN model used for allocations in 2009/10 SMR
4 No weights HCHS AREA-based UWP/HCHS MFF SYLLR
5 No weights HCHS PBRA model applied to patients on list at April 2006 SYLLR
6 No weights HCHS CARAN model used for allocations in 2009/10 SYLLR
7 Yes HCHS AREA-based UWP/HCHS MFF SMR
8 No weights HCHS, prescribing & GMS AREA-based UWP/(HCHS, prescribing & GMS) MFF SMR
9 Yes HCHS, prescribing & GMS AREA-based UWP/(HCHS, prescribing & GMS) MFF SMR
10 No weights HCHS & prescribing AREA-based UWP/(HCHS & prescribing) MFF SMR
11 Yes HCHS & prescribing AREA-based UWP/(HCHS & prescribing) MFF SMR
12 No weights HCHS, prescribing & GMS CARAN model used for allocations in 2009/10 SMR
13 Yes HCHS, prescribing & GMS CARAN model used for allocations in 2009/10 SMR
Note: UWP=unified weighted population.
27 Note that implied need=unified weighted population/(CARAN MFF*raw population).
58
Table B8.5: table showing cancer spend models with various indicators of MFF and need
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2
cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR
no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted
second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage
iAREA need 1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need 1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need 1 iAREA need 2 iAREA need 2 iAREA need 3 iAREA need 3 CARAN need CARAN need
HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
PCT budget per head 0.353 0.681*** 0.572** 0.388 0.752*** 0.618** 0.326 0.250 0.245 0.246 0.241 0.552** 0.544*
[0.273] [0.235] [0.247] [0.272] [0.238] [0.247] [0.362] [0.284] [0.357] [0.284] [0.357] [0.239] [0.308]
needAREA1 1.513*** 1.557*** 1.351***
[0.288] [0.284] [0.367]
other programme need 1 -0.654*** -0.771*** -0.733*** -0.604*** -0.749*** -0.661*** -0.749*** -0.661*** -0.680*** -0.616***
[0.124] [0.125] [0.124] [0.131] [0.152] [0.154] [0.151] [0.154] [0.126] [0.139]
needPBRA 1.320*** 1.352***
[0.261] [0.265]
needCARAN 1.431*** 1.477*** 1.347*** 1.160***
[0.287] [0.289] [0.246] [0.294]
other programme need 2 -0.649*** -0.773*** -0.728***
[0.119] [0.124] [0.119]
needAREA2 1.778*** 1.554***
[0.329] [0.389]
needAREA3 1.765*** 1.545***
[0.328] [0.388]
Constant 0.271 0.707 0.569 0.356 0.835 0.665 0.067 5.901*** 5.559** 5.932*** 5.582** 3.430** 3.220
[0.544] [0.551] [0.554] [0.542] [0.567] [0.554] [0.572] [2.062] [2.550] [2.063] [2.550] [1.645] [2.087]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Endogeneity test statistic 13.112 18.683 18.420 13.313 18.736 18.716 11.940 13.098 11.708 13.017 11.504 16.985 13.460
Endogeneity p-value 0.000293 1.54e-05 1.77e-05 0.000264 1.50e-05 1.52e-05 0.000549 0.000296 0.000622 0.000309 0.000695 3.77e-05 0.000244
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.870 1.139 0.560 0.504 0.748 0.281 1.089 1.730 1.875 1.711 1.857 0.381 0.321
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.351 0.286 0.454 0.478 0.387 0.596 0.297 0.188 0.171 0.191 0.173 0.537 0.571
Shea's partial R-squared 0.607 0.526 0.586 0.570 0.482 0.548 0.612 0.511 0.537 0.510 0.536 0.572 0.583
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 40.55 38.73 40.45 40.49 38.17 41.14 38.91 38.41 37.13 38.38 37.11 43.82 41.36
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 1.57e-09 3.88e-09 1.64e-09 1.61e-09 5.14e-09 1.16e-09 3.55e-09 4.56e-09 8.66e-09 4.63e-09 8.75e-09 3.06e-10 1.05e-09
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 73.17 63.72 68.50 67.14 51.14 60.78 72.14 57.74 61.44 58.09 61.58 68.29 66.96
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.233 0.299 0.0271 0.198 0.211 0.00518 0.000324 0.00529 0.0391 0.0345 0.00971 9.41e-07 0.0158
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.629 0.585 0.869 0.656 0.646 0.943 0.986 0.942 0.843 0.853 0.922 0.999 0.900
Notes: (a) iAREA need 1=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS MFF
(b) iAREA need 2=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS, prescribing & GMS MFFs
(c) iAREA need 3=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS & prescribing MFFs
(d) other programme need 1=circulatory disease SMR
(e) other programme need 2=circulatory disease SYLLR
(f) robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8.6: table showing circulatory disease spend models with various indicators of MFF and need
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10
circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR
no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted
second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage
iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 iAREA need2 iAREA need2 iAREA need3 iAREA need3 CARAN need CARAN need
HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
other programme need 1 -0.766** -0.736** -0.811** -0.939*** -0.776** -0.927*** -0.781** -0.935*** -0.831** -1.112***
[0.298] [0.299] [0.370] [0.305] [0.315] [0.324] [0.316] [0.326] [0.367] [0.392]
PCT budget per head 0.861*** 1.162*** 1.035*** 0.836*** 1.191*** 0.998*** 0.719*** 0.832*** 0.661** 0.829*** 0.657** 0.983*** 0.914***
[0.240] [0.218] [0.219] [0.229] [0.220] [0.210] [0.259] [0.242] [0.264] [0.242] [0.264] [0.213] [0.231]
needAREA1 0.624* 0.732* 0.967**
[0.355] [0.389] [0.378]
white ethnic group 0.215*** 0.187** 0.207** 0.232*** 0.199** 0.225** 0.278*** 0.219** 0.284*** 0.219** 0.284*** 0.209** 0.286***
[0.079] [0.080] [0.086] [0.083] [0.083] [0.095] [0.084] [0.085] [0.091] [0.085] [0.091] [0.086] [0.098]
provision of unpaid care 0.457** 0.554*** 0.488** 0.437** 0.549*** 0.466* 0.239 0.527*** 0.336 0.528*** 0.335 0.477** 0.200
[0.205] [0.186] [0.227] [0.212] [0.183] [0.247] [0.227] [0.190] [0.210] [0.190] [0.211] [0.227] [0.268]
needPBRA 0.250 0.295
[0.275] [0.280]
needCARAN 0.480 0.610 0.546 0.925**
[0.401] [0.479] [0.369] [0.399]
other programme need 2 -0.904** -0.871** -0.956*
[0.365] [0.347] [0.491]
needAREA2 0.655* 1.020**
[0.383] [0.424]
needAREA3 0.652* 1.018**
[0.381] [0.422]
Constant 2.380** 2.377* 2.621* 3.246** 3.244** 3.533* 2.744** 3.763* 5.275** 3.803* 5.337** 2.827 4.028**
[1.212] [1.251] [1.469] [1.572] [1.553] [2.088] [1.222] [2.133] [2.306] [2.143] [2.319] [1.863] [1.995]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Endogeneity test statistic 8.506 10.727 8.136 6.475 8.793 5.743 9.019 8.939 8.654 9.036 8.745 8.315 9.729
Endogeneity p-value 0.00354 0.00106 0.00434 0.0109 0.00302 0.0166 0.00267 0.00279 0.00326 0.00265 0.00310 0.00393 0.00181
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 2.454 0.640 1.841 2.364 0.423 2.166 2.993 1.770 2.225 1.792 2.237 1.777 2.030
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.117 0.424 0.175 0.124 0.515 0.141 0.0836 0.183 0.136 0.181 0.135 0.183 0.154
Shea's partial R-squared 0.235 0.205 0.184 0.207 0.184 0.148 0.238 0.225 0.230 0.224 0.228 0.183 0.183
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 22.99 24.15 20.59 21.32 25.01 17.46 26.79 23.47 27.59 23.63 27.59 20.91 24.11
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 1.02e-05 5.70e-06 3.39e-05 2.35e-05 3.70e-06 0.000161 1.52e-06 8.02e-06 1.02e-06 7.41e-06 1.02e-06 2.88e-05 5.80e-06
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 23.14 22.53 18.64 17.28 20.44 12.62 22.37 21.47 22.07 21.27 21.63 19.10 18.93
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.00329 0.156 0.102 0.0384 0.333 0.288 0.0270 0.123 0.152 0.189 0.235 0.0165 0.190
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.954 0.693 0.750 0.845 0.564 0.592 0.869 0.726 0.696 0.664 0.628 0.898 0.663
Notes: (a) iAREA need 1=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS MFF
(b) iAREA need 2=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS, prescribing & GMS MFFs
(c) iAREA need 3=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS & prescribing MFFs
(d) other programme need 1=cancer SMR
(e) robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8.7: table showing respiratory problems spend models with various indicators of MFF and need
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11
respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR
no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted
second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage
iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 iAREA need2 iAREA need2 iAREA need3 iAREA need3 CARAN need CARAN need
HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
PCT budget per head 0.781** 0.992*** 0.957*** 1.045*** 1.315*** 1.204*** 0.808** 0.592** 0.591* 0.588** 0.585* 0.865*** 0.958***
[0.318] [0.330] [0.363] [0.370] [0.409] [0.432] [0.334] [0.282] [0.310] [0.283] [0.310] [0.287] [0.329]
needAREA1 1.714*** 1.741*** 1.813***
[0.597] [0.497] [0.563]
lone pensioner households -0.497 -0.243 -0.483 -0.419* -0.240 -0.380 -0.595* -0.078 -0.304 -0.089 -0.320 -0.447 -0.556
[0.346] [0.243] [0.356] [0.252] [0.210] [0.271] [0.346] [0.285] [0.378] [0.286] [0.380] [0.337] [0.344]
other programme need 1 -0.803** -0.602** -0.890** -0.866** -0.391 -0.664 -0.407 -0.687 -0.834* -0.931**
[0.397] [0.294] [0.439] [0.392] [0.364] [0.478] [0.364] [0.481] [0.428] [0.437]
needPBRA 1.176*** 1.226***
[0.391] [0.366]
needCARAN 1.686*** 1.720*** 1.680*** 1.782***
[0.627] [0.536] [0.609] [0.561]
other programme need 2 -1.109** -0.955** -1.197**
[0.455] [0.406] [0.552]
needAREA2 1.312** 1.770**
[0.667] [0.803]
needAREA3 1.325** 1.788**
[0.661] [0.800]
Constant -0.143 -0.649 0.258 2.954 2.293 3.531 -0.046 1.605 2.457 1.686 2.578 1.022 0.595
[1.250] [0.961] [1.415] [2.335] [2.094] [2.856] [1.220] [2.372] [2.547] [2.389] [2.574] [1.980] [2.082]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Endogeneity test statistic 7.821 8.431 9.089 9.157 10.215 9.242 6.984 4.679 4.326 4.853 4.475 9.016 6.863
Endogeneity p-value 0.00516 0.00369 0.00257 0.00248 0.00139 0.00236 0.00822 0.0305 0.0375 0.0276 0.0344 0.00268 0.00880
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 1.655 3.108 0.983 0.214 1.502 0.0135 0.615 4.704 2.922 4.621 2.855 0.866 0.156
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.198 0.0779 0.321 0.644 0.220 0.908 0.433 0.0301 0.0874 0.0316 0.0911 0.352 0.693
Shea's partial R-squared 0.164 0.211 0.149 0.183 0.203 0.172 0.167 0.161 0.131 0.161 0.131 0.142 0.146
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 18.58 21.08 18.17 22.04 17.51 18.27 18.78 20.00 13.94 20.14 13.90 17.12 16.62
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 9.22e-05 2.64e-05 0.000113 1.64e-05 0.000158 0.000108 8.34e-05 4.55e-05 0.000940 4.23e-05 0.000960 0.000192 0.000246
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 8.163 14.31 7.772 8.729 8.513 6.885 8.383 13.56 7.241 13.77 7.297 7.776 7.220
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.238 0.0135 0.141 0.0704 0.0139 0.0164 1.083 2.231 2.206 2.311 2.283 3.699 4.984
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.625 0.907 0.707 0.791 0.906 0.898 0.298 0.135 0.138 0.128 0.131 0.0545 0.0256
Notes: (a) iAREA need 1=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS MFF
(b) iAREA need 2=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS, prescribing & GMS MFFs
(c) iAREA need 3=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS & prescribing MFFs
(d) other programme need 1=SMR for all causes of death amenable to health care (see Martin, Rice and Smith 2012)
(e) other programme need 2=SYLLR for all causes of death
(f) robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8.8: table showing gastro-intestinal problems spend models with various indicators of MFF and need
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13
gastro gastro gastro gastro gastro gastro gastro gastro gastro gastro gastro gastro gastro
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR
no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted
second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage
iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 iAREA need2 iAREA need2 iAREA need3 iAREA need3 CARAN need CARAN need
HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
PCT budget per head 0.538 0.876** 0.862** 1.058** 1.461*** 1.396*** 0.627* 0.240 0.271 0.237 0.265 0.509* 0.692**
[0.355] [0.371] [0.414] [0.446] [0.513] [0.533] [0.371] [0.301] [0.334] [0.301] [0.334] [0.305] [0.340]
lneed 2.627*** 2.840*** 2.775***
[0.851] [0.758] [0.755]
lone pensioner households -0.838* -0.269 -0.740 -0.793** -0.362 -0.736* -1.080** 0.122 -0.262 0.121 -0.270 -0.612 -0.901**
[0.492] [0.347] [0.520] [0.385] [0.314] [0.422] [0.460] [0.290] [0.375] [0.287] [0.374] [0.453] [0.445]
other programme need 1 -1.386** -0.820** -1.416** -1.572*** -0.279 -0.751 -0.281 -0.763 -1.216** -1.510***
[0.566] [0.402] [0.634] [0.520] [0.366] [0.476] [0.363] [0.475] [0.562] [0.552]
needPBRA 1.422*** 1.627***
[0.488] [0.478]
needCARAN 2.369*** 2.740*** 2.375*** 2.619***
[0.889] [0.839] [0.836] [0.748]
other programme need 2 -2.093*** -1.524*** -2.250***
[0.663] [0.588] [0.817]
needAREA2 1.267* 1.916**
[0.662] [0.794]
needAREA3 1.264* 1.920**
[0.650] [0.784]
Constant 2.133 0.486 2.386 8.379** 5.626* 9.374** 2.512 4.107 5.367* 4.129 5.450* 5.180** 4.691**
[1.763] [1.237] [1.998] [3.338] [2.958] [4.164] [1.605] [2.520] [2.774] [2.524] [2.787] [2.437] [2.310]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Endogeneity test statistic 3.530 1.329 4.118 11.390 5.366 9.900 7.202 0.041 1.085 0.052 1.144 4.849 8.194
Endogeneity p-value 0.0603 0.249 0.0424 0.000738 0.0205 0.00165 0.00728 0.839 0.298 0.820 0.285 0.0277 0.00420
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 7.192 9.154 4.655 2.282 6.867 1.169 5.058 12.98 11.45 12.91 11.31 4.276 2.414
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.00732 0.00248 0.0310 0.131 0.00878 0.280 0.0245 0.000316 0.000715 0.000327 0.000771 0.0387 0.120
Shea's partial R-squared 0.164 0.211 0.149 0.183 0.203 0.172 0.167 0.161 0.131 0.161 0.131 0.142 0.146
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 18.58 21.08 18.17 22.04 17.51 18.27 18.78 20.00 13.94 20.14 13.90 17.12 16.62
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 9.22e-05 2.64e-05 0.000113 1.64e-05 0.000158 0.000108 8.34e-05 4.55e-05 0.000940 4.23e-05 0.000960 0.000192 0.000246
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 8.163 14.31 7.772 8.729 8.513 6.885 8.383 13.56 7.241 13.77 7.297 7.776 7.220
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.00544 0.107 0.00251 0.0613 0.0576 0.000667 0.167 1.735 2.598 1.752 2.633 2.450 3.579
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.941 0.743 0.960 0.804 0.810 0.979 0.683 0.188 0.107 0.186 0.105 0.118 0.0585
Notes: (a) iAREA need 1=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS MFF
(b) iAREA need 2=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS, prescribing & GMS MFFs
(c) iAREA need 3=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS & prescribing MFFs
(d) other programme need 1= SMR for all causes of death amenable to health care (see Martin, Rice and Smith 2012)
(e) other programme need 2= SYLLR for all causes of death
(f) robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8.9: table showing cancer outcome models with various indicators of MFF and need
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 2
cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer cancer
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR
no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted
second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage
iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 iAREA need2 iAREA need2 implied need iAREA need3 CARAN need CARAN need
HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
lneedAREA1 1.142*** 1.048*** 1.121***
[0.161] [0.143] [0.169]
cancer spend per head -0.426*** -0.287*** -0.351*** -0.356*** -0.223*** -0.291*** -0.487*** -0.284*** -0.367*** -0.284*** -0.366*** -0.421*** -0.494***
[0.125] [0.080] [0.098] [0.110] [0.068] [0.082] [0.148] [0.109] [0.133] [0.109] [0.133] [0.126] [0.156]
needPBRA 0.972*** 0.881***
[0.104] [0.090]
needCARAN 1.087*** 1.005*** 1.126*** 1.112***
[0.130] [0.110] [0.153] [0.167]
needAREA2 1.048*** 1.070***
[0.128] [0.143]
needAREA3 1.035*** 1.058***
[0.128] [0.142]
Constant 3.689*** 4.049*** 3.884*** 4.139*** 4.482*** 4.309*** 3.536*** 6.012*** 6.375*** 6.009*** 6.373*** 6.614*** 6.938***
[0.318] [0.202] [0.249] [0.278] [0.172] [0.207] [0.372] [0.476] [0.583] [0.476] [0.583] [0.552] [0.684]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Endogeneity test statistic 18.518 16.063 19.086 15.982 12.454 17.096 18.965 11.026 13.552 10.985 13.490 19.697 19.500
Endogeneity p-value 1.68e-05 6.13e-05 1.25e-05 6.40e-05 0.000417 3.55e-05 1.33e-05 0.000898 0.000232 0.000918 0.000240 9.07e-06 1.01e-05
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.248 0.239 0.0431 0.163 0.161 0.00820 0.192 0.860 0.690 0.857 0.686 0.000632 0.0933
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.619 0.625 0.835 0.686 0.688 0.928 0.661 0.354 0.406 0.355 0.407 0.980 0.760
Shea's partial R-squared 0.200 0.246 0.226 0.200 0.246 0.226 0.176 0.202 0.167 0.202 0.166 0.169 0.142
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 18.49 23.43 21.27 18.49 23.43 21.27 16.89 19.40 17.25 19.39 17.20 18.35 15.71
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 9.66e-05 8.17e-06 2.41e-05 9.66e-05 8.17e-06 2.41e-05 0.000215 6.12e-05 0.000179 6.17e-05 0.000184 0.000104 0.000389
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 19.15 28.08 24.39 19.15 28.08 24.39 15.16 19.90 14.69 19.81 14.58 16.81 12.05
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 2.789 5.422 3.218 3.506 5.986 3.796 3.838 4.129 5.271 4.234 5.259 4.399 5.890
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.0949 0.0199 0.0728 0.0611 0.0144 0.0514 0.0501 0.0422 0.0217 0.0396 0.0218 0.0360 0.0152
Notes: (a) iAREA need 1=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS MFF
(b) iAREA need 2=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS, prescribing & GMS MFFs
(c) iAREA need 3=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS & prescribing MFFs
(d) robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8.10: table showing circulatory disease outcome models with various indicators of MFF and need
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 10
circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation circulation
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR
no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted
second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage
iAREA need
1 PBRA need CARAN need
iAREA need
1 PBRA need CARAN need
iAREA need
1
iAREA need
2
iAREA need
2
iAREA need
3
iAREA need
3 CARAN need CARAN need
HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
needAREA1 2.442*** 2.657*** 2.554***
[0.239] [0.256] [0.251]
circulation spend per head -1.166*** -0.945*** -1.080*** -1.245*** -0.983*** -1.138*** -1.258*** -0.968*** -1.077*** -0.966*** -1.075*** -1.285*** -1.379***
[0.203] [0.180] [0.195] [0.215] [0.190] [0.205] [0.207] [0.191] [0.194] [0.191] [0.194] [0.243] [0.238]
needPBRA 2.104*** 2.262***
[0.208] [0.220]
needCARAN 2.394*** 2.587*** 2.508*** 2.624***
[0.242] [0.257] [0.278] [0.282]
needAREA2 2.303*** 2.452***
[0.218] [0.233]
needAREA3 2.281*** 2.426***
[0.217] [0.231]
Constant 1.971*** 2.456*** 2.165*** 1.983*** 2.555*** 2.222*** 1.771*** 9.078*** 9.596*** 9.073*** 9.584*** 10.605*** 11.050***
[0.429] [0.379] [0.411] [0.454] [0.400] [0.432] [0.438] [0.916] [0.931] [0.914] [0.928] [1.168] [1.145]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Endogeneity test statistic 32.774 30.750 39.253 38.776 28.130 42.881 28.691 28.410 28.030 28.471 27.939 40.272 38.934
Endogeneity p-value 1.04e-08 2.94e-08 3.72e-10 4.75e-10 1.13e-07 5.82e-11 8.49e-08 9.82e-08 1.19e-07 9.51e-08 1.25e-07 2.21e-10 4.38e-10
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 7.315 11.76 3.706 5.337 12.53 3.288 5.937 10.43 7.965 10.24 7.888 2.449 1.678
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.0625 0.00827 0.295 0.149 0.00576 0.349 0.115 0.0153 0.0467 0.0166 0.0484 0.484 0.642
Shea's partial R-squared 0.368 0.383 0.376 0.368 0.383 0.376 0.349 0.370 0.346 0.371 0.347 0.305 0.291
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 29.32 26.93 31.11 29.32 26.93 31.11 32.68 31.06 34.79 31.25 34.98 28.69 31.43
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 6.73e-06 2.05e-05 2.90e-06 6.73e-06 2.05e-05 2.90e-06 1.39e-06 2.97e-06 5.14e-07 2.72e-06 4.70e-07 9.03e-06 2.50e-06
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 20.24 19.21 20.32 20.24 19.21 20.32 19.89 20.09 19.66 20.15 19.70 15.50 16.33
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.0847 0.0884 2.19e-07 0.257 0.0261 0.0107 0.0185 0.0138 0.00282 0.0143 0.00315 2.369 0.196
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.771 0.766 1.000 0.612 0.872 0.918 0.892 0.906 0.958 0.905 0.955 0.124 0.658
Notes: (a) iAREA need 1=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS MFF
(b) iAREA need 2=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS, prescribing & GMS MFFs
(c) iAREA need 3=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS & prescribing MFFs
(d) robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8.11: table showing respiratory disease outcome models with various indicators of MFF and need
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 11
respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory respiratory
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted
second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage
iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 iAREA need2 iAREA need2 iAREA need3 iAREA need3 CARAN need CARAN need
HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
needAREA1 8.008*** 9.158*** 8.647***
[2.969] [3.298] [3.317]
respiratory spend per head -4.845** -3.364*** -4.149** -5.568** -3.894*** -4.808** -5.182** -3.535** -3.773** -3.536** -3.764** -6.738* -6.640*
[2.147] [1.225] [1.734] [2.388] [1.359] [1.945] [2.352] [1.412] [1.503] [1.400] [1.479] [3.799] [3.464]
needPBRA 5.941*** 6.789***
[1.706] [1.887]
needCARAN 7.238*** 8.306*** 10.184** 10.352**
[2.492] [2.788] [5.006] [4.635]
needAREA2 6.501*** 7.025***
[1.985] [2.176]
needAREA3 6.460*** 6.965***
[1.959] [2.130]
Constant -10.277* -6.163* -8.328* -12.218* -7.567** -10.087* -11.234* 17.749*** 18.712*** 17.755*** 18.675*** 31.101** 30.667**
[5.898] [3.355] [4.749] [6.563] [3.723] [5.328] [6.465] [5.877] [6.252] [5.824] [6.151] [15.828] [14.436]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Endogeneity test statistic 51.569 49.552 54.608 55.731 52.069 58.974 48.137 42.431 44.464 42.671 44.683 57.889 53.094
Endogeneity p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.32e-11 0 6.48e-11 0 0 0
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.302 1.253 0.123 0.305 1.828 0.211 0.179 0.785 0.354 0.700 0.303 0.00383 0.0915
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.582 0.263 0.726 0.581 0.176 0.646 0.673 0.376 0.552 0.403 0.582 0.951 0.762
Shea's partial R-squared 0.0491 0.0791 0.0593 0.0491 0.0791 0.0593 0.0462 0.0654 0.0624 0.0661 0.0633 0.0235 0.0246
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 5.660 8.303 7.499 5.660 8.303 7.499 5.437 7.311 6.973 7.461 7.117 3.866 3.772
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0.0590 0.0157 0.0235 0.0590 0.0157 0.0235 0.0660 0.0258 0.0306 0.0240 0.0285 0.145 0.152
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 3.344 5.857 4.507 3.344 5.857 4.507 2.959 4.328 3.804 4.402 3.875 2.030 1.859
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.791 4.049 0.000560 1.490 5.225 0.00355 0.327 0.0202 0.00861 0.0218 0.0116 3.788 1.716
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.374 0.0442 0.981 0.222 0.0223 0.952 0.568 0.887 0.926 0.883 0.914 0.0516 0.190
Notes: (a) iAREA need 1=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS MFF
(b) iAREA need 2=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS, prescribing & GMS MFFs
(c) iAREA need 3=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS & prescribing MFFs
(d) robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8.12: table showing gastro-intestinal disease outcome models with various indicators of MFF and need
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 13
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal gastro
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
outcome
model
uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR uses SMR
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted no weighting weighted
second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage
iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 PBRA need CARAN need iAREA need1 iAREA need2 iAREA need2 iAREA need3 iAREA need3 CARAN need CARAN need
HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF HCHS MFF
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 2
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
CARAN 3
MFFs
needAREA1 3.853*** 3.966*** 3.779***
[0.551] [0.558] [0.499]
gastro spend per head -1.755*** -1.420*** -1.641*** -1.544*** -1.180*** -1.404*** -1.750*** -1.275*** -1.317*** -1.275*** -1.315*** -2.056*** -2.192***
[0.397] [0.353] [0.427] [0.399] [0.358] [0.429] [0.385] [0.335] [0.326] [0.335] [0.325] [0.589] [0.574]
needPBRA 3.342*** 3.413***
[0.486] [0.498]
needCARAN 3.794*** 3.887*** 4.140*** 4.250***
[0.612] [0.621] [0.768] [0.710]
needAREA2 3.426*** 3.479***
[0.466] [0.419]
needAREA3 3.393*** 3.443***
[0.462] [0.415]
Constant -2.155** -1.251 -1.838 -0.954 0.028 -0.566 -2.166** 7.919*** 8.073*** 7.916*** 8.064*** 11.273*** 11.835***
[1.047] [0.928] [1.121] [1.054] [0.943] [1.127] [1.016] [1.431] [1.391] [1.430] [1.387] [2.524] [2.460]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Endogeneity test statistic 23.347 18.985 25.405 17.048 11.389 17.857 16.834 16.638 11.980 16.689 11.942 25.632 22.341
Endogeneity p-value 1.35e-06 1.32e-05 4.65e-07 3.65e-05 0.000739 2.38e-05 4.08e-05 4.52e-05 0.000538 4.40e-05 0.000549 4.13e-07 2.28e-06
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 3.067 4.604 1.555 4.936 7.575 2.637 7.476 5.029 8.762 4.907 8.714 1.284 3.554
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.216 0.100 0.459 0.0847 0.0227 0.268 0.0238 0.0809 0.0125 0.0860 0.0128 0.526 0.169
Shea's partial R-squared 0.193 0.231 0.200 0.193 0.231 0.200 0.191 0.208 0.198 0.208 0.198 0.139 0.135
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 16.47 17.51 16.32 16.47 17.51 16.32 17.68 17.09 18.26 17.14 18.34 13.39 13.98
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0.000910 0.000556 0.000974 0.000910 0.000556 0.000974 0.000511 0.000679 0.000389 0.000661 0.000375 0.00386 0.00293
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 12.12 13.24 10.79 12.12 13.24 10.79 11.96 13.23 12.98 13.24 13.00 7.550 7.248
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.233 0.0427 0.0897 1.246 1.121 0.258 0.170 0.0935 0.443 0.0893 0.411 0.00841 0.117
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.629 0.836 0.765 0.264 0.290 0.611 0.680 0.760 0.506 0.765 0.521 0.927 0.732
Notes: (a) iAREA need 1=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS MFF
(b) iAREA need 2=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS, prescribing & GMS MFFs
(c) iAREA need 3=AREA unified weighted population/HCHS & prescribing MFFs
(d) robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The assimilation of the impact of alternative measures of need, weights, and MFFs proved overwhelming.
Instead, we approached the selection of the appropriate need~weighting~MFF combination from an a
priori perspective. The AREA-based need formula has been replaced by the CARAN formula for the
purposes of resource allocation and therefore it must be believed to be a better indicator of relative health
care need. The PBRA approach is relatively new and has not been implemented yet. We therefore
decided to use the CARAN based measure as our indicator of the level of need.
With some PCTs several times larger than others, it is difficult to justify giving them all the same
weighting. It was therefore decided to weight all of our models by PCT size (where size is measured by
the PCTs population).
We also decided to use the own population expenditure data on the grounds that all NHS expenditure,
irrespective of its funding source, should be included in the analysis (although there is the issue about
how this income is split between PBCs).
Finally, it was decided to focus on the use of the SYLLR as the outcome indicator, and to proxy other
programme need in the expenditure equation using the all cause SYLLR minus the own programme
SYLLR.
B8.3 Model estimation using 2006/7 expenditure data and mortality data for 2004/2006:
CARAN need and three MFFs
Initially, acceptable models were obtained using the CARAN measure of need and adjusting expenditure
for local input prices using a weighted average of the MFFs for all three services (HCHS, prescribing, and
GMS/PMS). The outcome and expenditure results for the big four programmes are shown in Table
B8.13 with the relevant outcome and expenditure elasticities highlighted.
In all four outcome models expenditure has a significant negative effect on mortality and, in three of
these; the all service measure of need has a significant positive effect. In the respiratory outcome model,
where the all service need term is not significant, there is another indicator of need  the proportion of
the population that are permanently sick  and this is both positive and statistically significant. The
diagnostic statistics suggest that, in all four cases, own programme expenditure is endogenous and that
the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are relevant. There is some evidence
that the instruments are slightly weak in one of the four outcome results (the respiratory model).28 The
Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no evidence of model mis-specification.
In all four expenditure models both the need and budget variables have a positive and significant effect
on own programme expenditure. In addition, the proxy for need in other programmes is negative and
significant in all four cases. In the gastro-intestinal expenditure programme the prevalence of lone
pensioners households is associated with less NHS expenditure; there might be some unmet need here or
perhaps this is a self-selecting group.
The diagnostic statistics suggest that, for all four expenditure models, the proxy for other programme
need is endogenous and that the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are
relevant and, with the possible exception of the gastro-intestinal expenditure result, there is no evidence
that the instruments are weak. The Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no evidence of model mis-
specification.
The elasticities shown in Table B8.13 can be used to calculate the cost of a life year in each programme
and these calculations -- for both these four programmes as well as for the other six programmes with a
mortality based outcome indicator -- are shown in Tables B8.14 and B8.15 (the full outcome and
expenditure models for the other six programmes with a mortality based outcome indicator are not
shown here).
28 Ideally, the test F statistic should equal to or greater than ten.
67
Table B8.14 reveals that the cost of a life year for the big four programmes combined is £11,298. This is
remarkably close to the figure obtained using expenditure data for 2005/6, an AREA-based measure of
need, and a HCHS MFF (£12,855). The cost of a life year for all ten programmes with a mortality based
measure of need the cost of a life year is £21,743, which is even closer to the figure obtained using
2005/6 expenditure data (£21,256). If we assume a zero gain in the 13 programmes without a mortality
based indicator then the cost per life year across all 23 programmes is £66,318 (it is £56,799 for 2005/6
data).
Alternatively, if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the gain attributable to the
remaining 12 programmes is, on average, the same as that attributable to those with a mortality outcome
measure, then Table B8.15 shows that the cost of a life year across all programmes is £25,038 (it is
£24,200 for 2005/6 data).
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Table B8.13: table showing outcome and expenditure models for the big four programmes using spend data (incorporating three MFFs) for 2006/7
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13
cancer cancer circulation circulation respiratory respiratory gastro gastro
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
Regressors outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model
all cause SYLLR excluding cancer -0.952***
[0.179]
budget per head (HPG MFF) 0.542** 0.694** 0.712*** 0.650**
[0.242] [0.292] [0.252] [0.289]
need CARAN 0.958*** 1.765*** 2.830*** 2.185*** 1.764 1.371*** 4.609*** 2.696***
[0.129] [0.286] [0.252] [0.355] [1.192] [0.297] [0.700] [0.679]
own programme spend per head -0.351*** -1.441*** -2.830*** -2.125***
[0.117] [0.219] [0.767] [0.563]
all cause SYLLR excluding circulatory problems -1.782***
[0.336]
permanently sick 1.371***
[0.405]
all cause SYLLR excluding respiratory problems -0.670**
[0.288]
all cause SYLLR excluding gastro-intestinal problems -1.856***
[0.612]
lone pensioner households -0.593**
[0.297]
Constant 6.588*** 5.937*** 11.538*** 10.299*** 18.965*** 3.117 12.208*** 9.752***
[0.515] [1.775] [1.050] [2.384] [3.853] [1.976] [2.416] [3.053]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
Endogeneity test statistic 14.496 20.274 43.352 25.784 27.923 7.922 21.862 13.531
Endogeneity p-value 0.000140 6.71e-06 0 3.82e-07 1.26e-07 0.00488 2.93e-06 0.000235
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.208 0.293 1.507 0.542 1.879 0.356 1.006 0.0267
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.649 0.588 0.681 0.462 0.170 0.550 0.316 0.870
Shea's partial R-squared 0.163 0.445 0.303 0.296 0.0802 0.366 0.142 0.206
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 16.97 42.38 32.53 32.70 10.51 36.33 15.00 19.07
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0.000207 6.28e-10 1.49e-06 7.93e-08 0.00523 1.29e-08 0.000553 7.22e-05
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 12.47 48.32 17.31 25.71 7.482 24.32 11.80 8.660
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 5.471 0.00111 0.0912 0.0183 3.090 1.915 0.267 0.0880
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.0193 0.973 0.763 0.892 0.0788 0.166 0.605 0.767
Robust standard errors in brackets. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: all spend figures are on a net population basis and are adjusted for local prices using three MFFs from the Department of Healths resource allocation exposition
book for 2009/10. All estimated models use 152 PCTs and are weighted by PCT population. The SYLLR is the mortality indicator.
There are several differences between the models estimated here and those reported in Martin, Rice and Smith (2008b):
(i) here we use net population spend data (not net spend data);
(ii) here we use three MFFs (not solely the HCHS MFF); and
(iii) here we use a consistent definition of the other programme need proxy across all programmes (i.e., all cause SYLLR minus the own programme SYLLR).
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Table B8.14: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2006/7 (three MFFs) and outcome data for 2004/06 (assumes zero
gain for 13 programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
=0.01*C*D =0.01*D*G*H =E/I =0.01*D*H*M/3 =E/N
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Average annual
mortality, <75
years, 2004/06
Outcome
elasticity
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Total life years
lost, <75years,
2004/06
Change in annual
life years lost
Cost per life
year gained
(£)
1 Cancer £4,122 0.542 £22.34 62,259 0.351 118.44 £188,625 2,221,530 1,409 £15,859
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.694 £42.76 45,504 1.441 455.06 £93,959 1,463,912 4,880 £8,762
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.712 £23.39 11,601 2.83 233.76 £100,058 321,264 2,158 £10,839
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,700 0.65 £24.05 5,926 2.125 81.85 £293,820 328,853 1,514 £15,884
5 Big four programmes £17,268 £112.54 125,290 889.12 £126,573 4,335,559 9,961 £11,298
6 Big four programmes 2005/6 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
7 Infectious diseases £1,053 0.725 £7.63 2,050 0.03 0.45 £17,121,951 101604 7 £1,036,377
8 Endocrine problems £1,852 0.954 £17.67 1,690 0.965 15.56 £1,135,604 60,615 186 £94,985
9 Neurological problems £2,790 0.64 £17.86 729 0.1 0.47 £38,271,605 68,808 15 £1,216,428
10 Genito-urinary problems £3,482 0.799 £27.82 294 0.074 0.17 £160,047,803 11,554 2 £12,217,601
11 Trauma & injuries £2,892 0.609 £17.61 1,037 0.527 3.33 £5,291,867 30,000 32 £548,767
12 Maternity* & neonates £3,574 0.601 £21.48 2,123 0.036 0.46 £46,762,966 484,950 35 £614,153
13 Other six programmes £15,643 £110.07 7,923 20.43 £5,387,190 757,531 277 £396,796
14 Other six programmes 2005/6 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
15 All ten programmes £32,911 0.676 £222.61 133,213 909.55 £244,747 5,093,090 10,238 £21,743
16 All ten programmes 2005/6 £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Assume zero health gain in the other 13 programmes
18 Other 13 programmes £34,985 1.304 £456.35 0.00 0
19 Other 13 programmes 2005/6 £33,942 1.186 £402.43 0.00 0
20 All 23 programmes £67,896 £678.96 909.55 £746,481 10,238 £66,318
21 All 23 programmes 2005/6 £64,310 £643.10 926.22 £694,330 11,322 £56,799
Note: 2006/7 2005/6
22 All 23 programme spend £67,896 £64,310
23 % change in budget 1.00 1.00
24 proportionate change 0.01 0.01
25 Change in budget £678.96 £643.10
Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G5 & G6 and G13 & G14 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04.
Note that, for 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
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Table B8.15: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2006/7 (three MFFs) and outcome data for 2004/06 (assumes some
gain in other 13 programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
=0.01*C*D =0.01*D*G*H =E/I =0.01*D*H*M/3 =E/N
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Average
annual
mortality,
<75years,
2004/06
Outcome
elasticity
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2004/06
Change in annual
life years lost
Cost per life
year gained
(£)
1 Cancer £4,122 0.542 £22.34 62,259 0.351 118.44 £188,625 2,221,530 1,409 £15,859
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.694 £42.76 45,504 1.441 455.06 £93,959 1,463,912 4,880 £8,762
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.712 £23.39 11,601 2.83 233.76 £100,058 321,264 2,158 £10,839
4 Gastro-intestinal disease £3,700 0.65 £24.05 5,926 2.125 81.85 £293,820 328,853 1,514 £15,884
5 Big four programmes £17,268 £112.54 125,290 889.12 £126,573 4,335,559 9,961 £11,298
6 Big four programmes 2005/6 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
7 Infectious diseases £1,053 0.725 £7.63 2,050 0.03 0.45 £17,121,951 101604 7 £1,036,377
8 Endocrine problems £1,852 0.954 £17.67 1,690 0.965 15.56 £1,135,604 60,615 186 £94,985
9 Neurological problems £2,790 0.64 £17.86 729 0.1 0.47 £38,271,605 68,808 15 £1,216,428
10 Genito-urinary problems £3,482 0.799 £27.82 294 0.074 0.17 £160,047,803 11,554 2 £12,217,601
11 Trauma & injuries £2,892 0.609 £17.61 1,037 0.527 3.33 £5,291,867 30,000 32 £548,767
12 Maternity* & neonates £3,574 0.601 £21.48 2,123 0.036 0.46 £46,762,966 484,950 35 £614,153
13 Other six programmes £15,643 £110.07 7,923 20.43 £5,387,190 757,531 277 £396,796
14 Other six PBCs 2005/6 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
15 All ten programmes £32,911 0.676 £222.61 133,213 909.55 £244,747 5,093,090 10,238 £21,743
16 All ten programmes 2005/6 £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Assume zero health gain in PBC23, and gain in ten PBCs applies to other 12 PBCs
17 PBC23 £10,585 0.844 £89.34 0.00 0.00
18 PBC23 2005/6 £8,449 0.926 £78.24 0.00 0.00
19 Other 12 programmes £24,400 £367.01 1,499.56 £244,747 16,880 £21,743
20 Other 12 PBCs 2005/6 £25,493 £324.20 1,247.69 £259,838 15,252 £21,256
21 All 23 programmes £67,896 £678.96 2,409.11 £281,830 27,118 £25,038
22 All 23 programmes 2005/6 £64,310 £643.10 2,173.90 £295,827 26,575 £24,200
Note: 2006/7 2005/6
23 All 23 programme spend £67,896 £64,310
24 % change in budget 1.00 1.00
25 proportionate change 0.01 0.01
26 Change in budget £678.96 £643.10 See also notes to Table B8.14 immediately above.
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B8.4 Model estimation using 2006/7 expenditure data and mortality data for 2004/2006:
CARAN need and two MFFs
Further discussion by the project team noted that the PB data incorporates all PCT expenditure and that,
as there is a separate category for GMS/PMS expenditure (PBC23a), it seems appropriate that the
GMS/PMS MFF should be applied to this category. However, other categories of expenditure exclude
GMS/PMS expenditure but incorporate both HCHS and prescribing expenditure. It therefore seems
appropriate that a weighted averaged of the HCHS and prescribing MFFs should be applied to these
other (non-GMS/PMS) categories of expenditure.
We therefore re-estimated the outcome and expenditure models for those programmes with a mortality
based outcome indicator using the CARAN measure of need and adjusting expenditure for local input
prices using the MFFs for HCHS and prescribing services. The outcome and expenditure results for the
big four programmes are shown in Table B8.16 with the relevant outcome and expenditure elasticities
again highlighted (the first-stage regressions associated with these results can be found in Table BA.5 in
the annex).
In all four outcome models expenditure has a significant negative effect on mortality and, in three of
these, the all service measure of need has a significant positive effect. In the respiratory outcome model,
where the all service need term is not significant, there is another indicator of need  the proportion of
the population that are permanently sick  and this is both positive and statistically significant. The all
service measure of need squared is also positive and significant in the cancer outcome equation. The
diagnostic statistics suggest that, in all four cases, own programme expenditure is endogenous and that
the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are relevant. There is a little evidence
that the instruments are weak in one of the four outcome results, namely the respiratory model. Re-
estimation of the latter model but without the least significant instrument generates a coefficient of -3.507
on expenditure and the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic now exceeds ten (it is 11.799). The Pesaran-Taylor
test suggests that there is no evidence of model mis-specification in any of the outcome models.
In all four expenditure models both the need and budget variables have a positive and significant effect
on own programme expenditure. In addition, the proxy for need in other programmes is negative and
significant in all four cases. In the gastro-intestinal expenditure programme the prevalence of lone
pensioners households is associated with less NHS expenditure; there might be some unmet need here or
perhaps this is self-selecting group.
The diagnostic statistics suggest that, for all four expenditure models, expenditure is endogenous and the
instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are relevant and, with the possible
exception of the gastro-intestinal expenditure result, there is no evidence that the instruments are weak.
Re-estimation of the gastro-intestinal expenditure model without the least significant instrument generates
a coefficient of 0.667 on the budget variable and the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic now exceeds ten (it is
16.871). The Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no evidence of model mis-specification.
The outcome and expenditure elasticities are little changed from those presented in Table B8.13 and, like
those, these new elasticities can be used to calculate the cost of a life year in each programme. These
calculations -- for both these four programmes as well as for the other six programmes with a mortality
based outcome indicator -- are shown in Tables B8.17 and B8.18 (the full outcome and expenditure
models for the other six programmes with a mortality based outcome indicator are not shown here).
The figures for 2006/7 in Table B8.17 (which incorporate two MFFs) can be compared with those for
2006/7 in Table B8.14 (which incorporate three MFFs). Table B8.17 reveals that the use of a different
MFF has little impact on the cost of a life year for the big four PBCs (it was £11,298, it is now £10,783)
as well as on the cost of a life year for all programmes with a mortality outcome measure (was £21,743,
now £20,893).
In addition, Table B8.18 shows that if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the
gain attributable to the remaining 12 programmes is, on average, the same as that attributable to those
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with a mortality outcome measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes is now £23,697 (it
was £25,038 for 2006/7 in Table B8.15).
The figures in Table B8.18 also reveal that the cost of a life year in 2006/7 for all programmes (£23,697)
is little changed from the comparable figure for 2005/6 (£24,200).
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Table B8.16: table showing outcome and expenditure models for the big four programmes using spend data for 2006/7 (incorporating two MFFs) and
mortality data for 2004/5/6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13
cancer cancer circulation circulation respiratory respiratory gastro gastro
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model
own programme spend per head -0.337*** -1.447*** -2.839*** -2.137***
[0.104] [0.220] [0.772] [0.569]
need CARAN per head 0.974*** 1.772*** 2.860*** 2.191*** 1.782 1.375*** 4.657*** 2.697***
[0.110] [0.287] [0.257] [0.355] [1.198] [0.297] [0.716] [0.676]
needCARAN per head squared 1.314***
[0.352]
all cause SYLLR excluding cancer -0.951***
[0.180]
PCT budget per head 0.548** 0.701** 0.718*** 0.655**
[0.242] [0.292] [0.253] [0.289]
all cause SYLLR excluding circulatory disease -1.778***
[0.336]
permanently sick aged 16-74 1.385***
[0.405]
all cause SYLLR excluding respiratory problems -0.663**
[0.288]
all cause SYLLR excluding gastro-intestinal problems -1.847***
[0.609]
lone pensioner households -0.590**
[0.295]
Constant 6.506*** 5.881*** 11.567*** 10.227*** 19.047*** 3.032 12.260*** 9.664***
[0.455] [1.778] [1.058] [2.387] [3.877] [1.977] [2.441] [3.046]
Endogeneity test statistic 15.173 20.248 43.405 25.854 27.876 7.863 21.853 13.607
Endogeneity p-value 9.81e-05 6.80e-06 0 3.68e-07 1.29e-07 0.00505 2.94e-06 0.000225
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.00201 0.306 1.440 0.530 1.912 0.344 1.011 0.0294
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.964 0.580 0.696 0.467 0.167 0.557 0.315 0.864
Shea's partial R-squared 0.164 0.445 0.300 0.296 0.0793 0.366 0.140 0.206
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 17.85 42.38 32.37 32.70 10.42 36.33 14.86 19.07
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0.000133 6.28e-10 1.61e-06 7.93e-08 0.00545 1.29e-08 0.000592 7.22e-05
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.28 48.32 17.14 25.71 7.390 24.32 11.63 8.660
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.00226 0.00178 0.0945 0.0215 3.139 1.908 0.266 0.0605
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.962 0.966 0.759 0.883 0.0764 0.167 0.606 0.806
Note: robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B8.17: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2006/7 (two MFFs) and outcome data for 2004/06 (assumes zero gain
for 13 programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
=0.01*C*D =0.01*D*G*H =E/I =0.01*D*H*M/3 =E/N
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Average
annual
mortality,
<75years,
2004/06
Outcome
elasticity
Change in annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2004/06
Change in annual life
years lost
Cost per life
year gained (£)
1 Cancer £4,122 0.548 £22.59 62,259 0.337 114.98 £196,461 2,221,530 1,368 £16,518
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.701 £43.19 45,504 1.447 461.57 £93,569 1,463,912 4,950 £8,725
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.718 £23.59 11,601 3.507 292.12 £80,743 321,264 2,697 £8,747
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,700 0.667 £24.68 5,926 2.137 84.47 £292,170 328,853 1,562 £15,795
5 Big four programmes £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
6 Big four programmes 2005/6 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
7 Infectious diseases £1,053 0.731 £7.70 2,050 0.03 0.45 £17,121,951 101,604 7 £1,036,377
8 Endocrine problems £1,852 0.966 £17.89 1,690 0.812 13.26 £1,349,579 60,615 158 £112,882
9 Neurological problems £2,790 0.648 £18.08 729 0.098 0.46 £39,052,658 68,808 15 £1,241,253
10 Genito-urinary problems £3,482 0.837 £29.14 294 0.073 0.18 £162,240,239 11,554 2 £12,384,965
11 Trauma & injuries £2,892 0.617 £17.84 1,037 0.527 3.37 £5,291,867 30,000 33 £548,767
12 Maternity* & neonates £3,574 0.601 £21.48 2,123 0.035 0.45 £48,099,051 484,950 34 £631,700
13 Other six programmes £15,643 £112..13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
14 Other six PBCs 2005/6 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
15 All ten programmes £32,911 0.687 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
16 All ten programmes 2005/6 £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Assume zero health gain in the other 13 programmes
18 Other 13 programmes £34,985 1.294 £452.78 0.00 0
19 Other 13 PBCs 2005/6 £33,942 1.186 £402.43 0.00 0
20 All 23 programmes £67,896 £678.96 971.30 £699,024 10,826 £62,718
21 All 23 programmes 2005/6 £64,310 £643.10 926.22 £694,330 11,322 £56,799
Note: 2006/7 2005/6
22 All 23 programme spend £67,896 £64,310
23 % change in budget 1.00 1.00
24 proportionate change 0.01 0.01
25 Change in budget £678.96 £643.10
Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G5 & G6 and G13 & G14 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04.
Note that, for 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
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Table B8.18: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2006/7 (two MFFs) and outcome data for 2004/06 (assumes some
gain in other 13 programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
=0.01*C*D =0.01*D*G*H =E/I =0.01*D*H*M/3 =E/N
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Average
annual
mortality,
<75years,
2004/06
Outcome
elasticity
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2004/06
Change in annual
life years lost
Cost per life
year gained (£)
1 Cancer £4,122 0.548 £22.59 62,259 0.337 114.98 £196,461 2,221,530 1,368 £16,518
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.701 £43.19 45,504 1.447 461.57 £93,569 1,463,912 4,950 £8,725
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.718 £23.59 11,601 3.507 292.12 £80,743 321,264 2,697 £8,747
4 Gastro-intest problems £3,700 0.667 £24.68 5,926 2.137 84.47 £292,170 328,853 1,562 £15,795
5 Big four programmes £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
6 Big four PBCs 2005/6 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
7 Infectious diseases £1,053 0.731 £7.70 2,050 0.03 0.45 £17,121,951 101,604 7 £1,036,377
8 Endocrine problems £1,852 0.966 £17.89 1,690 0.812 13.26 £1,349,579 60,615 158 £112,882
9 Neurological problems £2,790 0.648 £18.08 729 0.098 0.46 £39,052,658 68,808 15 £1,241,253
10 Genito-urinary problems £3,482 0.837 £29.14 294 0.073 0.18 £162,240,239 11,554 2 £12,384,965
11 Trauma & injuries £2,892 0.617 £17.84 1,037 0.527 3.37 £5,291,867 30,000 33 £548,767
12 Maternity* & neonates £3,574 0.601 £21.48 2,123 0.035 0.45 £48,099,051 484,950 34 £631,700
13 Other six programmes £15,643 £112..13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
14 Other six PBCs 2005/6 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
15 All ten programmes £32,911 0.687 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
16 All ten programmes 2005/6 £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Assume zero health gain in PBC23, and gain in ten PBCs applies to other 12 PBCs
17 PBC23 £10,585 0.759 £80.34 0.00 0.00
18 PBC23 2005/6 £8,449 0.926 £78.24 0.00 0.00
19 Other 12 programmes £24,400 £372.44 1,599.42 £232,861 17,826 £20,893
20 Other 12 PBCs 2005/6 £25,493 £324.20 1,247.69 £259,838 15,252 £21,256
21 All 23 programmes £67,896 £678.96 2,570.72 £264,113 28,652 £23,697
22 All 23 programmes 2005/6 £64,310 £643.10 2,173.90 £295,827 26,575 £24,200
Note: 2006/7 2005/6
23 All23 programme spend £67,896 £64,310
24 % change in budget 1.00 1.00
25 proportionate change 0.01 0.01
26 Change in budget £678.96 £643.10
Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G5 & G6 and G13 & G14 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04.
Note that, for 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
76
B8.5 Model estimation using 2006/7 expenditure data and mortality data for 2006/2008:
CARAN need and two MFFs
One shortcoming with the models presented above is that they relate expenditure in 2006/7 to mortality
in the same period and in the two previous periods (i.e., in 2004, 2005 and 2006). The difficulty with this
is that one would expect expenditure in year t to affect mortality in year t and possibly subsequent years
(t+1, t+2, etc) but not mortality in previous years (t-1, t-2, etc). However, if we assume that PCTs have
reached some sort of equilibrium in the expenditure choices they make and the outcomes they secure, so
that expenditure levels change relatively little from one year to the next, then mortality over the three year
period t, t-1 and t-2 might be a good proxy for mortality in t, t+1 and t+2. Indeed, this is probably not an
unreasonable assumption given the relatively slow pace at which both types of variable change.
Although this assumption of equilibrium is not an unreasonable one, it is one that ideally we would like to
be able to drop. Fortunately, with the recent availability of more up-to-date mortality data, we have the
opportunity to relate expenditure in 2006 to mortality in the same year and in the two following years (i.e.,
in 2006, 2007 and 2008).29 Thus the models reported in Table B8.16 were re-estimated replacing the
mortality rate for 2004/5/6 with that for 2006/7/8. The outcome and expenditure results for the big
four programmes are shown in Table B8.19 with the relevant outcome and expenditure elasticities again
highlighted (the first-stage regressions associated with these results can be found in Table BA.6 in the
annex). These elasticities are similar to those presented previously in Table B8.16 but there are some
changes (e.g, the outcome elasticity in the respiratory outcome equation falls from -2.839 to -2.029).
In all four outcome models expenditure has a significant negative effect on mortality and the all service
measure of need has a significant positive effect. The all service measure of need squared is also positive
and significant in the cancer outcome equation. In the respiratory outcome model, there is an additional
indicator of need  the proportion of the population that are permanently sick  and this is both positive
and statistically significant. The diagnostic statistics suggest that, in all four cases, own programme
expenditure is endogenous and that the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are
relevant. There is no evidence that the instruments are weak in three of the four outcome results. The
Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no evidence of model mis-specification
However, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic for the respiratory disease outcome model is 7.022 and this is
less than the critical target of 10.0. This indicates that the instruments may be weak. However, if we re-
estimate this model having dropped the least significant instrument, the coefficient on own programme
expenditure is now -2.622 and this is significant at the 1% level. Moreover, there is now no evidence of
weak instruments (the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is 11.025) and it is this coefficient that we use for the
respiratory outcome model in the cost of a life year calculations below.
In three of the four expenditure models both the need and budget variables have a positive and
significant effect on own programme expenditure. In addition, the proxy for need in other programmes
is negative and significant in all four cases. The diagnostic statistics suggest that, for all four expenditure
models, expenditure is endogenous and the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments
are relevant and there is no evidence that the instruments are weak. The Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that
there is no evidence of model mis-specification.
The outcome and expenditure elasticities presented in Table B8.19 can be used to calculate the cost of a
life year in each programme. These calculations -- for both the big four programmes as well as for the
other six programmes with mortality based outcome indicator -- are shown in Table B8.20. They show
that the use of a more appropriate measure of mortality (i.e., for 2006/2007/2008 rather than for
2004/2005/2006) slightly increases the cost of a life year for the big four PBCs (from £10,783 to
£12,333) as well as for all ten programmes with a mortality outcome measure (from £20,893 to £23,780).
29 Clearly, some expenditure in year t will have an effect on mortality beyond t+2 but we have no mortality data that
would allow us to include this in our modelling work. We must assume that, for expenditure that affects mortality
beyond t+2, PCTs have reached some sort of equilibrium position in terms of their expenditure choices and the
outcomes secured.
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In addition, Table B8.21 shows that if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the
gain attributable to the remaining 12 programmes is, on average, the same as that attributable to those
with a mortality outcome measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes is now £26,876 (it
was £23,697 using mortality for 2004/5/6).
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Table B8.19: table showing outcome and expenditure models for the big four programmes using spend data for 2006/7 (two MFFs) and mortality
data for 2006/7/8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13
cancer cancer circulation circulation respiratory respiratory gastro gastro
outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model
own programme spend per head -0.342*** -1.434*** -2.029*** -1.536***
[0.099] [0.218] [0.636] [0.468]
need CARAN per head 0.995*** 1.626*** 2.860*** 2.306*** 2.696*** 1.449*** 4.160*** 2.040***
[0.106] [0.343] [0.252] [0.372] [1.044] [0.331] [0.577] [0.378]
need CARAN per head squared 1.163*** 2.451
[0.348] [1.561]
SYLLR all deaths exclude cancer -0.855***
[0.191]
PCT budget per head 0.465 0.540* 0.679*** 0.446*
[0.300] [0.299] [0.251] [0.263]
SYLLR all deaths exc circulatory -1.666***
[0.295]
permanently sick 0.759**
[0.367]
SYLLR all deaths exc respiratory -0.672**
[0.305]
SYLLR all deaths exclude gastro -1.206***
[0.314]
lone pensioner households
Constant 6.501*** 5.913*** 11.413*** 10.696*** 13.756*** 3.346 9.719*** 8.370***
[0.436] [2.815] [1.046] [2.379] [3.279] [2.075] [2.009] [2.299]
Endogeneity test statistic 13.695 19.421 42.548 24.461 17.687 8.439 16.373 15.211
Endogeneity p-value 0.000215 1.05e-05 6.90e-11 7.58e-07 2.60e-05 0.00367 5.20e-05 9.61e-05
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.685 0.021 0.949 1.262 1.462 0.302 2.761 0.0164
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.408 0.084 0.814 0.261 0.227 0.583 0.0966 0.0898
Shea's partial R-squared 0.164 0.445 0.300 0.296 0.0785 0.327 0.140 0.356
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 17.85 41.88 32.37 32.02 10.02 34.98 14.86 35.72
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0.000133 8.04e-10 1.61e-06 1.11e-07 0.00666 2.54e-08 0.000592 1.75e-08
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 13.28 56.69 17.14 31.84 7.022 20.94 11.63 22.40
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.00537 0.18 0.136 0.00349 0.0120 1.497 1.669 0.007
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.942 0.668 0.712 0.953 0.913 0.221 0.196 0.935
Note: robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
79
Table B8.20: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2006/7 and outcome data for 2006/7/8 (assumes zero health gain for
13 programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
=0.01*C*D =0.01*D*G*H =E/I =0.01*D*H*M/3 =E/N
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2006/08
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative sign)
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2006/08
Change in annual
life years lost
Cost per life
year gained (£)
1 Cancer £ 4,122 0.465 £19.17 61,961 0.342 98.54 £194,520 2,207,021 1,170 £16,383
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.540 £33.27 41,106 1.434 318.31 £104,519 1,361,634 3,515 £9,466
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.679 £22.31 11,574 2.622 206.06 £108,248 324,223 1,924 £11,593
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,700 0.446 £16.50 6,160 1.536 42.20 £391,048 345,908 790 £20,892
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 120,801 665.10 £137.188 4,238,786 7,399 £12,333
6 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
7 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
8 Infectious diseases £1,053 0.792 £8.34 2,050 0.047 0.76 £10,928,905 106,552 13 £630,798
9 Endocrine problems £1,852 0.953 £17.65 1,542 0.842 12.37 £1,426,410 57,672 154 £114,416
10 Neurological problems £2,790 0.616 £17.19 727 0.112 0.50 £34,265,082 66,137 15 £1,129,960
11 Genito-urinary problems £3,482 0.912 £31.76 294 0.051 0.14 £232,226,224 10,030 2 £20,421,090
12 Trauma & injuries* £2,892 0.358 £10.35 1,037 0 0.00 #DIV/0! 30,000 0 #DIV/0!
13 Maternity & neonates* £3,574 0.224 £8.01 2,189 0.482 2.36 £3,387,363 492,600 177 £45,158
Other six programmes summary:
14 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £15,643 £93.29 7,839 16.14 £5,780,723 762,991 362 £258,046
15 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £15,643 £112.13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
16 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
All ten programmes summary:
17 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £32,911 0.561 £184.53 128,640 681.24 £270,881 5,001,777 7,760 £23,780
18 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £32,911 0.687 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
19 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Assume zero health gain in the other 13 programmes
Other 13 programmes summary:
20 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £34,985 1.413 £494.43 0.00 0
21 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £34,985 1.294 £452.78 0.00 0
22 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £33,942 1.186 £402.43 0.00 0
All 23 programmes
23 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £67,896 £678.96 681.24 £996,655 7,760 £87,494
24 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £67,896 £678.96 971.30 £699,024 10,826 £62,718
25 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £64,310 £643.10 926.22 £694,330 11,322 £56,799
Note: 2006/7 2005/6
26 All 23 programme spend £67,896 £64,310 Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G6 & G7 and G15 & G16 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04.
27 % change in budget 1.00 1.00 Note that we have been unable to obtain a satisfactory outcome model for trauma & injuries and have assumed a zero outcome elasticity.
28 proportionate change 0.01 0.01 Note that, for expenditure in 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
29 Change in budget £678.96 £643.10
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Table B8.21: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2006/7 and outcome data for 2006/7/8 (assumes average health gain
for 12 other programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O
=0.01*C*D =0.01*D*G*H =E/I =0.01*D*H*M/3 =E/N
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2006/08
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative sign)
Change in
annual mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2006/08
Change in annual life
years lost
Cost per life
year gained (£)
1 Cancer £4,122 0.465 £19.17 61,961 0.342 98.54 £194,520 2,207,021 1,170 £16,383
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.540 £33.27 41,106 1.434 318.31 £104,519 1,361,634 3,515 £9,466
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.679 £22.31 11,574 2.622 206.06 £108,248 324,223 1,924 £11,593
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,700 0.446 £16.50 6,160 1.536 42.20 £391,048 345,908 790 £20,892
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 120,801 665.10 £137.188 4,238,786 7,399 £12,333
6 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
7 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
8 Infectious diseases £1,053 0.792 £8.34 2,050 0.047 0.76 £10,928,905 106,552 13 £630,798
9 Endocrine problems £1,852 0.953 £17.65 1,542 0.842 12.37 £1,426,410 57,672 154 £114,416
10 Neurological problems £2,790 0.616 £17.19 727 0.112 0.50 £34,265,082 66,137 15 £1,129,960
11 Genito-urinary problems £3,482 0.912 £31.76 294 0.051 0.14 £232,226,224 10,030 2 £20,421,090
12 Trauma & injuries* £2,892 0.358 £10.35 1,037 0 0.00 #DIV/0! 30,000 0 #DIV/0!
13 Maternity & neonates* £3,574 0.224 £8.01 2,189 0.482 2.36 £3,387,363 492,600 177 £45,158
Other six programmes summary:
14 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £15,643 £93.29 7,839 16.14 £5,780,723 762,991 362 £258,046
15 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £15,643 £112.13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
16 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
All ten programmes summary:
17 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £32,911 0.561 £184.53 128,640 681.24 £270,881 5,001,777 7,760 £23,780
18 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £32,911 0.687 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
19 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Other 13 PBCs? Assume zero health gain in PBC23
20 PBC23: spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £10,585 0.739 £78.22 0.00 0.00
21 PBC23: spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £10,585 0.759 £80.34 0.00 0.00
22 PBC23: spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £8,449 0.926 £78.24 0.00 0.00
...and that the gain in ten PBCs (see above) applies to the remaining 12 PBCs
23 12 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £24,400 £416.20 1,536.48 £270,881 17,502 £23,780
24 12 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £24,400 £372.44 1,599.42 £232,861 17,826 £20,893
25 12 PBCs: spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £25,493 £324.20 1,247.69 £259,838 15,252 £21,256
All 23 programmes
26 23 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £67,896 £678.96 2,217.72 £306,153 25,262 £26,876
27 All 23 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £67,896 £678.96 2,570.72 £264,113 28,652 £23,697
28 All 23 PBCs: spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £64,310 £643.10 2,173.90 £295,827 26,575 £24,200
Note: 2006/7 2005/6
29 All 23 programme spend £67,896 £64,310 Note the annual mortality figures reported in cells G5 & G6 and G13 & G14 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/4.
30 % change in budget 1.00 1.00 Note that, for 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
31 proportionate change 0.01 0.01
32 Change in budget £678.96 £643.10
81
B8.6 Adjusting the cost of life (year) estimates for the mismatch in the ICD10 coverage of the
expenditure and the mortality data
The cost of a life (year) estimates presented in Tables B8.20 and B8.21 assume a 1% increase in each
PCTs budget and are calculated as:
the cost of an additional life in a particular programme
= the change in expenditure in that programme / the change in mortality in that programme
= (annual spend * expenditure elasticity) / (annual mortality * outcome elasticity
* expenditure elasticity)
and
the cost of an additional life year in a particular programme
= the change in expenditure in that programme / the change in life years lost in that programme
= (annual spend * expenditure elasticity) / (annual mortality * outcome elasticity
* expenditure elasticity)
Thus an integral part of the calculation of the cost of a life (year) is the annual mortality (life years lost)
figure associated with a particular programme. Ideally, the ICD10 coverage of the expenditure data
should coincide with that of the mortality data but, as know from Table B5.1, the ICD10 coverage of
the mortality data typically falls short of that for the expenditure data. Unless we adjust the annual
mortality figure so that its ICD10 coverage approximates that of the expenditure data, our cost of life
(year) estimates will usually be too large because they will usually underestimate the mortality gain.
Table B8.22 reproduces Table B8.20 but incorporates this ICD 10 coverage adjustment (see columns L
and R in Table B8.22). This adjustment reduces the cost of a life year:
x for the big four programmes from £12,333 to £10,604
x for the ten programmes with a mortality based outcome indicator from £23,780 to £19,965
x for all programmes assuming a zero gain for the 13 PBCs without an outcome indicator from
£87,494 to £73,457.
Similarly, Table B8.23 reproduces Table B8.21 but incorporates this ICD 10 coverage adjustment (see
columns L and R again). If we assume a zero health gain in PBC23 and an average gain in the other 12
PBCs without a mortality based outcome indicator, then this adjustment reduces the cost of a life year
for all programmes from £26,876 to £22,565.
82
TableB8.22: table showing Cost of life and life year estimates using expenditure data for 2006 and outcome data for 2006/7/8 (assumes zero health gain for
13 programmes) adjusted for the ICD10 coverage of the expenditure and outcome data
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
=0.01*C*
D
=0.01*D*G*
H =E/I =I/L =E/M
=0.01*D*H*
P/3 =Q/R =E/Q =E/S
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend
(£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2006/08
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative sign)
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Coverage of
mortality data
relative to spend
data
Change in annual
mortality adj for
coverage
Cost per life
gained (£) adj for
coverage
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2006/08
Change in
annual life
years lost
Coverage of
mortality data
relative to
spend data
Change in
annual life
years lost adj
for YLL
Cost per life year
gained (£)
Cost per life year
gained adj for YLL
coverage (£)
1 Cancer £4,122 0.465 £19.17 61,961 0.342 98.54 £194,520 0.984 100.14 £191,407 2,207,021 1,170 0.984 1,,189 £16,383 £16,121
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.540 £33.27 41,106 1.434 318.31 £104,519 0.992 320.88 £103,683 1,361,634 3,515 0.992 3,543 £9,466 £9,390
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.679 £22.31 11,574 2.622 206.06 £108,248 0.773 262.57 £83,676 324,223 1,924 0.773 2,489 £11,593 £8,961
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,700 0.446 £16.50 6,160 1.536 42.20 £391,048 0.571 73.90 £223,288 345,908 790 0.571 1,383 £20,892 £11,929
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 120,801 665.10 £137,188 761.49 £119,823 4,238,786 7,399 8,604 £12,333 £10,604
6 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
7 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
8 Infectious diseases £1,053 0.792 £8.34 2,050 0.047 0.76 £10,928,905 1.000 0.76 £10,928,905 106,552 13 1.000 13 £630,798 £630,798
9 Endocrine problems £1,852 0.953 £17.65 1,542 0.842 12.37 £1,426,410 0.634 19.52 £904,344 57,672 154 0.634 243 £114,416 £72,539
10 Neurological problems £2,790 0.616 £17.19 727 0.112 0.50 £34,265,082 0.136 3.69 £4,660,051 66,137 15 0.136 112 £1,129,960 £153,675
11 Genito-urinary problems £3,482 0.912 £31.76 294 0.051 0.14 £232,226,224 0.172 0.80 £39,942,910 10,030 2 0.172 9 £20,421,090 £3,512,427
12 Trauma & injuries* £2,892 0.358 £10.35 1,037 0 0.00 #DIV/0! 0.175 0.00 #DIV/0! 30,000 0 0.175 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
13 Maternity & neonates* £3,574 0.224 £8.01 2,189 0.482 2.36 £3,387,363 8.213 0.29 £27,820,413 492,600 177 0.679 261 £45,158 £30,662
Other six programmes summary:
14 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £15,643 £93.29 7,839 16.14 £5,780,723 25.05 £3,724,129 762,991 362 639 £258,046 £146,108
15 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £15,643 £112.13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
16 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
All ten programmes summary:
17 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £32,911 0.561 £184.53 128,640 681.24 £270,881 786.54 £234,617 5,001,777 7,760 9,243 £23,780 £19,965
18 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £32,911 0.687 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
19 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Assume zero health gain in the other 13 programmes
Other 13 programmes summary:
20 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £34,985 1.413 £494.43 0.00 0 0
21 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £34,985 1.294 £452.78 0.00 0
22 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £33,942 1.186 £402.43 0.00 0
All 23 programmes
23 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £67,896 £678.96 681.24 £996,655 786.54 £863,228 7,760 9,243 £87,494 £73,457
24 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £67,896 £678.96 971.30 £699,024 10,826 £62,718
25 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £64,310 £643.10 926.22 £694,330 11,322 £56,799
Note: 2006/7 2005/6
26 All 23 programme spend £67,896 £64,310 Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G6 & G7 and G15 & G16 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04.
27 % change in budget 1.00 1.00 Note that we have been unable to obtain a satisfactory outcome model for trauma & injuries and have assumed a zero outcome elasticity.
28 proportionate change 0.01 0.01 Note that, for expenditure in 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
29 Change in budget £678.96 £643.10 Note that the adjustment for the coverage of the YLL data relative to the spend data uses deaths under age 75 in England in 2008.
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Table B8.23: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using expenditure data for 2006 and outcome data for 2006/7/8 (assumes average health gain
for 12 other programmes) adjusted for the ICD10 coverage of the expenditure and outcome data
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
=0.01*C*D
=0.01*D
*G*H =E/I =I/L =E/M
=0.01*D*H*
P/3 =Q/R =E/Q =E/S
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2006/08
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative
sign)
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Coverage
of
mortality
data
relative to
spend
data
Change in
annual
mortality
adj for
coverage
Cost per life
gained (£)
adj for
coverage
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2006/08
Change in
annual life
years lost
Coverage of
mortality
data relative
to spend data
Change in
annual life
years lost
adj for
coverage
Cost per life
year gained
(£)
Cost per life
year gained
adj for YLL
coverage (£)
1 Cancer £4,122 0.465 £19.17 61,961 0.342 98.54 £194,520 0.984 100.14 £191,407 2,207,021 1,170 0.984 1,,189 £16,383 £16,121
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.540 £33.27 41,106 1.434 318.31 £104,519 0.992 320.88 £103,683 1,361,634 3,515 0.992 3,543 £9,466 £9,390
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.679 £22.31 11,574 2.622 206.06 £108,248 0.773 262.57 £83,676 324,223 1,924 0.773 2,489 £11,593 £8,961
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,700 0.446 £16.50 6,160 1.536 42.20 £391,048 0.571 73.90 £223,288 345,908 790 0.571 1,383 £20,892 £11,929
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 120,801 665.10 £137,188 761.49 £119,823 4,238,786 7,399 8,604 £12,333 £10,604
6 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
7 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
8 Infectious diseases £1,053 0.792 £8.34 2,050 0.047 0.76 £10,928,905 1.000 0.76 £10,928,905 106,552 13 1.000 13 £630,798 £630,798
9 Endocrine problems £1,852 0.953 £17.65 1,542 0.842 12.37 £1,426,410 0.634 19.52 £904,344 57,672 154 0.634 243 £114,416 £72,539
10 Neurological problems £2,790 0.616 £17.19 727 0.112 0.50 £34,265,082 0.136 3.69 £4,660,051 66,137 15 0.136 112 £1,129,960 £153,675
11 Genito-urinary problems £3,482 0.912 £31.76 294 0.051 0.14 £232,226,224 0.172 0.80 £39,942,910 10,030 2 0.172 9 £20,421,090 £3,512,427
12 Trauma & injuries* £2,892 0.358 £10.35 1,037 0 0.00 #DIV/0! 0.175 0.00 #DIV/0! 30,000 0 0.175 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
13 Maternity & neonates* £3,574 0.224 £8.01 2,189 0.482 2.36 £3,387,363 8.213 0.29 £27,820,413 492,600 177 0.679 261 £45,158 £30,662
Other six programmes summary:
14 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £15,643 £93.29 7,839 16.14 £5,780,723 25.05 £3,724,129 762,991 362 639 £258,046 £146,108
15 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £15,643 £112.13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
16 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
All ten programmes summary:
17 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £32,911 0.561 £184.53 128,640 681.24 £270,881 786.54 £234,617 5,001,777 7,760 9,243 £23,780 £19,965
18 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £32,911 0.687 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
19 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £30,368 0.792 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Other 13 PBCs? Assume zero health gain in PBC23
20 PBC23: spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £10,585 0.739 £78.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
21 PBC23: spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £10,585 0.759 £80.34 0.00 0.00
22 PBC23: spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £8,449 0.926 £78.24 0.00 0.00
...and that the gain in ten PBCs (see row 17) applies to the remaining 12 PBCs
23 12 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £24,400 £416.20 1,536.48 £270,881 1,773.97 £234,617 17,502 20,847 £23,780 £19,965
24 12 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £24,400 £372.44 1,599.42 £232,861 17,826 £20,893
25 12 PBCs: spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £25,493 £324.20 1,247.69 £259,838 15,252 £21,256
All 23 programmes
26 23 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £67,896 £678.96 2,217.72 £306,153 2,560.50 £265,167 25,262 30,090 £26,876 £22,565
27 23 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £67,896 £678.96 2,570.72 £264,113 28,652 £23,697
28 23 PBCs: spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £64,310 £643.10 2,173.90 £295,827 26,575 £24,200
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Note: 2006/7 2005/6
29 All 23 programme spend £67,896 £64,310
30 % change in budget 1.00 1.00
31 proportionate change 0.01 0.01
32 Change in budget £678.96 £643.10
Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G6 & G7 and G15 & G16 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04 yet.
Note that we have been unable to obtain a satisfactory outcome model for trauma & injuries and have assumed a zero outcome elasticity.
Note that, for expenditure in 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
Note that the adjustment for the coverage of the YLL data relative to the spend data uses deaths under age 75 in England in 2008.
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B8.7 Adjusting the cost of life (year) estimates for Department of Health funded expenditure
that is not undertaken by PCTs
PCT expenditure accounts for a large proportion of Department of Health expenditure but PCTs do not
account for all of the Departments budget. In 2006/7 the Department of Healths gross expenditure
totalled £83.5bn. Charges raised £3.4bn so net expenditure totalled £80.1bn. Of this net expenditure,
PCTs accounted for £67.3bn (that is, 84%) and various other bodies accounted for the remaining
£12.8bn. A breakdown of this gross and net expenditure by major body is shown in Table B8.24.
Table B8.24: table showing department of Health funded expenditure by major bodies, 2006/7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Gross spend Income Net spend
Body £ billion £ billion £ billion
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
PCTs 69.8 2.5 67.3
Strategic Health Authorities 3.8 0.0 3.8
Special Health Authorities* 2.8 1.3 1.5
Department of Health Own Costs 7.1 -0.4 7.5
(eg PSS grants, grants to LAs)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Department of Health 83.5 3.4 80.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*This includes, for example, NICE, the NHS Business Services Authority, the Information Centre, the NHS
Litigation Authority, and the National Patient Safety Agency.
The Department of Health has allocated net non-PCT expenditure across the 23 PBCs and the impact of
this allocation on total spend by PBC is shown in Table B8.25 below. No geographic breakdown (e.g., by
PCT) of this expenditure is available.
Of the additional £12bn of net expenditure, £11.2bn (93%) has been allocated to PBC23. This largely
reflects: (a) the allocation of almost all Strategic Health Authority expenditure to either PBC23B (other:
SHAs including workforce development committees) or PBC23X (other: miscellaneous), and (b) the
allocation of almost two-thirds of Department of Health expenditure to PBC23X (other: miscellaneous).
The remaining £0.8bn of additional net expenditure is spread across all PBCs according to various
allocation rules. For example, the majority of expenditure on Special Health Authorities is apportioned
across programme categories on the basis of the PCT and SHA expenditure breakdown. The exception
is the NHS Business Services Authority expenditure which is apportioned on the basis of Primary Care
prescribing expenditure splits. Although this approach avoids allocating expenditure to the Other:
Miscellaneous category, this allocation of expenditure does not necessarily reflect actual expenditure. For
example, NHS Litigation Authority expenditure may not be incurred in the same areas as overall PCT
expenditure [38].
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Table B8.25: table showing net PCT and other Department of Health funded expenditure by
PBC, 2006/7
PBC
# Programme budget category Net spend, £bn, 2006/7
Others'
spend as
% of PCT
spend
all PCTs others all DH
(a) (b) c) (d)
01 Infectious Diseases 1.1 0.1 1.2 13.3%
02 Cancers & Tumours 4.1 0.0 4.2 0.8%
03 Disorders of Blood 0.8 0.1 0.9 12.0%
04
Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic
Issues 1.9 0.1 2.0 5.4%
05 Mental Health Disorders 8.4 0.3 8.7 3.2%
06 Problems of Learning Disability 2.4 -0.1 2.4 -2.5%
07 Neurological 2.8 0.0 2.8 1.3%
08 Problems of Vision 1.4 0.0 1.3 -1.8%
09 Problems of Hearing 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.5%
10 Problems of Circulation 6.2 0.2 6.4 4.0%
11 Problems of the Respiratory System 3.3 0.1 3.3 1.6%
12 Dental Problems 2.6 -0.2 2.4 -7.0%
13
Problems of the Gastro Intestinal
System 3.7 0.0 3.7 -0.5%
14 Problems of the Skin 1.4 0.0 1.5 2.2%
15
Problems of the Musculoskeletal
System 3.4 0.0 3.4 -0.3%
16 Problems due to Trauma and Injuries 2.9 0.0 2.9 -0.5%
17
Problems of the Genito Urinary
System 3.5 0.1 3.6 2.1%
18 Maternity and Reproductive Health 2.9 -0.1 2.8 -2.2%
19 Conditions of Neonates 0.7 0.1 0.7 10.3%
20 Adverse Effects and Poisoning 0.7 0.0 0.7 -0.8%
21 Healthy Individuals 1.4 0.0 1.4 0.8%
22 Social Care Needs 1.5 0.0 1.5 0.9%
23 Other Areas of Spend/Conditions 10.6 11.2 21.8 106.1%
All Categories 67.9 12.0 79.9 17.7%
Note: the figures in Tables B8.24 and B8.25 draw on various sources (e.g., Department of Health resource accounts
and programme budgeting returns) and may (a) disagree slightly and (b) create some unusual results (e.g., the
aggregate PCT figure for dental problems exceeds the all England level[38]).
It is clear that most of the non-PCT expenditure is not specific to any disease area and that, to avoid
putting all of it into a residual category, the Department has identified what are reasonable but largely
arbitrary rules to spread what is a relatively small proportion of this non-PCT expenditure across all
PBCs.
The cost of a life (year) estimates presented above are based on the impact of a 1% exogenous change in
total net PCT spend. All of our outcome and expenditure models have been estimated using net PCT
expenditure, and all of our elasticities relate to this expenditure. Implicitly we assume that any budgetary
shock only affects PCT funding and that it leaves non-PCT funding unchanged.
Suppose instead we assume a 1% exogenous change in the Departmental budget. How might this
budgetary shock be split between PCT and non-PCT expenditure? There are two obvious options to
consider. We could assume either: (a) that all of this change is applied to PCT budgets and that there is
no change in the non-PCT budget (as we do implicitly at the moment) or (b) that the budgetary shock
affects both PCT and non-PCT budgets.
If the non-PCT budget is wholly unresponsive to the exogenous shock then our cost of a life year
estimates will be unchanged because this expenditure category attracts none of the budgetary change
(although this expenditure will clearly contribute to a measure of average productivity).
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If the non-PCT budget is to some degree responsive to the exogenous shock then it will affect our cost of
a life (year) estimates. To calculate the size of this impact we would need to know:
(a) how responsive the non-PCT budget is to a total Departmental budgetary shock;
(b) how the responsive part of the non-PCT budget is allocated across PBCs;
and
(c) the size of the health effects associated with changes in the non-PCT budget at PBC level.
We have no evidence on how responsive the non-PCT budget is likely to be to a total budgetary shock.
However, from Table B8.25 and the discussion about the rather arbitrary (but understandable) rules
employed by the Department to allocate non-PCT expenditure to PBCs, it would seem reasonable to
assume that any change in the non-PCT budget should all be allocated to PBC23. This solves the
problem of identifying the health gains associated with this change in the non-PCT budget because, in
our cost of a life year calculations, we assume that expenditure in this category attracts no health gains.
Thus although we have no evidence on how responsive the non-PCT budget is likely to be to a total
budgetary shock, we can present two scenarios. In the first scenario, the non-PCT budget is wholly
unresponsive to a budgetary shock and any budgetary change is fully implemented via PCT expenditure.
In this case, there is no impact on the cost of a life year.
In the second scenario, one might assume that the non-PCT budget is as responsive to Departmental
budgetary changes as is the PCT budget. In this case a 1% change in the Departmental budget is
translated into a 1% change in both the total PCT and total non-PCT budgets, and this will increase the
cost of a life year by 17.7% for 2006/7, that is, from £22,565 to £26,553. This percentage increase is, of
course, the same figure as total non-PCT expenditure expressed as a percentage of PCT expenditure.
This is because all of the additional non-PCT expenditure is allocated to PBC23 and the assumption is
that all expenditure in this category offers no health gain.
We have no information on how any Departmental budgetary shock is likely to be split between PCT
and non-PCTs budgets. Our cost of a life year estimates implicitly assume that the non-PCT budget is
wholly unresponsive to any budgetary shock. This is clearly a possibility. Alternatively, one might
assume that the non-PCT budget is as responsive to a Departmental budgetary shock as is the PCT
budget. If this was the case then it would add 17.7% to our cost of a life year estimate for 2006/7.
However, in the absence of any information about the responsiveness of the non-PCT budget, it is
difficult to come to any firm conclusion about the impact of non-PCT expenditure on our cost of a life
year estimates. We therefore persevere with the assumption that the non-PCT budget is wholly
unresponsive to Departmental budgetary shocks.
B8.8 Application of method to other non-mortality based outcome indicators
Not all health care expenditure will be directed towards the reduction of mortality but it is relatively
easy to envisage how our methods might be applied to other, non-mortality based, outcome indicators.
To illustrate how our approach might be applied to other such indicators we note that PROMs (health
gain) data for various operations is available from the HES online website. For each PCT this data set
reports the average health gain for those survey respondents who have had a specific operation (e.g., for
hip replacement, for knee replacement, for varicose veins, and for groin hernia) over the survey period.
As a starting point, and to illustrate the principles involved, we focus on hip and knee replacements. As
our outcome indicator for these procedures, we calculate
[(average health gain per hip operation*number of hip operations) +
(average health gain per knee operation*number of knee operations)]
/total PCT population
for each PCT (this ignores age standardisation). This health gain measure is broadly comparable with our
usual mortality measure, which is a 'years of life lost' rate per 10,000 of population (again, ignoring age
standardisation).
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Ideally the expenditure, number of operations, and PROMs data should all relate to the same time period
but here the PROMs data covers operations undertaken between April 2009 and October 2010 yet the
expenditure and number of operations data relate to 2006/7. Implicitly we are assuming that the average
gain per operation in 2006/7 is the same as over the PROMs survey period (although this is not
particularly important as we are only illustrating principles here).
Unfortunately, the Department of Health does not report the number of patients undergoing an eligible
operation by commissioner (PCT) so we use the HES dataset for 2006/7 to obtain this information.
Eligible hip and knee operations are defined in Annex 1 of the Guide to PROMs methodology (on the
HES website) and we use these definitions (of eligible operation codes) to obtain a count of eligible hip
and knee finished consultant episodes (FCEs) by PCT for 2006/7.
With data for both the average health gain per operation and the number of operations, we are now in a
position to calculate the health gain per head of population for hip and knee replacements as defined
above. We can then use this as an outcome indicator for expenditure in the problems of the musculo-
skeletal system programme (i.e., PBC15) because the vast majority of hip and knee replacements are for
osteoarthritis and this diagnosis is included in PBC15.
Table B8.26 reports the estimated outcome equation for PBC15 using the PROMs based outcome
indicator. The result is intuitively plausible. More expenditure boosts the health gain but, for a given
spend, more need reduces the gain. Of course we should remember that the health gain data relates to
operations undertaken between April 2009 and October 2010 yet the expenditure and number of
operations data (FCEs) relate to 2006/7. However, one might assume that the gain associated with each
operation in 2009/10 is the same as the gain associated with each operation in 2006/7.
The diagnostic statistics suggest that expenditure is endogenous and that the instruments are valid. They
also suggest that the instruments are relevant and there is no evidence that the instruments are weak. The
Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no evidence of model mis-specification.
This brief example illustrates the principles involved in extending our modelling approach beyond those
programmes with a mortality indicator.
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Table B8.26: table showing outcome model for the trauma and injuries programme, 2006/7
Regressors Coefficient
(standard error)
Expenditure per person in PBC 15 1.9068***
(0.4289)
Need CARAN per person -1.6807***
(0.4533)
Constant -6.3486***
(1.794)
Number of PCTs 143
Diagnostic test statistics
Endogeneity test statistic 24.677
Endogeneity p-value 0.0000
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 1.136
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.2865
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 14.702
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 0.0006
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic 10.367
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.03
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.8588
Notes: (i) the dependent variable is the health gain per head of population associated with eligible hip and knee
operations undertaken during 2006/7; (ii) that there are only 143 observations and not the usual 152 because, for the
other nine PCTs, there are fewer than 30 completed PROMs questionnaires on which to compute the average
health gain and, as a result of such a low number of respondents, these PCTs have been dropped from the sample;
(ii) the first-stage regression includes the IMD2007 (coefficient = -0.439, standard error=0.144) and the proportion
of residents providing unpaid care (coefficient = 0.219, standard error=0.367); and (iii) robust standard errors in
brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
B8.9 Comparing outcome models for high spending and low spending PCTs
As we have already noted, not all PCTs spend the same amount in each programme of care. Even after
allowing for differences in local circumstances (such as input prices and need), some PCTs spend more
than others, and it is this variation in expenditure that facilitates the estimation of our outcome and
expenditure models.
Figure B8.2 illustrates the familiar health gain production function; as expenditure increases so too
does health output but it increases at a diminishing rate. If all PCTs face the same production function
(having controlled for input prices and need), and all PCTs are wholly efficient, then we would expect
those PCTs that spend more (e.g., at point B) to experience a lower outcome elasticity than those that
spend less (e.g., at point A) simply because they are further along the production function and are
experiencing greater diminishing marginal returns.
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Figure B8.2: graph showing Health gain production function
Health gain in programme
production function
A B Health care spend
in programme(£)
To test this hypothesis we used the expenditure model for each of the big four programmes to divide the
152 PCTs into two groups: those whose predicted spend is greater than the average predicted spend in
that programme (ceteris paribus), and those whose predicted spend is smaller than the average predicted
spend (ceteris paribus). We then re-estimated our outcome model for each of these two groups of PCTs
and the results of this re-estimation are shown in Table B8.27. 30
The first column in Table B8.27 presents the IV regression results for the outcome model for all PCTs;
the second column reports the results for the high spend PCTs; and the third column reports the results
for the low spend PCTs. For all four programmes, the coefficient on the expenditure variable is larger
(in an absolute sense) for the high spend PCTs than for the low spend PCTs. This result contradicts
our hypothesis that high spenders will have a lower elasticity than low spenders.
However, if we drop the assumption that all PCTs are equally efficient  so that that some lie within the
frontier defined by the production function  then it is clearly possible for high spending PCTs to
experience a larger outcome elasticity than a low spending one. And, of course, it is rather difficult to
defend the assumption that all PCTs are equally efficient.
We can use the outcome elasticities reported in Table B8.27 to calculate the cost of a life year for high
and low spenders in each of the big four programmes. These calculations are shown in Table B8.28.31
As is to be anticipated, they reveal that the cost of a life year is much smaller in high spend PCTs than it
is in low spend PCTs. For example, the cost of a life year in the cancer programme is £16,383 across all
PCTs but for high spenders it is much less than this (£11,350) and for low spenders it is much greater
than this (£76,620). Presumably high spending PCTs are high spenders because the cost of a life year is
relatively low and additional health gains in a particular programme can be had relatively cheaply.
Similarly, low spending PCTs are low spenders because the cost of a life year is relatively high and
additional health gains are relatively expensive.
30 When re-estimating the all PCT model for high spenders and then for low spenders no attempt was made to
adjust the estimating equation for any implied model mis-specifiaction.
31 The cost of a life year estimates presented in Table 8.28 are not adjusted for the mismatch in the ICD10 coverage
of the expenditure and mortality data because such an adjustment would not affect our conclusions.
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Table B8.27: table showing re-estimating the 2006/7 outcome model for high spending and
low spending PCTs
Cancer outcome equation All High spend Low spend
PCTs PCTs PCTs
Regressors
1 Constant 6.500*** 7.132*** 5.352***
2 Need for health care 0.995*** 1.265*** 0.848***
3 Need for health care squared 1.162*** 0.588 0.842
4 Cancer expenditure per person -0.342*** -0.488*** -0.074
Number observations 152 76 76
Endogeneity test statistic 13.695*** 7.165*** 0.501
Instrument validity: Hansen J statistic 0.685 0.734 1.587
Instrument relevance: K-P LM statistic 17.847*** 7.102** 13.617***
Weak instrument: K-P Wald F statistic 13.279 6.722 7.436
Re-set test 0.01 0.68 1.95
Circulatory disease outcome equation All High spend Low spend
PCTs PCTs PCTs
Regressors
1 Constant 11.413*** 11.254*** 9.356***
2 Need for health care 2.859*** 2.741*** 2.636***
3 Circulatory expenditure per person -1.434*** -1.403*** -0.995***
Number observations 152 76 76
Endogeneity test statistic 42.548*** 9.424*** 20.489***
Instrument validity: Hansen J statistic 0.949 4.782 0.366
Instrument relevance: K-P LM statistic 32.372*** 12.658** 15.123***
Weak instrument: K-P Wald F statistic 17.143 6.275 12.421
Re-set test 0.14 0 1.29
Respiratory problems outcome equation All High spend Low spend
PCTs PCTs PCTs
Regressors
1 Constant 17.023*** 22.617** 11.695***
2 Need for health care 2.683** 2.512 3.095**
3 Need for health care squared 3.08 5.537 8.097***
4 Permanently sick 1.031** 1.401 0.844
5 Respiratory expenditure per person -2.622*** -3.697* -1.461*
Number observations 152 76 76
Endogeneity test statistic 20.860*** 10.254*** 5.380**
Instrument validity: Hansen J statistic n/a n/a n/a
Instrument relevance: K-P LM statistic 9.091*** 3.591 5.108**
Weak instrument: K-P Wald F statistic 11.025 4.568 6.227
Re-set test 0 0.08 0.21
Gastro-intestinal outcome equation All High spend Low spend
PCTs PCTs PCTs
Regressors
1 Constant 9.718*** 9.306*** 6.675***
2 Need for health care 4.159*** 5.156*** 3.236***
3 Gastro-intestinal spend per person -1.536*** -1.471*** -0.819
Number observations 152 76 76
Endogeneity test statistic 16.373*** 7.781*** 3.700*
Instrument validity: Hansen J statistic 2.761 1.529 3.824*
Instrument relevance: K-P LM statistic 14.865*** 10.094*** 7.956**
Weak instrument: K-P Wald F statistic 11.629 10.607 7.985
Re-set test 1.67 0.15 0.56
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Table B8.28: table showing calculation of the cost of a life year for the big four programmes in 2006/7 by type of PCT: high spenders and low
spenders
A B C D E F G H I
PBC description Type of PCT
Spend
(£m)
FY2006/7
1% of
spend
(£m)
FY2006/7
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative
sign)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2006/08
Annual
average life
years lost
(=F/3)
Change in annual life
years lost associated
with 1% increase in
spend (=E*G)/100
Cost (£)
per life
year gained
(=D/H)
unadj for
ICD10
coverage
Split PCTs according to whether they are 'high spender' (n=76) or 'low spenders' (n=76)
1 Cancers All 4,122 41.22 0.342 2,207,021 735,674 2,516 16,383
2 Cancers High spend 2,080 20.8 0.488 1,126,580 375,527 1,833 11,350
3 Cancers Low spend 2,042 20.42 0.074 1,080,442 360,147 267 76,620
4 Circulatory problems All 6,161 61.61 1.434 1,361,634 453,878 6,509 9,466
5 Circulatory problems High spend 3,148 31.48 1.403 695,890 231,963 3,254 9,673
6 Circulatory problems Low spend 3,012 30.12 0.995 665,744 221,915 2,208 13,641
7 Respiratory problems All 3,285 32.85 2.622 324,223 108,074 2,834 11,593
8 Respiratory problems High spend 1,645 16.45 3.697 174,639 58,213 2,152 7,644
9 Respiratory problems Low spend 1,640 16.4 1.461 149,584 49,861 728 22,513
10 Gastro- problems All 3,700 37 1.536 345,908 115,303 1,771 20,892
11 Gastro- problems High spend 1,868 18.68 1.471 190,231 63,410 933 20,026
12 Gastro- problems Low spend 1,832 18.32 0.819 155,676 51,892 425 43,106
Note: high spending PCTs are those whose predicted spend per person is greater than the average predicted spend per person (ceteris paribus), and
low spending PCTs are those whose predicted spend per person is less than the average predicted spend per person (ceteris paribus).
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B8.10 Comparing outcome models for over target and under target PCTs
The Department of Health has a well-developed resource allocation formula that determines the size of
each PCTs target budget given local conditions (such as population size and the need for health care).
Every few years an improved resource allocation formula is developed and this generates a new target
budget for each PCT. The new target might be quite different from the old target and the immediate
implementation of the new formula might lead to a large change in the budget for some PCTs. To avoid
the difficulties that sudden large budgetary changes might bring, actual annual financial allocations are
gradually moved towards the latest target budget. This means that in any year some PCTs receive an
actual allocation which is greater than their target allocation, and that others receive an actual allocation
which is less than their target allocation.
To examine whether being over or under the target allocation has any impact on the results, we split the
152 PCTs into two groups: those that received a budget over their target allocation in 2006/7, and those
that received a budget under their target allocation in 2006/7. The outcome elasticities from the
estimation of these models are shown in column E of Table B8.29, and these elasticities are used to
calculate the cost of a life year for each of these two groups of PCTs for each of the big four programmes
(see column I).
The results are consistent for each programme: PCTs whose budget is beyond their target allocation
record a smaller outcome elasticity and a larger cost of a life year than PCTs whose budget is less than
their target allocation. For example, in the cancer programme and across all PCTs the outcome elasticity
is -0.342 and the cost of a life year is £16,383 (unadjusted for the ICD10 coverage of the mortality data).
For PCTs with a budget that exceeds their target allocation, the outcome elasticity is smaller (-0.179) and
the cost of a life year is larger (£32,365) than for all PCTs combined. However, for PCTs with a budget
that falls short of their target allocation, the outcome elasticity is larger (-0.476) and the cost of a life year
is smaller (£11,502) than for all PCTs combined.
One explanation for this result is that PCTs whose budget is beyond their target allocation are under less
financial pressure than other PCTs, and that one consequence of this is that there is less pressure on them
to behave in the most efficient manner possible. There is some evidence in the literature to support the
hypothesis that the degree of PCT inefficiency is positively related to the amount by which a PCTs is over
its target allocation. [39]
If we also re-estimate the expenditure models for both groups of PCTs we can calculate the cost of a life
year for the big four programmes combined. The relevant expenditure elasticities are shown in column D
of Table B8.30. These expenditure elasticities are far larger for under target PCTs than they are for over
target PCTs. One reason for this might be that the big four programmes are priority (hard)
programmes. Over target PCTs are able to devote sufficient resources to the big four so that any
additional budget is directed towards other (softer) programmes which are less well funded than the
priority programmes. In contrast, under target PCTs are struggling to devote sufficient resources to the
priority programmes so that, when further funding does become available, this is directed towards the
priority programmes.
These expenditure and outcome elasticities in Table B8.30 can be used to calculate the cost of a life year
for the big four programmes combined (adjusted for the ICD10 coverage of the mortality data). This
cost is:
x £10,604 for all PCTs combined
x £14,083 for PCTs whose budget is beyond its target allocation
x £8,441 for PCTs whose budget falls short of its target allocation.
Again, the cost of a life year is much smaller for PCTs whose budget falls short of its target allocation.
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Table B8.29: table showing calculation of the cost of a life year for the big four programmes by type of PCT: over target and under target allocations
A B C D E F G H I
PBC description Type of PCT
Spend
(£m)
FY2006/7
1% of
spend
(£m)
FY2006/7
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative
sign)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2006/08
Annual
average life
years lost
(=F/3)
Change in annual life
years lost associated
with 1% increase in
spend (=E*G)/100
Cost (£)
per life
year gained
(=D/H)
Split PCTs according to whether they are over target allocation (n=67) or under target allocation (n=85)
1 Cancers All 4,122 41.22 0.342 2,207,021 735,674 2,516 16,383
2 Cancers Over target 1,733 17.33 0.179 897,403 299,134 535 32,365
3 Cancers Under target 2,390 23.9 0.476 1,309,618 436,539 2,078 11,502
4 Circulatory problems All 6,161 61.61 1.434 1,361,634 453,878 6,509 9,466
5 Circulatory problems Over target 2,587 25.87 1.115 544,326 181,442 2,023 12,787
6 Circulatory problems Under target 3,574 35.74 1.947 817,308 272,436 5,304 6,738
7 Respiratory problems All 3,285 32.85 2.622 324,223 108,074 2,834 11,593
8 Respiratory problems Over target 1,357 13.57 2.637 127,810 42,603 1,123 12,079
9 Respiratory problems Under target 1,928 19.28 2.674 196,413 65,471 1,751 11,013
10 Gastro- problems All 3,700 37 1.536 345,908 115,303 1,771 20,892
11 Gastro- problems Over target 1,566 15.66 0.569 142,281 47,427 270 58,030
12 Gastro- problems Under target 2,134 21.34 1.869 203,626 67,875 1,269 16,822
Note that for those over target, the average amount (percentage) is £13.415m (3.6%); for those under target, the average amount (percentage) is £10.575m (2.6%)
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Table B8.30: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2006 and outcome data for 2006/08 for the big four PBCs for:
(i) all PCTs; (ii) PCTs that are over target; and (iii) PCTs that are under target.
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S
=0.01*
C*D
=0.01*D*
G*I/H =E/J
=0.01*
D*I*N
/3 =O/P =E/O =E/Q
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elasticity
Change
in
spend
(£m)
Annual
mortality
<75
years,
2006/08
Coverage
of
mortality
data
relative to
spend
data
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative
sign)
Change in
annual
mortality,
adj for
coverage
Cost per life
gained adj
for coverage
(£)
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2006/08
Change
in
annual
life
years
lost
Coverage
of
mortality
data
relative to
spend
data
Change in
annual
life years
lost, adj
for
coverage
Cost per
life year
gained (£)
Cost per
life year
gained adj
for YLL
coverage
(£)
All PCTs together
1 Cancer £4,122 0.465 £19.17 61,961 0.984 0.342 100.14 £191,407 2,207,021 1,170 0.984 1,189 £16,383 £16,121
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.540 £33.27 41,106 0.992 1.434 320.88 £103,683 1,361,634 3,515 1.000 3,543 £9,466 £9,390
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.679 £22.31 11,574 0.773 2.622 266.57 £83,676 324,223 1,924 0.773 2,489 £11,593 £8,961
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,700 0.446 £16.50 6,160 0.571 1.536 73.90 £223,228 345,908 790 0.650 1,383 £20,892 £11,929
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 761.49 £119,823 7,399 8,604 £12,333 £10,604
For over target PCTs only (n=67)
6 Cancer £1,733 0.193 £3.34 24,918 0.984 0.179 8.75 £382,320 897,403 103 0.984 105 £32,365 £31,847
7 Circulatory problems £2,587 0.150 £3.88 16,346 0.992 1.115 27.56 £140,806 544,326 303 1.000 303 £12,787 £12,685
8 Respiratory problems £1,357 0.326 £4.42 4,588 0.773 2.637 51.02 £86,701 127,810 366 0.773 474 £12,079 £9,337
9 Gastro-intestinal problems £1,566 0.090 £1.41 2,525 0.571 0.569 2.26 £622,378 142,281 24 0.650 43 £58,030 £33,135
Big four programmes summary:
10 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £7,243 £13.06 89.60 £145,748 797 927 £16,378 £14,083
For under target PCTs only (n=85)
11 Cancer £2,390 0.785 £18.76 37,043 0.984 0.476 140.67 £133,377 1,309,618 1,631 0.984 1,658 £11,502 £11,318
12 Circulatory problems £3,574 0.748 £26.73 24,760 0.992 1.947 363.50 £73,544 817,308 3,968 1.000 4,000 £6,738 £6,684
13 Respiratory problems £1,982 1.035 £20.51 6,986 0.773 2.674 250.12 £82,015 196,413 1,812 0.773 2,344 £11,321 £8,751
14 Gastro-intestinal problems £2,134 0.592 £12.63 3,602 0.571 1.869 69.80 £181,000 203,626 751 0.650 1,315 £16,822 £9,605
Big four programmes summary:
15 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £10,080 £78.64 824.09 £95,429 8,162 9,317 £9,635 £8,441
Note: 2006/7 2005/6
All 23 programme spend £67,896 £64,310
% change in budget 1.00 1.00
proportionate change 0.01 0.01
Change in budget £678.96 £643.10
Note that the adjustment for the coverage of the YLL data relative to the spend data uses deaths under age 75 in England in 2008.
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B8.11 The correlation between the outcome and expenditure elasticities
To investigate the correlation between the outcome and expenditure elasticities for any given programme,
a random sample (with replacement) of 152 PCTs was drawn from the population of 152 PCTs. In this
random drawing, some of the original observations will appear once, some more than once, and some not
at all. Using this re-sampled dataset, outcome and expenditure models for the selected programme were
estimated (as per Table B8.19) and the outcome and expenditure elasticities saved. This step was
repeated 500 times and the correlation coefficient for the outcome and expenditure elasticities was
calculated. Table B8.31 shows these correlation coefficients for each of the big four programmes.
Table B8.31: table showing correlation coefficient for the outcome and expenditure elasticities
Programme of care
Correlation coefficient between the
outcome and expenditure elasticities
Cancers and tumours 0.1542
Circulatory disease 0.1968
Respiratory problems 0.0368
Gastro-intestinal problems 0.0611
Note: the estimated elasticities are from unweighted IV regressions because there is no weight option with the
bootstrap command in Stata. However, weighting makes little difference to our IV results. For example, in the
cancer outcome model the coefficient on spend is -0.342 with weighting applied but it is
-0.299 without any weighting applied. For the cancer spend model the coefficient on budget is 0.465 with weighting
but 0.520 without weighting.
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B8.12 Summary and conclusion
In this section we have undertaken several tasks. First, we have identified and resolved several estimation
issues relating to the appropriate measure of need, the appropriate price index to be used to adjust PCT
expenditure for local variations in input prices, and the fact that PCTs vary in size.
Second, we have derived plausible outcome and expenditure models for ten care programmes using
expenditure data for 2006/7 and mortality data for 2004/5/6. The cost of a life year across these ten
programmes is £20,893 (it was £21,256 using expenditure data for 2005/6).
Third, we have re-estimated the outcome and expenditure models using the same expenditure data but
replacing the mortality data for 2004/5/6 with data for 2006/7/8. The advantage of this is that it
assumes that the health benefits associated with expenditure occur either in the same period as the
expenditure or in the next two periods. This is an improvement on past practice where data constraints
forced researchers to relate expenditure to the current and two previous periods. This re-estimation
increased the cost of a life year across all ten programmes by 14%, from £20,893 to £23,780.
Fourth, we have adjusted the cost of a life year calculations for the mismatch in the ICD10 coverage of
the expenditure and mortality data. This reduces the cost of a life year for 2006/7 for those 10 PBCs
with a mortality indicator by 14%, from £23,780 to £19,965 (a decrease of 16%).
Fifth, we have noted that our cost of a life year estimates are based on the assumption that any
Departmental budgetary change falls entirely on PCTs. Although PCTs account for most of the
Department of Healths budget, non-PCTs still accounted for 15% of the budget in 2006/7. Because we
have no information on how any budgetary change would be split between PCTs and non-PCTs, our
estimates implicitly assume that any Departmental budgetary change falls entirely on PCTs. If, on the
other hand, the non-PCT budget is responsive to changes in the Departments budget then our cost of a
life year estimates will be slightly too low (for example, if the non-PCT budget is as responsive as the
PCT budget, then our cost of a life year estimate for 2006/7 will be increased by 17.7% (that is, from
£22,565 to £26,553).
We have also illustrated how our modelling framework can be applied to other non-mortality based
outcome indicators, and the cost of a life year estimates that are obtained if PCTs are split into different
groups (e.g., those that under and those that are over their target budget allocations). In the next section
we examine the impact of relaxing the instrument validity restriction on our results.
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B9. The sensitivity of the outcome elasticity to the validity of the instrument exclusion
restrictions
B9.1 Introduction
One of the crucial elements in the calculation of the cost of a life year for any programme of care is the
coefficient on the expenditure variable in the outcome equation. This coefficient indicates the amount by
which mortality changes following a (small) change in expenditure in that care programme. It is to be
expected that this coefficient will have a negative sign so that as expenditure increases, for example,
mortality will decline. If this coefficient is small (in an absolute sense) then it implies that any change in
expenditure will have little effect on mortality and so the cost of a life year will be relatively large (ceteris
paribus). Alternatively, if this coefficient is large (in an absolute sense) then any change in expenditure will
have a large effect on mortality and so the cost of a life year will be relatively small (ceteris paribus). For this
reason it is important that we correctly identify the magnitude of this treatment parameter.
Our basic outcome model for each programme of care isݕ ൌן ൅ߚ1ݔ + ߚ2݊ + ߳ (9.1)
where y is mortality, x is expenditure, and n is a measure of the need for health care (with all variables
relating to a particular programme of care). We are particularly interested in the size of the coefficient on
expenditure (ߚ1). We do not use OLS to estimate this outcome model because expenditure (x) is
endogenous and, in the presence of an endogenous regressor, OLS will provide both a biased and an
inconsistent estimator ofߚ1. Instead, we use instrumental variable (IV) techniques. Unlike OLS, IV will
provide a consistent estimator of ߚ1 and, although in finite samples the IV estimator will be biased, the
belief is that (providing certain assumptions are met) this bias will be less than that associated with OLS.
IV estimation involves finding variables (instruments) that are good predictors of expenditure (x) but
which are appropriately excluded from the equation of interest (that is, equation 1). The assumption is
that the instruments impact upon mortality (y) through their impact on expenditure (x) only, and that they
do not have a direct effect on mortality (y). If, on the other hand, an instrument reflects unobserved
factors that affect both expenditure and mortality directly, the use of this instrument will lead to a biased
and inconsistent estimate of the coefficient on expenditure. Such an instrument is said to be invalid
because it belongs in the equation of interest in its own right.
In our outcome models we typically employ two instruments (call these z1 and z2) for expenditure. IV
assumes that these instruments do not belong in the outcome equation (9.1). In other words, IV assumes
that the coefficients ߛ1 and ߛ2 in the outcome modelݕ ൌן ൅ߚ1ݔ + ߚ2݊ + ߛ1ݖ1 + ߛ2ݖ2 + ߳ (9.2)
are identically zero. Such exclusion restrictions can be debatable and researchers who employ IV
techniques often devote considerable effort towards convincing the reader that their assumed exclusion
restrictions are a good approximation[35, 36]. These efforts usually take two forms: first, researchers
often offer a strong theoretical economic argument why their instruments do not belong in the equation
of interest; and, second, statistical tests for the validity of the exclusion restrictions (Sargan 2SLS, Hansen
J-test GMM) are routinely reported as part of the results for any study that employs IV techniques.
It is difficult for us to identify clear theoretical reasons why our instruments (such as the proportion of
lone pensioner households, the provision of unpaid care, and an index of multiple deprivation) do not
belong in the equation of interest (that is, that they will not directly affect mortality). Of necessity,
therefore, we must be guided by the available statistical tests for the validity of the exclusion restrictions.
However, although our outcome models pass the relevant statistical test, some commentators have
argued that the Sargan/Hansen test may have weak power and may fail to reject the null hypothesis of
instrument validity even when an exclusion restriction is not valid. Given our reliance on this test, it is
important that we examine the circumstances in which this test may have weak power.
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B9.2 The Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions: when will it have low power?
As we have one endogenous variable (expenditure) in our outcome model and more than one instrument
available for health care expenditure, our estimating equation is said to be overidentified. With more
instruments than endogenous regressors, there is more than one way of using the instruments to estimate
the parameter ߚ1 on the endogenous variable. The Sargan-Hansen J test of overidentifying (OID)
restrictions calculates whether different instruments or different combinations of instruments generate
significantly different values for the coefficient (ߚ1) on the endogenous variable in the equation of
interest. If significant differences are detected then the test will reject the null hypothesis that all
instruments are jointly valid. Of course, the test does not reveal which instrument(s) is(are) invalid;
instead, the test uses the fact that different instruments (or combinations thereof) generate different
estimates of ߚ1 to infer that something is wrong with the set of instruments. Even if all of the
instruments are invalid in the sense that they are all correlated with the error term in the equation of
interest (and thus belong in the outcome equation as regressors), the test can detect this failure if the
induced biases in the estimates of ߚ1 differ across instruments. This vector-of-contrasts interpretation
of the Sargan-Hansen test makes it clear when the J test will lack power to reject the null hypothesis when
it is false. The J statistic will be small when the null hypothesis of valid instruments is correct; but it will
also be small if the biases induced in ߚ1෢ by invalid instruments all coincide (i.e., the instruments all
identify the same wrong parameter). [37]
Most of our estimated models involve the use of two instruments. Kovandic, Schaffer and Kleck[37]
point that when there are only two instruments the J test statistic is numerically identical to a Hausman
test statistic that contrasts the estimator using both instruments with an estimator using just one
instrument. The intuition [behind this result] isstraightforward: a Hausman test will reject the null
hypothesis that the two estimators being contrasted are both consistent so long as the estimators
converge to different values. It is not a requirement for one of the two estimators to be consistent for
the Hausman test (and therefore the J test) to have power to reject the null. One implication of this
observation is that misspecification, in the conditional mean of the model, need not necessarily cause the
Hansen-Sargan test to fail.
Kovandic, Schaffer and Kleck point out that these arguments suggest that the more unrelated the
instruments are to each other, the more credible is a failure to reject the null that the instruments are
exogenous, since a failure to reject would require that two unrelated instruments generate the same
asymptotic bias in ߚ1෢  (p19).
Schaffer [40] argues that [d]ifferent sets of instruments are likely to have more or less power depending
on where they come from. If all the instruments are minor variations on the same variable -- e.g., they are
the same variable but lagged a few different periods -- then they are all likely to identify the same psuedo-
parameter. The critique of low power is going to be fairly convincing here.
On the other hand, if the instruments are very different and, even better, there are ex ante reasons for
thinking that if they are invalid, they are invalid in different ways, the J test will have more power. For
example, suppose two instruments are available and it is thought that, if one is invalid, it will bias the
estimated parameter upwards but, if the other instrument is invalid, it will bias the estimated parameter
downwards. If the Hansen-Sargan J test fails to reject in this setting, it is a convincing result.[40]
In this study we typically use any two from three available instruments when estimating our outcome
equations. These three instruments are:
(a) the proportion of households that are lone pensioner households (from the 2001 Census);
(b) the proportion of residents providing more than one hour of unpaid care per week (from the 2001
Census); and
(c) the index of multiple deprivation (IMD) 2007.
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For the Hansen-Sargan J test to have low power the use of any two of these instruments should generate
the same asymptotic bias inߚ1෢ . However, it is far from obvious that this will be the case, particularly
given that our outcome equation already includes a measure of the need for health care.
Nevertheless, we must admit that it is possible that our instruments are correlated with both expenditure
and some unobserved factor which is directly influencing the mortality rate, and that the induced bias inߚ1෢ is the same for both instruments. In the next section we therefore examine the sensitivity of the
estimated outcome elasticity to the validity of the exclusion restrictions.
In summary:
x the Sargan-Hansen J test of overidentifying restrictions calculates whether different instruments
or different combinations of instruments generate significantly different values for the coefficient
(ߚ1) on the endogenous variable in the equation of interest. If significant differences are
detected then the test will reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are jointly valid.
x the J test uses the fact that different instruments (or combinations thereof) generate different
estimates of ߚ1 to infer that something is wrong with the chosen set of instruments.
x even if all of the instruments are invalid in the sense that they are all correlated with the error
term in the equation of interest, the test can detect this failure if the induced biases in the
estimates of ߚ1 differ across instruments.
x this vector-of-contrasts interpretation of the Sargan-Hansen test also makes it clear when the J
test will lack power to reject the null hypothesis when it is false. The J statistic will be small when
the null hypothesis of valid instruments is correct; but it will also be small if the biases induced inߚ1෢ by invalid instruments all coincide (i.e., the instruments all identify the same wrong parameter).
x most of our outcome models use two from the following three instruments: lone pensioners,
multiple deprivation and unpaid carers. Thus our Hansen-Sargan test statistics are likely to have
low power if our selected pair of instruments are both inducing the same bias inߚ1෢ . It is far
from obvious that these instruments will induce the same bias in the coefficient on expenditure.
x however, in case our instruments are imparting the same bias to ߚ1෢ , the next section examines
the sensitivity of the estimated outcome elasticity to the validity of the exclusion restrictions.
B9.3 The value selection problem
Given that the Hansen-Sargan J test might be unable to detect the presence of invalid instruments in
some (rather restrictive) circumstances, several studies have suggested that researchers using IV
techniques should subject the estimated coefficient on the endogenous variable to a sensitivity analysis
(e.g., Conley, Hansen and Rossi, 2012; Small, 2007). Recall that IV estimation involves the assumption
that the instruments do not belong in the equation of interest (i.e., in the outcome equation). In other
words, the assumption is that the coefficients ߛ1 and ߛ2 on the instruments z1 and z2 in the outcome
model ݕ ൌן ൅ߚ1ݔ + ߚ2݊ + ߛ1ݖ1 + ߛ2ݖ2 + ߳ (9.3)
are identically zero (where y is mortality, x is expenditure, and n is a measure of the need for health care).
One suggestion is that investigators should relax the assumption that ߛ1 and ߛ2 are identically zero and
examine the impact of this relaxation on the estimated value forߚ1. This proposal, however, raises the
issue of which non-zero values should be imposed upon ߛ1 andߛ2.
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Proponents of this approach suggest that prior information about the extent of deviations from the exact
exclusion restriction might be drawn from other research studies or from subject matter experts[35, 36].
In the present context, however, we have no prior beliefs about the likely values for, or even the signs on,ߛ1 andߛ2.
As a starting point we re-estimated the outcome model for the 2006/7 cancer programme 420 times,
assuming a uniform distribution between -1 and 1 for both ߛ1 and ߛ2.32 33 Table B9.1 shows the
estimated coefficients on expenditure (ߚ1෢ ) in our cancer outcome equation associated with the various
pairs of values imposed upon ߛ1 andߛ2. The coefficients in this table indicate that the outcome elasticity
is rather sensitive to the precise values assigned to ߛ1 andߛ2. However, in the absence of any guidance
from other research studies or from subject matter experts, we require a method that will identify a
plausible range of values for both ߛ1 andߛ2, and which we can use as the basis for our sensitivity
analysis.
32 See column 1 of Table 8.19 for the estimated IV cancer outcome model.
33 We used a symmetric distribution about zero because we have no priors about the signs of the coefficients on the
instruments. The use of a uniform distribution is arbitrary but of no significance.
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Table B9.1: table showing the impact of weakening the exclusion restrictions on the instruments in the cancer outcome equation
Coefficients on
expenditure (ࢼ૚෢ ) Imposed coefficient on IMD variable (ࢽ૛)
-1 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Imposed
coefficient
on lone
pensioner
households
variable
(ࢽ૚)
1.00 -4.47 -4.22 -3.96 -3.71 -3.45 -3.20 -2.95 -2.70 -2.45 -2.20 -1.96 -1.71 -1.47 -1.23 -0.99 -0.75 -0.50 -0.24 0.03 0.30 0.57
0.90 -4.31 -4.06 -3.80 -3.54 -3.29 -3.04 -2.79 -2.53 -2.29 -2.04 -1.80 -1.55 -1.31 -1.07 -0.83 -0.59 -0.33 -0.07 0.20 0.47 0.74
0.80 -4.15 -3.90 -3.64 -3.38 -3.13 -2.88 -2.62 -2.37 -2.13 -1.88 -1.64 -1.40 -1.16 -0.92 -0.67 -0.42 -0.16 0.10 0.37 0.65 0.92
0.70 -3.99 -3.74 -3.48 -3.22 -2.97 -2.72 -2.46 -2.21 -1.96 -1.72 -1.48 -1.24 -1.00 -0.76 -0.51 -0.26 0.01 0.28 0.55 0.82 1.10
0.60 -3.83 -3.58 -3.32 -3.06 -2.81 -2.55 -2.30 -2.05 -1.80 -1.56 -1.32 -1.08 -0.84 -0.60 -0.35 -0.09 0.18 0.45 0.73 1.00 1.28
0.50 -3.67 -3.41 -3.16 -2.90 -2.65 -2.39 -2.14 -1.89 -1.64 -1.40 -1.16 -0.92 -0.68 -0.44 -0.18 0.08 0.35 0.63 0.91 1.18 1.45
0.40 -3.51 -3.25 -3.00 -2.74 -2.49 -2.23 -1.98 -1.73 -1.48 -1.23 -0.99 -0.76 -0.52 -0.27 -0.01 0.26 0.53 0.81 1.09 1.36 1.63
0.30 -3.35 -3.09 -2.84 -2.58 -2.32 -2.07 -1.82 -1.57 -1.32 -1.07 -0.83 -0.60 -0.35 -0.10 0.16 0.44 0.71 0.99 1.26 1.53 1.80
0.20 -3.19 -2.93 -2.68 -2.42 -2.16 -1.91 -1.65 -1.40 -1.15 -0.91 -0.67 -0.43 -0.19 0.07 0.34 0.62 0.90 1.17 1.44 1.71 1.97
0.10 -3.03 -2.77 -2.51 -2.26 -2.00 -1.75 -1.49 -1.24 -0.99 -0.75 -0.51 -0.27 -0.02 0.25 0.52 0.80 1.07 1.34 1.61 1.88 2.14
0.00 -2.87 -2.61 -2.35 -2.10 -1.84 -1.58 -1.33 -1.07 -0.83 -0.58 -0.34 -0.10 0.15 0.43 0.70 0.98 1.25 1.52 1.78 2.04 2.31
-0.10 -2.71 -2.45 -2.19 -1.93 -1.68 -1.42 -1.16 -0.91 -0.66 -0.42 -0.18 0.07 0.33 0.61 0.88 1.15 1.42 1.68 1.95 2.21 2.47
-0.20 -2.55 -2.29 -2.03 -1.77 -1.51 -1.26 -1.00 -0.75 -0.50 -0.25 -0.01 0.24 0.51 0.79 1.06 1.32 1.59 1.85 2.11 2.37 2.63
-0.30 -2.39 -2.13 -1.87 -1.61 -1.35 -1.10 -0.84 -0.58 -0.33 -0.09 0.15 0.41 0.68 0.95 1.22 1.48 1.75 2.01 2.27 2.53 2.79
-0.40 -2.23 -1.97 -1.71 -1.45 -1.19 -0.93 -0.68 -0.42 -0.17 0.06 0.30 0.57 0.84 1.11 1.38 1.64 1.91 2.17 2.43 2.69 2.95
-0.50 -2.07 -1.81 -1.55 -1.29 -1.03 -0.78 -0.52 -0.27 -0.03 0.20 0.44 0.72 1.00 1.27 1.54 1.80 2.06 2.32 2.58 2.84 3.10
-0.60 -1.91 -1.65 -1.39 -1.13 -0.87 -0.62 -0.37 -0.13 0.10 0.32 0.58 0.87 1.15 1.42 1.69 1.95 2.22 2.48 2.74 3.00 3.26
-0.70 -1.75 -1.49 -1.23 -0.97 -0.72 -0.47 -0.22 0.01 0.22 0.46 0.73 1.02 1.30 1.57 1.84 2.11 2.37 2.63 2.89 3.16 3.42
-0.80 -1.59 -1.33 -1.07 -0.82 -0.57 -0.32 -0.09 0.14 0.35 0.60 0.88 1.17 1.45 1.72 1.99 2.26 2.52 2.79 3.05 3.31 3.57
-0.90 -1.43 -1.17 -0.92 -0.67 -0.42 -0.18 0.05 0.27 0.50 0.76 1.04 1.32 1.60 1.88 2.15 2.41 2.68 2.94 3.20 3.47 3.73
-1.00 -1.27 -1.02 -0.76 -0.52 -0.27 -0.04 0.18 0.41 0.65 0.92 1.20 1.48 1.76 2.03 2.30 2.57 2.83 3.09 3.36 3.62 3.88
Notes: This spreadsheet shows the value of the coefficient on expenditure (ߚ1෢ ) when estimating the cancer outcome equation [y* =(ݕ െ ߛଵݖଵ െ ߛଶݖଶ) = ן ൅ߚ1ݔ + ߚ2݊ + ߳]
using IV having imposed different pairs of values for ߛ1 and ߛ2 between -1 and 1. Cells in the top left-hand quadrant contain negative values for the outcome elasticity. The
outcome elasticity associated with our standard IV model (-0.34) is shown in the central square where ߛ1 and ߛ2 are, of course, zero.
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B9.4 The identification of values to be imposed on the coefficients on the excluded
instruments
Our outcome equations typically involve two instruments and one endogenous regressor. With this
structure we can re-estimate our outcome model twice, each time including one of the previously
excluded instruments to the equation of interest. In particular, we can estimateݕ ൌן ൅ߚ1ݔ + ߚ2݊ + ߛ1ݖ1 + ߳ (9.4)
and then ݕ ൌן ൅ߚ1ݔ + ߚ2݊ + ߛ2ݖ2 + ߳ (9.5)
with the same set of (included and excluded) instruments (n, z1, and z2) being used to instrument x1 in
both cases. This provides us with coefficient and variance estimates for ߛ1 and ߛ2 and we can sample
from these point estimates and their distributions to examine the impact of different (non-zero) values forߛ1 and ߛ2 on the outcome elasticity (ߚ1෢ ).
The sampling procedure is straightforward. We sample from these estimates and their distributions by
drawing two random numbers from a standard normal distribution and we form the product of these
numbers and the standard errors associated with our estimates of ߛ1 and ߛ2. Our sampled pair of values
of ߛ1 and ߛ2 (call these sampled values ߛ෤ଵ andߛ෤ଶ) are then the sum of these products and the respective
coefficient estimates of ߛ1 andߛ2. Table B9.2 shows the relevant coefficient and variance estimates forߛ1 and ߛ2 that are used as part of this sampling procedure.
Table B9.2: table showing various estimates associated with the excluded instruments from the
outcome equation for the big four programmes
Programme Instrument coefficient Std error variance covariance
Cancer z1: lone pensioner households -0.2074942 0.1773647 0.0314582
0.00494454
z2: IMD2007 -0.0827677 0.1141054 0.0130200
Circulatory disease z1: lone pensioner households -0.2606290 0.2441101 0.059590
0.01122591
z2: IMD2007 -0.2105334 0.2879230 0.082900
Respiratory problems z1: long term unemployment rate 0.2642582 0.13273061 0.0176174
-0.02136305
z2: limiting long-term illness rate -1.739808 1.611403 2.5966196
Gastro-intestinal z1: unpaid carers 1.812286 2.347459 5.510564 0.08016639
problems z2: IMD2007 0.5567431 0.2066839 0.0427822
The estimation of equations (9.4) and (9.5) does not generate estimates of ߛ1 and ߛ2 as part of the same
model and so the sampling procedure outlined above implicitly assumes a zero covariance between these
estimates. If we want to incorporate a covariance term into the sampling procedure this must be obtained
from elsewhere. In the absence of an obviously better approach, we obtain a covariance term from the
OLS estimation of our outcome model with the previously excluded instruments both included in the
regression equation. Thus we estimateݕ ൌן ൅ߚ1ݔ + ߚ2݊ + ߛ1ݖ1 + ߛ2ݖ2 + ߳ (9.6)
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where ݕ, ݔ,݊, ݖ1 and ݖ2 have their usual meaning, and where ߚ1 is constrained to be equal to its value
from the IV estimation of equation (9.1). The value for the covariance term between the estimates of ߛ1
and ߛ2 for each of the big four programmes is shown in the final column of Table B9.2.
The sampling procedure from our estimates of ߛ1 and ߛ2 with a non-zero covariance is essentially the
same as that outlined above but it incorporates the presence of a covariance term for the estimates of ߛ1
andߛ2. We can illustrate this procedure using data from the cancer outcome model. First, we form the
implied variance-covariance matrix for the estimates of ߛ1 and ߛ2
lone_pensioners IMD2007
lone_pensioners 0.031458 0.004944
IMD2007 0.004944 0.013020.
Second, we form the product of a pair of random numbers from the standard normal distribution (r1, r2)
with the Cholesky decomposition matrix from the variance-covariance matrix for the estimates of ߛ1 andߛ2. The latter is given by:
lone_pensioners IMD2007
lone_pensioners 0.177364 0
IMD2007 0.027877 0.110647.
Finally, we add this pair of products to the respective coefficient estimates of ߛ1 andߛ2 to obtain our
sampled pair of values of ߛ1 and ߛ2 (call these ߛ෤ଵ andߛ෤ଶ). In other words, for each pair of random
numbers (r1, r2), we calculate the sampled values ɀ෤ଵ and ɀ෤ଶ where൤ ߛ෤ଵߛ෤ଶ ൨ = ൤ ߛොଵߛොଶ ൨ + [ ቂܽ11 ܽ12ܽ21 ܽ22ቃ ቂ ݎ1ݎ2 ቃ ]
sampled coefficients (Cholesky pair of )
values for from (decomposition * random )
coefficients = IV + (matrix numbers )
on excluded regressions from standard)
instruments (9.4) & (9.5) normal )
above distribution )
This sampling procedure is undertaken 1,000 times, both with a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ, and
again with a non-zero covariance.
These procedures generate two sets of 1,000 pairs of values for ߛොଵandߛොଶ (one set assumes a zero
covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ and the other does not). These sets of values for ߛොଵandߛොଶ can be used to
examine the sensitivity of the estimated outcome elasticity to alternative non-zero values for the
coefficients on the excluded instruments.
B9.5 Obtaining the outcome elasticities associated with sampled coefficients on the excluded
instruments
For each pair of sampled values of ߛ1 and ߛ2 (ߛ෤ଵ andߛ෤ଶ), we can use IV techniques to estimate the
model ݕ௡௘௪ = ݕ െ ߛ෤1ݖͳ െ ߛ෤2ݖ2 ൌן ൅ߚ1ݔ + ߚ2݊ + ߳ (9.7)
with the usual instrument set (x2, z1, and z2) used to instrument the endogenous variable x1
(expenditure). For each pair of sampled the values ߛ෤ଵ andߛ෤ଶ, we obtain a different outcome elasticity
(ߚ1෢ ) and these different values can be plotted in a histogram. Such a plot illustrates the uncertainty
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associated with our point estimate of the outcome elasticity due to doubts about the validity of our
instruments; we call this type of uncertainty level 2 uncertainty. This level 2 uncertainty is in addition
to what we label level 1 uncertainty, that is, the uncertainty about the value of the outcome elasticity
assuming the validity of our exclusion restrictions (remember that our estimated outcome elasticity is only
a point estimate and that it has a distribution attached to it). To illustrate this level 1 uncertainty, we can
sample from the distribution of the point estimate for the outcome elasticity from our basic IV model
(whereߛ෤ଵ andߛ෤ଶ are zero in equation (9.7)) and plot the sampled values.
Plots illustrating the degree of level 1 uncertainty for each of the big four programmes are shown as
Figures B9.1a (cancer), B9.2a (circulatory disease), B9.3a (respiratory problems), and B9.4a (gastro-
intestinal problems) below. These level 1 uncertainty plots can be compared with plots of ߚ1෢ from the
estimation of equation (9.7). The latter plots illustrate the degree of level 2 uncertainty, that is, the
uncertainty associated with our point estimate of the outcome elasticity due to doubts about the validity
of the instruments. Figures B9.1b (cancer), B9.2b (circulatory disease), B9.3b (respiratory problems), and
B9.4b (gastro-intestinal problems) show plots of the outcome elasticity (ߚ1෢ from equation (9.7)) assuming
a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5). Figures B9.1c (cancer), B9.2c
(circulatory disease), B9.3c (respiratory problems), and B9.4c (gastro-intestinal problems) show plots of
the outcome elasticity (ߚ1෢ from equation (9.7)) assuming a non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in
equations (9.4) and (9.5).
Finally, the point estimates ߚ1෢ from the estimation of equation (9.7) also have a standard error and we
can sample from these distributions. These sampled values illustrate what we term level 3 uncertainty,
that is, the uncertainty associated with the value of the outcome elasticity due to both level 1 (sampling)
and level 2 (instrument invalidity) effects.
Plots illustrating the degree of level 3 uncertainty, assuming a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in
equations (9.4) and (9.5), are shown as Figures B9.1d (cancer), B9.2d (circulatory disease), B9.3d
(respiratory problems), and B9.4d (gastro-intestinal problems) below. Plots illustrating the degree of level
3 uncertainty, assuming a non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5), are shown
as Figures B9.1e (cancer), B9.2e (circulatory disease), B9.3e (respiratory problems), and B9.4e (gastro-
intestinal problems) below.
Uncertainty and the value of the cancer outcome elasticity (Figures B9.1a-B9.1e)
Figure B9.1a plots 1000 values from the distribution of the point estimate for the cancer outcome
elasticity. The mean value of these sampled values is -0.338 (the outcome elasticity in the basic IV model
is -0.342 and its standard error is 0.099) and virtually all of them lie between 0 and -0.6.
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Figure B9.1a: graph showing histogram for the sampled cancer outcome elasticity
The histogram in Figure B9.1b provides a plot of 1000 point estimates for the cancer outcome elasticity if
we drop the assumption that the coefficients on the excluded instruments are exactly zero (and we also
assume a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5)). The mean value of these 1000
outcome elasticities is -0.209 and this is about one-third lower than the elasticity in the basic IV model (=
-0.342). In addition, the mean value of the standard errors associated with these 1000 elasticities (0.109)
is slightly greater than the standard error in the basic IV model (0.099) so that about one-quarter of the
outcome elasticities in Figure B9.1b take a non-negative value.
The histogram in Figures B9.1c provides a similar plot to that in Figure B9.1b but this time we assume a
non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5). There is very little difference
between the zero (Figure B9.1b) and non-zero (9.1c) covariance plots, with both the mean elasticity and
mean standard error virtually identical in both plots.
The histograms in Figures B9.1b and B9.1c provide plots of the point estimate for the cancer outcome
elasticity if we drop the assumption that the coefficients on the excluded instruments are exactly zero.
Each point estimate also has a standard error and we can sample from these estimates and their
distributions to obtain the histograms shown in Figures B9.1d and B9.1e. With the exception of a slight
lengthening in the tail on the left hand side, these plots are very similar to the plots in Figures B9.1b and
B9.1c.
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -0.338.
The outcome elasticity for cancer expenditure in the basic IV model is -0.342.
sampling 1000 values from the distribution of
the point estimate for the cancer outcome elasticity
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Figure B9.1b: graph showing histogram for estimated outcome elasticity associated with cancer
outcome model (zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
FigureB9.1c: graph showing histogram for estimated outcome elasticity associated with cancer
outcome model (non-zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
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NB The mean value of the 1000 outcome elasticities is -0.209 (mean SE=0.109).
The outcome elasticity for cancer expenditure in the basic IV model is -0.342 (SE=0.099).
Sensitivity of the outcome elasticity for cancer expenditure
to 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the excluded instruments
with a zero covariance between these coefficients
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NB The mean value of the 1000 outcome elasticities is -0.209 (mean SE=0.105).
The outcome elasticity for cancer expenditure in the basic IV model is -0.342 (SE=0.099).
Sensitivity of the outcome elasticity for cancer expenditure
to 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the excluded instruments
with a non-zero covariance between the coefficients
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Figure B9.1d: graph showing histogram for sampled values of the cancer outcome elasticity
(zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
Figure B9.1e: graph showing histogram for sampled values of the cancer outcome elasticity
(non-zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
Figure B9.1f reproduces the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.1a, B9.1b and B9.1d
(remember that Figures B9.1b and B9.1d assume a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4)
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -0.220.
The outcome elasticity for cancer expenditure in the basic IV model is -0.342.
sampling from the 1000 outcome elasticities for cancer expenditure
(that were generated using 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the
excluded instruments with a zero covariance between these coefficients)
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -0.218.
The outcome elasticity for cancer expenditure in the basic IV model is -0.342.
sampling from the 1000 outcome elasticities for cancer expenditure
(that were generated using 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the
excluded instruments with a non-zero covariance between these coefficients)
109
and (9.5)). Together these plots illustrate the impact of all three levels of uncertainty on our estimate of
the cancer outcome elasticity. It is clear that the uncertainty induced by the instrument validity issue
considerably increases the uncertainty associated with our estimate of the outcome elasticity (compare, for
example, the density plot for level 1 uncertainty with those for both level 2 and level 3 uncertainty).
Figure B9.1f: graph showing comparing the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.1a,
9.1b and 9.1d
Figure B9.1g reproduces the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.1a, B9.1c and B9.1e
(remember that Figures B9.1c and B9.1e assume a non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations
(9.4) and (9.5)). As is the case for Figure B9.1f, these plots illustrate the impact of all three levels of
uncertainty on our estimate of the cancer outcome elasticity. And again, it is clear that it is the
uncertainty induced by the instrument validity issue that considerably increases the uncertainty associated
with our estimate of the outcome elasticity. For example, the standard deviation associated with the level
1 uncertainty density plot is 0.099 but the standard deviation for the level 2 (0.338) and level 3 (0.379)
uncertainty density plots are both considerably larger than this.
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NB The mean value of the level 1/level 2/level 3 elasticities is -0.338/-0.209/-0.220.
The outcome elasticity for cancer expenditure in the basic IV model is -0.342.
kernel density plots from Figures B9.1a, B9.1b and B9.1d: illustrating the uncertainty
associated with the point estimate for the cancer outcome elasticity
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Figure B9.1g: graph showing comparing the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.1a,
B9.1c and B9.1e
Uncertainty and the value of the circulatory disease outcome elasticity (Figures B9.2a-B9.2e)
Figure B9.2a plots 1000 values from the distribution of the point estimate for the circulatory disease
outcome elasticity. The mean value of these sampled values is -1.418 and virtually all of these values lie
between -2.0 and -0.75. The outcome elasticity in the comparable IV model is -1.427.34
34The outcome model for circulatory disease reported in Table B8.19 (using PB expenditure for 2006/7 and
mortality data for 2006/7/8) contains four instruments. The application of the sensitivity analysis described in this
section is considerably easier to implement if only two instruments are present and re-estimation of the outcome
model for circulatory disease without the two least significant instruments generates very similar results to those
obtained with all four instruments (for example, the coefficient on expenditure declines marginally from -1.434 to -
1.427). Therefore the sensitivity analysis reported here uses the outcome model containing only two instruments.
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NB The mean value of the level 1/level 2/level 3 elasticities is -0.338/-0.209/-0.218.
The outcome elasticity for cancer expenditure in the basic IV model is -0.342.
kernel density plots from Figures B9.1a, B9.1c and B9.1e: illustrating the uncertainty
associated with the point estimate for the cancer outcome elasticity
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Figure B9.2a: graph showing histogram for the sampled circulatory disease outcome elasticity
The histogram in Figure B9.2b provides a plot of 1000 point estimates for the circulatory disease
outcome elasticity if we drop the assumption that the coefficients on the excluded instruments are exactly
zero (and we also assume a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5)). The mean
value of these 1000 outcome elasticities is -1.697 and this is about one-fifth larger than the elasticity in the
comparable IV model (-1.427). Similarly, the mean value of the standard errors associated with these
1000 elasticities (0.269) is also about one-fifth larger than the standard error in the comparable basic IV
model (0.228). Virtually all of the point estimates values lie between -4.0 and 0.0, and there are very few
non-negative values.
The histogram in Figure B9.2c provides a similar plot to that in Figure B9.2b but this time we assume a
non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5). There is very little difference
between the zero (Figure B9.2b) and non-zero (9.2c) covariance plots, with both the mean elasticity and
mean standard error virtually identical in both plots.
The histograms in Figures B9.2b and B9.2c provide plots of the point estimate for the circulatory disease
outcome elasticity if we drop the assumption that the coefficients on the excluded instruments are exactly
zero. Each point estimate also has a standard error and we can sample (with replacement) from these
estimates and their distributions to obtain the histograms shown in Figures B9.2d and B9.2e. With the
exception of a slight lengthening in the tail on the left hand side (as was also observed for the cancer
programme), these plots are very similar to the plots in Figures B9.2b and B9.2c.
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -1.418.
The outcome elasticity for circulatory disease expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.427.
sampling 1000 values from the distribution of
the point estimate for the circulatory disease outcome elasticity
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Figure B9.2b: graph showing histogram for estimated outcome elasticity associated with the
circulatory disease outcome model (zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded
instruments)
Figure B9.2c: graph showing histogram for estimated outcome elasticity associated with the
circulatory disease outcome model (non-zero covariance between the coefficients on the
excluded instruments)
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NB The mean value of the 1000 outcome elasticities is -1.697 (mean SE=0.269).
The outcome elasticity for circulatory expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.427 (SE=0.228).
Sensitivity of the outcome elasticity for circulatory disease expenditure
to 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the excluded instruments
with a zero covariance between these coefficients
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NB The mean value of the 1000 outcome elasticities is -1.700 (mean SE=0.269).
The outcome elasticity for circulatory expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.427 (SE=0.228).
Sensitivity of the outcome elasticity for circulatory disease expenditure
to 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the excluded instruments
with non-zero covariance between the coefficients
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Figure B9.2d: graph showing histogram for sampled values of the circulatory disease outcome
elasticity (zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
Figure 9.2e: graph showing histogram for sampled values of the circulatory disease outcome
elasticity (non-zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -1.717.
The outcome elasticity for circulatory expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.427.
sampling from the 1000 outcome elasticities for circulatory disease expenditure
(that were generated using 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the
excluded instruments with a zero covariance between these coefficients)
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -1.718.
The outcome elasticity for circulatory expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.427.
sampling from the 1000 outcome elasticities for circulatory disease expenditure
(that were generated using 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the
excluded instruments with a non-zero covariance between these coefficients)
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Figure B9.2f reproduces the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.2a, B9.2b and B9.2d
(remember that Figures B9.2b and B9.2d assume a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4)
and (9.5)). Together these plots illustrate the impact of all three levels of uncertainty on our estimate of
the circulatory disease outcome elasticity. It is clear that the uncertainty induced by the instrument
validity issue considerably increases the uncertainty associated with our estimate of the outcome elasticity
(note that the range of values increases dramatically from the density plot illustrating level 1 uncertainty to
that illustrating level 2 uncertainty).
Figure B9.2f: graph showing comparing the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.2a,
B9.2b and B9.2d
Figure B9.2g reproduces the three kernel density plots from Figures B9.2a, B9.2c and B9.2e (remember
that Figures B9.2c and B9.2e assume a non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and
(9.5)). As is the case for Figure B9.2f, these plots illustrate the impact of all three levels of uncertainty on
our estimate on the circulatory disease outcome elasticity. And again, it is clear that it is the uncertainty
induced by the instrument validity issue that considerably increases the uncertainty associated with our
estimate of the outcome elasticity. For example, the standard deviation associated with the level 1
uncertainty density plot is 0.228 but the standard deviation for the level 2 (0.735) and level 3 (0.843)
uncertainty density plots are both considerably larger than this.
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NB The mean value of the level 1/level 2/level 3 elasticities is -1.418/-1.697/-1.717.
The outcome elasticity for circulatory disease expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.427.
kernel density plots from Figures B9.2a, B9.2b and B9.2d: illustrating the uncertainty
associated with the point estimate for the circulatory disease outcome elasticity
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Figure B9.2g: graph showing comparing the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.2a,
B9.2c and B9.2e
Uncertainty and the value of the respiratory disease outcome elasticity (Figures B9.3a-B9.3e)
Figure B9.3a plots 1000 values from the distribution of the point estimate for the respiratory disease
outcome elasticity (see column 5 of Table B8.19). The mean value of these sampled values is -2.004 (the
outcome elasticity in the comparable IV model is -2.029) and all of these values lie between -4.0 and 0.
Figure B9.3a: graph showing histogram for the sampled respiratory disease outcome elasticity
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -2.004.
The outcome elasticity for respiratory expenditure in the comparable IV model is -2.029.
sampling 1000 values from the distribution of
the point estimate for the respiratory disease outcome elasticity
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NB The mean value of the level 1/level 2/level 3 elasticities is -1.418/-1.700/-1.718.
The outcome elasticity for circulatory disease expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.427.
kernel density plots from Figures B9.2a, B9.2c and B9.2e: illustrating the uncertainty
associated with the point estimate for the circulatory disease outcome elasticity
density
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The histogram in Figure B9.3b provides a plot of 1000 point estimates for the respiratory disease
outcome elasticity if we drop the assumption that the coefficients on the excluded instruments are exactly
zero (and we also assume a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5)). The mean
value of these 1000 outcome elasticities from the respiratory disease outcome model (-1.145) is almost
one-half of the size of the elasticity in the comparable basic IV model (-2.029). And the mean value of
the standard errors associated with these 1000 elasticities (0.489) is about one-quarter less than the
standard error in the comparable basic IV model (0.636).
The histogram in Figure B9.3c provides a similar plot to that in Figure B9.3b but this time we assume a
non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5). However, there is very little
difference between the zero (Figure B9.3b) and non-zero (B9.3c) covariance plots, with both the mean
elasticity and mean standard error virtually identical in these two plots.
The histograms in Figures B9.3b and B9.3c provide plots of the point estimate for the respiratory disease
outcome elasticity if we drop the assumption that the coefficients on the excluded instruments are exactly
zero. Each point estimate also has a standard error and we can sample from these estimates and their
distributions to obtain the histograms shown in Figures B9.3d and B9.3e. With the exception of a slight
lengthening of the tail on the left hand side, these plots are similar to those in Figures B9.3b and B9.3c so
the sampling procedure would appear to have little impact on the distribution of the point elasticities.
Figure B9.3b: graph showing histogram for estimated outcome elasticity associated with
respiratory disease outcome model (zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded
instruments)
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NB The mean value of the 1000 outcome elasticities is -1.145 (mean SE=0.489).
The outcome elasticity for respiratory expenditure in the comparable IV model is -2.029 (SE=0.636).
Sensitivity of the outcome elasticity for respiratory expenditure
to 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the excluded instruments
with a zero covariance between these coefficients
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Figure B9.3c: graph showing histogram for estimated outcome elasticity associated with
respiratory disease outcome model (non-zero covariance between the coefficients on the
excluded instruments)
Figure B9.3d: graph showing histogram for sampled values of the respiratory disease outcome
elasticity (zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
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NB The mean value of the 1000 outcome elasticities is -1.149 (mean SE=0.485).
The outcome elasticity for respiratory expenditure in the comparable IV model is -2.029 (SE=0.636).
Sensitivity of the outcome elasticity for respiratory expenditure
to 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the excluded instruments
with a non-zero covariance between the coefficients
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -1.146.
The outcome elasticity for respiratory expenditure in the comparable IV model is -2.029.
sampling from the 1000 outcome elasticities for respiratory disease expenditure
(that were generated using 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the
excluded instruments with a zero covariance between these coefficients)
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Figure B9.3e: graph showing histogram for sampled values of the respiratory disease outcome
elasticity (non-zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
Figure B9.3f reproduces the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.3a, B9.3b and B9.3d
(remember that Figures B9.3b and B9.3d assume a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4)
and (9.5)). Together these plots illustrate the impact of all three levels of uncertainty on our estimate of
the respiratory disease outcome elasticity. It is clear that the uncertainty induced by the instrument
validity issue both shifts the density plot to the right and increases the uncertainty associated with our
estimate of the outcome elasticity (e.g., the range of values increases from -4.0 to 0.0 at level 1 to -5.0 to
2.5 at level 3).
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -1.151.
The outcome elasticity for respiratory expenditure in the comparable IV model is -2.029.
sampling from the 1000 outcome elasticities for respiratory disease expenditure
(that were generated using 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the
excluded instruments with a non-zero covariance between these coefficients)
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Figure B9.3f: graph showing comparing the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.3a,
B9.3b and B9.3d
Figure B9.3g reproduces the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.3a, B9.3c and B9.3e
(remember that Figures B9.3c and B9.3e assume a non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations
(9.4) and (9.5)). As is the case for Figure B9.3f, these plots illustrate the impact of all three levels of
uncertainty on our estimate of the respiratory disease outcome elasticity. And again, it is clear that the
uncertainty induced by the instrument validity issue both shifts the density plot to the right and
considerably increases the uncertainty associated with our estimate of the outcome elasticity. More
precisely, the standard deviation associated with the level 1 uncertainty density plot is 0.636 but the
standard deviation for the level 2 (0.919) and level 3 (1.098) uncertainty density plots are both
considerably larger than this.
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NB The mean value of the level 1/level 2/level 3 elasticities is -2.004/-1.145/-1.146.
The outcome elasticity for respiratory disease expenditure in the comparable IV model is -2.029.
kernel density plots from Figures B9.3a, B9.3b and B9.3d: illustrating the uncertainty
associated with the point estimate for the respiratory disease outcome elasticity
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Figure B9.3g: graph showing comparing the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.3a,
B9.3c and B9.3e
Uncertainty and the value of the gastro-intestinal disease outcome elasticity (Figures B9.4a-B9.4e)
Figure B9.4a plots 1000 values from the distribution of the point estimate for the gastro-intestinal disease
outcome elasticity (see column 7 of Table B8.19). The mean of these sampled values is -1.518 (the
outcome elasticity in the comparable IV model is -1.536) and all of these values lie between -3.0 and 0.0.
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NB The mean value of the level 1/level 2/level 3 elasticities is -2.004/-1.149/-1.151.
The outcome elasticity for respiratory disease expenditure in the comparable IV model is -2.029.
kernel density plots from Figures B9.3a, B9.3c and B9.3e: illustrating the uncertainty
associated with the point estimate for the respiratory disease outcome elasticity
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Figure B9.4a: graph showing histogram for the sampled gastro-intestinal disease outcome
elasticity
The histogram in Figure B9.4b provides a plot of 1000 point estimates for the respiratory disease
outcome elasticity if we drop the assumption that the coefficients on the excluded instruments are exactly
zero (and we also assume a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5)). The mean
value of these 1000 outcome elasticities (-2.365) is 50% larger than the size of the elasticity in the
comparable IV model (-1.536). And the mean value of the standard errors associated with these 1000
elasticities (0.853) is about 80% larger than the standard error in the basic IV model (0.468).
The histogram in Figure B9.4c provides a similar plot to that in Figure B9.4b but this time we assume a
non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4) and (9.5). However, there is very little
difference between the zero (Figure B9.4b) and non-zero (B9.4c) covariance plots, with both the mean
elasticity and mean standard error virtually identical in these plots.
The histograms in Figures B9.4b and B9.4c provide plots of point estimates for the gastro-intestinal
problems outcome elasticity if we drop the assumption that the coefficients on the excluded instruments
are exactly zero. Each point estimate also has a standard error and we can sample from these estimates
and their distributions to obtain the histograms shown in Figures B9.4d and B9.4e. With the exception of
a slight extension to both tails, these plots are similar to the plots in Figures B9.4b and B9.4c.
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -1.518.
The outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.536.
sampling 1000 values from the distribution of
the point estimate for the gastro-intestinal disease outcome elasticity
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Figure B9.4b: graph showing histogram for estimated outcome elasticity associated with gastro-
intestinal outcome model (zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
Figure B9.4c: graph showing histogram for estimated outcome elasticity associated with gastro-
intestinal outcome model (non-zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded
instruments)
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NB The mean value of the 1000 outcome elasticities is -2.365 (mean SE=0.853).
The outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal expenditure in the basic IV model is -1.536 (SE=0.468).
Sensitivity of the outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal expenditure
to 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the excluded instruments
with a zero covariance between these coefficients
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NB The mean value of the 1000 outcome elasticities is -2.360 (mean SE=0.839).
The outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal expenditure in the basic IV model is -1.536 (SE=0.468).
Sensitivity of the outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal expenditure
to 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the excluded instruments
with non-zero covariance between the coefficients
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Figure B9.4d: graph showing histogram for sampled values of the gastro-intestinal problems
outcome elasticity (zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
Figure B9.4e: graph showing histogram for sampled values of the gastro-intestinal problems
outcome elasticity (non-zero covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
Figure B9.4f reproduces the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.4a, B9.4b and B9.4d
(remember that Figures B9.4b and B9.4d assume a zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations (9.4)
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -2.442.
The outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.536.
sampling from the 1000 outcome elasticities for gastro-intestinal expenditure
(that were generated using 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the
excluded instruments with a zero covariance between these coefficients)
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NB The mean value of these 1000 sampled outcome elasticities is -2.434.
The outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.536.
sampling from the 1000 outcome elasticities for gastro-intestinal expenditure
(that were generated using 1000 alternative pairs of coefficients on the
excluded instruments with a non-zero covariance between these coefficients)
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and (9.5)). These plots illustrate the impact of all three levels of uncertainty on our estimate of the gastro-
intestinal outcome elasticity. It is clear that the uncertainty induced by the instrument validity issue both
shifts the density plot to the left slightly and dramatically increases the uncertainty associated with our
estimate of the outcome elasticity (e.g., the range of values increases from -3 to 0 at level 1, from -13 to 9
at level 2, and then further from -16 to 11 at level 3).
Figure B9.4f: graph showing comparing the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.4a,
B9.4b and B9.4d
Figure B9.4g reproduces the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.4a, B9.4c and B9.4e
(remember that Figures B9.4c and B9.4e assume a non-zero covariance between ߛොଵandߛොଶ in equations
(9.4) and (9.5)). As is the case for Figure B9.4f, these plots illustrate the impact of all three levels of
uncertainty on our estimate of the gastro-intestinal outcome elasticity. And again, it is clear that the
uncertainty induced by the instrument validity issue both shifts the density plot to the left slightly and
considerably increases the uncertainty (range) associated with our estimate of the outcome elasticity.
More precisely, the standard deviation associated with the level 1 uncertainty density plot is 0.468 but the
standard deviation for the level 2 (3.658) and level 3 (3.834) uncertainty density plots are both eight times
larger than this.
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NB The mean value of the level 1/level 2/level 3 elasticities is -1.518/-2.365/-2.442.
The outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.536.
kernel density plots from Figures B9.4a, B9.4b and B9.4d: illustrating the uncertainty
associated with the point estimate for the gastro-intestinal outcome elasticity
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Figure B9.4g: graph showing comparing the three kernel density plots shown in Figures B9.4a,
B9.4c and B9.4e
B9.6 Implications of uncertainty for the estimate of the cost of a life year
In the previous subsection, we have evaluated the outcome equation elasticities when uncertainty over the
validity of instrument variables is considered (level 3 uncertainty), in contrast to assuming the
instruments are valid (level 1 uncertainty). This analysis showed that including level 3 uncertainty affects
the central value of the outcome elasticities; however, it is difficult to predict its effect on the expectation
of the threshold given the impact of expenditure on mortality appears reduced in some programmes but
increased in others. In Table B9.3, the mean estimates of the outcome elasticities under level 3 uncertainty
were used to calculate the threshold for the big four programmes of health. The results show that relaxing
the assumption of validity of the instruments has little impact on the expectation of the threshold for the
big 4 PBCs [the cost per life year gained threshold changed from £10,604 (Table B8.22) to £11,009 in
Table B9.3].
Table B9.3: Cost of life and life year estimates for the big four programmes using expenditure
data for 2006 and outcome data for 2006/7/8 adjusted for the ICD10 coverage of the expenditure
and outcome data
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2006/7
Spend
elastici
ty
Change in
spend
(£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2006/08
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative sign)
Coverage of
mortality data
relative to
spend data
Change in
annual
mortality adj
for coverage
Cost per life
gained (£) adj
for coverage
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2006/08
Coverage of
mortality data
relative to
spend data
Change in
annual life
years lost adj
for YLL
Cost per
life year
gained (£)
Cost per life
year gained
adj for YLL
coverage (£)
1 Cancer £4,122 0.465 £19.17 61,961 0.218 0.984 63.90 £299,975 2,207,021 0.984 759 £16,383 £25,265
2 Circulatory problems £6,161 0.540 £33.27 41,106 1.718 0.992 384.42 £86,544 1,361,634 0.992 4,245 £9,466 £7,838
3 Respiratory problems £3,285 0.679 £22.31 11,574 1.151 0.773 116.99 £190,666 324,223 0.773 1,092 £11,593 £20,419
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,700 0.446 £16.50 6,160 2.434 0.571 117.11 £140,906 345,908 0.571 2,192 £20,892 £7,528
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 120,801 682.42 £133,707 4,238,786 8,288 £12,333 £11,009
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NB The mean value of the level 1/level 2/level 3 elasticities is -1.518/-2.360/-2.434.
The outcome elasticity for gastro-intestinal expenditure in the comparable IV model is -1.536.
kernel density plots from Figures B9.4a, B9.4c and B9.4e: illustrating the uncertainty
associated with the point estimate for the gastro-intestinal outcome elasticity
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The assumption of validity of instruments is expected to affect significantly the level of uncertainty over
the cost effectiveness threshold estimate. Illustrations of this source of uncertainty were presented in the
previous section (B9.5) using empirical distributions derived from the sampling procedure implemented;
these illustrations represent the uncertainty in the mean estimate for each of the elasticities. To
characterise the effect of levels 1 and 3 uncertainty on the overall threshold we used the sets of simulated
elasticities (one for each of the 4 programmes of care) to compute a threshold value; in doing so for all
simulated sets, a sample of threshold values was obtained. In this way, uncertainty was propagated from
the outcome elasticities to the threshold estimates, and an empiric distribution describing uncertainty over
threshold estimates obtained. The cumulative density function can be used to display such uncertainty;
this plots the probability (y-axis) of the threshold being below certain values (x-axis) in the simulated
sample (this corresponds to a Bayesian interpretation of uncertainty). Figure B9.5a plots the cumulative
density curve for the cost per life gained threshold when level 1 and level 3 uncertainty are considered in
turn, and B9.5b for the cost per life year gained threshold.
Figure B9.5a Cumulative density plot for the cost per life gained threshold for the big 4 PBCs
(considers covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments).
In drawing the cumulative density function, negative threshold values were dealt with by evaluating whether it was the health component or the cost component that was negative. For
simulations where health change was negative (0% were observed for both levels 1 and 3), the threshold was left as a negative value. Simulations showing a negative change in spend were
assigned a very high positive threshold value  in this was an asymptote is generated in the plot (respectively 0% and 5.6% were observed for levels 1 and 3).
Figure B9.5b Cumulative density plot for the cost per life year gained threshold for the big 4
PBCs (considers covariance between the coefficients on the excluded instruments)
In drawing the cumulative density function, negative threshold values were dealt with by evaluating whether it was the health component or the cost component that was negative. For
simulations where health change was negative (0% were observed for both levels 1 and 3), the threshold was left as a negative value. Simulations showing a negative change in spend were
assigned a very high positive threshold value  in this was an asymptote is generated in the plot (respectively 0.04% and 7.7% were observed for levels 1 and 3).
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The probability that the overall threshold is less than £7,500 per life year is around 0.2 when uncertainty
over the validity of instruments in considered (level 3), whereas when the instruments are assumed valid
(level 1) this probability is 0. Under level 1 uncertainty, we would be confident that the threshold is less
than £30,000 (probability of 1), but when considering level 3 uncertainty there is some chance that the
threshold is higher than £30,000 (probability of 0.2). These plots show that uncertainty on the validity of
the instruments generates significant uncertainty over the threshold value.
B9.7 Summary and conclusion
One of the crucial elements in the calculation of the cost of a life year for any care programme is the
coefficient on the expenditure variable in the outcome equation. The endogenous nature of expenditure
in our model means that OLS estimation is inappropriate and that instead IV techniques must be used.
The application of these techniques requires the identification of variables that are good predictors of the
endogenous variable (expenditure) but which do not have a direct effect on the dependent variable
(mortality).
It is difficult to provide theoretical arguments why our selected instruments will not affect mortality
directly. Instead, we rely on the widely used Hansen-Sargen test of instrument validity. Although our
models pass this test, some commentators have argued that this test has weak power and may fail to
reject the null hypothesis of instrument validity even when an exclusion restriction is not valid. Given
our reliance on this test, we noted that this test will only lack power if the biases induced in the coefficient
on the endogenous variable by invalid instruments all coincide (i.e., the instruments all identify the same
wrong parameter). However, it is far from obvious that this will be so in this case, particularly given that
our outcome equation already includes a measure of the need for health care.
Nevertheless, it is possible that our instruments are correlated with both expenditure and some
unobserved factor which is directly influencing the mortality rate, and that the induced bias in ߚ1෢ is the
same for both instruments.
We therefore undertook an extensive sensitivity analysis of the estimated outcome elasticity to the validity
of the exclusion restrictions. In summary, we found that both the central value and distribution of the
outcome elasticity may change if we drop the assumption that the coefficients on the excluded
instruments are identically zero.
This change in the central value of the outcome elasticity reduces the impact of expenditure on mortality
in some programmes (e.g., for cancer the average outcome elasticity falls from -0.338 to -0.210, and for
respiratory disease it falls from -2.004 to -1.151). However, in other programmes this change in the
central value increases the impact of expenditure on mortality (e.g., for circulatory disease the average
outcome elasticity increases from -1.418 to -1.718, and for gastro-intestinal problems it increases from -
1.518 to -2.434).
However, in all four programmes the standard deviation associated with the distribution of the value for
the outcome elasticity increased: for cancer it increased from 0.099 to 0.379; for circulatory disease it
increased from 0.228 to 0.843; for respiratory disease it increased from 0.636 to 1.098; and for gastro-
intestinal disease it increased from 0.468 to 3.834.
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B10 Analysis of programme budgeting expenditure for 2007/8 and mortality data for
2007/2009
Outcome and expenditure models were estimated using updated data for expenditure (from 2006/7 to
2007/8) and updated mortality data (from 2006/2007/2008 to 2007/2008 /2009). Results for the
outcome model are shown in Table B10.1 and results for the expenditure model are in Table B10.2. First
stage regressions for these IV models can be found in Tables BA.7 and BA.8 in the annex.
B10.1 Outcome models
Some of the outcome models in Table B10.1 contain just two variables: own programme expenditure and
a measure of the need for health care. The latter is usually the measure of need as employed by the
Department of Health for resource allocation purposes and this incorporates the CARAN formula for
acute services. For the respiratory programme we have added the square of this need measure to improve
the model fit. In other PBCs we found that the all service measure of need performed poorly and we
have replaced or supplemented it with either a more programme specific measure (e.g., the epilepsy
prevalence rate for neurological mortality) or with a better performing proxy for need (e.g., the percentage
of residents born outside the EU for maternity/neonate mortality).
Two results are reported for three of the big four programmes. One of these two results uses two
instruments and so we report the instrument validity test statistic. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of
instrument validity in all three cases. However, there is some evidence of weak instruments (at least in
the respiratory and gastro-intestinal programmes) but, if we drop one instrument and re-estimate the
model, the evidence of instrument weakness disappears (but of course there is no instrument validity test
statistic with this re-estimation). The removal of one instrument has little impact on the coefficient on
expenditure and it is this coefficient from this one instrument model that we use below in our cost of a
life year calculations.
The first seven results in Table B10.1 show the outcome model for the big four programmes (i.e., for
cancer, circulatory disease, respiratory problems and gastro-intestinal problems). In all four programmes
the need variable has a positive and significant effect on mortality, and expenditure has the anticipated
negative effect. The diagnostic statistics reveal that, in all four PBCs, own programme expenditure is
endogenous and that the instruments are valid. They also suggest that the instruments are relevant and
there is no evidence that the instruments are weak in the models with one excluded instrument. The
Pesaran-Taylor test suggests that there is no evidence of model mis-specification.
The outcome results for the other programmes (in columns 8 - 13) are similar to but more diverse than
those for the big four programmes. This is to be anticipated because mortality is a much rarer outcome
in these programmes than it is in the big four programmes. Own programme expenditure is not
endogenous in four of these programmes but we retain the IV estimator for three of these four because
this yields more plausible results than the OLS estimator (the results are more plausible in the sense that
the signs on the coefficients are more in line with our prior expectations).
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the endocrine problems programme but
this is not statistically significant. The all service measure of need is not relevant for this PBC; instead, we
find that the diabetes prevalence rate is positively associated with mortality, as is a measure of deprivation
(the IMD2007).
Mortality from epilepsy is negatively and significantly associated with expenditure in the neurological
programme. Both the all service need for health care and the epilepsy prevalence rate are positively and
significantly associated with mortality in this programme.
Expenditure has a negative and statistically significant effect on mortality (from renal problems) in the
genitor-urinary problems programme. The prevalence of lone parent households is positively associated
with mortality.
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Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the infectious disease programme and this
is statistically significant. The all service measure of need is not relevant for this PBC; instead, we find
that a measure of need associated with HIV is positively associated with mortality, as is a measure of
deprivation (the IMD2007).
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the maternity & neonates programme but
the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. In this PBC the generic all service measure of need
has been replaced with two other indicators of deprivation  the proportion of residents born outside the
EU and the proportion of those aged 16-74 without any qualifications  and both of these are positively
associated with mortality.
Finally, expenditure and need have the anticipated effects on mortality in the trauma and injuries
programme. In addition, the proportion of households without access to a car is negatively associated
with mortality from fractures (perhaps access to a car facilitates involvement in serious road traffic
accidents), and the proportion of residents that are students is positively associated with mortality from
fractures.
The relevant statistical test suggests that expenditure is endogenous in six of the ten programmes but we
have retained the IV estimates for three of the other four programmes because they provide plausible
results. The Hansen-Sargen test suggests that the selected instruments are valid, and the Kleibergen-Paap
LM statistic suggests that they are relevant (i.e., correlated with the endogenous regressor). With the
possible exception of the trauma and injuries programme, the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic suggests that we
do not have a problem with weak instruments.35 Finally, the Pesaran-Taylor/Ramsey reset test statistics
reveal no evidence of mis-specification.
B10.2 Expenditure models
Most of the expenditure models in Table B10.2 contain just three variables: the PCT budget, a proxy for
the own programme need for health care, and a proxy for the need for health care in other programmes.
The budget term is positive in all eleven models and it is statistically significant in eight of these eleven
models.
The usual proxy for the own programme need for health care (i.e., the all service measure of need) is
present in six of the models and it is significant in five of them. Its presence is supplemented with the
addition of its squared value to improve model fit in the respiratory problems programme.
In some programmes (e.g., the endocrine, metabolic & nutritional programme and the neurological
programme), we have replaced and/or supplemented the all service measure of need with a more
programme specific measure (e.g., the diabetes prevalence rate and the epilepsy prevalence rate) and these
measures of need have the anticipated positive impact on expenditure.
In addition, in a couple of other programmes we have used alternative proxies for the own programme
need (e.g., with the use of the Department of Healths measure of maternity need in the
maternity/neonates expenditure equation).
For eight of the eleven programmes we have used the all cause mortality rate less the own programme
mortality rate as the proxy for the need for health care in other programmes, and the coefficient on this
term is negative in seven programmes and statistically significant in six of the seven. In three
programmes -- maternity/neonates, GMS/PMS and trauma & injuries programmes -- we have used the
all cause mortality rate as the proxy for the need for health care in other programmes due to difficulties
associated with the measurement of the own programme mortality rate. The coefficient on this term is
not significant in any of the three models.
35 The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is very close to the target value of ten for both the genitor-urinary and infectious
diseases outcome models.
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The relevant statistical test suggests that expenditure is endogenous in six of the eleven programmes but
we have retained the IV estimates for two other programmes (GMS/PMS and trauma & injuries) because
the IV estimator provides more plausible results. In the other three programmes we report OLS results.
The Hansen-Sargen test suggests that the selected instruments are valid, and the Kleibergen-Paap LM
statistic suggests that they are relevant (i.e., correlated with the endogenous regressor). The Kleibergen-
Paap F statistic suggests that we do not have a problem with weak instruments. Finally, the Pesaran-
Taylor reset test statistics and the Ramsey reset F statistics reveal no evidence of model mis-specification.
B10.3 Calculation of the cost of a life and life year
Expenditure and outcome elasticities for our preferred models are shown in Table B10.3 (see columns D
and H) and these are used to calculate the cost of a life and the cost of a life year, both for individual
programmes and for all programmes collectively.
Column N reports the cost per life gained and column U reports the cost per life year gained. From the
latter we can see that the cost per life year gained is £13,830 for the big four programmes and £28,983 for
all ten programmes with a mortality-based outcome indicator. These represent 30% and 45% increases
on the respective costs for the previous year (i.e., using expenditure data for 2006/7 and mortality data
for 2006/2007/2008).
If we assume that the other 13 programmes (all without a mortality based outcome indicator) offer no
health gain, then the cost per life year across all PCT expenditure is £82,765. This is up from £73,457
using data for the previous year (an increase of 13%).
In addition, Table B10.4 shows that if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the
gain attributable to the remaining 12 programmes is, on average, the same as that attributable to those
with a mortality outcome measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes is £31,846 (it was
£22,565 using data for the previous year).
B10.4 Summary and conclusion
In this section we have estimated outcome and expenditure models using PB data for 2007/8 and
mortality data for 2007/8/9. The cost of an additional life year for all ten programmes with a mortality
based outcome is £28,983. This is a 45% increase on the cost (£19,965) for the previous year (i.e., using
expenditure data for 2006/7 and mortality data for 2006/2007/2008). The next section presents
outcome and expenditure models using PB data for 2008/9 and mortality data for 2008/9/10, and it
explores the reasons for the increase in the cost of an additional life year identified in this section.
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Table B10.1: table showing outcome models using spend data for 2007/8 (two MFFs) and mortality data for 2007/8/9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 4 PBC 7 PBC 17 PBC 1 PBC 1819 PBC 16
cancer cancer circulation respiratory respiratory gastro-intestinal gastro-intestinal endocrine neurological genito-urinary
infectious
diseases
maternity
& neonates
trauma
& injuries
2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8
outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
o/need
exogenous
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
VARIABLES second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage OLS second stage second stage second stage second stage
own programme spend per head -0.365*** -0.365*** -1.277*** -2.205*** -2.211*** -1.292*** -1.328** -0.566 -0.339** -1.898** -0.546* -0.110 -0.369
[0.106] [0.107] [0.206] [0.705] [0.739] [0.497] [0.519] [0.550] [0.144] [0.921] [0.300] [0.139] [0.353]
need CARAN per head 0.984*** 0.985*** 2.818*** 5.119*** 5.113*** 3.908*** 3.947*** 0.853** 3.029***
[0.108] [0.110] [0.256] [1.052] [1.105] [0.633] [0.658] [0.344] [0.717]
need CARAN per head squared 4.085** 3.982**
[1.721] [1.774]
IMD 2007 0.517*** 0.481***
[0.109] [0.098]
diabetes prevalence rate 2007/8 0.820**
[0.359]
epilepsy prevalence rate 2007/8 0.652***
[0.231]
lone parent households 1.767***
[0.430]
HIV need per head squared 0.143**
[0.064]
HIV need per head 0.487***
[0.120]
born outside the EU 0.152***
[0.028]
no qualifications aged 16 to 74 0.990***
[0.115]
no car households -0.658***
[0.221]
full-time students 0.528***
[0.128]
Constant 6.635*** 6.637*** 10.643*** 12.244*** 12.269*** 8.688*** 8.845*** 0.512 3.072*** 12.110** 2.176*** 3.303*** 2.654**
[0.480] [0.483] [0.996] [2.947] [3.090] [2.142] [2.237] [1.349] [0.614] [4.852] [0.675] [0.762] [1.346]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 147 151 151 151
Endogeneity test statistic 17.288 16.323 39.948 21.368 28.333 18.871 17.769 1.293 3.916 3.603 0.551 1.375
Endogeneity p-value 3.21e-05 5.34e-05 1.42e-05 3.79e-06 1.02e-07 1.40e-05 2.49e-05 0.255 0.0478 0.0577 0.458 0.241
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.00124 n/a 0.056 n/a 0.163 0.120 n/a n/a 6.710 0.583 0.675 5.001
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.972 0.814 0.686 0.729 0.0349 0.747 0.411 0.0820
Shea's partial R-squared 0.162 0.162 0.323 0.0832 0.0977 0.126 0.112 0.133 0.160 0.104 0.201 0.137
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 19.52 19.44 20.71 8.807 8.840 10.76 10.53 20.71 20.01 16.45 30.58 16.82
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 5.76e-05 1.04e-05 0.0000 0.00300 0.0120 0.00462 0.00117 5.36e-06 0.000169 0.000917 2.29e-07 0.000770
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 14.50 29.13 34.54 12.26 6.533 7.809 14.70 25.56 9.624 9.688 23.31 7.835
Pesaran-Taylor/Ramsey test statisti 0.00606 0.0115 2.06 2.839 2.850 0.418 0.106 0.00725 0.469 0.393 2.251 0.00684 0.0128
Pesaran-Taylor/Ramsey p-value 0.938 0.915 0.1515 0.0920 0.0914 0.518 0.744 0.932 0.704 0.531 0.134 0.934 0.910
Note: (i) robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
(ii) the addition of unpaid carers as an instrument for the endocrine outcome model generates a Hansen-Sargen test statistic of 0.372 (p-value 0.5418) and the coefficient on expenditure is -0.423.
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Table B10.2: table showing expenditure models using spend data for 2007/8 (two MFFs) and mortality data for 2007/8/9
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 1 PBC 4 PBC 7 PBC 17 PBC 1819 PBC 23 PBC 16
cancer circulation respiratory gastro-intestinal infectious disease endocrine neurological genito-urinary maternity/ neonates GMS/PMS etc trauma/injuries
2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
VARIABLES second stage second stage second stage second stage OLS second stage second stage OLS OLS second stage second stage
all cause SYLLR excluding cancer -1.227***
[0.220]
PCT budget per head 0.890** 0.293 0.536* 0.622* 1.435*** 0.264 1.036*** 1.004*** 0.514* 0.563 1.686***
[0.431] [0.350] [0.298] [0.321] [0.258] [0.206] [0.307] [0.356] [0.264] [0.344] [0.384]
need CARAN per head 1.659*** 3.117*** 1.786*** 1.982*** 0.925*** 0.029
[0.430] [0.535] [0.334] [0.422] [0.305] [0.371]
all cause SYLLR exc circulatory -2.115***
[0.397]
all cause SYLLR exc respiratory -0.781***
[0.236]
need CARAN per head squared 1.687***
[0.446]
all cause SYLLR exc gastro -1.279***
[0.333]
HIV need per head 0.440***
[0.025]
all cause SYLLR exc infect diseases -0.543**
[0.249]
HIV need per head squared 0.183***
[0.021]
all cause SYLLR exc diabetes -0.384*
[0.218]
diabetes prevalence rate 2007/8 0.332***
[0.123]
all cause SYLLR exc epilepsy -0.259
[0.223]
epilepsy prevalence rate 2007/8 0.571***
[0.072]
all cause SYLLR exc renal -0.072
[0.168]
maternity need per head 0.582***
[0.098]
all cause SYLLR 0.286 -0.169 -0.277
[0.193] [0.290] [0.363]
lone pensioner households -0.480***
[0.182]
population working in agriculture 0.132***
[0.022]
Constant 4.973 15.081*** 4.986** 7.488*** -4.212*** 3.555* -1.684 -2.675 -1.222 1.413 -5.960***
[3.047] [3.303] [2.342] [2.786] [1.034] [1.817] [1.130] [2.562] [1.388] [1.373] [1.104]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151
Endogeneity test statistic 20.985 19.454 11.612 15.477 2.846 4.958 0.060 1.769
Endogeneity p-value 4.63e-06 1.03e-05 0.000655 8.35e-05 0.0916 0.0260 0.807 0.183
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.411 0.003 1.369 0.0201 0.510 2.748 1.091 1.121
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.522 0.959 0.504 0.887 0.775 0.0974 0.296 0.571
Shea's partial R-squared 0.384 0.253 0.398 0.325 0.402 0.518 0.416 0.364
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 40.04 28.14 39.41 33.23 40.29 31.53 16.51 27.19
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 2.02e-09 7.76e-07 1.42e-08 6.09e-08 9.26e-09 1.42e-07 0.000260 5.37e-06
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 51.44 29.097 40.69 20.04 37.14 73.21 26.60 32.54
Pesaran-Taylor/Ramsey test statisti 2.262 0.0002 0.0236 0.0341 0.721 2.351 0.619 1.297 1.018 1.757 0.193
Pesaran-Taylor/Ramsey p-value 0.133 0.988 0.878 0.854 0.541 0.125 0.432 0.278 0.387 0.185 0.660
Note: robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B10.3: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2007/8 and outcome data for 2007/2008/2009 (assumes zero health gain for
13 programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
=0.01*C*
D
=0.01*D*
G*H =E/I =I/L =E/M
=0.01*D*
H*P/3 =Q/R =E/Q =E/S
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2007/8
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend
(£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2007/09
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative
sign)
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Coverage of
mortality
data relative
to spend data
Change in
annual
mortality
adj for
coverage
Cost per life
gained (£) adj
for coverage
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2007/09
Change in
annual life
years lost
Coverage of
mortality
data relative
to spend data
Change in
annual life
years lost adj
for coverage
Cost per life
year gained
(£)
Cost per life
year gained
adj for
coverage (£)
1 Cancer £4,573 0.890 £40.70 61,960 0.365 201.28 £202,207 0.984 204.55 £198,972 2,189,685 2,371 0.984 2,410 £17,165 £16,891
2 Circulatory problems £6,325 0.293 £18.53 39,304 1.277 147.06 £126,018 0.992 148.25 £125,010 1,313,223 1,638 0.992 1,651 £11,315 £11,224
3 Respiratory problems £3,431 0.536 £18.39 10,764 2.205 127.22 £144,557 0.773 164.58 £111,742 315,457 1,243 0.773 1,608 £14,798 £11,439
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,805 0.622 £23.67 6,031 1.328 49.82 £475,081 0.571 87.25 £271,271 343,355 945 0.571 1,656 £25,034 £14,295
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £18,134 £101.29 118,059 525.37 £192,795 604.62 £167,526 4,161,720 6,197 7,324 £16,345 £13,830
6 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 120,801 665.10 £137,188 761.49 £119,823 4,238,786 7,399 8,604 £12,333 £10,604
7 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
8 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
9 Infectious diseases £1,119 1.436 £16.07 1,977 0.548 15.56 £1,032,863 1.000 15.56 £1,032,863 106,092 278 1.000 278 £57,742 £57,742
10 Endocrine problems £1,997 0.264 £5.27 1,471 0.566 2.20 £2,398,551 0.634 3.47 £1,520,681 55,492 28 0.634 44 £190,745 £120,932
11 Neurological problems £3,165 1.035 £32.76 718 0.339 2.52 £13,003,180 0.136 18.52 £1,768,432 64,873 76 0.136 558 £431,749 £58,718
12 Genito-urinary problems £3,439 1.004 £34.53 270 1.855 5.03 £6,866,327 0.172 29.24 £1,181,008 8,529 53 0.172 308 £652,096 £112,160
13 Trauma & injuries* £2,918 1.686 £49.20 1,013 0.369 6.30 £7,806,376 0.175 36.01 £1,366,116 21,273 44 0.175 252 £1,115,197 £195,159
14 Maternity & neonates* £3,662 0.514 £18.82 2,199 0.11 1.24 £15,139,113 8.213 0.15 £124,337,534 489,170 92 0.679 136 £204,168 £138,630
Other six programmes summary:
15 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £16,300 £156.65 7,648 32.85 £4,768,699 102.95 £1,521,610 745,429 571 1,575 £274,309 £99,428
16 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £15,643 £93.29 7,839 16.14 £5,780,723 25.05 £3,724,129 762,991 362 639 £258,046 £146,108
17 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £15,643 £112.13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
18 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
All ten programmes summary:
19 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £34,434 £257.94 125,707 558.22 £462,067 707.57 £364,540 4,907,149 6,768 8,900 £38,110 £28,983
20 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £32,911 £184.53 128,640 681.24 £270,881 786.54 £234,617 5,001,777 7,760 9,243 £23,780 £19,965
21 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £32,911 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
22 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £30,368 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Assume zero health gain in the other 13 programmes
Other 13 programmes summary:
23 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £39,223 £478.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £34,985 £494.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £34,985 £452.78 0.00 0.00
26 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £33,942 £402.43 0.00 0.00
All 23 programmes
27 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £73,657 £736.57 558.22 £1,319,496 707.57 £1,040,992 6,768 8,900 £108,829 £82,765
28 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £67,896 £678.96 681.24 £996,655 786.54 £863,228 7,760 9,243 £87,494 £73,457
29 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £67,896 £678.96 971.30 £699,024 10,826 £62,718
30 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £64,310 £643.10 926.22 £694,330 11,322 £56,799
Note: 2007/8 2006/7 2005/6 Note that the YLL for maternity and neonates is estimated as [(6,456 neonate deaths*75years)+(142 maternal deaths*35years)]. This totals 489,170 life years
31 All 23 programme spend £73,657 £67,896 £64,310 Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G7 & G8 and G17 & G18 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04.
32 % change in budget 1.00 1.00 1.00 Note that, for expenditure in 2007/8, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
33 proportionate change 0.01 0.01 0.01 Note that the adjustment for the coverage of the mortality & YLL data relative to the spend data uses deaths under age 75 in England in 2008.
34 Change in budget £736.57 £678.96 £643.10 Note that the YLL figure for trauma & injuries has been estimated assuming that each death is on average at age 67 so that, on average, 7 years of life are lost per death.
134
Table B10.4: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2007/8 and outcome data for 2007/2008/2009 (assumes zero health gain for PBC23 and
'average' gain for other 12 programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
=0.01*C*D
=0.01*D*
G*H =E/I =I/L =E/M
=0.01*D*
H*P/3 =Q/R =E/Q =E/S
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2007/8
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2007/09
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative
sign)
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Coverage of
mortality
data relative
to spend data
Change in
annual
mortality
adj for
coverage
Cost per life
gained (£) adj
for coverage
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2007/09
Change in
annual life
years lost
Coverage of
mortality
data relative
to spend data
Change in
annual life
years lost
adj for
coverage
Cost per life
year gained
(£)
Cost per life
year gained
adj for
coverage (£)
1 Cancer £4,573 0.890 £40.70 61,960 0.365 201.28 £202,207 0.984 204.55 £198,972 2,189,685 2,371 0.984 2,410 £17,165 £16,891
2 Circulatory problems £6,325 0.293 £18.53 39,304 1.277 147.06 £126,018 0.992 148.25 £125,010 1,313,223 1,638 0.992 1,651 £11,315 £11,224
3 Respiratory problems £3,431 0.536 £18.39 10,764 2.205 127.22 £144,557 0.773 164.58 £111,742 315,457 1,243 0.773 1,608 £14,798 £11,439
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,805 0.622 £23.67 6,031 1.328 49.82 £475,081 0.571 87.25 £271,271 343,355 945 0.571 1,656 £25,034 £14,295
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £18,134 £101.29 118,059 525.37 £192,795 604.62 £167,526 4,161,720 6,197 7,324 £16,345 £13,830
6 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 120,801 665.10 £137,188 761.49 £119,823 4,238,786 7,399 8,604 £12,333 £10,604
7 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
8 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
9 Infectious diseases £1,119 1.436 £16.07 1,977 0.548 15.56 £1,032,863 1.000 15.56 £1,032,863 106,092 278 1.000 278 £57,742 £57,742
10 Endocrine problems £1,997 0.264 £5.27 1,471 0.566 2.20 £2,398,551 0.634 3.47 £1,520,681 55,492 28 0.634 44 £190,745 £120,932
11 Neurological problems £3,165 1.035 £32.76 718 0.339 2.52 £13,003,180 0.136 18.52 £1,768,432 64,873 76 0.136 558 £431,749 £58,718
12 Genito-urinary problems £3,439 1.004 £34.53 270 1.855 5.03 £6,866,327 0.172 29.24 £1,181,008 8,529 53 0.172 308 £652,096 £112,160
13 Trauma & injuries* £2,918 1.686 £49.20 1,013 0.369 6.30 £7,806,376 0.175 36.01 £1,366,116 21,273 44 0.175 252 £1,115,197 £195,159
14 Maternity & neonates* £3,662 0.514 £18.82 2,199 0.11 1.24 £15,139,113 8.213 0.15 £124,337,534 489,170 92 0.679 136 £204,168 £138,630
Other six programmes summary:
15 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £16,300 £156.65 7,648 32.85 £4,768,699 102.95 £1,521,610 745,429 571 1,575 £274,309 £99,428
16 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £15,643 £93.29 7,839 16.14 £5,780,723 25.05 £3,724,129 762,991 362 639 £258,046 £146,108
17 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £15,643 £112.13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
18 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
All ten programmes:
19 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £34,434 £257.94 125,707 558.22 £462,067 707.57 £364,540 4,907,149 6,768 8,900 £38,110 £28,983
20 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £32,911 £184.53 128,640 681.24 £270,881 786.54 £234,617 5,001,777 7,760 9,243 £23,780 £19,965
21 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £32,911 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
22 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £30,368 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Other 13 PBCs? Assume zero health gain in PBC23
23 PBC23: spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £11,763 0.563 £66.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 PBC23: spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £10,585 0.739 £78.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 PBC23: spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £10,585 0.759 £80.34 0.00 0.00
26 PBC23: spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £8,449 0.926 £78.24 0.00 0.00
...and that the gain in ten PBCs (see row 19) applies to the remaining 12 PBCs
27 12 PBCs: spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £27,460 £412.41 892.53 £462,067 1,131.31 £364,540 10,821 14,229 £38,110 £28,983
28 12 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £24,400 £416.20 1,536.48 £270,881 1,773.97 £234,617 17,502 20,847 £23,780 £19,965
29 12 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £24,400 £372.44 1,599.42 £232,861 17,826 £20,893
30 12 PBCs: spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £25,493 £324.20 1,247.69 £259,838 15,252 £21,256
All 23 programmes
31 23 PBCs: spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £73,657 £736.57 1,450.75 £507,717 1,838.88 £400,554 17,590 23,129 £41,875 £31,846
32 23 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £67,896 £678.96 2,217.72 £306,153 2,560.50 £265,167 25,262 30,090 £26,876 £22,565
33 23 PBCs: spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £67,896 £678.96 2,570.72 £264,113 28,652 £23,697
34 23 PBCs: spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £64,310 £643.10 2,173.90 £295,827 26,575 £24,200
Note: 2007/8 2006/7 2005/6
35 All 23 programme spend £73,657 £67,896 £64,310 Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G7 & G8 and G17 & G18 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04.
36 % change in budget 1.00 1.00 1.00 Note that the coverage of the YLL data relative to the spend data for trauma & injuries is assumed to take a value of 1.0 (that is, the ICD coverage is the same).
37 proportionate change 0.01 0.01 0.01 Note that, for expenditure in 2007/8, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
38 Change in budget £736.57 £678.96 £643.10 Note that the adjustment for the coverage of the mortality data relative to the spend data uses deaths under age 75 in England in 2008.
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B11. Analysis of programme budgeting expenditure for 2008/9 and mortality data for
2008/2010
Outcome and expenditure models were estimated using updated data for expenditure (from 2007/8 to
2008/9) and updated mortality data (from 2007/2008/2009 to 2008/2009 /2010). Results for the
outcome model are shown in Table B11.1 and results for the expenditure model are in Table B11.2. First
stage regressions for these IV models can be found in Tables BA.9 and BA.10 in the annex.
B11.1 Outcome models
Most of the outcome models in Table B11.1 contain just two variables: own programme expenditure and
a measure of the need for health care. The latter is usually the measure of need as employed by the
Department of Health for resource allocation purposes and this incorporates the CARAN formula for
acute services. For the respiratory disease programme we have added the square of the need measure to
improve the model fit. In other PBCs (e.g., for the endocrine, metabolic and nutritional programme), we
found that the all service measure of need performed poorly and we have replaced it with a more
programme specific measure (e.g., the diabetes prevalence rate) or with a better performing proxy for
need (e.g., the percentage of residents born outside the EU for maternity/neonate mortality).
The relevant statistical test suggests that expenditure is endogenous in six of the ten programmes but we
have retained the IV estimates for the other four because they provide plausible results. The Hansen-
Sargen test suggests that the selected instruments are valid, and the Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic suggests
that they are relevant (i.e., correlated with the endogenous regressor). The Kleibergen-Paap F statistic
suggests that we do not have a problem with weak instruments (although the F statistic is marginally less
than the conventional target value of ten in the genitor-urinary and infectious disease programmes).
Finally, the Pesaran-Taylor reset test statistics reveal no evidence of mis-specification.
Results for the big four programmes are shown in the first five columns of Table B11.1. Two results are
reported for the gastro-intestinal programme. The first of these (column 4) uses two instruments and so
we report the instrument validity test statistic. However, one of these instruments is insignificant in the
first-stage regression and, if we drop this instrument and re-estimate the model, we obtain the result in
column 5 (but of course there is no instrument validity test statistic with this re-estimation). The removal
of one instrument has little impact on the coefficient on expenditure but the Kleibergen-Paap F statistic is
now much greater than ten.
In all of the big four programmes the need variable has a positive and significant effect on mortality, and
expenditure has the anticipated negative effect. As we have noted before, the outcome results for the
other programmes (in columns 6 - 10) are similar to but more diverse than those for the big four
programmes. This is to be anticipated because mortality is a much rarer outcome in these programmes
than it is in the big four programmes.
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the endocrine problems programme and
this is statistically significant. The all service measure of need is not relevant for this PBC; instead, we
find that the diabetes prevalence rate is positively associated with mortality, as is a measure of deprivation
(the IMD2007).
Expenditure has a negative but statistically insignificant impact on mortality from epilepsy in the
neurological programme, and the all service indicator of the need for health care is positively and
significantly associated with mortality in this programme.
Expenditure also has a negative but not statistically significant effect on mortality (from renal problems)
in the genitor-urinary problems programme. The prevalence of lone parent households is positively
associated with mortality.
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the infectious disease programme and this
is statistically significant. The all service measure of need is not relevant for this PBC; instead, we find
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that a measure of need associated with HIV is positively associated with mortality, as is a measure of
deprivation (the IMD2007).
Expenditure has the anticipated negative effect on mortality in the maternity & neonates programme. In
this PBC the coefficient on the generic all service measure of need is positive but not significant. It has
been supplemented with two other indicators of deprivation  the proportion of residents born outside
the EU and the proportion of those aged 16-74 without any qualifications  and both of these are
positively associated with mortality.
Finally, we were unable to develop a plausible outcome model for the trauma and injuries programme.
137
Table B11.1: table showing uutcome models using spend data for 2008/9 (two MFFs) and mortality data for 2008/9/10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 4 PBC 7 PBC 17 PBC 1 PBC 1819
cancer circulation respiratory gastro-intestinal gastro-intestinal endocrine neurological genito-urinary infectious disease maternityneonate
2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9
outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model
instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
VARIABLES second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage second stage
own programme spend per head -0.307*** -1.319*** -1.808*** -1.287*** -1.364** -1.170*** -0.417 -1.615 -0.504** -0.125
[0.084] [0.186] [0.488] [0.478] [0.549] [0.431] [0.473] [1.608] [0.223] [0.188]
needCARAN 0.954*** 2.840*** 4.811*** 3.907*** 3.993*** 1.280** 0.405
[0.095] [0.247] [0.760] [0.625] [0.700] [0.579] [0.288]
needCARAN2 3.016**
[1.284]
diabetes prevalence rate 0.903**
[0.371]
IMD 2007 0.711*** 0.528***
[0.108] [0.091]
lone parent households 1.820***
[0.659]
HIV need per head 0.468***
[0.093]
HIV need per head squared 0.163***
[0.046]
born outside EU 0.169***
[0.031]
population with no qualifications 0.752***
[0.129]
Constant 6.372*** 10.861*** 10.818*** 8.715*** 9.048*** 2.107** 3.233 11.065 1.844*** 3.097***
[0.381] [0.908] [2.111] [2.076] [2.386] [1.022] [1.987] [8.588] [0.500] [0.949]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 148 151 151
Endogeneity test statistic 11.547 25.007 30.177 14.839 11.963 6.209 2.251 0.530 2.952 0.340
Endogeneity p-value 0.000679 5.71e-07 3.94e-08 0.000117 0.000543 0.0127 0.133 0.467 0.0858 0.560
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.843 0.801 0.00285 0.101 0.558 4.446 3.513 4.412 0.225
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.358 0.371 0.957 0.751 0.757 0.108 0.0609 0.220 0.635
Shea's partial R-squared 0.245 0.282 0.176 0.192 0.150 0.193 0.155 0.103 0.191 0.263
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic 23.51 24.85 13.79 13.60 11.64 25.23 21.85 12.51 20.29 22.02
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 7.85e-06 4.02e-06 0.00101 0.00111 0.000644 1.38e-05 7.02e-05 0.00192 0.000437 1.65e-05
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 21.14 47.87 15.10 11.93 16.51 13.56 20.13 9.000 9.306 16.92
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 0.416 0.405 0.104 0.483 0.0584 1.211 0.838 1.681 0.0456 0.107
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.519 0.524 0.747 0.487 0.809 0.271 0.360 0.195 0.831 0.744
Note: robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B11.2 Expenditure models
Most of the expenditure models in Table B11.2 contain just three variables: the PCT budget, a proxy for
the own programme need for health care, and a proxy for the need for health care in other programmes.
The budget term is positive and statistically significant in ten of the eleven models.
The usual proxy for the own programme need for health care (i.e., the all service measure of need) is
positive and significant in five of the eleven results. In a couple of programmes (respiratory disease and
endocrine problems) we have added the squared value of need to improve the model fit and in both cases
this term is positive and significant.
In some programmes (e.g., the endocrine PBC and the neurological PBC), we have replaced and/or
supplemented the all service measure of need with a more programme specific measure (e.g., the diabetes
and the epilepsy prevalence rates) and these usually have a positive and significant impact on expenditure.
In addition, in a couple of programmes we have used alternative proxies for own programme need (e.g.,
with the use of the Department of Healths measure of maternity need in the maternity/neonates
expenditure equation and the use of HIV need in the infectious diseases programme).
For eight of the eleven programmes we have used the all cause mortality rate less the own programme
mortality rate as the proxy for the need for health care in other programmes, and the coefficient on this
term is negative in seven programmes and statistically significant in six of the seven. In three
programmes -- maternity/neonates, GMS/PMS and trauma & injuries programmes -- we have used the
all cause mortality rate as the proxy for the need for health care in other programmes due to difficulties
associated with the measurement of the own programme mortality rate. The coefficient on this term is
negative but not significant in these three models.
The relevant statistical test suggests that expenditure is endogenous in five of the eleven programmes but
we have retained the IV estimates for two further programmes (endocrine problems and
maternity/neonates) because the IV estimator provides more plausible results than the OLS estimator. In
the other four programmes we report OLS results.
The Hansen-Sargen test suggests that the selected instruments are valid, and the Kleibergen-Paap LM
statistic suggests that they are relevant (i.e., correlated with the endogenous regressor). The Kleibergen-
Paap F statistic suggests that we do not have a problem with weak instruments. Finally, the Pesaran-
Taylor reset test statistics and the Ramsey reset F statistics reveal no evidence of model mis-specification.
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Table B11.2: table showing expenditure models using spend data for 2008/9 (two MFFs) and mortality data for 2008/9/10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 1 PBC 4 PBC 7 PBC 17 PBC 1819 PBC 23a PBC 16
cancer circulatory respiratory gastro-intestinal infectiousdisease endocrine neurological genito-urinary maternity/neonates GMS/PMS trauma/injuries
2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
instrument o/need instrument o/need instrument o/need instrument o/need o/need exogenous instrument o/need instrument o/need o/need exogenous instrument o/need o/need exogenous o/need exogenous
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
VARIABLES second stage second stage second stage second stage OLS second stage second stage OLS second stage OLS OLS
all cause SYLLR exc cancer -1.216***
[0.186]
PCT budget per head 0.525* 0.648 0.652* 0.456* 1.546*** 0.484** 0.980*** 0.697*** 0.975*** 0.494*** 1.344***
[0.296] [0.552] [0.337] [0.254] [0.265] [0.240] [0.220] [0.209] [0.303] [0.140] [0.236]
need CARAN per head 2.081*** 2.606*** 2.036*** 2.095*** 0.553 0.295 0.724**
[0.389] [0.623] [0.377] [0.411] [0.369] [0.310] [0.334]
all SYLLR exc circulatory -1.987***
[0.351]
all SYLLR exc respiratory -1.081***
[0.264]
need CARAN per head squar 1.336*** 1.602***
[0.501] [0.495]
all SYLLR exc gastro -1.256***
[0.317]
HIV need per head 0.456***
[0.027]
all SYLLR exc infectious dis -0.472**
[0.227]
HIV need per head squared 0.178***
[0.023]
all SYLLR excluding diabetes -0.164
[0.197]
diabetes prevalence rate 0.439***
[0.112]
all SYLLR excluding epilepsy -0.257*
[0.153]
epilepsy prevalence rate 0.414***
[0.063]
born outside EU 0.039***
[0.014]
all SYLLR excluding renal -0.029
[0.139]
all cause SYLLR -0.348 -0.106 -0.269
[0.302] [0.104] [0.195]
maternity need per head 0.846***
[0.120]
lone pensioner households -0.166**
[0.079]
permanently sick aged 16-74 -0.310***
[0.092]
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professional occupations -0.124*
[0.064]
working in agriculture 0.107***
[0.022]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 1 PBC 4 PBC 7 PBC 17 PBC 1819 PBC 23a PBC 16
cancer circulatory respiratory gastro-intestinal infectiousdisease endocrine neurological genito-urinary maternity/neonates GMS/PMS trauma/injuries
2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
instrument o/need instrument o/need instrument o/need instrument o/need o/need exogenous instrument o/need instrument o/need o/need exogenous instrument o/need o/need exogenous o/need exogenous
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
VARIABLES second stage second stage second stage second stage OLS second stage second stage OLS second stage OLS OLS
Constant 7.556*** 11.702*** 6.044** 8.551*** -5.471*** 0.488 -1.315 -0.521 -0.696 0.586 -3.605***
[2.406] [4.445] [2.651] [2.592] [1.096] [2.282] [1.005] [1.857] [0.800] [1.133] [1.027]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 150 151
R-squared 0.776 0.497 0.278 0.339
Endogeneity test statistic 17.101 22.697 17.212 12.023 1.803 7.163 3.243
Endogeneity p-value 3.54e-05 1.90e-06 3.34e-05 0.000525 0.179 0.00744 0.0717
Hansen-Sargan test statistic 0.0538 0.332 0.858 0.420 0.138 0.594 1.349
Hansen-Sargan p-value 0.817 0.565 0.354 0.517 0.710 0.441 0.509
Shea's partial R-squared 0.379 0.265 0.389 0.331 0.399 0.500 0.257
Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic 39.01 29.71 37.32 33.84 38.45 35.08 22.81
Kleibergen-Paap p-value 3.38e-09 3.54e-07 7.87e-09 4.48e-08 4.48e-09 2.41e-08 4.43e-05
Kleibergen-Paap F statistic 39.97 26.93 44.98 20.13 47.20 75.67 16.35
Pesaran-Taylor reset statistic 1.129 0.0810 0.000203 0.557 0.354 0.366 0.00412
Pesaran-Taylor p-value 0.288 0.776 0.989 0.456 0.552 0.545 0.949
Ramsey reset F statistic 1.723 1.431 0.072 1.044
Probability > F 0.165 0.236 0.975 0.375
Note: robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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B11.3 Calculation of the cost of a life and life year
Expenditure and outcome elasticities for our preferred models are shown in Table B11.3 (see columns D
and H) and these are used to calculate the cost of a life and the cost of a life year, both for individual
programmes and for all programmes collectively.
Again, column N reports the cost per life gained and column U reports the cost per life year gained.
From the latter we can see that the cost per life year gained has increased slightly compared with that
using the previous expenditure and mortality data set (i.e., for 2007 and 2007/8/9 respectively): it has
increased from £13,830 to £14,650 for the big four programmes and from £28,983 to £30,883 for all ten
programmes with a mortality-based outcome indicator.
If we assume that the other 13 programmes offer no health gain, then the cost per life year across all PCT
expenditure has increased from £82,765 in 2007/8 to £84,974 in 2008/9.
In addition, Table B11.4 shows that if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the
gain attributable to the remaining 12 programmes is, on average, the same as that attributable to those
with a mortality outcome measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes in 2008/9 is
£33,333. This is a 5% increase on the figure (£31,846) for the previous year.
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Table B11.3: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2008/9 and outcome data for 2008/2009/2010 (assumes zero health gain
for 13 programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
=0.01*C*D =0.01*D*G*H =E/I =I/L =E/M
=0.01*D*
H*P/3 =Q/R =E/Q =E/S
PBC description
Spend (£m)
2008/9
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2008/10
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative
sign)
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Coverage of
mortality
data relative
to spend data
Change in
annual
mortality
adj for
coverage
Cost per life
gained (£) adj
for coverage
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2008/10
Change in
annual life
years lost
Coverage of
mortality
data relative
to spend data
Change in
annual life
years lost
adj for
coverage
Cost per
life year
gained (£)
Cost per life
year gained
adj for
coverage (£)
1 Cancer £4,843 0.525 £25.43 61,899 0.307 99.77 £254,855 0.984 101.39 £250,777 2,170,660 1,166 0.984 1,185 £21,802 £21,454
2 Circulatory problems £6,655 0.648 £43.12 38,075 1.319 325.43 £132,514 0.992 328.06 £131,454 1,285,026 3,661 0.992 3,691 £11,779 £11,685
3 Respiratory problems £3,994 0.652 £26.04 10,660 1.808 125.66 £207,230 0.773 162.56 £160,189 311,034 1,222 0.773 1,581 £21,307 £16,470
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,989 0.456 £18.19 6,015 1.364 37.41 £486,199 0.571 65.52 £277,620 341,884 709 0.571 1,241 £25,662 £14,653
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2008 & mortality 2008/10 £19,481 £112.78 116,649 588.27 £191,716 657.53 £171,552 4,108,604 6,758 7,698 £16,688 £14,650
6 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £18,134 £101.29 118,059 525.37 £192,795 604.62 £167,526 4,161,720 6,197 7,324 £16,345 £13,830
7 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 120,801 665.10 £137,188 761.49 £119,823 4,238,786 7,399 8,604 £12,333 £10,604
8 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
9 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
10 Infectious diseases £1,201 1.545 £18.56 1,828 0.504 14.23 £1,303,576 1.000 14.23 £1,303,576 100,078 260 1.000 260 £71,432 £71,432
11 Endocrine problems £2,222 0.484 £10.75 1,398 1.17 7.92 £1,358,473 0.634 12.49 £861,272 54,779 103 0.634 163 £104,008 £65,941
12 Neurological problems £3,466 0.98 £33.97 711 0.417 2.91 £11,690,226 0.136 21.36 £1,589,871 64,222 87 0.136 643 £388,267 £52,804
13 Genito-urinary problems £3,779 0.697 £26.34 240 1.615 2.70 £9,749,742 0.172 15.71 £1,676,956 8,004 30 0.172 175 £877,038 £150,851
14 Trauma & injuries* £3,255 1.344 £43.75 983 0 0.00 #DIV/0! 0.175 0.00 #DIV/0! 6,881 0 0.175 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
15 Maternity & neonates* £3,978 0.975 £38.79 2,156 0.125 2.63 £14,760,668 8.213 0.32 £121,229,365 479,905 195 0.679 287 £198,939 £135,080
Other six programmes summary:
16 Spend 2008 & mortality 2008/10 £17,901 £172.15 7,316 30.39 £5,665,475 64.11 £2,685,119 713,869 676 1,528 £254,794 £112,674
17 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £16,300 £156.65 7,648 32.85 £4,768,699 102.95 £1,521,610 745,429 571 1,575 £274,309 £99,428
18 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £15,643 £93.29 7,839 16.14 £5,780,723 25.05 £3,724,129 762,991 362 639 £258,046 £146,108
19 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £15,643 £112.13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
20 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
All ten programmes summary:
21 Spend 2008 & mortality 2008/10 £37,382 £284.93 123,965 618.66 £460,562 721.64 £394,836 4,822,473 7,434 9,226 £38,328 £30,883
22 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £34,434 £257.94 125,707 558.22 £462,067 707.57 £364,540 4,907,149 6,768 8,900 £38,110 £28,983
23 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £32,911 £184.53 128,640 681.24 £270,881 786.54 £234,617 5,001,777 7,760 9,243 £23,780 £19,965
24 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £32,911 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
25 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £30,368 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Assume zero health gain in the other 13 programmes
Other 13 programmes summary:
26 Spend 2008 & mortality 2008/10 £41,016 £499.05 0.00 0.00 0 0
27 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £39,223 £478.63 0.00 0.00 0 0
28 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £34,985 £494.43 0.00 0 0
29 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £34,985 £452.78 0.00 0
30 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £33,942 £402.43 0.00 0
All 23 programmes
31 Spend 2008 & mortality 2008/10 £78,398 £783.98 618.66 £1,267,229 721.64 £1,086,385 7,434 9,226 £105,460 £84,974
32 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £73,657 £736.57 558.22 £1,319,496 707.57 £1,040,992 6,768 8,900 £108,829 £82,765
33 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £67,896 £678.96 681.24 £996,655 786.54 £863,228 7,760 9,243 £87,494 £73,457
34 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £67,896 £678.96 971.30 £699,024 10,826 £62,718
35 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £64,310 £643.10 926.22 £694,330 11,322 £56,799
Note: 2008/9 2007/8 2006/7 2005/6 Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G7 & G8 and G17 & G18 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04.
31 All 23 programme spend £78,398 £73,657 £67,896 £64,310 Note that, for expenditure in 2008/9, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
32 % change in budget 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 Note that the adjustment for the coverage of the mortality & YLL data relative to the spend data uses deaths under age 75 in England in 2008.
33 proportionate change 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 Note that the YLL figure for trauma & injuries has been estimated assuming that each death is on average at age 67 so that, on average, 7 years of life are lost per death.
34 Change in budget £783.98 £736.57 £678.96 £643.10 Note that the coverage of the YLL data relative to the spend data for trauma & injuries is assumed to take a value of 1.0 (that is, the ICD coverage is the same).
Note that the YLL for maternity and neonates is estimated as [(6,339 neonate deaths*75years)+(128 maternal deaths*35years)]. This totals 479,905 life years.
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Table B11.4: table showing cost of life and life year estimates using spend data for 2008/9 and outcome data for 2008/2009/2010 (assumes zero health gain
for PBC23 and average gain for other 12 programmes)
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U
=0.01*C*D
=0.01*D*G*
H =E/I =I/L =E/M
=0.01*D*
H*P/3 =Q/R =E/Q =E/S
PBC description
Spend
(£m)
2008/9
Spend
elasticity
Change in
spend (£m)
Annual
mortality,
<75years,
2008/10
Outcome
elasticity
(without
negative
sign)
Change in
annual
mortality
Cost per life
gained (£)
Coverage of
mortality
data relative
to spend data
Change in
annual
mortality
adj for
coverage
Cost per life
gained (£)
adj for
coverage
Total life
years lost,
<75years,
2008/10
Change in
annual life
years lost
Coverage
of
mortality
data
relative to
spend
data
Change in
annual life
years lost
adj for
coverage
Cost per
life year
gained (£)
Cost per life
year gained
adj for
coverage (£)
1 Cancer £4,843 0.525 £25.43 61,899 0.307 99.77 £254,855 0.984 101.39 £250,777 2,170,660 1,166 0.984 1,185 £21,802 £21,454
2 Circulatory problems £6,655 0.648 £43.12 38,075 1.319 325.43 £132,514 0.992 328.06 £131,454 1,285,026 3,661 0.992 3,691 £11,779 £11,685
3 Respiratory problems £3,994 0.652 £26.04 10,660 1.808 125.66 £207,230 0.773 162.56 £160,189 311,034 1,222 0.773 1,581 £21,307 £16,470
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,989 0.456 £18.19 6,015 1.364 37.41 £486,199 0.571 65.52 £277,620 341,884 709 0.571 1,241 £25,662 £14,653
Big four programmes summary:
5 Spend 2008 & mortality 2008/10 £19,481 £112.78 116,649 588.27 £191,716 657.53 £171,552 4,108,604 6,758 7,698 £16,688 £14,650
6 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £18,134 £101.29 118,059 525.37 £192,795 604.62 £167,526 4,161,720 6,197 7,324 £16,345 £13,830
7 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £17,268 £91.24 120,801 665.10 £137,188 761.49 £119,823 4,238,786 7,399 8,604 £12,333 £10,604
8 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £17,268 £114.04 125,290 953.13 £119,650 4,335,559 10,576 £10,783
9 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £17,625 £141.22 125,290 909.96 £155,196 4,516,953 10,986 £12,855
10 Infectious diseases £1,201 1.545 £18.56 1,828 0.504 14.23 £1,303,576 1.000 14.23 £1,303,576 100,078 260 1.000 260 £71,432 £71,432
11 Endocrine problems £2,222 0.484 £10.75 1,398 1.17 7.92 £1,358,473 0.634 12.49 £861,272 54,779 103 0.634 163 £104,008 £65,941
12 Neurological problems £3,466 0.98 £33.97 711 0.417 2.91 £11,690,226 0.136 21.36 £1,589,871 64,222 87 0.136 643 £388,267 £52,804
13 Genito-urinary problems £3,779 0.697 £26.34 240 1.615 2.70 £9,749,742 0.172 15.71 £1,676,956 8,004 30 0.172 175 £877,038 £150,851
14 Trauma & injuries* £3,255 1.344 £43.75 983 0 0.00 #DIV/0! 0.175 0.00 #DIV/0! 6,881 0 0.175 0 #DIV/0! #DIV/0!
15 Maternity & neonates* £3,978 0.975 £38.79 2,156 0.125 2.63 £14,760,668 8.213 0.32 £121,229,365 479,905 195 0.679 287 £198,939 £135,080
Other six programmes summary:
16 Spend 2008 & mortality 2008/10 £17,901 £172.15 7,316 30.39 £5,665,475 64.11 £2,685,119 713,869 676 1,528 £254,794 £112,674
17 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £16,300 £156.65 7,648 32.85 £4,768,699 102.95 £1,521,610 745,429 571 1,575 £274,309 £99,428
18 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £15,643 £93.29 7,839 16.14 £5,780,723 25.05 £3,724,129 762,991 362 639 £258,046 £146,108
19 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £15,643 £112.13 7,923 18.17 £6,172,491 757,531 249 £449,706
20 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £12,743 £99.44 7,923 16.26 £6,115,621 751,009 337 £295,074
All ten programmes summary:
21 Spend 2008 & mortality 2008/10 £37,382 £284.93 123,965 618.66 £460,562 721.64 £394,836 4,822,473 7,434 9,226 £38,328 £30,883
22 Spend 2007 & mortality 2007/9 £34,434 £257.94 125,707 558.22 £462,067 707.57 £364,540 4,907,149 6,768 8,900 £38,110 £28,983
23 Spend 2006 & mortality 2006/8 £32,911 £184.53 128,640 681.24 £270,881 786.54 £234,617 5,001,777 7,760 9,243 £23,780 £19,965
24 Spend 2006 & mortality 2004/6 £32,911 £226.18 133,213 971.30 £232,861 5,093,090 10,826 £20,893
25 Spend 2005 & mortality 2002/4 £30,368 £240.67 133,213 926.22 £259,838 5,267,962 11,322 £21,256
Other 13 PBCs? Assume zero health gain in PBC23
26 PBC23: spend 08, mortality 8/10 £11,663 0.494 £57.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
27 PBC23: spend 07, mortality 7/9 £11,763 0.563 £66.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
28 PBC23: spend 06, mortality 6/8 £10,585 0.739 £78.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
29 PBC23: spend 06, mortality 4/6 £10,585 0.759 £80.34 0.00 0.00
30 PBC23: spend 05, mortality 2/4 £8,449 0.926 £78.24 0.00 0.00
...and that the gain in 10 PBCs (see row 21) applies to the remaining 12 PBCs
31 12 PBCs:spend 08,mortality 8/10 £29,353 £441.43 958.47 £460,562 1,118.02 £394,836 11,517 14,294 £38,328 £30,883
32 12 PBCs: spend 07, mortality 7/9 £27,460 £412.41 892.53 £462,067 1,131.31 £364,540 10,821 14,229 £38,110 £28,983
33 12 PBCs: spend 06, mortality 6/8 £24,400 £416.20 1,536.48 £270,881 1,773.97 £234,617 17,502 20,847 £23,780 £19,965
34 12 PBCs: spend 06, mortality 4/6 £24,400 £372.44 1,599.42 £232,861 17,826 £20,893
35 12 PBCs: spend 05, mortality 2/4 £25,493 £324.20 1,247.69 £259,838 15,252 £21,256
All 23 programmes
36 23 PBCs:spend 08,mortality 8/10 £78,398 £783.98 1,577.13 £497,094 1,839.66 £426,155 18,951 23,520 £41,369 £33,333
37 23 PBCs: spend 07, mortality 7/9 £73,657 £736.57 1,450.75 £507,717 1,838.88 £400,554 17,590 23,129 £41,875 £31,846
38 23 PBCs: spend 06, mortality 6/8 £67,896 £678.96 2,217.72 £306,153 2,560.50 £265,167 25,262 30,090 £26,876 £22,565
39 23 PBCs: spend 06, mortality 4/6 £67,896 £678.96 2,570.72 £264,113 28,652 £23,697
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40 23 PBCs: spend 05, mortality 2/4 £64,310 £643.10 2,173.90 £295,827 26,575 £24,200
Note: 2008/9 2007/8 2006/7 2005/6
35 All 23 programme spend £78,398 £73,657 £67,896 £64,310
36 % change in budget 1.00 1.00 1.00 1
37 proportionate change 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
38 Change in budget £783.98 £736.57 £678.96 £643.10
Note that the annual mortality figures reported in cells G7 & G8 and G17 & G18 are identical because we do not have mortality data for 2002/04.
Note that the coverage of the YLL data relative to the spend data for trauma & injuries is assumed to take a value of 1.0 (that is, the ICD coverage is the same).
Note that, for expenditure in 2007/8, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
Note that the adjustment for the coverage of the mortality data relative to the spend data uses deaths under age 75 in England in 2008.
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B11.4 Comparing the cost of life year estimates associated with different data sets
Table B11.5 presents expenditure and outcome elasticities for the five combinations of expenditure and
outcome data that have been used to estimate our model. It also reports the corresponding unadjusted
cost of life year estimates (i.e., estimates that are unadjusted for the mismatch in the ICD10 coverage of
the expenditure and mortality data). It is clear from this Table (see row 13) that the (unadjusted) cost of a
life year for the ten programmes with a mortality based outcome indicator fluctuated around £22,000 for
the first three sets of estimations (see columns M-O). However, using the two most recent sets of
expenditure data (i.e., for 2007/8 and then for 2008/9), the figures in the table suggest that this cost has
increased to about £38,000.
What are the proximate causes of this increase? Recall that the cost of a life year is calculated as
the change in expenditure associated with a 1% budget increase
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------.
the change in the number of life years lost associated with this increase
For 2006/7 (using mortality data for 2006/7/8) and for the ten programmes with a mortality based
outcome indicator, the change in expenditure associated with a 1% budget increase is £184.53m and the
change in the number of life years lost associated with this increase is 7,760 (see Table B8.21 in the
appendix for the calculation of these figures). Thus the cost of a life year is £23,780 (=£184.53m/7,760).
For 2007/8 (using mortality data for 2007/8/9) and for the ten programmes with a mortality based
outcome indicator, the change in expenditure associated with a 1% budget increase is £257.94m and the
change in the number of life years lost associated with this increase is 6,768 (see Table B10.3 in the
appendix for the calculation of these figures). Thus the cost of a life year is £38,110 (=£257.94m/6,768).
It is clear that the 60% increase in the cost of a life year between 2006/7 and 2007/8 is largely attributable
(a) to the 40% increase in the additional expenditure (up from £184.53m to £257.94m) directed towards
these ten programmes following a 1% budget increase and (b) to the 12% decline in the number of life
years gained associated with this increase in expenditure (down from 7,760 to 6,768 life years).
The rise in the share of the budget increase directed towards these programmes can be attributed to the
increase in the implied expenditure elasticity associated with these ten programmes (up from 0.561 to
0.749). The decrease in the number of years of life gained appears to be due (a) to an overall reduction in
the (absolute) size of the outcome elasticities and (b) to a shift in the additional expenditure towards those
programmes with a relatively high cost of a life year. For example, the cost of a life year for the small six
programmes is much larger than for the big four programmes. However, in 2007/8 the spend elasticity
for the small six increases from 0.561 to 0.961 (71%) while the expenditure elasticity for the big four rises
from 0.528 to 0.559 (6%). A similar pattern  of additional expenditure shifting away from the low cost
PBCs  can be seen within the big four programmes. However, it is not clear why such rather dramatic
changes should have taken place.
Table B11.6 presents cost of life year estimates (adjusted for the mismatch in the ICD10 coverage of the
expenditure and mortality data) for various combinations of programmes. These reveal similar increases
in the cost of a life year between 2006/7 on the one hand and 2007/8 and 2008/9 on the other. The cost
of a life year increased from £19,965 in 2006/7 to £28,983 in 2007/8 for the ten programmes with
mortality rate, an increase of 45%; and it increased from £22,565 to £31,846 for all programmes if we
assume a zero health gain in PBC23 and the same gain in the other 12 programmes as in the ten with a
mortality rate (an increase of 41%).
One reason for this apparent step change in the cost of a life year might be the adjustment that was made
to the methodology for the collection of the 2007/8 programme budgeting data. In previous years
expenditure that was not directly attributable to a particular programme category was apportioned using
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admitted patient care percentages.36 In other words, if x% of total admitted patient care expenditure was
allocated to PBC 1, then x% of all expenditure that was not directly attributable to a particular
programme category was also allocated to PBC 1. With effect from 2007/8, however, NHS organisations
were asked to select an appropriate basis for the apportionment of this non-programme specific
expenditure and that, where no reasonable basis existed, such expenditure was to be allocated to the
Other  Miscellaneous (PBC 23X) category.
The Department of Health estimates that this allocation rule change increased the amount of expenditure
attributed to PBC 23X by £700 million. It will also, of course, have reduced expenditure across other
programmes by the same amount in total. However, not all programmes will have been equally affected;
PBCs that are more heavily inpatient based would have lost expenditure while others, such as learning
disabilities, social care, and mental health, will have lost considerably less. In addition, not all PCTs will
have been equally affected because each will have employed different apportionment rules for the non-
programme specific expenditure. [38]
Although this allocation rule change has considerably increased the estimated cost of a life year, we
believe that this rule change has led to a more accurate allocation of expenditure across PBCs, and that
the more recent estimates of the cost of a life year (for 2007/8 and 2008/9) are more accurate than those
for the earlier years (for 2005/6 and 2006/7).
36Expenditure on, for example, community care, A&E, ambulance services, and outpatients can be difficult to
attribute a particular PBC. Critical care, rehabilitation, and specialised commissioning across care settings will also
be difficult to attribute to a particular programme.
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B11.5 Adjusting the cost of a life year estimates to constant prices
The cost of a life year estimates presented above are all at current prices. To put them on a constant
price basis, we need an index of pay and price inflation for the labour and goods/services purchased by
the NHS. Curtis [41] reports a pay and prices index for Hospital and Community Health Services and
this implies an inflation rate of 3.7% in 2006/7, 2.9% in 2007/8, and 3.9% in 2008/9.37 If we assume that
similar inflation rates also apply to the purchase of pharmaceuticals and the provision of primary care
(items that are excluded from the HCHS index), then we can use these figures to put the cost of a life
year estimates on a constant price basis.
For example, if we assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the gain attributable to the 12
programmes without a mortality indicator is, on average, the same as that attributable to those with a
mortality outcome measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes in 2008/9 is £33,333 at
current (2008/9) prices. The cost for 2007/8 is £31,846 at current (2007/8) prices or £33,088 at constant
(2008/9) prices, and the figure for 2006/7 is £22,565 at current (2006/7) prices or £24,125 at constant
(2008/9) prices. The conversion of the costs from a current to constant price basis has relatively little
impact because the inflation rate over the relevant period is quite small.
B11.6 Summary and conclusion
In this section we have estimated outcome and expenditure models using PB data for 2008/9 and
mortality data for 2008/9/10. The cost of an additional life year for all ten programmes with a mortality
based outcome is £30,883. This is similar to the comparable figure (£28,983) for the previous year (i.e.,
using expenditure data for 2007/8 and mortality data for 2007/2008/2009). If we assume that PBC23
generates a zero health gain and that the gain attributable to the 12 programmes without a mortality
indicator is, on average, the same as that attributable to those with a mortality outcome measure, then the
cost of a life year across all programmes in 2008/9 is £33,333 and this too is similar to the figure for the
previous year (£31,846).
We have also identified a pay and prices index that can be used to put the estimated costs on a constant
price basis. This index has recorded an annual inflation rate of about 3.5% since 2005/6.
There appears to have been a step change in the cost of an additional life year. The cost of a life year
estimates are very similar up to and including 2006/7, and they are very similar for 2007/8 and 2008/9.
However, there is a substantial difference between the figures for 2004/5, 2005/6 and 2006/7 on the one
hand, and for 2007/8 and 2008/9 on the other. The reason for this step change is not obvious but it
might be due to changes in the algorithm used by the Department of Health to allocate non-admitted
patient care activity to budget categories. Although this allocation rule change has considerably increased
the estimated cost of a life year, we believe that this rule change has led to a more accurate allocation of
expenditure across PBCs, and that the more recent estimates of the cost of a life year (for 2007/8 and
2008/9) are more accurate than those for the earlier years (for 2005/6 and 2006/7).
37
With the index for 1987/8 set equal to 100, then 2005/6=240.9, 2006/7=249.8, 2007/8=257.0, and
2008/9=267.0 (Curtis, 2011, p209).
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Table B11.5: table showing expenditure and outcome elasticities for five combinations of expenditure and outcome data, and corresponding
(unadjusted) cost of life year estimates
A B C D E F G H I J
K L M N O P Q
spend elasticities outcome elasticities cost of an additional life year (unadjusted for YLL coverage)
PBC description
(a) using
spend for
2005 and
mortality
for 2002/4
(b) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2004/6
(c) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2006/8
(d) using
spend for
2007 and
mortality
for 2007/9
(e) using
spend for
2008 and
mortality
for
2008/10
(a) using
spend for
2005 and
mortality
for 2002/4
(b) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2004/6
(c) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2006/8
(d) using
spend for
2007 and
mortality
for 2007/9
(e) using
spend for
2008 and
mortality
for
2008/10
(a) using
spend for
2005 and
mortality
for 2002/4
(b) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2004/6
(c) using
spend for
2006 and
mortality
for 2006/8
(d) using
spend for
2007 and
mortality
for 2007/9
(e) using
spend for
2008 and
mortality
for 2008/10
1 Cancer 0.968 0.548 0.465 0.890 0.525 -0.394 -0.337 -0.342 -0.365 -0.307 £13,741 £16,518 £16,383 £17,165 £21,802
2 Circulatory problems 0.682 0.701 0.540 0.293 0.648 -1.370 -1.447 -1.434 -1.277 -1.319 £8,328 £8,725 £9,466 £11,315 £11,779
3 Respiratory problems 0.849 0.718 0.679 0.536 0.652 -1.574 -3.507 -2.622 -2.205 -1.808 £20,601 £8,747 £11,593 £14,798 £21,307
4 Gastro-intestinal problems 0.772 0.667 0.446 0.622 0.456 -2.018 -2.137 -1.536 -1.328 -1.364 £18,303 £15,795 £20,892 £25,034 £25,662
5 All big four PBCs 0.801 0.660 0.528 0.559 0.579 -0.941 -1.083 -0.965 -0.872 -0.825 £12,855 £10,783 £12,333 £16,345 £16,688
6 Infectious diseases 0.742 0.731 0.792 1.436 1.545 -0.152 -0.030 -0.047 -0.548 -0.504 £215,054 £1,036,377 £630,798 £57,742 £71,432
7 Endocrine problems 0.425 0.966 0.953 0.264 0.484 -0.244 -0.812 -0.842 -0.566 -1.170 £371,601 £112,882 £114,416 £190,745 £104,008
8 Neurological problems 1.111 0.648 0.616 1.035 0.98 -0.182 -0.098 -0.112 -0.339 -0.417 £503,201 £1,241,253 £1,129,960 £431,749 £388,267
9 Genito-urinary problems 1.041 0.837 0.912 1.004 0.697 -0.034 -0.073 -0.051 -1.855 -1.615 £29,144,918 £12,384,965 £20,421,090 £652,096 £877,038
10 Trauma & injuries* 0.627 0.617 0.358 1.686 1.344 -1.332 -0.527 0 -0.369 0 £282,132 £548,767 n/a £1,115,197 n/a
11 Maternity & neonates* 0.388 0.601 0.224 0.514 0.975 -0.237 -0.035 -0.482 -0.110 -0.125 £17,490 £631,700 £45,158 £204,168 £198,939
12 All small six PBCs 0.780 0.717 0.596 0.961 0.962 -0.262 -0.122 -0.392 -0.254 -0.300 £295,074 £449,706 £258,046 £274,309 £254,794
13 All 10 PBCs with mortality 0.792 0.687 0.561 0.749 0.762 -0.844 -0.940 -0.877 -0.778 -0.747 £21,256 £20,893 £23,780 £38,110 £38,328
14 All 23 PBCs assuming zero gain in PBCs without mortality indicator £56,799 £62,718 £87,494 £108,829 £105,460
15 GMS/PMS 0.926 0.759 0.739 0.563 0.494 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
16 All 23 PBCs assuming zero gain in PBC 23 but average gain in other PBCs without a mortality indicator £24,200 £23,697 £26,876 £41,875 £41,369
Notes:
LWKDWWKHVSHQGDQGRXWFRPHHODVWLFLWLHVUHSRUWHGIRUJURXSVRISURJUDPPHVDUHWKHLPSOLHGHODVWLFLWHVFDOFXODWHGIURPWKHWRWDOVIRUWKHUHOHYDQWLQGLYLGXDOSURJUDPPHVLHJURXSVSHQGHODVWLFLW\ 3%&VSHQG3%&VSHQGHODVWLFLW\3%&VSHQGDQG
JURXSRXWFRPHHODVWLFLW\ 3%&PRUWDOLW\3%&RXWFRPHHODVWLFLW\3%&PRUWDOLW\)RUWKHSXUSRVHRIWKHFDOFXODWLRQRIWKHLPSOLHGJURXSRXWFRPHHODVWLFLW\ZHKDYHXVHGWKH\HDUVRIOLIHORVWDVWKHPRUWDOLW\LQGLFDWRU7KHLPSOLHGJURXSHODVWLFLWLHVDUH
directly comparable with the individual programme elasticities as both exclude the impact of the relevant budget elasticities. The implied group elasticities cannot be used to calculate directly the cost of a life (year) for a group of PBCs. Instead, the latter should
be calculated by summing across the change in spend and the change in mortality for the individual PBCs within the group.
(ii) for each individual programme: the cost of an additional life year = expenditure elasticity*annual spend/(expenditure elasticity*outcome elasticity*annual life years lost)
LLLIRUDJURXSRISURJUDPPHVWKHRYHUDOOFRVWRIDQDGGLWLRQDOOLIH\HDU DQQXDOVSHQGVSHQGHODVWLFLW\VSHQGHODVWLFLW\RXWFRPHHODVWLFLW\DQQXDOOLIH\HDUVORVW
(iv) that the results using expenditure for 2006/7 and mortality for 2004/6 incorporate MFFs for HCHS and prescribing (see Tables B8.17 and B8.18).
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Table B11.6: table showing adjusted cost of life year estimates for various combinations of programmes
A B C D E
Cost per life year
Programme budgeting category (adjusted for ICD10 coverage of spend and mortality data)
2006/7 2007/8 2008/9
1 Cancer £16,121 £16,891 £21,454
2 Circulatory disease £9,390 £11,224 £11,685
3 Respiratory problems £8,961 £11,439 £16,470
4 Gastro-intestinal problems £11,929 £14,295 £14,653
5 All big four programmes £10,604 £13,830 £14,650
6 Other six programme with a mortality rate £146,108 £99,428 £112,674
7 All ten PBCs with a mortality rate £19,965 £28,983 £30,883
(a) If we assume a zero health gain in those PBCs without a mortality rate
8 All 23 programmes £73,457 £82,765 £84,974
or (b) if we assume a zero gain in PBC23 and that the average gain from the
the 10 PBCs with a mortality rate is applied to the remaining programmes
9 All 23 programmes £22,565 £31,846 £33,333
Note that the figures for 2006/7 relate to the use of mortality for 2006/2007/2008 combined.
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B12. Summary and concluding remarks
The findings presented in this report build on four previous studies[2-5]. These studies and the results
presented here draw on the availability of two new data sets to obtain empirical estimates of the
relationship between mortality and expenditure across all English local health authorities.
In this research we have extended the previous studies in several ways. First, we have derived plausible
outcome and expenditure models for a larger number of programmes (ten) than previous studies. The
cost of a life year across all ten programmes with a mortality based outcome indicator using expenditure
data for 2006/7 and mortality data for 2004/5/6 is £20,893.
Second, we relate expenditure in time period t to mortality in that period (t) and in the next two periods
(t+1 and t+2). In other words, we assume that the health benefits associated with expenditure occur
either in the same period as the expenditure or in the next two periods. This is an improvement on past
practice where data constraints forced researchers to relate expenditure to the current and two previous
periods. When we re-estimated our models having replaced mortality data for 2004/5/6 with that the
2006/7/8, we found that the cost of a life year across the ten programmes with a mortality based
outcome indicator using expenditure data for 2006/7 is £23,780 (up from £20,893, an increase of 14%).
Third, we have noted the mismatch in the ICD10 coverage of the expenditure and mortality data. If we
adjust the calculation of the cost of a life year for 2006/7 for this mismatch then the cost of a life year
across the ten programmes with a mortality based outcome indicator declines from £23,780 to £19,965 (a
decrease of 16%).
Fourth, previous estimates of the cost of a life year have been for individual programmes of care. In this
report we have presented estimates of the cost of a life year for an enlarged number of programmes and,
with the aid of assumptions about the productivity (health gain) of programmes without a meaningful
mortality-based outcome indicator, we have extended our individual programme estimates to incorporate
expenditure across all programmes of care. Thus for 2006/7, the cost of a life year for those PBCs with a
mortality based outcome indicator is £19,965. If we assume that (a) that the health gain associated with
PBC23, which includes primary care and workforce training expenditure, are reflected in the mortality
rates for disease specific programmes and (b) that the average health gain across the other programmes
without a mortality based outcome indicator is the same as that for those PBCs with a mortality based
outcome indicator, then the cost of life year across all programmes is £22,565.
Fifth, we have extended our cost of life year estimates beyond 2006/7. Re-estimation of our model using
budgeting expenditure for 2007/8 generates an all programme cost of a life year estimate of £31,846, and
re-estimation of our model using budgeting expenditure for 2008/9 generates a similar cost of a life year
estimate (£33,333). Together, the last two estimates suggest that there has been step change in the cost of
a life year, and that this appears to have occurred between 2006/7 and 2007/8. The cost of a life year
estimates are very similar up to and including 2006/7, and they are very similar for 2007/8 and 2008/9.
However, there is a substantial difference between the figures for 2004/5, 2005/6 and 2006/7 on the one
hand (at about £22k), and for 2007/8 and 2008/9 on the other (at about £33k). The reason for this step
change is not obvious but it might be due to changes in the algorithm used by the Department of Health
to allocate non-admitted patient care activity to budget categories. Although this allocation rule change
has considerably increased the estimated cost of a life year, we believe that this rule change has led to a
more accurate allocation of expenditure across PBCs, and that the more recent estimates of the cost of a
life year (for 2007/8 and 2008/9) are more accurate than those for the earlier years (for 2005/6 and
2006/7).
Virtually all of the cost of a life year estimates presented in this report are at current prices. However, it is
possible to put them on a constant price basis using the Hospital and Community Health Services pay
and prices index [41]. For 2006/7, 2007/8 and 2008/9 this index recorded an annual rate of inflation of
about 3.5% and so the impact of this constant price adjustment is fairly minimal. For example, if we
assume that PBC23 generates a zero health gain and that the gain attributable to the 12 programmes
without a mortality indicator is, on average, the same as that attributable to those with a mortality
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outcome measure, then the cost of a life year across all programmes at constant 2008/9 prices is £33,333
for 2008/9, £33,088 for 2007/8, and £24,125 for 2006/7.
Finally, although previous results and our current models pass the appropriate statistical tests and, in
particular, the Hansen-Sargen test for valid instruments, we are aware that this test might be unable to
detect the presence of invalid instruments in some (albeit rather restrictive) circumstances. Responding
to this, several studies have suggested that researchers using IV techniques should subject the estimated
coefficient on the endogenous variable to a sensitivity analysis. We do precisely this for the outcome
equation for each of the big four models. This sensitivity analysis reveals that uncertainty associated with
instrument validity has little effect on our estimate of the cost of a life year but it does increase the degree
of uncertainty associated with this estimate.
We recognize that this study has a number of limitations. The cost of an additional life year estimates for
those programmes with a mortality-based outcome indicator are unadjusted for the quality of life during
the additional year; the quoted costs will be an under-estimate of the QALY-adjusted cost of a life year to
the extent that additional life years are not in perfect health. In previous studies we have noted that a
rudimentary adjustment for this issue using HODaR data increased the cost of a life year by about 50% to
60%.[2, 5]
At the same time, however, the estimated costs will exaggerate the cost of an additional QALY-adjusted
year for those programmes with a mortality-based outcome indicator because they ignore any health
benefits that are not associated with a reduction in mortality. In other words, expenditure that improves
the quality of life (e.g., cancer palliative care) but which does not extend the length of life is implicitly
given a zero health gain value.
In addition, the expenditure data relates to expenditure on all patients whereas the mortality data is based
on a life expectancy of 75 years. Thus implicitly our calculations attribute a zero health gain to all
expenditure on those aged over 75. To illustrate the magnitude of the potential health gain ignored by
this restriction, note that in a recent study of costs associated with all inpatient and outpatient activity
(excluding mental health), those aged over 75 years accounted for 25% of all costs in 2007/8[34] for
details of this study).
Moreover, our cost of a life year estimates are based on the assumption that any Departmental budgetary
change falls entirely on PCTs. Although PCTs account for most of the Department of Healths budget,
non-PCTs still accounted for 15% of the budget in 2006/7. Because we have no information on how any
budgetary change would be split between PCTs and non-PCTs, we have assumed that that any
Departmental budgetary change falls entirely on PCTs. If, on the other hand, the non-PCT budget is
responsive to changes in the Departments budget then our cost of a life year estimates will be too low. If
the non-PCT budget is as responsive as the PCT budget, then our cost of a life year estimate for 2006/7
will be increased by 17.7% (that is, from £22,565 to £26,553).
The results presented in this study are all from the estimation of the relationship between expenditure and
mortality using data for a single time period. With the availability of several years of data for both
expenditure and mortality, we wanted to estimate a panel data model because a panel can offer advantages
over a one period model (e.g., it is better able to handle any unobserved heterogeneity across PCTs).
However, most of the instruments employed here are based on the 2001 Census and thus estimation of a
panel model will not be possible until these instruments become time variant; this should occur later this
year with release of the 2011 Census data at PCT level. This is one piece of work that we intend to
pursue in the near future.
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Annex
Table BA.1: table showing national (all PCT) expenditure per head (£) and growth in expenditure (%) by PBC group and sub-group, 2003/4 - 2008/9
PBC # PBC description
Spend
(£)
Spend
(£)
Spend
(£)
Spend
(£)
Spend
(£)
Growth
%
Spend
(£)
Growth
%
per
head
per
head
per
head
per
head
per
head
per
head
2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2007/8 2008/9 2008/9
1 Infectious Diseases 17.95 20.22 23.61 20.88 22.08 6 23.46 6
1a HIV and AIDS 7.39 8.54 16 10.36 21
1x Infectious diseases (Other) 13.49 13.54 0 13.10 -3
2 Cancers and Tumours 64.95 75.54 83.24 81.67 90.21 10 94.55 5
2a Cancer, Head and Neck 2.83 2.65 -6 2.72 3
2b Cancer, Upper GI 4.05 4.38 8 4.73 8
2c Cancer, Lower GI 6.46 6.71 4 7.47 11
2d Cancer, Lung 3.89 4.28 10 4.48 5
2e Cancer, Skin 1.88 2.05 9 2.05 0
2f Cancer, Breast 7.39 8.35 13 9.34 12
2g Cancer, Gynaecological 2.97 2.93 -1 3.05 4
2h Cancer, Urological 7.76 7.84 1 8.17 4
2i Cancer, Haematological 8.40 9.22 10 9.47 3
2x Cancers and Tumours (Other) 36.04 41.79 16 43.07 3
3 Disorders of Blood 14.08 17.00 17.48 16.58 19.44 17 19.50 0
4 Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic 28.96 31.86 37.26 36.70 39.39 7 43.38 10
4a Diabetes 17.76 19.44 9 21.73 12
4b Endocrine, Nutritional and Metabolic 6.95 7.47 8 7.96 6
4x Other Endocrine, Nutritional, Metabolic 11.99 12.48 4 13.69 10
5 Mental Health Disorders 133.31 146.83 158.95 166.53 180.90 9 191.21 6
5a Substance Misuse 13.81 15.76 14 17.81 13
5b Organic Mental Disorders 14.24 14.83 4 17.39 17
5c Psychotic Disorders 23.84 31.19 31 33.69 8
5d Child and Adolescent Mental Health 12.13 12.15 0 13.33 10
5x Other Mental Health Disorders 102.51 106.97 4 108.99 2
6 Problems of Learning Disability 37.93 43.37 46.54 48.36 54.20 12 56.11 4
7 Neurological 29.83 35.09 41.06 55.27 62.43 13 67.64 8
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7a Chronic Pain 19.31 22.12 15 22.79 3
7x Neurological (Other) 35.96 40.31 12 44.85 11
8 Problems of Vision 24.61 27.65 28.24 26.97 30.69 14 32.95 7
9 Problems of Hearing 5.73 6.32 6.27 6.21 8.07 30 8.16 1
10 Problems of Circulation 110.12 122.37 124.28 122.06 124.77 2 129.94 4
10a Coronary Heart Disease 38.91 40.32 4 41.20 2
10b Cerebrovascular disease 16.05 17.30 8 19.35 12
10c Problems of Rhythm 7.22 8.21 14 8.43 3
10x Problems of circulation (Other) 59.88 58.95 -2 60.96 3
11 Problems of the Respiratory System 54.60 62.71 69.56 65.07 67.68 4 77.97 15
11a Obstructive Airways Disease 10.64 10.64 0 12.70 19
11b Asthma 14.04 15.73 12 16.99 8
11x Problems of the respiratory system, other 40.40 41.31 2 48.27 17
12 Dental Problems 10.78 13.55 24.91 51.93 59.45 14 62.44 5
13 Problems of Gastro Intestinal System 63.56 73.22 81.30 73.30 75.05 2 77.89 4
13a Upper GI 19.88 19.51 -2 19.89 2
13b Lower GI 20.46 21.92 7 22.63 3
13c Hepatobiliary 11.26 12.23 9 12.90 5
13x Problmes of the gastro intestinal system 21.69 21.39 -1 22.46 5
14 Problems of the Skin 20.98 24.90 26.84 28.31 30.41 7 32.34 6
14a Burns 1.08 1.56 44 1.02 -34
14x Problems of the Skin 27.23 28.86 6 31.32 9
15 Problems of Musculo Skeletal System 61.36 71.72 74.74 66.75 75.91 14 79.68 5
16 Problems due to Trauma and Injuries 62.31 72.13 76.41 57.29 57.56 0 63.54 10
17 Problems of Genito Urinary System 55.32 62.38 67.38 68.98 67.83 -2 73.78 9
17a Genital tract problems 19.33 18.80 -3 19.36 3
17b Renal problems 21.54 19.74 -8 22.29 13
17c STD 4.26 4.71 10 5.43 15
17x Problems of Genito Urinary system, other 23.85 24.58 3 26.69 9
18 Maternity and Reproductive Health 52.28 55.04 60.42 57.64 57.09 -1 60.44 6
19 Conditions of Neonates 11.72 13.93 13.42 13.17 15.15 15 17.23 14
20 Adverse effects and poisoning 9.68 12.32 14.25 14.59 15.84 9 18.31 16
20a Unintended consequences of treatment 10.54 12.14 15 12.96 7
20b Poisoning 2.13 2.44 15 2.91 19
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20c Violence 0.47 0.49 3 1.75 258
20x Poisoning and adverse effects 1.45 0.77 -47 0.70 -9
21 Healthy Individuals 20.29 22.77 26.18 26.85 31.44 17 35.74 14
21a NSF Prevention programme 2.30 3.75 63 4.82 29
21b NSF Mental health prevention 0.17 0.47 176 0.46 -2
21x Healthy Individuals (Other) 24.38 27.22 12 30.46 12
22 Social Care Needs 24.81 30.93 33.59 30.29 35.29 17 36.58 4
23 Other 136.94 157.75 171.82 209.70 232.02 11 227.71 -2
23a GMS/PMS 141.42 147.53 4 145.26 -2
23b Training (WDCs) 0.60 0.30 -49 0.24 -21
23x Miscellaneous 67.67 84.19 24 82.20 -2
1 to 23 All PBCs 1052.12 1199.60 1307.76 1345.10 1452.91 8 1530.59 5
Notes:
(i) The population figures for 2003/4, 2004/5 and 2005/6 are identical (the total for England is 49,175,998).
(ii) The corresponding figure for 2006/7 is 50,476,231, for 2007/8 it is 50,695,989, and for 2008/9 it is 51,220,531.
(iii) The spend per head figures are calculated by summing expenditure across all PCTs and dividing by the national population.
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Table BA.2: table showing set of socio-economic indicators available as potential instruments in the IV estimation
Indicator name Short description Long description
BORNEXEU
Residents born outside the European
Union
Residents born outside the European Union divided by all residents (census cell definition:
KS005008/KS005001)
WHITEEG Population in white ethnic group
Population in white ethnic group divided by total population
(KS006002+KS006003+KS006004)/KS006001
PCWALLTI Population of working age with illness
Proportion of population of working age with limiting long term illness aged 16-74
(KS008003/KS09A001)
POPPUCAR Unpaid care providers in population Proportion of population providing unpaid care (KS008007/KS008001)
POPPUCA1
Unpaid care (<20 hrs week) in
population Proportion of population providing unpaid care of 1-19 hours a week (KS008008/KS008001)
POPPUCA2 Unpaid care (20-49 hrs) in population
Proportion of population providing unpaid care for 20-49 hours per week
(KS008009/KS008001)
POPPUCA3
Unpaid care (>50 hrs week) in
population Proportion of population providing unpaid care for over 50 hours week (KS008007/KS008001)
NQUAL174
Proportion aged 16-74 with no
qualifications Proportion of population aged 16-74 with no qualifications (KS013002/KS013001
FTSTUDEN Proportion aged 16-74 full-time students
Proportion of population aged 16-74 that are full-time students
((KS013008+KS013009)/KS013001)
HHNOCAR Households without a car Proportion of households without a car (KS017002/KS017001)
OWNOCC Owner occupied households
Proportion of households that are owner occupied
(KS018002+KS018003+KS018004)/KS018001)
LAHARENT Rented social housing Proportion of households that are rented from LA or HA ((KS018005+KS018006)/KS018001)
PRIVRENT Rented private housing Proportion of households that are rented from private landlords (KS018007/KS018001)
LONEPENH Lone pensioner households Proportion of households that are one pensioner households (KS020002/KS020001)
LONEPARH Lone parent households
Proportion of households that are lone parent households with dependent children
(KS020011/KS020001)
PERMSICK Permanently sick of those aged 16-74 Proportion of population aged 16-74 that are permanently sick (KS09A010/KS09A001)
PC74LTUN
Long-term unemployed of those aged
16-74 Proportion of those aged 16-74 that are long-term unemployed (KS09A015/KS09A001)
WORKAGRI Employed in agriculture
Proportion of those aged 16-74 in employment that are working agriculture
(KS11A002/KS11A001)
PROFOCCU People in professional occupations
Proportion of those aged 16-74 in managerial and professional occupations
((KS14A002+KS14A003+KS14A004)/KS14A001)
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Table BA.3: table showing first stage regressions for outcome models associated with 2005/6 expenditure and mortality data for 2002/3/4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 16 PBC 19
cancer circulation respiratory gastro-intestinal trauma neonates
2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6
outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model
instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend
unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted
VARIABLES first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage
need per head 0.406*** 1.173*** 1.533*** 0.970*** 0.727**
[0.097] [0.235] [0.401] [0.243] [0.289]
lone pensioner households 0.593*** 0.229*** -0.118 0.045 0.561***
[0.109] [0.084] [0.112] [0.093] [0.108]
provision of unpaid care -0.013 0.374*** 0.574*** -0.148
[0.135] [0.115] [0.089] [0.132]
IMD 2000 -0.152*** -0.247*** -0.047 -0.016
[0.056] [0.069] [0.060] [0.074]
white ethnic group -0.007
[0.067]
permanently sick 0.192**
[0.085]
low birth weight births 0.393
[0.308]
lone parent households 0.034
[0.209]
no qualifications -0.599***
[0.148]
long-term unemployed 0.394***
[0.122]
LA/HA rented accommodation 0.283**
[0.127]
Constant -1.373*** -0.311 -1.562*** -0.959*** -1.780*** -2.797***
[0.304] [0.244] [0.344] [0.192] [0.260] [0.433]
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 294
R-squared 0.297 0.629 0.434 0.571 0.396 0.197
Note: these are the first-stage regressions for the IV models reported in Table B7.4. Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table BA.4: table showing first stage regressions for expenditure models associated with 2005/6 expenditure and mortality data for 2002/3/4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 7 PBC 16 PBC 23
cancer circulation respiratory gastro-intestinal neurological trauma GMS/PMS
2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6 2005/6
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted unweighted
VARIABLES first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage
no qualifications 0.240***
[0.038]
lone pensioner households -0.686*** -0.244*** -0.234*** -0.266*** -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.129***
[0.067] [0.052] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.049] [0.038]
private rented housing 0.072***
[0.017]
work in agriculture -0.006
[0.008]
PCT budget per head -0.146 -0.003 -0.077 -0.022 -0.077 -0.077 0.043
[0.117] [0.074] [0.070] [0.070] [0.070] [0.070] [0.069]
no car households 0.092**
[0.039]
lone parent households 0.171***
[0.035]
permanently sick 0.125***
[0.027]
need per head 1.933*** 0.651*** 0.875*** 0.597*** 0.875*** 0.875***
[0.110] [0.157] [0.175] [0.157] [0.175] [0.175]
white ethnic group 0.197***
[0.038]
provision of unpaid care -0.371*** -0.153** -0.217*** -0.217*** -0.217***
[0.071] [0.065] [0.055] [0.055] [0.055]
IMD 2000 0.056* 0.128*** 0.179*** 0.128*** 0.128***
[0.033] [0.038] [0.035] [0.038] [0.038]
Constant 2.562*** 4.103*** 4.851*** 5.114*** 4.851*** 4.851*** 7.361***
[0.159] [0.140] [0.109] [0.082] [0.109] [0.109] [0.139]
Observations 295 295 295 295 295 295 295
R-squared 0.804 0.680 0.858 0.849 0.858 0.858 0.881
Note: these are the first-stage regressions for the IV models reported in Table B7.5. Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table BA.5: table showing first stage regressions for outcome and expenditure models associated with 2006/7 expenditure and mortality data for
2004/5/6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13
cancer cancer circulation circulation respiratory respiratory gastro gastro
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model
uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR uses SYLLR
instrument
spend
instrument
o/calls
instrument
spend
instrument
o/calls
instrument
spend
instrument
o/calls
instrument
spend
instrument
o/calls
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage
CARAN need CARAN need CARAN need CARAN need CARAN need CARAN need CARAN need CARAN need
VARIABLES 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs
need CARAN per head 1.162*** 1.602*** 1.539*** 0.606*** 1.026*** 0.836*** 1.292*** 0.938***
[0.250] [0.126] [0.323] [0.141] [0.368] [0.175] [0.358] [0.167]
need CARAN per head squared 0.912
[0.666]
lone pensioner households 0.383*** -0.431*** 0.321*** -0.221***
[0.134] [0.073] [0.111] [0.067]
IMD 2007 -0.153** -0.247*** 0.117*** 0.104** -0.115 0.107***
[0.074] [0.087] [0.037] [0.043] [0.094] [0.041]
PCT budget per head 0.120 0.183* 0.077 -0.020
[0.124] [0.094] [0.084] [0.093]
provision of unpaid care -0.410*** 0.097 -0.309*** 0.373* -0.325***
[0.088] [0.197] [0.090] [0.215] [0.078]
white ethnic group -0.060
[0.082]
permanently sick 0.681**
[0.269]
long-term unemployed -0.123***
[0.035]
limiting long-term illness -0.785*
[0.449]
Constant 5.586*** 3.074*** 6.387*** 3.790*** 3.906*** 4.501*** 5.496*** 5.119***
[0.235] [0.887] [0.363] [0.703] [0.474] [0.595] [0.314] [0.657]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
R-squared 0.438 0.846 0.623 0.814 0.623 0.840 0.554 0.827
Note: these are the first-stage regressions for the IV models reported in Table B8.16. Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table BA.6: table showing first stage regressions for outcome and expenditure models associated with 2006/7 expenditure and mortality data for
2006/7/8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13
cancer cancer circulation circulation respiratory respiratory gastro gastro
2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7 2006/7
outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model outcome model spend model
SYLLR 2006/8 SYLLR 2006/8 SYLLR 2006/8 SYLLR 2006/8 SYLLR 2006/8 SYLLR 2006/8 SYLLR 2006/8 SYLLR 2006/8
instrument
spend
instrument
o/calls
instrument
spend
instrument
o/calls
instrument
spend
instrument
o/calls
instrument
spend
instrument
o/calls
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage
VARIABLES 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs 2 MFFs
need CARAN per head 1.162*** 1.574*** 1.539*** 0.791*** 1.061*** 0.909*** 1.292*** 1.059***
[0.250] [0.138] [0.323] [0.157] [0.386] [0.167] [0.358] [0.166]
need CARAN p/head squ 0.912 0.455
[0.666] [0.599]
lone pensioner household 0.383*** -0.375*** 0.321*** -0.269*** -0.313***
[0.134] [0.079] [0.111] [0.067] [0.072]
IMD 2007 -0.153** -0.247*** 0.097** 0.107*** -0.115 0.066
[0.074] [0.087] [0.039] [0.041] [0.094] [0.040]
PCT budget per head 0.126 0.128 0.020 0.040
[0.136] [0.101] [0.090] [0.091]
provision of unpaid care -0.386*** 0.097 -0.289*** 0.373* -0.203**
[0.097] [0.197] [0.080] [0.215] [0.088]
white ethnic group -0.060
[0.082]
permanently sick 0.677**
[0.272]
long-term unemployed -0.121***
[0.035]
limiting long-term illness -0.798*
[0.454]
Constant 5.586*** 3.160*** 6.387*** 4.132*** 3.864*** 4.916*** 5.496*** 4.481***
[0.235] [0.963] [0.363] [0.729] [0.493] [0.637] [0.314] [0.654]
Observations 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 152
R-squared 0.438 0.821 0.623 0.823 0.624 0.831 0.554 0.857
Note: these are the first-stage regressions for the IV models reported in Table B8.19. Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table BA.7: table showing first stage regressions for outcome models associated with 2007/8 expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
PBC 2 PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 4 PBC 17 PBC 1 PBC 1819 PBC 16
cancer cancer circulation respiratory respiratory
gastro-
intestinal
gastro-
intestinal endocrine
genito-
urinary
infectious
disease
Maternity
&neonates
Trauma
&injuries
2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
instrument
spend
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
VARIABLES first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage
need CARAN per head 0.582** 0.545*** 0.724*** 1.251*** 1.196*** 0.999*** 1.047*** 1.111*** 0.856***
[0.284] [0.105] [0.168] [0.094] [0.113] [0.105] [0.099] [0.259] [0.282]
no car households 0.512* 0.288**
[0.267] [0.137]
lone pensioner households 0.632*** 0.644*** 0.468*** 0.360*** 0.269*** 0.199
[0.148] [0.119] [0.100] [0.103] [0.100] [0.133]
IMD 2007 -0.012 -0.067 0.325
[0.088] [0.053] [0.224]
need CARAN per head squ 1.332*** 1.338***
[0.428] [0.425]
provision of unpaid care 0.441** 0.200
[0.174] [0.160]
born outside EU -0.054*** -0.067*** 0.004 -0.079**
[0.018] [0.017] [0.041] [0.039]
diabetes prevalence rate 2007/8 0.358***
[0.123]
permanently sick 0.307***
[0.061]
lone parent households 0.029
[0.124]
CKD prevalence rate 2007/8 0.123**
[0.061]
long-term unemployed 0.146**
[0.061]
limiting long-term illness 0.207
[0.134]
HIV need per head squared 0.128***
[0.031]
HIV need per head 0.300***
[0.044]
work in agriculture 0.152** 0.126***
[0.064] [0.033]
work in professional occupation 0.647***
[0.172]
no qualifications -0.214
[0.160]
maternity need per head 0.647***
[0.159]
full-time students 0.126
[0.095]
LA/HA accommodation -0.197*
[0.104]
Constant 5.759*** 5.747*** 6.754*** 4.886*** 5.172*** 4.531*** 4.104*** 4.224*** 5.269*** 4.226*** 4.004*** 4.766***
[0.252] [0.234] [0.322] [0.201] [0.350] [0.281] [0.057] [0.390] [0.209] [1.007] [0.297] [0.339]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 147 151 151 151
R-squared 0.369 0.369 0.653 0.659 0.664 0.531 0.524 0.436 0.296 0.724 0.407 0.361
Note: these are the first-stage regressions for the IV models reported in Table B10.1. Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table BA.8: table showing first stage regressions for expenditure models associated with 2007/8 expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 4 PBC 7 PBC 23 PBC 16
cancer circulation respiratory gastro-intestinal Endocrine neurological GMS/PMS etc trauma & injuries
2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8 2007/8
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
instrument
o/need
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
VARIABLES first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage
PCT budget per head 7/8 0.071 0.066 0.039 -0.034 0.057 0.170 0.360** 0.366***
[0.137] [0.123] [0.105] [0.105] [0.121] [0.130] [0.144] [0.136]
need CARAN per head 1.613*** 1.201*** 1.050*** 0.971*** 1.090*** 1.148***
[0.149] [0.136] [0.191] [0.188] [0.198] [0.137]
need CARAN p/head square 0.343
[0.266]
lone pensioner households -0.357*** -0.220*** -0.261*** -0.274*** -0.444*** -0.255*** -0.229***
[0.067] [0.060] [0.063] [0.063] [0.055] [0.061] [0.072]
provision of unpaid care -0.362*** -0.215** -0.156* -0.296*** -0.181* 0.195**
[0.094] [0.090] [0.093] [0.086] [0.100] [0.092]
IMD 2007 0.070 0.099** 0.067 0.309*** 0.276***
[0.042] [0.043] [0.045] [0.043] [0.039]
diabetes prevalence rate 2007/8 0.008
[0.069]
epilepsy prevalence rate 2007/8 0.020
[0.049]
white ethnic group 0.221***
[0.060]
work in agriculture 0.009
[0.011]
Constant 3.624*** 4.454*** 4.667*** 5.298*** 4.496*** 3.974*** 2.054** 2.630***
[0.969] [0.848] [0.735] [0.724] [0.920] [0.954] [0.994] [0.978]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 151
R-squared 0.847 0.828 0.861 0.834 0.860 0.839 0.830 0.824
Note: these are the first-stage regressions for the IV models reported in Table B10.2. Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table BA.9: table showing first stage regressions for outcome models associated with 2008/9 expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 13 PBC 4 PBC 7 PBC 17 PBC 1 PBC 1819
cancer circulation respiratory gastro-intestinal gastro-intestinal endocrine neurological genito-urinary infectious disease maternity/neonates
2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9
outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model outcome model
instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend instrument spend
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
Regressors first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage
need CARAN per head 1.122*** 1.274*** 1.228*** 0.989*** 1.056*** 0.373** 0.659***
[0.198] [0.146] [0.085] [0.088] [0.087] [0.175] [0.236]
lone pensioner households 0.490*** 0.426*** 0.252** 0.272** 0.287***
[0.127] [0.090] [0.110] [0.109] [0.109]
IMD 2007 -0.145** -0.082 0.236
[0.060] [0.091] [0.214]
no car households -0.188*** 0.502**
[0.053] [0.227]
need CARAN per head sq 1.071**
[0.426]
provision of unpaid care 0.339*** 0.539** 1.393***
[0.117] [0.232] [0.340]
born outside EU -0.042*** -0.060*** 0.080*** -0.031
[0.016] [0.015] [0.026] [0.032]
diabetes prevalence rate 2007/8 0.167
[0.132]
permanently sick 0.380***
[0.104]
epilepsy prevalence rate 2007/8 0.486***
[0.121]
owner occupied households -0.235**
[0.113]
lone parent households 0.175** 0.013
[0.080] [0.106]
CKD prevalence rate 2007/8 0.089***
[0.033]
long-term unemployed 0.148***
[0.045]
HIV need per head 0.471***
[0.050]
HIV need per head squared 0.146***
[0.027]
no qualifications -0.751*** -0.092
[0.189] [0.113]
work in agriculture 0.150***
[0.051]
maternity need per head 0.834***
[0.162]
Constant 5.937*** 5.435*** 5.610*** 4.752*** 4.167*** 6.379*** 4.808*** 5.363*** 6.010*** 4.171***
[0.221] [0.230] [0.238] [0.236] [0.048] [0.768] [0.193] [0.121] [1.513] [0.375]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 151 148 151 151
R-squared 0.521 0.612 0.746 0.665 0.648 0.559 0.477 0.378 0.791 0.614
Note: these are the first-stage regressions for the IV models reported in Table B11.1. Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table BA.10: table showing first stage regressions for expenditure models associated with 2008/9 expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
PBC 2 PBC 10 PBC 11 PBC 13 PBC 4 PBC 7 PBC 1819
cancer circulatory respiratory gastro-intestinal endocrine neurological maternity/neonates
2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9 2008/9
spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model spend model
instrument o/need instrument o/need instrument o/need instrument o/need instrument o/need instrument o/need instrument o/need
weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted weighted
VARIABLES first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage first stage
PCT budget per head 8/9 0.090 0.049 0.020 -0.115 0.055 0.180 0.452***
[0.155] [0.118] [0.113] [0.106] [0.122] [0.132] [0.128]
need CARAN per head 1.589*** 1.215*** 1.305*** 1.042*** 1.112*** 1.119***
[0.168] [0.133] [0.129] [0.207] [0.211] [0.141]
need CARAN per head sq 0.221
[0.270]
lone pensioner households -0.371*** -0.209*** -0.286*** -0.256*** -0.453*** -0.106*
[0.071] [0.060] [0.057] [0.062] [0.053] [0.059]
provision of unpaid care -0.349*** -0.236** -0.266*** -0.302*** -0.239**
[0.105] [0.092] [0.088] [0.099] [0.119]
IMD 2007 0.099** 0.051 0.223***
[0.045] [0.048] [0.044]
diabetes prevalence rate 2007/8 0.067
[0.064]
epilepsy prevalence rate 2007/8 0.036
[0.044]
maternity need per head 0.266***
[0.078]
white ethnic group 0.292***
[0.065]
Constant 3.457*** 4.528*** 4.687*** 5.851*** 4.340*** 3.858*** 1.901**
[1.131] [0.849] [0.814] [0.753] [0.940] [0.979] [0.864]
Observations 151 151 151 151 151 151 151
R-squared 0.840 0.828 0.854 0.830 0.857 0.837 0.843
Note: these are the first-stage regressions for the IV models reported in Table B11.2. Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2C.1 Introduction
This Appendix describes how the results of the econometric work undertaken to estimate the link
between NHS spending and mortality, which was detailed in Appendix B, can be translated in to effects
on life years and quality adjusted life years (QALYs). This Appendix presents much of the detail of data
and analyses that support Chapter 4 of the main report.
We present three sequential steps of analysis which lead to estimates of the overall cost per QALY
threshold for the NHS:
i. In section C.2.1 we reconsider how the estimated effects on mortality from the econometrics
work might better translate into life years by exploring the limitations of mortality data available
at PCT level and the published years of life lost (YLL) figures presented in the previous chapter.
We explore how these estimates might be improved using additional data and analysis.
ii. In section C.2.2 we consider how these estimates of life year effects might be adjusted for the
quality of life in which they are lived, taking account of the gender and the age at which life years
are gained or lost as well as the disutility associated with particular diseases.
iii. In section C.2.3 we explore ways to also take account of those effects on health not directly
associated with mortality and life year effects (i.e., the pure quality of life effects) to estimate an
overall cost per QALY threshold.
This sequence of analysis is set out and explained based on the analysis of 2006/07 expenditure and
mortality data from 2006 to 2008. At the end of each section, we present a summary which includes a
central best estimate as well as extreme lower and upper bounds for the cost per life year and cost per
QALY threshold. The core assumptions which underpin these three values are common across sections
C.2.1 to C.2.4. The central or best estimate is based on two assumptions one conservative and the other
more optimistic with respect to the health effects associated with expenditure. The first is that the health
effects of changes in one year of expenditure are restricted to one year. Analyses in Appendix B uses 3
years of mortality data, but these are averaged to an annual value prior to estimating outcome elasticities.
Therefore, the estimated outcome elasticities represent the proportionate effect on mortality in one year
due to a proportionate change in expenditure. This is likely to underestimate effects on mortality since
expenditure that reduces mortality risk for an individual in one year may well also reduce their risk over
subsequent years; possibly over the whole of their remaining disease duration. Expenditure may also
prevent disease in future patient populations. Therefore, total health effects will be underestimated and
the cost per life year or QALY threshold will be overestimated. Although undoubtedly conservative, it
may be offset to some extent by the more optimistic assumption used to translate mortality effects into
life years. In common with YLL figures published by NHS IC and the WHO Global Burden of Disease
study it is assumed that any death averted by expenditure in one year will return the individual to the
mortality risk of the general population, i.e., the years of life gained associated with each death averted are
based on what would have been their life expectancy taking account of their of age and gender (using life
tables for the general population).
The extreme upper and lower bounds for cost per life year and cost per QALY thresholds are based on
making both assumptions either optimistic (providing the lower bound for the threshold) or both
conservative (an upper bound for the threshold). The lower bound is based on assuming that health
effects are not restricted to one year but apply to the remaining disease duration for the population at risk
during the expenditure year (although this still does not account for the effects of expenditure on
preventing disease). The upper bound is based on the combination of assuming that health effects are
restricted to one year and that any death averted is only averted for the minimum duration consistent with
the mortality data used to estimate the outcome elasticities in Appendix B. It is very important to note
that the lower and upper bounds represent extreme values rather than alternative but plausible views that
could reasonably be taken.
3The three sequential steps of analysis, which provide a cost per life year threshold, through a cost per life
year adjusted for quality to a cost per QALY threshold, are explained and detailed in sections C.2.1 to
C.2.3, using the analysis of 2006 expenditure and mortality data from 2006 to 2008. In Section C.2.4,
further analysis using these data highlight which PBCs have the greatest influence on the overall
threshold. An exploration of the impact of the uncertainty over the outcome and spend elasticities in
estimates of the threshold is also presented in Section C.2.5. The sequence of analyses is then applied to
2008/09 expenditure and 2008 to 2010 mortality data; results of the cost per QALY threshold for the
most recent years of analysis are presented in Section C.3. In Section C.4 we present our best estimate of
the threshold cost per QALY based on the analysis of 2007/8 expenditure and mortality data from 2007
to 2009.
4C.2 Analysis of 2006/07 expenditure and 2006 to 2008 mortality data
C.2.1 From mortality to life years
In this section we summarise our examination of a number of issues associated with available PCT-based
mortality data and the associated published estimates of YLL. We then examine how, given the limited
information available about the population at risk in each PBC, we might take proper account of the fact
that some of the observed deaths would have occurred anyway (had the same population not been at risk
in the particular PBC) when estimating YLL, i.e., taking account of unobserved counterfactual deaths.
This allows us to estimate the YLL that better reflects the effect of expenditure on the mortality observed
in each PBC, and infer the excess deaths associated with each PBC. Finally we present cost per death
averted and cost per life year which accounts for the issues raised in this section.
C.2.1.1 Mortality and YLL coverage
The mortality data that is available at PCT level does not offer full coverage of all deaths across all the
ICDs that make up each PBC. Table C.1 illustrates, using a few PBCs as examples, the mapping of three
digit ICD-10 to PBCs (column 1) and the incomplete coverage of these ICDs in mortality data
(column 2). A more detailed account of the extent of coverage is presented in Table B.5.1 in Appendix B.
Table C.1. Illustrating coverage
PBC
ICD codes covered by the
spend data
ICD codes covered
by the mortality data
(NHS IC)
Coverage of
mortality data
relative to spend data
(2008)
[1] [2] [3]
1 Infectious diseases large parts of A00-B99 A00-B99 1.000
2 Cancer C00-C97, D00-D49 C00-C97 0.984
4 Endocrine E000-E899 E10-E14 0.634
10 Circulatory I00-I99, Q20-Q28 I00-I99 0.992
11 Respiratory
A150-A169,* A190-A199,
J000-J989, Q300-Q349,
R000-R099
J12-J18, J40-J44, J45-
J46
0.773
National (English) data are, however, available that cover all deaths associated with all the ICDs that
make up each PBC. Therefore, it is possible to adjust the incomplete reporting of mortality at PCT level
(see section B5.1 in Appendix B) before applying the estimated outcome elasticities to calculate the deaths
averted due to expenditure. Applying published estimates of YLL per death to all the deaths averted using
coverage adjustment factors (as illustrated in column 3 of Table C.1) provides the estimate of the cost per
life year reported in Appendix B. Note that the proportionate effects on mortality (due to changes in
expenditure) are therefore assumed to be similar for mortality that is and is not recorded at PCT level.
This seems more reasonable than assuming no effect of expenditure on mortality that happens not to be
recorded at PCT level.
The published estimates of YLL (NHS IC) used in Chapter 3 only include deaths below 75 years (but
exclude deaths below 1 year) and are based on the difference between age 75 and the age of each death
below 75. These estimates have the same limited coverage as PCT level mortality data, so are not
available for all the ICDs that make up each PBC. Therefore, applying the available estimates of YLL per
death to the estimated number of deaths averted requires an assumption that the YLL per death is similar
for those groups of ICDs covered and not covered by the published YLL figures.
This can be examined by using national ONS data to calculate YLL in the same way as NHS IC, but with
full coverage of all the ICDs that make up each PBC. Although ONS data provides complete coverage
and reports gender, age at death is only reported in 5 year ranges (these data are not available at PCT level
so could not be used when estimating outcome elasticities in Chapter 3). Therefore, using ONS data to
5estimate YLL requires taking the midpoint1 of each range as the age of death, i.e., assuming reported
deaths are equally likely over the range in which they are reported. For this reason it is not possible to
precisely recover the published YLL figures using ONS data for those ICD groupings that can be
precisely matched to the NHS IC coverage. However, the differences are small (ranging from -1% to 2%
as shown in Table C.2 below), suggesting that taking the midpoint of each range as the age of death is a
reasonable approximation.
Table C.2. Estimates of YLL for NHS IC and ONS for those ICD groupings that can be precisely
matched to the NHS IC coverage
PBC
YLL<75
(NHS IC)*
YLL<75
(ONS) +
Difference in
YLL
[1] [2] [3]
1 Infectious diseases 35,517 35,688 0.5%
2 Cancer 735,674 744,240 1%
4 Endocrine problems 19,224 19,445 1%
10 Circulatory 453,878 461,062 2%
18+19 Maternity & neonates 164,200 163,105 -1%
* does not take into account coverage adjustment
+ deaths age<1 included in PBC 18+19
Published estimates of YLL are available from NHS IC for PBC16 (Trauma and injuries) but ONS does
not provide the information required to calculate YLL for this PBC. The estimated outcome elasticity for
PBC 16 (Trauma and injuries) was zero for 2006 and could not be estimated for 2008 expenditure.
Therefore, this PBC does not contribute any changes in health outcomes, although the changes in this
expenditure are included in subsequent estimates of cost per life year and QALY thresholds. However,
there was a very limited coverage of mortality data recorded at PCT level and the expenditure data for this
PBC. In addition, the mortality data that was available (ICDs S72, S02, S06 and T90) was less likely to be
associated with changes expenditure in this PBC and more likely to be associated with changes in
expenditure in others. Consequently the health effects of changes in expenditure in PBC 16 may be
underestimated. Therefore, this PBC does not contribute any changes in health outcomes due to changes
in expenditure in subsequent estimates of cost per life year and QALY thresholds.
The differences between estimates of YLL based on ONS and NHS IC data are, however, much more
significant and are reported in Table C.3. These reflect differences in the distribution of ages at death
between those groups of ICDs covered and not covered in the NHS IC figures. For example, NHS IC
figures available at PCT level for PBC7 (neurological problems) have low coverage of all deaths in this
PBC (0.136 in column 1). The deaths that are reported in NHS IC are associated with epilepsy and the
YLL (22,046 in column 2) reflects the generally younger age at death in this group. When adjusted for
full coverage (22,046/0.136 = 162,100 in column 3) the estimated YLL is much greater than the YLL
based directly on all deaths by age group reported for the PBC in ONS. This difference in YLL reflects
the fact that the deaths in PBC7 which are not covered by NHS IC figures tend to be in older age groups
so generate fewer YLL.
1 The calculated midpoints are as follows,
Age range < 1 1-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
midpoint 0.5 3.0 7.5 12.5 17.5 22.5 27.5 32.5 37.5 42.5
Age range 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+
midpoint 47.5 52.5 57.5 62.5 67.5 72.5 77.5 82.5 87.5 92.5
6Table C.3. Estimates of YLL for NHS IC and ONS
PBC
Coverage of
mortality data
relative to
spend data
YLL<75
(NHS IC)
YLL<75
adjusted
(NHS IC)
YLL<75
no adjustment
needed
(ONS)
Difference
from adjusted
NHS IC to
ONS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1 Infectious diseases 1.000 35,517 35,517 40,928 15%
2 Cancer 0.984 735,674 747,636 758,804 1%
4 Endocrine problems 0.634 19,224 30,322 41,548 37%
7 Neurological problems 0.136 22,046 162,100 93,755 -42%
10 Circulatory 0.992 453,878 457,538 481,246 5%
11 Respiratory 0.773 108,074 139,812 147,465 6%
13 Gastro-intestinal 0.571 115,303 201,931 177,532 -12%
17 Genito-urinary 0.172 3,343 19,438 17,380 -11%
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 0.679 164,200 241,826 15,409 -94%
Using ONS data also allows deaths under the age of 1 year to be appropriately assigned to PBCs via the
ICD in which they occurred (NHS IC YLL figures exclude deaths under one year), rather than assigning
them all to PBC18 & 19 as in Appendix B.2 This explains the large reduction in YLL for PBC18 & 19
(Maternity and neonates) as much of the mortality is re-assigned to ICDs which contribute to other
PBCs. Since most of the deaths that are re-assigned are allocated to PBC1 (infectious diseases) the YLL
for this PBC increases despite complete reporting of deaths at PCT level and full coverage by NHS IC
figures (see Table C.4).
Table C.4. Estimates of YLL for NHS IC and ONS including deaths age <1
PBC
YLL<75
(from NHS IC)
YLL<75
(from ONS)*
Difference in
YLL
[1] [2] [3]
1 35,517 40,928 15%
2 735,674 744,960 1%
4 19,224 19,445 1%
10 453,878 464,763 2%
18+19 164,200 15,409
†
-91%
* deaths age<1 included in PBC of death
†
does not include YLL from deaths <28 days
Using ONS data to calculate YLL in the same way as the published NHS IC figures, but overcoming
some of the issues associated with the reporting of mortality at PCT level and the coverage of published
estimates of YLL, generates similar estimates of a cost per life year threshold (see column 2 Table C.6) to
those reported in Appendix B.
C.2.1.2 Life expectancy and YLL
As noted above, the NHS IC estimates of YLL only include deaths below 75 years and are based on the
difference between age 75 and the age of each death below 75. Implicitly, this treats 75 as the appropriate
normal life expectancy for males and females for the population at risk in each PBC. However, with the
exception of maternity and neonates, most deaths in PBCs occur above the age of 75 and life
expectancies are significantly greater than 75. Based on 2006 to 2008 data, life expectancy at birth is
greater than 75 (77.74 for males and 81.88 for females).3 Given the need to reflect the normal life
expectancy for the at risk population, it is more appropriate to use the age distribution of the general
population, and calculate life expectancy conditional on age averaged over the general populations age
2 The YLL available from NHS IC represented all deaths from maternity and all deaths under 28 days across PBCs.
The coverage factor (0.68) adjusts this YLL to represent maternity and all deaths < 1year across PBCs. The
calculation is described in Appendix B, footnote (v) of Table B5.1.
3 Figures for England, from http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/subnational-health4/life-expec-at-birth-age-65/2004-
06-to-2008-10/statistical-bulletin.html#tab-National-life-expectancy.
7distribution. General population life expectancies are estimated to be 80.7 for males and 84.4 for females,
These life expectancy estimates will always be higher than life expectancies at birth.
Based on ONS data, YLLs can be re-recalculated using the above estimates of gender specific life
expectancy for the general population. When increasing life expectancy (LE) two effects occur, both of
which tend to increase estimates of YLL. Firstly, more deaths are included in the YLL calculation (those
that occur between age 75 and LE) and secondly, each death previously counted below 75 will generate
5.7 or 9.4 more YLL for males and females respectively. The effect on the number of deaths and the
YLL for each PBC of using the life expectancy of the general population is reported in Table C.5.
Table C.5. The difference in YLL by life expectancy
PBC
Deaths<75
(ONS)
Deaths<LE
(ONS)
Difference in
deaths due to
increased LE
YLL<75
(ONS)
YLL<LE
(ONS)
Difference in
YLL due to
increased LE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1 Infectious diseases 2,050 3,710 81% 40,928 62,051 52%
2 Cancer 62,944 95,212 51% 758,804 1,345,013 77%
4 Endocrine 2,367 4,000 69% 41,548 65,015 56%
7 Neurological 5,095 8,975 76% 93,755 145,526 55%
10 Circulatory 41,487 82,098 98% 481,246 916,170 90%
11 Respiratory 14,000 30,500 118% 147,465 310,326 110%
13 Gastro-intestinal 10,611 15,827 49% 177,532 273,303 54%
17 Genito-urinary 1,588 4,197 164% 17,380 39,098 125%
18+19 Maternity & neonates 226 226 0% 15,409 17,167 11%
Life expectancy (LE): male=80.7, female=84.4
The number of deaths counted below LE increases for every PBC except for maternity & neonates
because, as expected, all deaths are below age 75 in PBC18 & 19. However, YLL increases for all PBCs
reflecting the additional years otherwise expected to be lived to an older LE. Of course including more
of the deaths observed in each PBC and the greater YLL associated with them will generate more deaths
averted and more life years gained when applying the same proportionate effects from the outcome
elasticities estimated in Appendix B. Therefore, the cost per death averted and cost per life year
thresholds are expected to be lower using these figures than those reported in Appendix B.
The impact on the cost per life year and cost per death averted thresholds is summarised in Table C.6. A
detailed breakdown of the changes in spend and YLL across PBCs is presented in Table C.7. A listing of
the spend and outcome elasticities used in threshold calculations throughout this section is in Table C.8
(columns 2 and 5). Note that in analyses in Appendix B and Sections in this Appendix up to C.2.3.1
(corresponding to Chapter 3 and Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.1 in main report) expenditure elasticities were
not estimated for the other 11 PBCs where outcome elasticities could not be estimated because the same
health effect of changes in expenditure was assumed, i.e., it did not matter how changes in expenditure
was allocated between them. However, in this section it does matter how the remaining change in
expenditure is allocated
Table C.6: Summary of cost per death averted and cost per life year threshold.
Using 75 as the cut-off (ONS) Using LE as the cut-off (ONS)
Cost per death
averted
Cost per LY
gained
Cost per death
averted
Cost per LY
gained
[1] [2] [3] [4]
big 4 PBC's £122,756 £10,398 £63,426 £5,487
11 PBCs (with mortality) £240,433 £20,031 £124,655 £10,660
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining
12 PBCs)
£884,579 £73,697 £458,620 £39,218
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for
remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)*
£271,739 £22,639 £140,886 £12,048
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
Table C.7: Breakdown of the cost per death averted and cost per life year thresholds
Using 75 as the cut-off (ONS) Using LE as the cut-off (ONS)
PBC PBC description
Change
in spend,
£m
N death
(<75)
Change
in N
deaths
Cost per
death
averted, £ YLL
Change
in YLL
Cost per LY
gained, £
N deaths
(<LE)
Change
in N
deaths
Cost per
death
averted, £ YLL
Change
in YLL
Cost per LY
gained, £
2 Cancer £19 62 944 100.10 £191,500 758 804 1 207 £15,885 95 212 151.42 £126,599 1 345 013 2 139 £8,962
10 Circulatory £33 41 487 321.26 £103,560 481 246 3 727 £8,928 82 098 635.73 £52,333 916 170 7 094 £4,690
11 Respiratory £22 14 000 249.25 £89,482 147 465 2 625 £8,495 30 500 543. £41,074 310 326 5 525 £4,037
13 Gastro-intestinal £17 10 611 72.69 £227,013 177 532 1 216 £13,568 15 827 108.42 £152,198 273 303 1 872 £8,814
Big 4 £122,756 £10,398 £63,426 £5,487
1 Infectious diseases £8 2 050 0.76 £10,936,680 40 928 15 £547,796 3 710 1.38 £6,043,179 62 051 23 £361,319
4 Endocrine £18 2 367 18.99 £929,559 41 548 333 £52,957 4 000 32.1 £550,066 65 015 522 £33,842
7 Neurological £17 5 095 3.52 £4,889,114 93 755 65 £265,693 8 975 6.19 £2,775,491 145 526 100 £171,172
17 Genito-urinary £32 1 588 0.74 £42,993,075 17 380 8 £3,928,251 4 197 1.95 £16,267,096 39 098 18 £1,746,202
16 Trauma & injuries* £10 NA 0.00 NA NA 0 NA NA 0 NA NA 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £8 226 0.24 £32,813,038 15 409 17 £481,261 226 0.24 £32,813,038 17 167 19 £431,977
First 11 PBCs £240,433 £20,031 £124,655 £10,660
3 Disorders of Blood £11 46.57 £240,433 559 £20,031 89.83 £124,655 1 050 £10,660
5 Mental Health £204 849.17 £240,433 10 193 £20,031 1 637.87 £124,655 19 153 £10,660
6 Learning Disability £31 128.05 £240,433 1 537 £20,031 246.98 £124,655 2 888 £10,660
8 Vision £24 100.54 £240,433 1 207 £20,031 193.92 £124,655 2 268 £10,660
9 Hearing £6 26.60 £240,433 319 £20,031 51.3 £124,655 600 £10,660
12 Dental £23 97.72 £240,433 1 173 £20,031 188.48 £124,655 2 204 £10,660
14 Skin £11 43.72 £240,433 525 £20,031 84.34 £124,655 986 £10,660
15 Musculo skeletal £15 62.93 £240,433 755 £20,031 121.38 £124,655 1 419 £10,660
20 Poisoning and AE £4 18.27 £240,433 219 £20,031 35.23 £124,655 412 £10,660
21 Healthy Individuals £18 76.27 £240,433 915 £20,031 147.1 £124,655 1 720 £10,660
22 Social Care Needs £68 281.19 £240,433 3 375 £20,031 542.35 £124,655 6 342 £10,660
23 Other £78 0 NA NA NA NA
All (23 PBCs) £271,739 £22,639 £140,886 £12,048
Note that we have been unable to obtain a satisfactory outcome model for trauma & injuries and have assumed a zero outcome elasticity.
Note that, for expenditure in 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
9Table C.8: Outcome and spend elasticities.
Total
spend
2006/07,
(m£)
Spend elasticities
Change in spend, m£ (%
share)
Outcome
elasticities(ii)PBC PBC description
Unadju
sted(i)
Analysis up
to 4.4.1
(C.2.3.1 in
App C)
Analysis in
4.4.2
(C.2.3.2 in
App C)
Analysis up
to 4.4.1
(C.2.3.1 in
App C)
Analysis in
4.4.2
(C.2.3.2 in
App C)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
2 Cancer £4,122 0.465 0.465 0.657 19 (2.8%) 27 (4%) 0.342
10 Circulatory £6,161 0.540 0.540 0.763 33 (4.9%) 47 (6.9%) 1.434
11 Respiratory £3,285 0.679 0.679 0.959 22 (3.3%) 32 (4.6%) 2.622
13 Gastro-intestinal £3,700 0.446 0.446 0.630 17 (2.4%) 23 (3.4%) 1.536
Big 4 £17,268 91 (13.4%) 129 (19%)
1 Infectious diseases £1,054 0.792 0.792 1.119 8 (1.2%) 12 (1.7%) 0.047
4 Endocrine £1,853 0.953 0.953 1.346 18 (2.6%) 25 (3.7%) 0.842
7 Neurological £2,790 0.616 0.616 0.870 17 (2.5%) 24 (3.6%) 0.112
17 Genito-urinary £3,482 0.912 0.912 1.289 32 (4.7%) 45 (6.6%) 0.051
16 Trauma & injuries* £2,892 0.358 0.358 0.506 10 (1.5%) 15 (2.2%) -
18+19
Maternity &
neonates* £3,574 0.224 0.224 0.316 8 (1.2%) 11 (1.7%) 0.482
First 11 PBCs £32,912 185 (27.2%) 261 (38.4%)
3 Blood £837 0.700 1.338 0.989 11 (1.6%) 8 (1.2%) -
5 Mental Health £8,406 1.271 2.429 1.796 204 (30.1%) 151 (22.2%) -
6 Learning Disability £2,441 0.660 1.261 0.933 31 (4.5%) 23 (3.4%) -
8 Vision £1,362 0.929 1.775 1.313 24 (3.6%) 18 (2.6%) -
9 Hearing £314 1.067 2.039 1.508 6 (0.9%) 5 (0.7%) -
12 Dental £2,621 0.469 0.896 0.663 23 (3.5%) 17 (2.6%) -
14 Skin £1,429 0.385 0.736 0.544 11 (1.5%) 8 (1.1%) -
15 Musculo-skeletal £3,369 0.235 0.449 0.332 15 (2.2%) 11 (1.6%) -
20 Poisoning and AE £737 0.312 0.596 0.441 4 (0.6%) 3 (0.5%) -
21 Healthy Individuals £1,355 0.708 1.353 1.000 18 (2.7%) 14 (2.0%) -
22 Social Care Needs £1,529 2.314 4.422 3.269 68 (10.0%) 50 (7.4%) -
23 Other £10,585 0.739 0.739 1.044 78 (11.5%) 111 (16.3%) -
All (23 PBCs) £67,896 679 (100%) 679 (100%)
(i) The spend elasticities reflect how a 1% increase in budget is distributed across PBCs; however, in the econometrics, these were
estimated separately for each PBC (unadjusted estimates in column 2) and because of this, its direct application to spend
generates a change in budget bigger than the 1%. An adjustment was thus applied to the remaining 12 PBCs (except PBC23 that
was left unchanged), by multiplying each by a common factor  the magnitude of the unadjusted spend elasticities is changed but
proportionality to the original elasticities is maintained
(ii) without the negative sign
The cost per death averted (or life saved) threshold should not be over interpreted because this is of little
direct policy interest since lives are never saved (death is only delayed) and the significance of a death
averted depends critically on how long it is averted and the quality of life in which additional years are
lived (see Section C.2.2). However, establishing the number of deaths averted which are associated with
net YLL is useful because it enables an assessment of the number of life years gained associated with each
death averted. Table C.9 presents the YLL saved for each death averted implied by the assumptions
underlying calculations of the cost per life year threshold in Table C.7. For the 11 PBCs with mortality
signal, each death averted is assumed to be associated with a gain of 11.7 YLL (when LE is used,
column 2). This value is smaller than when using 75 years old as a cut-off (column 1) because a higher
proportion of deaths closer to the cut-off age are being considered (i.e., with lower YLL associated).
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Table C.9: Implied YLL per death averted for each PBC
PBC PBC description
Implied YLL
per death
averted (<75)
Implied YLL
per death
averted (<LE)
[1] [2]
2 Cancer 12.1 14.1
10 Circulatory problems 11.6 11.2
11 Respiratory problems 10.5 10.2
13 Gastro-intestinal problems 16.7 17.3
Big 4 11.8 11.6
1 Infectious diseases 20.0 16.7
4 Endocrine problems 17.6 16.3
7 Neurological problems 18.4 16.2
17 Genito-urinary problems 10.9 9.3
16 Trauma & injuries* NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 68.2 76.0
First 11 PBCs 12.0 11.7
There are good reasons why YLL figures calculated as the difference between age of death and LE are
likely to be overestimated. This is dealt with in the next section (Section C.2.1.3). In Section C.2.1.4 we
take account of the fact that some of the deaths observed in a PBC would have occurred anyway in a
similar normal population (i.e., the counterfactual population not at risk through membership of the
PBC) so not all observed deaths are excess and generate YLL.
C.2.1.3 YLL and accounting for counterfactual deaths
The estimates of YLL based on ONS data overcome many of the limitations of the published NHS IC
figures. However, the YLLs reported in Table C.5 are calculated in the same way as the NHS IC figures,
by taking the difference between a fixed LE and the age at death for deaths observed below that LE.
Simply taking the difference between a fixed LE and the age at death of deaths that occur below LE and
ignoring those deaths that occur above LE, is only an accurate representation of the YLL if it is
reasonable to assume that no deaths would have otherwise occurred prior to LE (so all normal deaths
must occur at LE) and that there are no deaths (survivors) beyond LE in the at risk population, i.e. all
deaths below LE are excess deaths and there are no excess deaths above LE. The estimate of YLL in the
previous section may thus be biased for two reasons: i) it does not account for the fact that not all deaths
observed below LE are excess deaths in the sense that some deaths would have occurred (at the same
age) in a similar population not at risk in the PBC and ii) some of the deaths observed above LE may be
excess deaths that would not otherwise have occurred at that age (see breakdown of deaths below and
above LE in Table C.10).
The overall effect on YLL, and on the cost per life year, will depend on the number of deaths above and
below LE that are excess. However, it is more likely that deaths below LE are excess. Estimates of YLL
are required which take account of the counterfactual deaths that would have occurred even if the
population in the PBC was not at risk through membership of the ICD codes that make it up, but faced
the same mortality risks as the general population, accounting for the age and gender distribution of the
PBC population.
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Table C.10. Number of deaths below and above LE in 2006/07/08, by PBC
PBC
<LE
2006
>LE
2006
<LE
2007
>LE
2007
<LE
2008
>LE
2008
Annual
N deaths
<LE
Annual
N deaths
> LE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
1 Infectious diseases 3,824 3,420 3,902 3,735 3,403 2,589 3,710 3,248
2 Cancer 95,549 34,192 95,331 35,455 94,758 37,144 95,213 35,597
4 Endocrine 4,006 2,661 3,967 2,750 4,028 2,882 4,000 2,764
7 Neurological 8,454 5,762 8,845 6,501 9,626 6,871 8,975 6,378
10 Circulatory 84,909 78,369 80,610 78,481 80,779 76,407 82,099 77,752
11 Respiratory 29,925 34,549 29,540 35,060 32,036 35,227 30,500 34,945
13 Gastro-intestinal 15,893 8,311 15,658 8,376 15,930 8,274 15,827 8,320
17 Genito-urinary 4,056 6,049 4,072 6,558 4,465 6,673 4,198 6,427
18+19 Maternity & neonates 195 0 216 0 267 0 226 0
Life expectancy (LE): male=80.7, female=84.4
Ideally, with reliable information about the size of the population at risk in each PBC and its age and
gender distribution it would be possible to estimate the number of deaths that would be expected to
occur had this population not been at risk, based on mortality data for the general population. The
difference between deaths observed across all ages in the PBC and the deaths expected to have occurred
in this matched normal population would provide the number of excess deaths by age and gender.
These counterfactual deaths will occur in the other PBCs insofar as all deaths are recorded in an ICD
code, taking account of the unavoidable fact that everyone must die of something at some time. For
example, even if all observed cancer mortality was avoidable and could in principle be eliminated with
sufficient expenditure, lives would not be saved but deaths delayed and reallocated to other causes.4
The YLL associated with each of these excess deaths is the life expectancy conditional on gender and on
surviving to the age at which the excess death occurred. The total YLL for the at risk population is simply
the sum of these YLLs over all excess deaths, which could occur at any age. We do not (and will never)
know the counterfactual expected age of death for each individual patient. However, two perfectly
matched populations of individuals, one at risk and another not at risk in the PBC can be compared in
terms of their survival curves (Figure C.1). The area below each survival curve reflects the life expectancy
and the area between the two survival curves returns the YLL. This is equivalent to comparing the
average age of death across patients in the population at risk in the PBC (N patients), with the average age
of death in the matched, not at risk, population (for simplicity assumed to be equally sized). Equation (1)
describes the YLL per patient as the difference in the average age of death, agedeath , observed for each
individual, i (out of N individuals), in each population. The YLL for the population is simply the per
patient YLL multiplied by the size of the population N.ܻܮܮ௣௘௥௣௔௧௜௘௡௧ =  ܮܧ୬୭୰୫ െ ܮܧ୔୆େ = ଵேσ ageௗ௘௔௧௛,௜୬୭୰୫୒௜ୀଵ െ ଵேσ ageௗ௘௔௧௛,௜୔୆େ୒௜ୀଵ (1)ܻܮܮ = ܰ ή ܻܮܮ௣௘௥௣௔௧௜௘௡௧
4 Note that the outcome elasticities are based on PBC mortality that is sensitive to changes in expenditure (i.e., is
avoidable) at the margin so no assumptions about how much of the PBC mortality is avoidable is required.
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Figure C.1: Survival curve of a population at risk in a PBC and of a matched normal population
The difficultly is that routinely available data do not provide any information about the size of the
population at risk or its age and gender distribution (matching criteria). Thus a matched population
cannot be generated, and the area between the two curves cannot be evaluated. Therefore, it is not
possible to directly estimate excess deaths or compare survival curves. Even if the size of the at risk
population is unknown we can still use information that might be available about its age and gender
distribution (or make reasonable assumptions) to estimate a matched normal LE using life tables for the
general population  such a LE summarises the area under the counterfactual survival curve (ܮܧ௡௢௥௠ =
1ܰσ age݀݁ܽݐ݄ǡ݅normN݅=1 in equation 1). Unfortunately, it is not possible to also calculate the LE for the
population at risk in the PBC (or represent the survival curve) without information about the size of the
at risk population  if it was possible, the difference between these life expectancies would approximate
the YLL per patient at risk in a PBC.
Fortunately, we can still recover a consistent estimate of YLL using the normal LE of a matched
population that is not at risk (a summary of the counterfactual average age of death), alongside the death
data available for the PBC population. Equation (2) shows that population YLL can be approximated by
subtracting the age at which each observed death in a PBC has occurred to the normal LE. ൌ  ή ቀLE୬୭୰୫ െ ଵேσ ageୢୣୟ୲୦,୧୔୆େ୒௜ୀଵ ቁ = σ ൫LE୬୭୰୫ െ ୢୣୟ୲୦,୧୔୆େ ൯୒௜ୀଵ (2)
The data on the PBC observed deaths available expresses the ages at which deaths occurred in age groups
(k out of K groups). Following from Equation (2), the population YLL can be evaluated considering the
number of patients dying in each of the age groups, Ndie,k, as depicted in Equation (3). This is equivalent
to comparing survival curves where age is discretized into intervals and the midpoint of the intervals used
as age of death  this is illustrated in Figure C.2.
YLL = σ ൫LE୬୭୰୫ െ ௗ௘௔௧௛,௞൯௄௞ୀଵ ή ୢ୧ୣ,௞ (3)
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Figure C.2: Area between the survival curves, discretized.
The calculations (in Equations 2 and 3) require all observed deaths  both those that occur below and
those that occur above this LE  to be taken into account. Those deaths occurring below LE generate
YLL - compared to the average of a matched population not at risk. However, we must also account for
those deaths that occur at ages above LE. These deaths generate life years gained (YLG) compared to
the average of a matched population not at risk. Therefore, the appropriate estimate is a net YLL (i.e.,
YLL  YLG). In effect, by subtracting YLG from YLL we take account of the fact that not all deaths
below LE are excess deaths but some deaths above LE are. Insofar as deaths above LE have been
observed in a specific PBC, the net YLL estimate will always be lower than the estimate of YLL.
Consequently, the estimates in Section C.2.1.3 overestimate YLL and hence underestimate the cost per
life year threshold.
Using the life expectancy of the general population
Routinely available data provides the age and gender of observed deaths but no information about the age
and gender distribution of the at risk population itself. Using observed age and gender at death (see
columns 5 and 6 of Table C.11) as an indication of the distribution of the at risk population will
significantly overestimate the LE of a normal matched population insofar as a disease may be chronic
(not all PBC mortality occurs on entry into the at risk population). If mortality risk increases over the
disease duration more deaths would be observed in groups that have been prevalent for some time (i.e.,
are older) than those that are incident. Older age groups will thus be overrepresented in observed deaths
compared to a matched normal population. For these reasons LE and YLL would be overestimated
using age at death as a proxy for the age distribution of the at risk population, and the cost per life year
would be underestimated.
1
P
ro
b
ab
il
it
y
o
f
su
rv
iv
in
g
Time
14
Table C.11: Average age and life expectancy for PBCs based on age of the general population
PBC Sex
Average age
of general
population
LE of
general
population Age at death
LE at age of
death
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1 Infectious diseases
m 38.5 80.7 72.8 87.5
f 40.8 84.4 79.3 91.1
2 Cancer
m 38.5 80.7 73.3 86.5
f 40.8 84.4 73.8 88.8
4 Endocrine
m 38.5 80.7 72.5 87.1
f 40.8 84.4 77.9 90.6
7 Neurological
m 38.5 80.7 72.8 87.2
f 40.8 84.4 77.7 90.5
10 Circulatory
m 38.5 80.7 76.4 87.9
f 40.8 84.4 82.7 91.7
11 Respiratory
m 38.5 80.7 79.4 89.0
f 40.8 84.4 82.9 91.8
13 Gastro-intestinal
m 38.5 80.7 68.9 85.7
f 40.8 84.4 77.1 90.1
17 Genito-urinary
m 38.5 80.7 81.6 90.1
f 40.8 84.4 84.0 92.3
18+19 Maternity & neonates
m 38.5 80.7 1.1 78.3
f 40.8 84.4 11.4 82.7
In the absence of additional external information the net YLL could be based on the life expectancy of
the general population, reflecting its current age and gender distribution. Such net YLL estimates are
reported in Table C.12, and illustrate the impact of accounting for counterfactual deaths in the way
described above. The YLL reported in column 5 of Table C.12 are calculated the same way and are the
same as the figures previously reported (column 5 of Table C.5). That is, they do not account for deaths
that would have otherwise occurred below LE or the very many deaths that occur above LE. With the
exception of PBC18 & 19 many death occur above the LE of the general population (see column 4 in
Table C.12) in all PBCs. As a consequence, there are LYG associated with all other PBCs (see column 6)
so the net YLL in column 7 are lower than YLL based on the same life expectancy. Therefore, failure to
account for counterfactual deaths would lead to an overestimate of the YLL associated with a PBC and
the effects of expenditure on YLL. The cost per life year threshold would be underestimated (see
Table C.15).
Table C.12. Net YLL using life expectancy of the general population
PBC
LE of
Males
LE of
Females
Average2006-2008
Deaths Deaths
YLL YLG Net YLL
<LE >LE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
1 Infectious diseases 80.7 84.4 3,710 3,248 62,052 18,796 43,256
2 Cancer 80.7 84.4 95,213 35,597 1,345,038 175,350 1,169,689
4 Endocrine 80.7 84.4 4,000 2,764 65,016 15,864 49,152
7 Neurological 80.7 84.4 8,975 6,378 145,529 34,621 110,908
10 Circulatory 80.7 84.4 82,099 77,752 916,192 444,694 471,498
11 Respiratory 80.7 84.4 30,500 34,945 310,334 215,829 94,505
13 Gastro-intestinal 80.7 84.4 15,827 8,320 273,308 45,295 228,012
17 Genito-urinary 80.7 84.4 4,198 6,427 39,099 40,530 -1,431
18+19 Maternity & neonates 80.7 84.4 226 0 17,167 0 17,167
However, these figures are only correct insofar as the distribution of age and gender in each PBC is
similar to the general population. For example, if the at risk population tends to be younger the correct
LE for the PBC will be lower. A lower LE will mean that there are less deaths below LE each generating
fewer YLL, and more deaths above LE each generating more LYG. The net YLL will thus tend to be
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lower. Similarly, if the at risk population tends to be older than the general population, the correct LE
will be higher and net YLL will also tend to be higher.
This explains the apparent net gain in YLL (negative net YLL) for PBC17 (Genito-urinary) where most
deaths occur at ages greater than the LE of the general population so that LYG exceeds YLL. As we are
able to show later (see Table C.14) this is because the age distribution in this PBC tends to be older than
the general population, i.e., the LE for a matched normal population should be higher with fewer deaths
above and more below this LE.
Using additional information about age and gender distribution
It is evident that estimates of YLL require some account to be taken of counterfactual deaths. In the
absence of routinely available information this requires examination of alternative sources of information
which might provide a basis for more credible assumptions about the age and gender distribution of the
at risk population in each PBC than either, the distribution of observed deaths or of the general
population.5 The WHO Global Burden of Disease (GBD) study, updated in 2008 using 2004 data (see
Addendum 1 for more details6) provides a range of summary health indicators for the UK, which are, in
part, based on estimates of the incidence and duration of sequelae associated with different types of
disease by age and gender. Therefore, the type of information used by WHO in the GBD Study to
generate summary estimates for the UK can also be used to improve the assumptions required about the
age and gender distribution of the PBC populations. Importantly, at this stage, we do not need to rely on
estimates of the absolute size of the at risk population, but only the relative share by age and gender.
Specifically, the information reported by GBD (estimates specific to the UK provided in the National
Burden of Disease toolkit) reported the incidence and duration of sequelae associated with different types
of disease by age and gender. Since it is possible that a patient may experience more than one of the types
of sequelae reported in GBD we use the gender and age distribution of the sequelae with the highest
prevalence, i.e., the minimum estimate of prevalence consistent with these figures (Addendum 1 to this
Appendix), to evaluate the age and gender distribution within each disease.
GBD classifies diseases by U-codes, which are groups of three digit ICD-10 codes (see Addendum 1 to
this Appendix for details of how U-codes map to ICD-10 codes).7 Since we know which ICD codes
contribute to each PBC we can map information from U-codes to PBCs via the ICD codes that
contribute to each. The resulting average age and life expectancy for each PBC is reported in columns 3
and 4 of Table C.13 using the information available from GBD in combination with life tables for the
general population.
5 Although this research was not funded to purchase access to GPRD data we were able to examine a sample of it
which comprised of 22,313,086 rows/patientICD10 events (3 digit) representing 4,229,910 patients with data on
new diagnosis of diseases observed between 1 Jan 2006 and 24 June 2011 (see Addendum 1). Although GPRD data
could, in principle, provide this type of information the difficulties of reliability, face validity and interpretation of
the sample data in the form available to us meant that it was not directly useful.
6 We are aware that the 2000-2002 WHO GBD study and the update which was published in 2008 using 2004 data
has itself recently been updated. However, the report and tools where not publically available at the time this
research was conducted.
7 Throughout the analyses in this Appendix, mortality, life years and QALY were not assigned to procedural ICD
codes (i.e. those in ICD chapter Z, Factors influencing health status and contact with health services). Health effects
from increased spending on these ICD codes would either be non-existant or would be evident in other ICD codes
related to the procedure. . This means that no health effects are associated with PBC 22 Social Care (which only
includes procedural ICD codes), although changes in expenditure on PBC 22 are included. This is likely to
overestimate the threshold because any health effects associated with PBC 22 will not be reflected in the estimated
outcome elasticities of other PBCs unless the effects happen to be correlated with changes in expenditure in those
other PBCs.
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Table C.13. Average age and life expectancy for PBCs based on GBD
PBC Sex
Average
age of
general
population
LE of
general
population
Proportion
males in
PBC
(GBD)
Average
age in
PBC
(GBD)
Normal LE
of PBC
population
(GBD)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1 Infectious diseases
m 38.5 80.7 54.1% 28.6 79.6
f 40.8 84.4 45.9% 30.2 83.6
2 Cancer
m 38.5 80.7 28.0% 61.3 83.0
f 40.8 84.4 72.0% 52.3 84.7
4 Endocrine
m 38.5 80.7 38.4% 44.2 81.0
f 40.8 84.4 61.6% 50.8 84.7
7 Neurological
m 38.5 80.7 28.1% 24.8 79.6
f 40.8 84.4 71.9% 23.5 83.3
10 Circulatory
m 38.5 80.7 51.6% 55.4 83.0
f 40.8 84.4 48.4% 57.9 86.5
11 Respiratory
m 38.5 80.7 48.0% 32.1 80.3
f 40.8 84.4 52.0% 33.7 84.0
13 Gastro-intestinal
m 38.5 80.7 42.9% 35.8 80.6
f 40.8 84.4 57.1% 41.9 84.5
17 Genito-urinary
m 38.5 80.7 85.9% 63.2 83.5
f 40.8 84.4 14.1% 47.3 85.6
18+19
Maternity &
neonates
m 38.5 80.7 16.3% 3.0 78.7
f 40.8 84.4 83.7% 24.1 83.1
These summary estimates suggest that some of the PBC populations may be on average older than the
general population (e.g., Cancer, Circulatory and Genito-urinary PBCs) or younger (e.g., Maternity &
neonates, Infectious diseases and Neurological). However, when trying to interpret these summaries it
should be noted that the average age reported in Table C.13 is the average over the ages at which sequelae
occur within the ICDs contributing to the PBC. Therefore, a similar average age can reflect very different
age distributions. Some reflect a markedly bimodal distribution, e.g., PBC11, Respiratory, where there is
high incidence at very young and older ages (see Figure C.3), or very different age distributions across the
type of diseases that contribute to the PBC. For example PBC7 (Neurological) includes dementia which
accounts for the vast majority of the PBC population older than 70. However, a greater proportion of the
population is in much younger age groups with other conditions, especially migraine (see Addendum 1 to
this Appendix for a detailed description of age and gender distributions in all PBCs). When interpreting
these summary estimates it should also be noted that the reported life expectancies are not the life
expectancies at the average ages reported in column 3 (Table C.13), but the average over the life
expectancies for each age group within the contributing ICDs weighted by the age distribution of the
sequelae with maximum prevalence from GBD U-codes.
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Figure C.3: Distribution of PBC11 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICDs, alongside proportion of prevalent patients in the PBC and contribution to
variance of each ICD
A- Chronic lower respiratory diseases (J40-J47) H- Other diseases of pleura (J90-J94) O- Other viral diseases (B25-B34)
B- Acute upper respiratory infections (J00-J06) I- Other diseases of the respiratory system (J95-J99) P- Symptoms and signs circulatory and respiratory systems (R00-R09)
C- Influenza and Pneumonia (J09-J18) J- Other bacterial diseases (A30-A49) Q- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified (R70-R99)
D- Lung diseases due to external agents (J60-J70) K- Suppurative and necrotic conditions of lower
respiratory tract (J85-J86)
R- Persons encountering health services for examination and investigation (Z00-
Z13)
E- Other diseases of upper respiratory tract (J30-J39) L- Mycoses (B35-B49) S- Persons encountering health services for specific procedures and health care
(Z40-Z54)
F- Other acute lower respiratory infections (J20-J22) M- Tuberculosis (A15-A19) T- Persons with potential health hazards related to family and personal history and
certain conditions influencing health status (Z80-Z99)
G- Other respiratory diseases principally affecting
the interstitium (J80-J84)
N- Other diseases casused by chlamydiae (A70-A74) U- Congenital malformations and deformations respiratory system (Q30-Q34)
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The implications for net YLL of using these PBC specific estimates of normal life expectancy are
reported in Table C.14. As expected, the net YLL for those PBCs with a LE greater than the general
population are higher than those reported in column 7 in Table C.12 (e.g., PBC10 Circulatory and PBC17
Genito-urinary, which now has positive net YLL). Similarly those PBCs with a LE less than the general
population have lower net YLL than reported in column 7 in Table C.12 (e.g., PBC1 Infectious diseases
and PBC18 & 19 Maternity & neonates, where the effect of a lower LE is more modest as there are no
deaths above either of the estimates of LE).
Table C.14. Net YLL using life expectancy for each PBC
PBC
LE of
Males
LE of
Females
Average2006-2008
Deaths
YLL YLG Net YLL
<LE >LE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
1 Infectious diseases 79.6 83.6 3,498 3,460 58,686 21,724 36,962
2 Cancer 83.0 84.7 101,203 29,607 1,473,733 126,549 1,347,184
4 Endocrine 81.0 84.7 4,068 2,696 66,283 15,058 51,225
7 Neurological 79.6 83.3 8,370 6,983 135,686 41,770 93,917
10 Circulatory 83.0 86.5 96,694 63,157 1,102,020 278,251 823,768
11 Respiratory 80.3 84.0 29,549 35,897 298,343 230,313 68,030
13 Gastro-intestinal 80.6 84.5 15,824 8,323 273,117 45,414 227,703
17 Genito-urinary 83.5 85.6 4,969 5,655 47,229 29,101 18,127
18+19 Maternity & neonates 78.7 83.1 226 0 16,801 0 16,801
The impact on the cost per life year threshold of the issues discussed in this Section is summarised in
columns 3 and 4 of Table C.15.
Table C.15. Summary of cost per life year threshold
Using cut-off in estimating YLL (ONS) Using net YLL estimates
cut-off of 75
cut-off of LE of
the GP
Using LE of the
GP
Using LE of the
PBC population
(GBD)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
big 4 PBC's £10,398 £5,487 £10,421 £8,080
11 PBCs (with mortality) £20,031 £10,660 £19,928 £15,628
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining
12 PBCs)
£73,697 £39,218 £73,317 £57,497
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for
remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)*
£22,639 £12,048 £22,523 £17,663
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
Taking account of counterfactual deaths by calculating net YLL based on the life expectancy of the
general population (see column 3) provides similar estimates to those reported in Appendix B. Assuming
that PBC populations have the same age and gender distribution as the general population when the,
albeit limited, information that is available suggests otherwise, seems inappropriate. Therefore, our
preferred central estimate of the cost per life year threshold is reported in column 4 (Table C.15). These
are lower than those based on the general population, reflecting the impact on net YLL of evidence that
the population at risk in some key PBCs (especially PBC2 and 10) tend to be older than the general
population. A detailed breakdown of the changes in spend and YLLs across PBCs that originate this
central estimate are presented in columns 5 to 7 of Table C.16. In Section C.2.1.5 we consider extreme
upper and lower bounds that might be placed on this central estimate.
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Table C.16: LY threshold using net YLL estimates (non-zero health effects for remaining PBCs except
GMS).
Using LE of the GP Using LE of the PBC population
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m Net YLL
Change in
Net YLL
Cost per LY
gained, £ Net YLL
Change in
net YLL
Cost per LY
gained, £
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
2 Cancer £19 1 169 689 1 860 £10,305 1 347 184 2 142 £8,947
10 Circulatory problems £33 471 498 3 651 £9,112 823 768 6 379 £5,216
11 Respiratory problems £22 94 505 1 683 £13,256 68 030 1 211 £18,415
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £17 228 012 1 562 £10,564 227 703 1 560 £10,579
Big 4 £10,421 £8,080
1 Infectious diseases £8 43 256 16 £518,314 36 962 14 £606,574
4 Endocrine problems £18 49 152 394 £44,765 51 225 411 £42,953
7 Neurological problems £17 110 908 77 £224,601 93 917 65 £265,235
17 Genito-urinary problems £32 - 1 431 - 1 -£47,709,995 18 127 8 £3,766,371
16 Trauma & injuries* £10 NA 0 NA NA 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £8 17 167 19 £431,977 16 801 18 £441,387
First 11 PBCs £19,928 £15,628
3 Disorders of Blood £11 562 £19,928 716 £15,628
5 Mental Health Disorders £204 10 245 £19,928 13 064 £15,628
6 Learning Disability £31 1 545 £19,928 1 970 £15,628
8 Problems of Vision £24 1 213 £19,928 1 547 £15,628
9 Problems of Hearing £6 321 £19,928 409 £15,628
12 Dental problems £23 1 179 £19,928 1 503 £15,628
14 Skin £11 528 £19,928 673 £15,628
15 Musculo skeletal system £15 759 £19,928 968 £15,628
20 Poisoning and AE £4 220 £19,928 281 £15,628
21 Healthy Individuals £18 920 £19,928 1 173 £15,628
22 Social Care Needs £68 3 393 £19,928 4 326 £15,628
23 Other £78 0 NA 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £22,523 £17,663
Note that we have been unable to obtain a satisfactory outcome model for trauma & injuries and have assumed a zero outcome
elasticity.
Note that, for expenditure in 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and
expenditure models.
C.2.1.4 Inferring excess deaths
We have been able to establish a measure of net YLL which takes account of deaths that would have
occurred anyway below a normal LE for the PBC population (i.e., not all deaths observed in a PBC are
excess) and that some deaths observed above this LE would not otherwise have occurred at that age (i.e.,
some of these deaths are excess). As explained in Section C.2.1.3, net YLL calculated in this way is
equivalent to first establishing the number of excess deaths at each age, then calculating YLL for each
excess death (based on the LE conditional on the age at which each excess death occurred) and then
summing these YLL across all excess deaths (i.e., across all ages). In other words, the estimates of net
YLL imply a number of excess deaths required to generate them in each PBC. Therefore, it is possible to
solve for the total number of excess deaths based on the net YLL and the average YLL per observed
death (the average of the sum of the YLLs for every observed death where the YLL for each observed
death is the difference between age at death and LE conditional on age of death). The net YLL divided by
the average YLL per death provides the number of excess deaths required, which on average will generate
the estimated net YLL.
In the absence of information about the age distribution of excess deaths, calculations assume that the
average YLL associated with observed and excess deaths are similar. Insofar as excess deaths are thought
likely to generate more YLL than observed deaths the number of excess deaths will tend to be
overestimated. This would tend to underestimate the cost per excess death averted. However, the cost
per life year estimates remain unchanged and do not require such an assumption.
The implied excess deaths associated with net YLL based on the LE of the PBCs (see column 7 Table
C.14) are reported in Table C.17. With the exception of PBC18&19, excess deaths are some proportion
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of total observed deaths in each PBC. The proportion of excess deaths differs by PBC reflecting the
distribution of deaths relative to the LE of the PBC. For example, in those PBCs where a large
proportion of deaths occur below LE (see column 3 and 4) excess deaths tend to be greater proportion of
total deaths (e.g., PBC2, 13 and 10). Where most deaths occur above LE excess deaths as a proportion of
total deaths tend to be lower (e.g., PBC11, 17 and 1). Nevertheless, the impact of the age distribution of
deaths and the age distribution of the at risk population (summarised as LE) on the calculation of excess
deaths is not always obvious as both will affect the numerator (net YLL) as well the denominator (average
YLL per death) in this calculation.
Table C.17: Excess deaths implied by net YLL.
PBC Net YLL
YLL per
observed
death
Excess
deaths
Total
deaths
% excess
deaths
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1 Infectious diseases 36,962 13.4 2,797 6 958 40%
2 Cancer 1,347,184 14.1 95,715 130 810 73%
4 Endocrine 51,225 13.7 3,769 6 764 56%
7 Neurological 93,917 13.7 6,909 15 353 45%
10 Circulatory 823,768 10.5 79,218 159 851 50%
11 Respiratory 68,030 9.2 7,386 65 445 11%
13 Gastro-intestinal 227,703 15.2 15,199 24 147 63%
17 Genito-urinary 18,127 8.3 2,172 10 625 20%
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 16,801 73.9 226 226 100%
Excess deaths are calculated for each gender by dividing net YLLs by the YLL per death (column [3] = column [1] / column [2] )
* The number of excess deaths estimated in PBC18&19 was initially estimated to be 230, higher than the number of total deaths.
This is due to the use of approximations (i.e. in the life expectancy, or in using the net YLL) thus, for consistency, we assumed
this to be 100% of the total deaths.
Estimates of net YLL and changes in life years due to expenditure (see Table C.14 and C.15) have already
accounted for the fact that not all deaths are excess and do not generate YLL. Nevertheless, solving for
the number of implied excess deaths associated with these net YLL estimates allows a comparison of the
cost per excess and observed PBC death avoided and an examination of the interpretation that can be
placed of the life years expected to be gained from an excess or observed death averted.
Since only deaths observed in the PBC can be used to estimate the effects of expenditure (excess deaths
are not directly observed since they rely on an unobserved counterfactual population and would occur
outside the PBC), the outcome elasticities can be interpreted as the proportionate change in observed
PBC mortality due to a proportionate change in PBC expenditure. Equally, however, they can also be
interpreted as the proportionate effect on excess death due to a proportionate change in expenditure so
can be applied to either total observed or total excess deaths. Observed PBC mortality that is sensitive to
changes in expenditure can be regarded as avoidable and it is only this mortality that contributes to the
estimates of outcome elasticities (not all observed mortality is necessarily avoidable and sensitive to
expenditure - such mortality will not contribute to the estimates). Not all observed mortality is excess
when compared to the counterfactual population but this is unrelated to the question of how sensitive it
is to expenditure, i.e., observed mortality will be just as sensitive to expenditure whether or not it is
regarded as excess. Therefore, the estimated outcome elasticities can be applied to either observed PBC
deaths or excess PBC deaths
The cost per excess death and the cost per PBC death averted are reported in Table C.18, and a detailed
breakdown of changes in spend and excess or total deaths across PBCs is shown in Table C.19. The cost
per PBC death averted is, of course; significantly lower than the cost per excess death as excess deaths are
only a proportion of total deaths (see Table C.17). Also the cost per PBC death averted are substantially
lower than those reported in Appendix B (see Tables B8.22 and B8.23), since these estimates do not
restrict the effects of expenditure to PBC deaths under 75.
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Table C.18. Summary of the cost per death averted threshold
Cost per excess
death averted, £
Cost per PBC death
averted, £
[1] [2]
big 4 PBC's £91,129 £32,864
11 PBCs (with mortality) £177,692 £64,774
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs) £653,748 £238,310
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £200,829 £73,208
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
Table C.19: Breakdown of the cost per death averted threshold.
PBC deaths Excess deaths
PBC PBC description
Change
in spend,
£m
Total
PBC
deaths
Change
in PBC
deaths
Cost per
PBC death
averted, £
Excess
deaths
Change
in excess
deaths
Cost per
excess death
averted, £
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
2 Cancer £19 130 809 208.03 £92,147 95 715 152.22 £125,934
10 Circulatory problems £33 159 851 1237.82 £26,878 79 218 613.43 £54,235
11 Respiratory problems £22 65 446 1165.14 £19,142 7 386 131.49 £169,616
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £17 24 148 165.42 £99,757 15 199 104.12 £158,488
Big 4 £32,864 0 £91,129
1 Infectious diseases £8 6 958 2.59 £3,222,218 2 797 1.04 £8,014,595
4 Endocrine problems £18 6 765 54.28 £325,291 3 769 30.24 £583,830
7 Neurological problems £17 15 353 10.59 £1,622,486 6 909 4.77 £3,605,579
17 Genito-urinary problems £32 10 625 4.94 £6,425,694 2 172 1.01 £31,430,287
16 Trauma & injuries* £10 NA 0 NA NA 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £8 226 0.24 £32,813,038 226 0.24 £32,813,038
First 11 PBCs £64,774 £177,691
3 Disorders of Blood £11 172.87 £64,774 63.01 £177,692
5 Mental Health Disorders £204 3152.02 £64,774 1149.00 £177,692
6 Learning Disability £31 475.30 £64,774 173.26 £177,692
8 Problems of Vision £24 373.19 £64,774 136.04 £177,692
9 Problems of Hearing £6 98.72 £64,774 35.99 £177,692
12 Dental problems £23 362.72 £64,774 132.22 £177,692
14 Skin £11 162.30 £64,774 59.16 £177,692
15 Musculo skeletal system £15 233.59 £64,774 85.15 £177,692
20 Poisoning and AE £4 67.80 £64,774 24.71 £177,692
21 Healthy Individuals £18 283.09 £64,774 103.19 £177,692
22 Social Care Needs £68 1043.74 £64,774 380.47 £177,692
23 Other £78 0 £0 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £73,208 £200,828
Recall from Appendix B that the measure of mortality that is available at PCT level and used to estimate
the outcome elasticities is restricted to deaths under 75, as are the published estimates of YLL associated
with them (see Section C.2.1.1). However, to restrict effects only to those under 75 would imply that
there is no excess mortality above 75 or equivalently that there are no health effects of PBC expenditure
above 75. Rather than assume no effects of NHS activity in older populations we apply the effects that
can be observed to the whole PBC but account for deaths that would have otherwise occurred in our
estimate of net YLL in Section C.2.1.3. Table C.20 illustrates the number deaths averted for a 1% change
in budget implicit in the alternative calculations of the cost per death averted threshold.
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Table C.20: Illustration of the number of deaths averted for a 1% change in budget
Using deaths < 75
(Appendix B, Table B8.21)
Using excess deaths
(Table C.18)
Using PBC deaths
(Table C.18)
Cost per
death
averted
(<75), £
Number of deaths
averted (<75) for
a 1% change in
budget
Cost per
excess
death
averted, £
Number of excess
deaths averted for a
1% change in
budget
Cost per
PBC
death
averted, £
Number of PBC
deaths averted for
a 1% change in
budget
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
big 4 PBC's £137,188 665 £91,129 1,001 £32,864 2,776
11 PBCs (with mortality) £270,881 681 £177,692 1,039 £64,774 2,849
All 23 PBCs (zero health
effects for remaining 12
PBCs)
£996,655 681 £653,748 1,039 £238,310 2,849
All 23 PBCs (non-zero
health effects for
remaining 12 PBCs,
except GMS)*
£306,153 2,218 £200, 828 3,381 £73,208 5,191
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
In many respects, whether or not PBC deaths at older ages are as sensitive to changes in expenditure is
not critical since any observed deaths that might be averted at older ages are less likely to generate life
years gained because they are more likely to have occurred anyway in that year (i.e., are excess so generate
zero life years gained anyway). Therefore, they will have very limited impact on cost per life year or
subsequently on cost per QALY estimates (in Sections C.2.2 and C.2.3). For this reason, it is the cost per
life year rather than cost per death averted, whether excess or observed, that is of primary interest. The
cost per PBC or excess death averted (or life saved) should thus not be over interpreted since lives are
never saved (death is only delayed). However, establishing the number of excess and PBC deaths averted
which are associated with net YLL is useful because it enables an assessment of the number of life years
gained associated with each death averted. These are reported for each PBC in Table C.21 and range
from 74.3 years per excess death for PBC 18 & 19 Maternity & neonates to 8.3 per excess death for
PBC17 Genito-urinary. On average, across all 11 PBCs each excess death averted is associated with 11.4
life years gained.
Table C.21: Implied YLL per death averted for each PBC
PBC PBC description
Implied YLL per
excess death
averted
Implied YLL per
PBC death
averted
[1] [2]
2 Cancer 14.07 10.30
10 Circulatory problems 10.40 5.15
11 Respiratory problems 9.21 1.04
13 Gastro-intestinal problems 14.98 9.43
Big 4 11.28 4.07
1 Infectious diseases 13.21 5.31
4 Endocrine problems 13.59 7.57
7 Neurological problems 13.59 6.12
17 Genito-urinary problems 8.34 1.71
16 Trauma & injuries NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates 74.34 74.34
First 11 PBCs 11.37 4.14
However, clinicians or the evaluative literature cannot distinguish whether an observed death is excess or
not. What can be observed is whether groups of similar patients with and without access to a treatment
survive and for how long. Therefore, it is the life years associated with each observed death that provides
a context that can be interpreted based on experience and evidence of how effective those interventions
that could be invested or disinvested tend to be. The average life years expected to be gained associated
with each observed PBC deaths averted takes account of that fact that some deaths that are avoided in
the PBC are not delayed for very long but quickly occur elsewhere and do not generate LY gained (i.e.,
they were not excess deaths). The portion of observed deaths that are regarded as excess depend on how
time is discretised. The data available reports deaths in annual intervals so in this context quickly means
within one year. If deaths were reported in narrower time intervals then a greater proportion of observed
23
deaths would be regarded as excess and, in the limit, with continuous time all observed deaths would be
excess. Of course, the average YLL associated with them would be smaller and is approximated by the
net YLLs per observed death reported (the effects of approximation is likely to be small but unavoidable
as it is due to deaths being reported in annual intervals).
However, establishing the number of excess and PBC deaths averted which are associated with net YLL
is useful because it enables an assessment of the number of life years gained associated with each death
averted. On average across all 11 PBCs each excess death averted is associated with 11.4 life years gained.
These are reported for each PBC in Table C21 in Appendix C and range from 74.3 years per excess death
for PBC 18 & 19 Maternity & neonates to 8.3 for PBC17 Genito-urinary. However, clinicians or the
evaluative literature cannot distinguish whether an observed death is excess or not. What can be
observed is whether groups of similar patients with and without access to a treatment survive and for
how long. Therefore, it is the life years associated with each observed death that provides a context that
can be interpreted based on experience and evidence of how effective those interventions that could be
invested or disinvested tend to be. The average life years expected to be gained associated with each
observed PBC deaths averted takes account of that fact that some deaths that are avoided in the PBC are
not delayed for very long but quickly occur elsewhere and do not generate LY gained (i.e., they were not
excess deaths). What portion of observed deaths are regarded as excess depend on how time is
discretised.
The data available reports deaths in annual intervals so in this context quickly means within one year. If
deaths were reported in narrower time intervals then a greater proportion of observed deaths would be
regarded as excess and in the limit with continuous time all observed deaths would be excess. Of course,
the average YLL associated with them would be smaller and is approximated by the net YLLs reported in
Table 4.5 per observed death (the effects of approximation is likely to be small but unavoidable as it is
due to deaths being reported in annual intervals). These are also reported for each PBC in Table C21 in
Appendix C and range from 74.3 years per observed death for PBC 18 & 19 Maternity & neonates8 to 1.0
for PBC11 Respiratory problems, i.e., the YLL per PBC death are much lower for those PBCs where a
small proportion of observed deaths are excess. On average across all 11 PBCs each PBC death averted is
associated with 4.1 life years gained.
C.2.1.5 Summary of cost per life year estimates
The sequence of analysis set out above has enabled an examination of the impact of the limitations
associated with the incomplete reporting mortality data at PCT level and incomplete coverage of
published YLL estimates. We have also been able to consider effects above 75 while taking account of
that fact that many deaths would have occurred anyway, despite the limited information available about
the population at risk within a PBC. The GBD Study does provide some information about the age and
gender distribution of the population at risk in a PBC so offers some improvement over the other
assumptions that would otherwise be required (i.e., that the distribution of age and gender is the same as
the general population or follows the distribution of observed deaths). For this reason the cost per life
year threshold in column 4 of Table C.15 and repeated in lines 1 to 4 in Table C.22 are regarded as the
central or best estimates given the evidence available and the credibility of alternative assumption that
could be made. As explained in Section C.1, these are based on the conservative assumption that any
health effects of changes in expenditure are restricted to one year, which, to some extent, may be offset
by the more optimistic assumption any death averted returns the individual to the mortality risk faced by
the general population, matched for age and gender.
8 This is the same as life years associated with excess deaths since all observed deaths in this PBC are
excess.
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Table C.22: Summary of the cost per life year threshold with upper and lower bounds
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year
YLL per PBC death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL
big 4 PBC's £8,080 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 [2]
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs) £57,497 [3]
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £17,663 [4]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: Remainder of disease
YLL per PBC death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL
big 4 PBC's £3,846 [5]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £6,106 [6]
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs) £22,463 [7]
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £6,901 [8]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year
YLL per PBC death averted: 2 YLL
big 4 PBC's £16,432 [9]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £32,387 [10]
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs) £119,155 [11]
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £36,604 [12]
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
It does not seem credible to imagine that NHS expenditure has no health effects in the 12 PBCs which
do not have sufficient mortality reported at PCT level to estimate outcome elasticities - what is implied by
the estimate reported in line 3. Therefore, it is the estimates reported in lines 2 and 4 that are of policy
interest. The estimate of £15,628 per life year (line 2) is restricted to the effects of changes in expenditure
in the 11PBCs where outcome elasticities can be estimated. The threshold of £17,663 per life year uses
the estimated health effects of expenditure in these PBC as a surrogate for health effects in the others,
i.e., assuming that the effects that can be observed will be similar to those that cannot. However, no
health effects are assigned to PBC23 (General Medical Services) on the basis that any health effects of this
expenditure would be recorded in the other PBCs.
It would be inappropriate to assign all the change in GMS expenditure to the estimate of cost per life year
based only on the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities because it would imply that GMS only contributes to
these PBCs. Restricting attention to the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities but allocating part of the
change in GMS expenditure to them based on their proportional share of changes in overall expenditure
would yield the same cost per life year as reported in line 4. 9
The extreme upper and lower bounds for the cost per life year thresholds in Table C.22 are based on
making the necessary assumptions about duration of health effects and how long a death might be
averted optimistic (providing the lower bound for the threshold) or conservative (an upper bound for the
threshold). The lower bound (lines 5 to 8) is based on assuming that health effects are not restricted to
one year but apply to the whole of the remaining disease duration of the population at risk in PBCs
during the expenditure year. Estimates of the average disease durations across the PBCs used in this
calculation are depicted in Table C.23 (column 2).10 These were obtained from the GBD Study (see
Addendum 1 to this Appendix). Although this lower bound for the threshold combines optimistic
assumptions, it is possible, indeed likely, that at least some expenditure may have effects on the health
outcomes of future patients that are not currently part of the population at risk in a PBC, e.g.,
investments or disinvestment in prevention will have an impact on populations that are incident to PBCs
in the future. Such effects are not captured in any of the estimates presented in this chapter so all are
conservative with respect to this type of health effect of changes in expenditure.
9 It should be noted that including changes in GMS expenditure but not assigning health effects to this PBC is likely
to overestimate the threshold because any health effects associated with GMS will not be reflected in the estimated
outcome elasticities of other PBCs unless the effects happen to be correlated with changes in expenditure in those
PBCs.
10 This information is also used in Section C.2.3.
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Table C.23: Disease duration by PBC (GBD).
PBC
Duration of disease for
an incident patient
(years), GBD
Remaining duration of
disease for at risk
population (years), GBD
[1] [2]
1 6.21 3.11
2 1.19 0.59
3 1.07 0.53
4 24.83 12.42
5 7.41 3.70
6 3.46 1.73
7 30.91 15.45
8 13.96 6.98
9 16.40 8.20
10 3.21 1.61
11 11.24 5.62
12 0.33 0.17
13 0.27 0.13
14 1.01 0.50
15 9.56 4.78
16 3.74 1.87
17 1.11 0.56
18 0.58 0.29
19 9.71 4.86
20 0.93 0.47
21 1.07 0.53
22 3.74 1.87
23 3.74 1.87
The upper bound (lines 9 to 12 in Table C.22) is based on the combination of assuming that health
effects are restricted to one year for the population currently at risk and that any death averted is only
averted for the minimum duration consistent with the mortality data. The econometrics work used the
average of 3 years of mortality (2006 to 2008), so the estimated outcome elasticities are based on
differences in mortality that remain after averaging over three years. Therefore, the estimated effects are
based on differences in observed PBC deaths that must have been sustained, on average, for more than a
minimum of 2 years. This is because whilst variation in mortality the first year of data will only contribute
to estimates if differences are sustained for a minimum of 3 years, variation in mortality in the second
year will only contribute if it is sustained for a minimum of 2 years, and in the third year only if sustained
for 1 year. If differences in mortality are similar each year (the three years contribute equally to the
estimates) then estimated effects must have been sustained, on average, for a minimum of 2 years.11 These
estimates can be interpreted as an upper bound given the data available and therefore the analysis that has
been feasible.
C.2.2 Adjusting life years for quality of life
The central or best estimates of the cost per life year threshold, which were presented in Table C.22 (lines
2 and 4) take no account of the health related quality of life in which years of life, expected to be gained
or lost through changes in expenditure, are likely to be lived. Even if attention is restricted to the direct
health consequences of changes in mortality, estimates of the cost per life year will tend to overestimate
the effects of changes in expenditure (underestimate the threshold) compared to a more complete
measure of health that accounts for the quality in which the years of life are expected to be lived. In this
Section we examine the ways in which the life years reported in Section C.2.1 can be adjusted for quality,
taking account of information that is available about: i) how quality of life differs by age and gender (see
Section C.2.1), and ii) how the quality of life years associated with mortality changes might be affected by
the types of diseases that make up each PBC (see Section C.2.2). Throughout we continue to take
account for counterfactual deaths in the way described in Section C.2.1.3 by making the adjustment for
11Since some of the variation in mortality in 1st year that is not sustained to the 3rd year will nevertheless be
sustained for 1 or 2 years, 2 life years per death averted represents somewhat less than the minimum, consistent with
restricting life years gained to the observed mortality data.
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quality to the life years associated with every observed death before calculating a quality adjusted net YLL.
The implications for a cost per quality adjusted life year (QALY) threshold that only accounts for the
health effects of mortality changes are presented in Section C.2.3.2. In Section C.2.3 we explore the ways
in which the likely direct effects of expenditure on quality of life (other than through mortality) might also
be taken into account.
C.2.2.1 Quality of life based on the general population
The most commonly used metric of health related quality of life in the UK is EQ5D,[1] which is specified
in the NICE reference case for methods of technology appraisal.[2] This metric has 5 dimensions of
quality each with three possible levels. Each of these 243 possible health states is valued relative to a
score of one, which represents full or best imaginable health (the best score across all 5 dimensions), and
a score of zero, which represents death, based on a representative sample of the UK population.[3]
Therefore, insofar as the years of life expected gained or lost through changes in expenditure would be
lived in this state of full health, the cost per life year thresholds reported in Table C.22 would also be the
cost per QALY thresholds, albeit ones that only account for the health effects of mortality changes.
However, unsurprisingly, there is good evidence that, on average, the general population is not in this
state of full health. Therefore, the quality of life score associated with the health states experienced by the
general population are less than 1, and are expected to decline with age and to differ by gender. These
quality of life norms for the general population by age and gender are illustrated in Figure C.4 based on
an analysis of data from the Health Survey for England (HSE, see Addendum 1 to this Appendix for a
description on HSE data and the analysis of quality of life norms illustrated in Figure C.4).
Figure C.4: Quality of life for the general population by age and gender12
These quality of life norms can be applied to the YLL associated with all observed deaths in each PBC,
taking account of gender and age at death. The results are reported in column 4 to 6 of Table C.24.
Table C.24: Net YLL adjusted for quality of life norms
PBC
Unadjusted life years Quality adjusted life years
YLL YLG Net YLL YLL YLG Net YLL
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1 Infectious diseases 58,686 21,724 36,962 47,481 14,618 32,864
2 Cancer 1,473,733 126,549 1,347,184 1,143,445 84,036 1,059,409
4 Endocrine 66,283 15,058 51,225 52,856 9,973 42,883
7 Neurological 135,686 41,770 93,917 109,349 28,262 81,087
10 Circulatory 1,102,020 278,251 823,768 848,046 183,330 664,717
11 Respiratory 298,343 230,313 68,030 231,578 154,743 76,835
13 Gastro-intestinal 273,117 45,414 227,703 216,256 30,277 185,979
17 Genito-urinary 47,229 29,101 18,127 35,929 18,947 16,982
18+19 Maternity & neonates 16,801 0 16,801 14,568 0 14,568
12 Pooled quality of life estimates provided by Dr Anju Keetharuth, University of Sheffield.
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There are two effects of adjusting life years for quality: i) since quality of life norms are always less than 1
the adjusted YLL and YLG are always lower than the unadjusted values in columns 1 and 2 (previously
reported in Table C.5); and ii) deaths above LE are necessarily at older ages with poorer quality of life
norms than those below, so the difference between adjusted and unadjusted values is greater for YLG
than YLL (Table C.25 illustrates these effects by showing the implied QoL scores applied to YLL and
YLG). The overall effect of quality adjustment on net YLL is the balance of these two effects, and tends
to reduce the net YLL (compare column 6 and 3 in Table C.24). The only exception is PBC11
(Respiratory) which has a large proportion of deaths occurring above the life expectancy of the PBC
population (see Table C.14).
Table C.25: Implied quality of life score in the net YLL adjustment for quality of life norms
PBC QoL score for YLL QoL score for YLG
[1] [2]
1 Infectious diseases 0.81 0.67
2 Cancer 0.78 0.66
4 Endocrine 0.80 0.66
7 Neurological 0.81 0.68
10 Circulatory 0.77 0.66
11 Respiratory 0.78 0.67
13 Gastro-intestinal 0.79 0.67
17 Genito-urinary 0.76 0.65
18+19 Maternity & neonates 0.87 NA
The quality adjusted net YLL figure in Column 6 suggest that the health effects of mortality are lower
than when relying only on unadjusted life years in Section C.2.1.3. Therefore, the health effects of
changes in expenditure on this more complete measure of health will also be lower. The implications of
these adjustments to a cost per QALY threshold that only accounts for the direct health effects of
mortality are summarised in Table C.26, and detailed in Table C.27. As expected, the cost per QALY
threshold based on adjusting the life years gained or lost (column 2, Table C.26) is higher than a threshold
based on unadjusted life years (column 1 in Tables C.26, these results were previously reported in Tables
C.15 and C.22).
Table C.26: Summary of cost per QALY threshold based on population norms and mortality effects
Cost per life year threshold Cost per QALY threshold
Population norms
[1] [2]
big 4 PBC's £8,080 £9,631
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £18,622
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining
12 PBCs) £57,497 £68,513
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for
remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £17,663 £21,047
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal except GMS.
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Table C.27: A breakdown of the cost per QALY threshold based on population norms
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
[1] [3] [4]
2 Cancer £19 1685 £11,378
10 Circulatory problems £33 5147 £6,464
11 Respiratory problems £22 1368 £16,304
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £17 1274 £12,952
Big 4 £9,631
1 Infectious diseases £8 12 £682,211
4 Endocrine problems £18 344 £51,309
7 Neurological problems £17 56 £307,201
17 Genito-urinary problems £32 8 £4,020,316
16 Trauma & injuries* £10 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £8 16 £509,044
First 11 PBCs £18,622
3 Disorders of Blood £11 601 £18,622
5 Mental Health Disorders £204 10964 £18,622
6 Learning Disability £31 1653 £18,622
8 Problems of Vision £24 1298 £18,622
9 Problems of Hearing £6 343 £18,622
12 Dental problems £23 1262 £18,622
14 Skin £11 565 £18,622
15 Musculo skeletal system £15 812 £18,622
20 Poisoning and adverse effects £4 236 £18,622
21 Healthy Individuals £18 985 £18,622
22 Social Care Needs £68 3630 £18,622
23 Other £78 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £21,047
Table C.28 depicts the judgements over life years, quality of life weights and total QALYs implicit in
calculations of the threshold cost per QALY in Table C.26. Specifically, columns 1 and 2 of Table C.28
report the number of life years associated with each death averted for each PBC; as expected, the values
are equal to those in Table C.21 as estimates rely on the net YLLs evaluated in Section C.2.1.3. In
columns 3 and 4, the number of QALYs gained associated with each death averted are presented. These
ranged from 64.46 QALYs gained per PBC death averted for PBCs18&19 (Maternity and Neonates) to
1.17 QALYs per PBC death averted for PBC11 (Respiratory)  column 4. In general, these values are
expected to be smaller than the unadjusted YLL per PBC death averted in column 2. The exception is
PBC 11 (respiratory)  in this PBC, the number of YLL and YLG are more similar than in other PBCs
(respectively, columns 1 and 2 of Table C.24), and given that YLGs are weighted more heavily (with
lower QoL scores) than YLL, the netting of adjusted estimates returns a higher number than the netting
of unadjusted estimates. On average, across all 11 PBCs each PBC death averted is associated with 3.5
QALYs gained.
Table C.28: Implied YLL per excess death averted and implied QoL score per YLL gained, for each PBC
PBC PBC description
Implied YLL per
excess death
averted
Implied YLL per
PBC death averted
Implied QALYs
gained per excess
death averted
Implied QALYs
gained per PBC
death averted
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 14.07 10.30 11.07 8.10
10 Circulatory 10.40 5.15 8.39 4.16
11 Respiratory 9.21 1.04 10.40 1.17
13 Gastro-intestinal 14.98 9.43 12.24 7.70
Big 4 11.28 4.07 9.46 3.41
1 Infectious diseases 13.21 5.31 11.75 4.72
4 Endocrine 13.59 7.57 11.38 6.34
7 Neurological 13.59 6.12 11.74 5.28
17 Genito-urinary 8.34 1.71 7.82 1.60
16 Trauma & injuries* NA NA NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 74.34 74.34 64.46 64.46
First 11 PBCs 11.37 4.14 9.54 3.48
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C.2.2.2 Adjusting age related quality of life for disease decrements
Adjusting life years for age and gender related quality of life norms assumes that any life year gained
through a change in expenditure would be lived in a similar quality of life to the general population. It is
possible however, that patients benefiting from reduced mortality may, nevertheless, continue to be
affected by the type of diseases that make up each PBC and experience the quality of life associated with
the original disease.
The Health Outcome Data Repository (HODaR)[4] provides over 30,000 observations of EQ-5D
measures of quality of life by ICD code and the age and gender of the patients in the sample (see
Addendum 1 to this Appendix). Although this is a rich UK data set, there were a limited number of
observations for some of the less common ICD codes. For this reason HODaR was supplemented with
information from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)[5] which also provides EQ-5D by ICD
and reports the average age of respondents (see Addendum 1 to this Appendix). These data provided a
means of estimating the quality of life associated with each ICD code at the average age of respondents in
the pooled sample (ICD estimates of the quality of life score and age were pooled across datasets by
considering the number of patients from each dataset contributing to estimates, i.e. a weighted average).
The quality of life associated with each PBC was then expressed as the average of the quality of life
associated with its component ICDs. The average quality of life scores across ICDs which contribute to
each PBC and the average age and gender of respondents were used to calculate a PBC disease related
decrement (disutility) based on quality of life norms from the general population  it is important to note
that by expressing the quality of life effects of different diseases as age related decrements we do not
require the HODaR and MEPS samples to necessarily be representative of the age distribution of the
population at risk in the PBCs.
Table C.29 summarises the data from HoDAR and MEPS and the quality of life decrements used further
in calculations of the threshold, namely: the number of patients for which quality of life scores were
available (column 1), the average age of these patients by gender (columns 2 and 3), the average quality of
life scores across PBCs (column 4), the quality of life scores for the population norms by gender
(columns 5 and 6), and the calculated disease related decrements (columns 7 and 8).
Table C.29: QoL scores per PBC from different sources
HoDAR/MEPS
Population
norms
Disease related
decrement compared
to population normsN average age
QoL score
for diseasedPBC male female male female male female
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
1 263 54.0 47.1 0.667 0.859 0.830 0.192 0.163
2 13 324 64.3 59.8 0.692 0.809 0.830 0.117 0.138
3 2 464 58.6 58.1 0.656 0.859 0.830 0.203 0.174
4 7 128 57.3 56.5 0.701 0.859 0.830 0.157 0.128
5 12 733 47.8 47.9 0.557 0.859 0.830 0.301 0.272
6 301 25.8 25.3 0.671 0.937 0.924 0.266 0.253
7 10 296 55.8 53.8 0.546 0.859 0.830 0.312 0.283
8 11 536 63.8 64.5 0.719 0.809 0.796 0.089 0.077
9 1 023 61.7 59.8 0.778 0.809 0.830 0.031 0.051
10 33 854 64.4 64.1 0.629 0.809 0.796 0.179 0.167
11 19 646 48.4 47.2 0.634 0.859 0.830 0.224 0.195
12 1 811 40.9 40.0 0.781 0.910 0.894 0.129 0.113
13 23 138 57.3 55.5 0.653 0.859 0.830 0.206 0.177
14 5 659 54.8 54.0 0.695 0.859 0.830 0.164 0.134
15 34 590 56.4 56.6 0.578 0.859 0.830 0.280 0.251
16 2 652 46.0 58.3 0.652 0.859 0.830 0.207 0.178
17 13 651 57.5 53.0 0.711 0.859 0.830 0.147 0.118
18+19 1 566 37.8 31.7 0.848 0.910 0.894 0.063 0.047
20 1 569 59.1 52.3 0.584 0.859 0.830 0.275 0.246
21 7 488 60.6 60.3 0.661 0.809 0.796 0.147 0.135
22 25 78.4 81.4 0.156 0.798 0.636 0.642 0.480
23 1 002 62.6 60.8 0.639 0.809 0.796 0.170 0.158
no gender details were available from MEPS so assumed 50:50 split of frequency
only primary diagnosis is used from HoDAR data
a lower bound of 0 is assumed for disutility for each PBC
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Figure C.5 illustrates the use of the decrement to quality of life norms for PBC1 (Infectious disease)
across a range of ages. For PBC1, the quality of life score was evaluated across the component ICD codes
was evaluated to be 0.667 in HoDAR and MEPS, at an average age of 54 for male respondents. Since the
quality of life norms for males age 54 is 0.859 this suggests a decrement associated with membership of
PBC1 of 0.192, which can then be applied to quality of life norms by age as illustrated in Figure C.5.
Figure C.5: Quality of life for males in PBC1 (Infectious disease) and the general population by age
In principle, it would be possible to estimate disease related disutility by age rather than assume a fixed
additive decrement. HODaR does provide age for each reported quality of life score but MEPs only
provides average age of respondents in published summaries. However, even with access to raw scores
and the age and gender of each, it is very unlikely that there would be sufficient data to estimate age
related decrements in each of the component ICDs. It would, however, be possible to assume a
proportionate rather than fixed decrement by age. However, the average age of respondents in the
pooled HODaR and MEPs sample (columns 2 and 3 of Table C.29) tends to be older than the age
distribution of the PBC populations (columns 3 and 4 of Table C.13). Given that older individuals are
expected to have a lower quality of life (norm), relative decrements can overestimate the decrements
observed in younger patients. By applying overestimated decrements, the quality adjusted net YLL would
be underestimated and the cost per QALY threshold increased compared to the fixed decrement applied
here.
Quality of life norms adjusted for disease related decrements can be applied to the YLL associated with
observed deaths in each PBC, taking account of gender and age at death in the same way as Section C.3.1.
To do so, the PBC decrements calculated from HoDAR and MEPS were applied to each observed death
and the age at which each life year was gained or lost (from ONS). The results are reported in columns 4
to 6 of Table C.30. The overall effect of quality adjustment that also applies a disease related decrement
is to reduce the net YLL to a greater extent than adjustment with population norms alone (compare
column 6 in Table C.30 to column 6 in Table C.24).
Table C.30: Net YLL adjusted for disease and age related quality of life
PBC
Unadjusted life years Quality adjusted life years
YLL YLG YLL YLG YLL YLG
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1 Infectious diseases 58,686 21,724 36,962 37,055 10,793 26,262
2 Cancer 1,473,733 126,549 1,347,184 955,690 67,930 887,760
4 Endocrine 66,283 15,058 51,225 43,394 7,844 35,550
7 Neurological 135,686 41,770 93,917 68,893 15,842 53,050
10 Circulatory 1,102,020 278,251 823,768 656,145 135,241 520,905
11 Respiratory 298,343 230,313 68,030 169,269 106,505 62,764
13 Gastro-intestinal 273,117 45,414 227,703 163,593 21,677 141,916
17 Genito-urinary 47,229 29,101 18,127 29,749 15,152 14,598
18+19 Maternity & neonates 16,801 0 16,801 13,662 0 13,662
The implied quality of life weights (considering the disease related decrements) for YLL and YLG are
shown in Table C.31. Note that, as expected, the weights assume a lower value than in Table C.25.
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Table C.31: Implied QoL weights in the net YLL adjusted for disease and age related quality of life
PBC
QoL weights
for YLL
QoL weights
for YLG
[1] [2]
1 Infectious diseases 0.63 0.50
2 Cancer 0.65 0.54
4 Endocrine 0.65 0.52
7 Neurological 0.51 0.38
10 Circulatory 0.60 0.49
11 Respiratory 0.57 0.46
13 Gastro-intestinal 0.60 0.48
17 Genito-urinary 0.63 0.52
18+19 Maternity & neonates 0.81 NA
Combining quality of life adjustments for both population norms and disease related decrements assumes
that any life years gained due to a reduction in mortality will be lived in the diseased state until life
expectancy, i.e., that all diseases are not just chronic but disease duration is lifelong. Inevitably this
assumption means that the health effects of changes in mortality will be reduced. Consequently the cost
per QALY threshold reported in Table C.32 (column 2) will be higher than adjusting life years gained for
population norms in Table C.26 (column 2). A detailed breakdown of the cost per QALY threshold based
on disease related disability and mortality effects is shown is Table C.33.
Table C.32: Summary of cost per QALY threshold based on disease related disutility
Cost per life year threshold Cost per QALY threshold
Disease related disutility
[1] [2]
big 4 PBC's £8,080 £12,109
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £23,395
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining
12 PBCs) £57,497 £86,072
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for
remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)* £17,663 £26,441
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal except GMS.
Table C.33: Breakdown of the cost per QALY threshold based on disease related disutility
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
[1] [4] [5]
2 Cancer £19 1412 £13,578
10 Circulatory problems £33 4034 £8,248
11 Respiratory problems £22 1117 £19,960
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £17 972 £16,974
Big 4 0 £12,109
1 Infectious diseases £8 10 £853,712
4 Endocrine problems £18 285 £61,892
7 Neurological problems £17 37 £469,558
17 Genito-urinary problems £32 7 £4,676,874
16 Trauma & injuries* £10 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £8 15 £542,801
First 11 PBCs 0 £23,395
3 Disorders of Blood £11 479 £23,395
5 Mental Health Disorders £204 8727 £23,395
6 Learning Disability £31 1316 £23,395
8 Problems of Vision £24 1033 £23,395
9 Problems of Hearing £6 273 £23,395
12 Dental problems £23 1004 £23,395
14 Skin £11 449 £23,395
15 Musculo skeletal system £15 647 £23,395
20 Poisoning and adverse effects £4 188 £23,395
21 Healthy Individuals £18 784 £23,395
22 Social Care Needs £68 2890 £23,395
23 Other £78 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £26,441
32
The number of life years gained associated with each death averted (columns 1 and 2 in Table C.34) is,
again, consistent with previous estimates (Tables C.28 and C.21). The average number of QALYs gained
across all 11 PBCs is 2.8 QALY per death averted (column 4 in Table C.34). As expected this value is
lower than in the previous section (column 4 in Table C.28).
Table C.34: Implied YLL per death averted and implied QoL score per YLL gained, for each PBC
PBC PBC description
Implied YLL per
excess death
averted
Implied YLL per
PBC death averted
Implied QALYs
gained per excess
death averted
Implied QALYs
gained per PBC
death averted
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 14.07 10.30 9.28 6.79
10 Circulatory 10.40 5.15 6.58 3.26
11 Respiratory 9.21 1.04 8.50 0.96
13 Gastro-intestinal 14.98 9.43 9.34 5.88
Big 4 11.28 4.07 7.53 2.71
1 Infectious diseases 13.21 5.31 9.39 3.77
4 Endocrine 13.59 7.57 9.43 5.26
7 Neurological 13.59 6.12 7.68 3.46
17 Genito-urinary 8.34 1.71 6.72 1.37
16 Trauma & injuries* NA NA NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 74.34 74.34 60.45 60.45
First 11 PBCs 11.37 4.14 7.60 2.77
C.2.2.3 Summary of the cost per QALY threshold based only on mortality effects
The analysis to this point is summarised in Table C.35. The three estimates of a cost per QALY
threshold are based on assuming that each life year gained is either: lived in full health (see column 1,
equal to the cost per life year estimates in Table C.22), lived in a quality of life that reflects age and gender
norms of the general population (column 2); or lived in a quality of life that reflects the original disease
state (column 3).
Table C.35: Summary of QALY threshold estimates based only on mortality effects
[1] [2] [3]
(QoL score =1) (population norms)
(Disease related
disutility)
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted**: ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL
QALYs per death averted**: ~4.1 QALYs ~3.5 QALYs ~2.8 QALYs
big 4 PBC's £8,080 £9,631 £12,109 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £18,622 £23,395 [2]
All 23 PBCs* £17,663 £21,047 £26,441 [3]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: Remainder of disease Remainder of disease Remainder of disease
YLL per death averted**: ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL
QALYs per death averted**: ~4.1 QALYs ~3.5 QALYs ~2.8 QALYs
big 4 PBC's £3,846 £4,252 £5,319 [4]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £6,106 £6,852 £8,568 [5]
All 23 PBCs* £6,901 £7,744 £9,683 [6]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted**: 2 YLL 2 YLL 2 YLL
QALYs per death averted**: 2 QALY ~1.9 QALY ~1.5 QALY
big 4 PBC's £16,432 £17,456 £21,747 [7]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £32,387 £34,492 £42,967 [8]
All 23 PBCs* £36,604 £38,983 £48,561 [9]
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal except GMS.
** see Tables C.20, C.27 and C.33
The weights reflecting the quality in which each of the years of life saved is lived implied in each of these
three estimates is shown in Table C.36.
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Table C.36: Implied QoL weight per YLL gained
PBC PBC description Full health
Population
norms
Disease related
disutility
[1] [2] [3]
2 Cancer 1 0.79 0.66
10 Circulatory 1 0.81 0.63
11 Respiratory 1 1.13 0.92
13 Gastro-intestinal 1 0.82 0.62
Big 4 1 0.84 0.67
1 Infectious diseases 1 0.89 0.71
4 Endocrine 1 0.84 0.69
7 Neurological 1 0.86 0.56
17 Genito-urinary 1 0.94 0.81
16 Trauma & injuries NA NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates 1 0.87 0.81
First 11 PBCs 1 0.84 0.67
Assuming that life years gained are lived in full health is not credible and should be regarded as an
underestimate of the threshold given what is known about quality of life norms for the general population
(see Figure C.4). Equally, assuming that all life years gained are lived in the quality of life of the original
disease state does not seem credible either and is likely to overestimate the threshold since it assumes that
all disease is not only chronic but lifelong and all life years would be lived in the diseased state until death.
The information that is available about disease duration suggests that many types of disease that comprise
the PBCs are not chronic and certainty not lifelong (see Table C.23). Although adjusting life years gained
for the quality of life of the general population taking account of age and gender (in column 2, Table C35)
is likely to underestimate the cost per QALY threshold based only on mortality effects, it probably
represents the best of the three alternative estimates available at this stage of the analysis . The lower
and upper bounds are based on combining optimistic and pessimistic assumptions about the duration of
health effects and how long a death might be averted as described in Section C.2.1.5.
However, it should be noted that these cost per QALY thresholds only account for the direct health
effects of changes in mortality due to changes in expenditure. Insofar as much, or at least some part, of
NHS activity and expenditure is intended to improve quality of life, not just mortality, then these
estimates will underestimate total health effects and overestimate a cost per QALY threshold based on a
more complete measure of possible health effects. In Section C.2.3 we explore the ways in which the
likely effects of expenditure on quality of life (other than through mortality) might also be taken into
account.
C.2.3. Including quality of life effects during disease
The cost per QALY thresholds presented in Section C.2.2 only account for the health (QALY) effects of
changes in mortality due to changes in expenditure. It does not seem credible to suppose that all NHS
activity and expenditure only influences mortality with no effect on the quality of life while alive and
experiencing a disease. Insofar as changes in NHS expenditure will also affect quality of life as well as
mortality then total health effects will be underestimated and the thresholds presented in Table C.35 will
overestimate the cost per QALY threshold. In this section we explore ways to also take account of those
effects on health not directly associated with mortality and life year affects (i.e., the pure quality of life
effects) to estimate an overall cost per QALY threshold.
The routine reporting of quality of life outcomes are increasingly available at PCT level (see Addendum 1
for a description of these data). In principle, the variation in such measures of outcome across PCTs
could be used to estimate outcome elasticities for quality of life rather than mortality effects using similar
econometric methods to those described in Appendix B (see Section B.8.8 for the results of an
exploratory econometric analysis of these data). However, the currently limited coverage of routine
reporting of these outcomes means that it is not feasible to estimate quality of life effects across all the
PBCs using these data. Here we explore how estimates of effects of expenditure that can be observed
(i.e., on mortality) can be used to infer the likely effects on what cannot be directly observed (quality of
34
life), rather than making extreme assumptions that are not credible (e.g., assuming that changes in
expenditure will have no effects on quality of life outcomes).
In Section C.2.3.1 we use three alternative estimates of the ratio of QALYs to life years lost due to
different types of disease as a means of inferring the change in QALYs that is likely to be associated with
the estimated change in YLL, i.e., applying the total QALYs lost associated with each YLL with disease.
This is consistent with regarding the estimates of the mortality and life year effects as a surrogate for a
more complete measure of the health effects of a change in expenditure.
However, these ratios of QALYs lost to life years lost due to disease in those PBC where outcome
elasticities could not be estimated cannot inform estimates of the threshold (there are no estimated life
year effects with which to apply the ratios). Nonetheless, the sources of information on which ratios are
based also provide much of the information required to calculate the QALY burden of disease in these
areas, which can be used to inform estimates of the threshold. Therefore, in section C.2.3.2 we use an
estimate of the QALY burden of disease, infer a proportionate effect on burden from the observed
effects on life years, and then apply this proportionate effect to the measures of QALY burden for all the
other PBCs. In this way we can use all the information available about the mortality and quality of life
effects of the different types of disease that make up each PBC, including those where mortality based
outcome elasticities are not available.
C.2.3.1 Using ratios of QALYs to YLL
The ratio of the total QALYs to years of life lost (YLL) due to a disease indicates the number of QALYs
associated with each YLL. Therefore, any change in YLL is expected to generate a number of QALYs
indicated by the ratio - in this way, the estimated effects on mortality and life years are interpreted as a
surrogate for a more complete measure of total health effects, which is reasonable. For example, a
disease with a ratio greater than 1 suggests that each YLL across the at risk population is associated with
more than one QALY, i.e., there are significantly greater quality of life effects while experiencing the
disease. Therefore, a change in expenditure that leads to 1 life year gained in this type of disease may
generate a greater QALY effect than the same life year effects in a disease where this ratio is less than 1,
i.e., where most of the effect of disease is on mortality rather than quality of life. Therefore, using these
ratios provides a means of accounting for the likely effect on quality of life other than through effects on
mortality.
To understand the differences between the three ratios presented below it is useful to regard the total
QALY lost to YLL ratio (R) for a particular disease as the sum of two ratios: i) the QALYs lost due to
premature death to YLL ratio (Rdeath) and ii) the QALYs lost during disease (while alive) to YLL ratio
(Ralive), as depicted in Equation 4.ܴ = ொ஺௅௒௟௢௦௧௒௅௅ = ொ஺௅௒௟௢௦௧೛ೝ೐೘ೌ೟ೠೝ೐೏೐ೌ೟೓௒௅௅ + ொ஺௅௒௟௢௦௧ೢ೓೔೗೐ೌ೗೔ೡ೐௒௅௅ , (4)ܴௗ௘௔௧௛ + ܴ௔௟௜௩௘
Insofar as YLL would not have been lived in full health, the quality of life effects captured in Rdeath are
estimated to be lower than 1. Note that the analyses in Section C.2.2 already imply a Rdeath ratio at PBC
level. The second component of the ratio, Ralive, represents QALYs lost during disease for the at risk
population as a proportion of the YLL observed in the same population  in diseases for which quality of
life during disease is compromised but life expectancy is not changed significantly Ralive may thus assume
high values. The ratios do not represent the balance of QALY gains due to mortality and morbidity in a
single patient, but rather in the population. Where Rdeath if lower than 1, only when the pure QALY
effects offset the less than full quality of life of the YLL is the ratio greater than one. Therefore, ratios
less than one are possible even when disease has measurable quality of life effects for those experiencing
it.
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DALY to YLL ratios
The WHO GBD study provides UK specific estimates of the years of life lived with disability and the
years of life lost due to different types of disease. Diseases in GBD are classified using U-codes that can
then be mapped to ICD-10, as illustrated in Table C.37 using a few examples (Addendum 1 provides
more details on the mapping procedure). GBD uses Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) as a measure
of the burden of disease. This DALY measure has two components: i) the years of life lived with
disability (YLD), which evaluates the number of years lived with disability over the durations of disease,
and incorporates weights (between zero and one) to reflect the scale of disability experienced in each year;
and ii) the years of life lost (YLL).
Table C.37: Illustration of the mapping between U-code and ICD
U-code ICDs
U037 (Other infectious diseases)
A02,A05,A20-A28,A31,A32,A38,A40-A49,A65-A70,A74-A79, A81,A82,
A83.1-A83.9, A84-A89,A92-A99, B00-B04,B06-B15,B25-B49,B58-B60, B64,
B66-B72, B74.3-B74.9,B75,B82-B89,B92-B99, G04
U016 (Tetanus) A33-A35
U061 (Mouth and oropharynx cancers) C00-C14
U057 (Iron-deficiency anaemia) D50, D64.9
The total DALY associated with a disease is simply YLL+YLD. Therefore, the DALY to YLL ratio is
(YLL+YLD)/YLL or equivalently YLL/YLL + YLD/YLL. Since the first term (YLL/YLL = Rdeath)
must equal one and the second (Ralive </'<//PXVWEHDUDWLREDVHGRQ'$/<VPXVW
necessarily be bounded by one.ܴ஽஺௅௒ = ஽஺௅௒௒௅௅ = (௒௅௅ା௒௅஽)௒௅௅ = 1 + ௒௅஽௒௅௅ (5)ܴௗ௘௔௧௛ + ܴ௔௟௜௩௘
This is illustrated in Table C.38a for the four different diseases (classified by U-codes) introduced in Table
C.36 which reflect diseases where mortality is the major component (e.g., U016) and where the impact of
disease on the quality of life while alive is the major component (e.g., U141).
Table C.38a: Examples of DALY to YLL ratios
Ucode DALY ratios (Rdeath + Ralive)
U037 (Other infectious diseases) 1.23 (1+0.23)
U016 (Tetanus) 1.00 (1+0)*
U061 (Mouth and oropharynx cancers) 1.05 (1+0.05)
U141 (Spina bifida) 2.34 (1+1.34)**
* Given the short disease duration, it is only mortality effects that contribute to the ratio
** Quality of life effects during disease contribute significantly to estimates of the ratio
Note that the estimates of GBD YLL used here are derived using UK data on mortality (relating to the
year 2004) by age and gender groups  we assume these data to be from ONS and thus consistent with
the data used in this work. However, the calculation of YLLs in GBD differs from both the approach
adopted by NHS IC and the approach adopted here of using net YLL. For each death observed in the
data, GBD evaluates YLL by considering the life expectancy at the age at which the death occurred (and
gender).[6] This is expected to overestimate net YLL (which accounts for counterfactual deaths, as
detailed in Section C.2.2.3). This will make no difference to the first term in the QALY ratio (Rdeath) since
an overestimate of YLL affects both denominator and numerator of the ratio. However, the second term
(Ralive) is likely to be underestimated. Therefore the ratios will tend to underestimate the QALY effects of
expenditure and overestimate the cost per QALY threshold. This will be adjusted for in Section C.2.3.2,
where our preferred analysis based on burden of disease is presented.
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Adjusting DALYs for quality of life norms
The use of DALY ratios bounded below by one essentially assumes that YLL would have otherwise been
lived in a state of full health. As was discussed in section C.2.3.1 this is not credible given information
available about the quality of life in the general population (see Figure C.4). It would lead to
overestimating the QALYs associated with mortality and life year effects and underestimating the cost per
QALY threshold. Therefore, it is important to adjust these DALY ratios for the quality of life norms by
age and gender in the same way as described in Section C.2.3.1. Equation 6 shows how the adjusted ratio
is formulated when YLLs are adjusted by the quality of life in the general population, un. This is a
simplified representation of the adjustment as despite gender and age having been considered in
calculations these are not shown in the notation below.ܴ஽஺௅௒௔ௗ௝ = ௨೙ή௒௅௅௒௅௅ + ௒௅஽௒௅௅ += ݑ௡ + ௒௅஽௒௅௅ (6)ܴௗ௘௔௧௛ + ܴ௔௟௜௩௘
The effect of this adjustment (within each U-code, see Addendum 1) is illustrated in Table C.38b. Now
those types of disease where mortality rather than quality of life with the disease is the major component
can have ratios less than one. Indeed the first term of these ratios (Rdeath) is consistent with (but not
equivalent to) the analysis in Section C.2.3.1, where the ratio of quality adjusted net YLLs to unadjusted
net YLLs represents this ratio on average for each PBC.
Table C.38b: Examples of adjusted DALY to YLL ratios
Ucode
Adjusted DALY
ratios (Rdeath + Ralive)
U037 (Other infectious diseases) 1.01 (0.78+0.23)
U016 (Tetanus) 0.78 (0.78+0)
U061 (Mouth and oropharynx cancers) 0.83 (0.78+0.05)
U141 (Spina bifida) 2.18 (0.85+1.34)
Using quality of life estimates (based on HODAR and MEPS)
The disability weights used in the DALY measure (in Ralive) are not based on the same description of
health states as the EQ5D measure, nor are the weights based on a representative sample of the UK
population responding to choice based elicitation questions. EQ5D based quality of life decrements (in
relation to age adjusted quality of life norms) associated with different types of disease can be estimated
from HODaR and MEPS data for the groups of ICD codes that make up each U-code. The calculations
of the quality of life decrements from HODaR were conducted as previously described in Section C.2.2.2.
In summary, the average quality of life scores across the ICDs which contribute to each U-code (based on
the contributing ICD codes, see Table C.36 and Addendum 1 for how ICD codes map to U-codes) and
the average age and gender of respondents from HODaR and MEPS were used to calculate a disease
decrement for each U-code, based on quality of life norms from the general population. Note that, by
expressing the quality of life effects of different diseases as age related decrements (see Figure C.5), we do
not require the HODaR and MEPS samples to necessarily be representative of the age distribution of the
population at risk.
The disease related quality of life decrements can then be used to replace the DALY disability weights in
Ralive reported in Tables C.38a and C.38b. This final adjustment is illustrated in Table C.38c: for example,
the evidence about quality of life from HODaR and MEPS suggests that the impact of U037 on quality of
life is greater than indicated by DALY disability weights. The quality of life effects of U141, although still
very significant, are lower than indicated by DALY disability weights.
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Table C.38c: Examples of QALY to YLL ratios (HODaR and MEPS)
Ucode
QALY ratios
(HoDAR and MEPs) (Rdeath + Ralive)
U037 (Other infectious diseases) 1.37 (0.78+0.60)
U016 (Tetanus) 0.78 (0.78+0
U061 (Mouth and oropharynx cancers) 0.80 (0.78+0.02)
U141 (Spina bifida) 1.88 (0.85+1.03)
By turning what were originally DALY ratios into EQ5D QALY ratios, we regard the QALY to YLL
ratios rather than DALY or modified DALY ratios as the preferred basis of estimating a cost per QALY
threshold. We consider these estimates to provide a more complete picture of the likely health effects of
changes in expenditure.
U-code QALY ratios to ICD QALY ratios
Information about the size and age and gender distribution is only available at U-code level. Therefore
U-code ratios are applied to all the ICD codes that contribute to a particular U-code. Note that, unlike
ICD codes, U-codes do not map directly to PBCs so some ICDs in different PBCs may belong to the
same U-code and therefore have the same U-code ratio. Some ICDs are not included in the U-code
classification of disease. Some of these are procedural codes (84 out of 1562)where mortality and QALY
effects were not assigned mortality of QALY effects anyway (any health effects would be evident in other
ICD codes) so it was not necessary to impute ratios for them. Of the others, some were associated with
PBC16 (186 out of 1562) with a zero outcome elasticity so did not require imputation either. Imputation
based on the median ratio across the ICDs within the PBC was required for the remaining (482 out of
1562). Eighty eight of these are not mapped into U-codes  these include three big categories of ICDs:
Symptoms and signs (R00R69), Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified
(R70R99) and Ill-defined and unknown causes of mortality (R95R99). The remaining 394 were
associated with U-codes where the ratio was undefined because the denominator (YLL) was zero. In
both these cases, values were also imputed based on the median ratio across the ICDs within the PBC.
Since the distribution of ratios within a PBC tend to be highly positively skewed, imputation based on the
median is likely to be conservative with respect to health effects and especially in the latter case where
mortality effects appear to be a much less important aspect of the disease.
Table C.39 illustrates the variation observed in the ratios (imputed) across ICDs within the same PBC.
Table C.39: Percentiles of the ratio across ICDs, by PBC
Percentiles of the adjusted DALY ratios
PBC PBC description 5% 15% 25% 50% 75% 85% 95%
2 Cancer 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.81 0.85 0.85 0.91
10 Circulatory problems 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.96 1.00 2.65
11 Respiratory problems 0.22 0.73 1.00 1.67 1.67 1.96 2.67
13 Gastro-intestinal problems 0.86 0.96 1.01 1.63 1.63 1.78 2.73
1 Infectious diseases 0.00 0.83 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.01 2.64
4 Endocrine problems 0.77 1.37 1.43 2.97 2.97 2.97 2.97
7 Neurological problems 0.86 1.01 1.01 2.01 2.01 2.01 2.30
17 Genito-urinary problems 0.74 0.77 0.77 1.10 1.10 1.10 12.41
18 Maternity 0.00 0.79 0.81 20.39 20.39 20.39 20.39
19 Neonates 1.17 1.17 1.17 1.17 2.29 2.29 2.29
Percentiles of the QALY ratios (HoDAR and MEPs)
PBC PBC description 5% 15% 25% 50% 75% 85% 95%
2 Cancer 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.83
10 Circulatory problems 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.94 1.01 1.83
11 Respiratory problems 0.73 0.86 1.37 2.09 2.09 2.24 2.80
13 Gastro-intestinal problems 0.84 1.01 1.37 1.70 1.70 2.17 7.10
1 Infectious diseases 0.83 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 3.26
4 Endocrine problems 0.77 2.37 2.55 5.12 5.12 5.12 10.15
7 Neurological problems 0.84 0.90 1.37 5.90 5.90 5.90 5.90
17 Genito-urinary problems 0.74 0.78 0.78 0.99 0.99 0.99 9.80
18 Maternity 0.81 0.81 0.83 49.30 49.30 49.30 49.30
19 Neonates 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88
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Allocating effects at PBC level to ICD codes
Tables C.38a,b and c illustrate how QALY ratios can be calculated for and differ by U-code.
Unsurprisingly, these ratios differ across the type of diseases that make up each PBC (Table C.39).When
using this information to estimate a cost per QALY threshold the mortality and life year effects observed
at PBC level must be allocated in some way to the component ICD codes before ratios are applied to LY
effects and the resulting QALY effects are summed across all the contributing ICD codes.
Alternatively, one could calculate an average of the ratios within a PBC and then apply this average ratio
to life year effects at PBC level, rather than calculate QALY effects at ICD level by applying the relevant
ratio. This would be inappropriate for two reasons. Firstly, ratios should not be averaged; instead, the
total QALYs lost and YLL should be summed across ICDs and the ratio of these sums used to represent
a PBC level estimate (i.e., a ratio of averages). Secondly, and even if the appropriate estimate of the
QALY to YLL ratio is calculated at the PBC level, this estimate would assume ICDs to be equally
representative of the PBC  i.e., that expenditure would be equally likely to affect any of the ICDs that
compose a particular PBC. This is unlikely to be true not only due to the inherent differences in the
disease described by the ICD coding, but also as ICDs are likely to differ significantly in what concerns
the size of the at risk population they represent.
It is important to consider explicitly how other information might inform the different ways in which the
effects observed at PBC level might be generated by the distribution of impacts at ICD level, i.e., where
investment or disinvestment is likely to occur within the PBC and therefore which ICDs are likely to
contribute most to overall health effects. An important and complementary element to the econometric
analysis of routinely reported information at PBC level, was to investigate this by looking at local level
information available within the NHS. The details of this investigation are reported in Addendum 2. The
review of local data sources suggested that there is very little routinely collected data on investment and
disinvestment by local NHS organisations beyond the high-level aggregate data on spending by PB which
are used in the econometric analysis. Although more disaggregated data on spending decisions about
specific services relevant to particular ICD codes could in principle be acquired through additional
primary research (surveys or Freedom of Information requests) this would be costly and with a risk that
information acquired in this way may not be complete, consistent or representative.
In the absence of useful information at a local level, it is possible to assume that a change in PBC
expenditure will be allocated equally (on a per patient basis) across the component ICD codes, i.e., any
investment or disinvestment is equally likely across the population at risk within the PBC. Hospital
Episode Statistics (HES) (see Addendum 1) provides information about the costs associated with each
ICD by PCT. The variation in per patient costs between PCTs (where total costs allocated to individual
ICDs were divided by the number of patients using services in the PCT) was analysed to establish which
ICDs contribute most to the variability in HES costs within a PBC, across PCTs. The ICDs that
contribute most to this variance might be expected to be more likely to have been subject to differential
investment or disinvestment across PCTs. Unfortunately total PBC costs are not available at ICD level
across PCTs so could not be used for this purpose. Costs from HES data are only a component of total
PBC costs (41% of total PBC costs for the 11 PBCs where mortality effect can be estimated) and
contribute less to the variability in PBC costs across PCTs (HES contribute only 23% of the variability
for the 11 PBCs where mortality effect can be estimated).
There are differences in relative weight assigned to ICDs based solely on the size of the population or its
contribution to variance in HES costs. If investment or disinvestment within a PBC tends to focus on
ICD codes representing areas of marginal value the health effects of a change in PBC expenditure may be
overestimated and a cost per QALY threshold underestimated when allocating effects equally across the
population at risk within each PBC. However, weighting ICDs based on HES data is likely to favour
those ICDs which represent more severe disease requiring more hospital care. This may over represent
ICDs with lower QALY to YLL ratios if mortality effects tend to be a major component of these types of
disease and maybe conservative with respect to the health effects of changes in expenditure.
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The implications for a cost per QALY threshold that uses the estimated mortality and life year effects as a
surrogate for a more complete measure of the likely heath effects (i.e., that includes quality of life as well
as quality adjusted life year effects) is summarised in Table C.40 and detailed in Table C.41. These results
use the contribution to variance in HES costs to weight the different ICD codes within a PBC (allocate
the life year effects), before applying the QALY ratios associated with each ICD (see footnote 13 reporting
results using weights based on size of the population).
Table C.40: Summary of the QALY threshold using ratios
Cost per QALY threshold
DALY ratios
Adjusted DALY
ratios
QALY ratios
(HoDAR and MEPs)
[1] [2] [3]
big 4 PBC's £5,402 £6,419 £5,990
11 PBCs (with mortality) £9,958 £11,718 £10,297
All 23 PBCs £11,254 £13,244 £11,638 *
* Preferred analysis
Table C.41: Breakdown of the QALY threshold using ratios by PBC
Adjusted DALY ratios
QALY ratios
(HoDAR and MEPs)
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
2 Cancer £19 1 763 £10,871 1 699 £11,283
10 Circulatory problems £33 7 677 £4,334 6 713 £4,956
11 Respiratory problems £22 2 379 £9,375 3 215 £6,937
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £17 2 396 £6,886 3 605 £4,577
Big 4 £6,419 £5,990
1 Infectious diseases £8 21 £388,430 27 £305,724
4 Endocrine problems £18 1 077 £16,396 2 036 £8,673
7 Neurological problems £17 296 £58,158 342 £50,295
17 Genito-urinary problems £32 15 £2,158,296 12 £2,623,379
16 Trauma & injuries* £10 0 NA 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £8 125 £64,173 273 £29,327
First 11 PBCs £11,718 £10,297
3 Disorders of Blood £11 956 £11,718 1 087 £10,297
5 Mental Health Disorders £204 17 423 £11,718 19 828 £10,297
6 Learning Disability £31 2 627 £11,718 2 990 £10,297
8 Problems of Vision £24 2 063 £11,718 2 348 £10,297
9 Problems of Hearing £6 546 £11,718 621 £10,297
12 Dental problems £23 2 005 £11,718 2 282 £10,297
14 Skin £11 897 £11,718 1 021 £10,297
15 Musculo skeletal system £15 1 291 £11,718 1 469 £10,297
20 Poisoning and adverse effects £4 375 £11,718 426 £10,297
21 Healthy Individuals £18 1 565 £11,718 1 781 £10,297
22 Social Care Needs £68 5 769 £11,718 6 566 £10,297
23 Other £78 0 NA 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £13,244 £11,638
Since all the analysis in this Section seeks to use the estimated mortality and life year effects as a surrogate
for a more complete measure of likely health effects, it is the cost per QALY threshold for all 23 PBCs
that is most relevant. As expected, this threshold (£11,638), is lower than a cost per QALY threshold
based only the quality adjusted life year effects (£21,047 and £26,441 in Table C.34 that assumes no
13 The table below reports the cost per QALY threshold using a relative weight based on the size of the ICD
population to allocate health effects.
Cost per QALY threshold
DALY ratios
Adjusted DALY
ratios
QALY ratios
(HoDAR and MEPs)
[1] [2] [3]
big 4 PBC's £4,400 £5,100 £2,340
11 PBCs (with mortality) £8,066 £9,267 £4,212
All 23 PBCs £9,117 £10,474 £4,760
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effects of NHS expenditure on quality of life itself). This difference gives some indication of the relative
importance of QALY effects due to avoidance of premature death and the QALY effects of avoiding
disability during disease. Table C.42 reports how the estimated QALY effects for each PBC can be
decomposed into that part associated with quality adjusted life year effects and that part associated with
pure quality of life effects. These results appear credible for the first 11PBCs, where those for which
mortality is the major concern have a much greater share of total QALY effects associated with avoidance
of premature death (e.g., PBC2 and PBC10) compared to those where quality of life is the major concern
(e.g., PBC 7).
Table C.42: Decomposing estimated QALY effects by PBC
PBC
QALY
change
(total)
QALY
change
(death)
% QALY gained
due to avoidance
of premature
death
due to avoidance
of disability while
alive
2 Cancer 1,699 1,641 97% 3%
10 Circulatory 6,713 4,856 72% 28%
11 Respiratory 3,215 923 29% 71%
13 Gastro-intestinal 3,605 1,193 33% 67%
1 Infectious diseases 27 11 40% 60%
4 Endocrine 2,036 323 16% 84%
7 Neurological 342 52 15% 85%
17 Genito-urinary 12 6 52% 48%
16 Trauma & injuries* 0 0 NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 273 15 6% 94%
3 Disorders of Blood 1,087 547 50% 50%
5 Mental Health 19,828 9,979 50% 50%
6 Learning Disability 2,990 1,505 50% 50%
8 Problems of Vision 2,348 1,181 50% 50%
9 Problems of Hearing 621 313 50% 50%
12 Dental problems 2,282 1,148 50% 50%
14 Skin 1,021 514 50% 50%
15 Musculo skeletal 1,469 739 50% 50%
20 Poisoning and AE 426 215 50% 50%
21 Healthy Individuals 1,781 896 50% 50%
22 Social Care Needs 6,566 3,304 50% 50%
23 Other 0 0 NA NA
The ratios of QALYs to YLL due to disease in those PBC where outcome elasticities could not be
estimated cannot be used to inform estimates of the threshold because there are no estimated life year
effects with which to apply the ratios. Therefore, as in previous sections, the estimated effect of
expenditure on health for the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities is applied to the estimated changes in
PBC expenditure for the other 12 PBCs (excluding GMS for the reasons given in Section C.2.1.5), i.e.,
assuming that the health effects that can be observed of a change in expenditure will be similar to those
that cannot. However, the use of QALY ratios also implies that the share of total health effects between
quality adjusted life year effects and that part associated with pure quality of life effects are also similar to
those PBC with estimated outcome elasticities. Summing the different types of health effects across these
11PBCs suggests that 50% is due to avoidance of premature death and 50% due to avoidance of
disability. This is clearly not credible when applied to the other PBCs, e.g., mental health, vision and
hearing are likely have a much greater share of total health effects associated with quality of life effects
and very little associated with premature mortality.
By comparing the change in QALY in each PBC (that originates cost per QALY threshold estimates,
column 2 in Table C.43), with the corresponding change in YLL (column 6, Table C.16), we can infer the
implied QALY to YLL ratio in each of the PBCs with a mortality signal. These are shown in Table C.40.
The QALY to YLL ratio implied by the analysis using QALY ratios for all 11 PBC with outcome
elasticities is 1.52, which suggests that every life year is associated with 1.52 QALYs on average across
these PBCs. However, this implied QALY ratio differs across these PBCs, ranging from 0.79 in PBC2 to
15.05 in PBC18+19 (see column 4 of Table C.43). It should be noted that the implied QALY ratio of
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1.35 for the 11 PBC with outcome elasticities is a ratio of QALYs to unadjusted YLL. The proportion of
total QALY effects due to premature deaths for the same PBCs (50% in Table C.41) also implies a ratio -
equal to two. However, this is a ratio of total QALY effects to quality adjusted YLL. The difference
between these two ratios is the denominator, i.e., quality adjusted YLL are lower than unadjusted YLL.
Table C.43: Implied QALY to YLL ratios.
Adjusted DALY ratios
QALY ratios
(HoDAR and MEPs)
PBC PBC description
Implied
QALY per
LY gained
Implied
QALY per
excess death
averted
Implied
QALY per
PBC death
averted
Implied
QALY per
LY gained
Implied
QALY per
excess death
averted
Implied
QALY per
PBC death
averted
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
2 Cancer 0.82 11.58 8.48 0.79 11.16 8.17
10 Circulatory problems 1.20 12.51 6.20 1.05 10.94 5.42
11 Respiratory problems 1.96 18.09 2.04 2.65 24.45 2.76
13 Gastro-intestinal problems 1.54 23.02 14.49 2.31 34.63 21.80
Big 4 1.26 14.20 5.12 1.35 15.21 5.49
1 Infectious diseases 1.56 20.64 8.30 1.98 26.22 10.54
4 Endocrine problems 2.62 35.61 19.84 4.95 67.31 37.51
7 Neurological problems 4.56 61.99 27.90 5.27 71.69 32.26
17 Genito-urinary problems 1.75 14.56 2.98 1.44 11.98 2.45
16 Trauma & injuries* NA NA NA NA NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 6.88 511.33 511.33 15.05 1118.85 1118.85
First 11 PBCs 1.33 15.16 5.53 1.52 17.26 6.29
The problem is that using QALY to YLL ratios means that much of the information that is available
about the other 12 PBCs cannot be used to inform the estimates of the cost per QALY threshold.
Fortunately, the sources of information on which ratios are based also provide much of the information
required to calculate the QALY burden of disease in these areas. Section C.2.3.2 explores how measures
of burden can be used to estimate a cost per QALY threshold that captures the likely effects of a change
in expenditure on all aspects of health while using all the information that is available about all the PBCs.
C.2.3.2 Using estimates of the QALY burden of disease
In this Section we use estimates of the QALY burden of disease to infer QALY effects in those PBCs
where the mortality effects of changes in expenditure can be observed and extrapolate the estimated
proportionate effects to those PBCs where the health effects of changes in expenditure cannot be
observed.. The estimated proportionate effect of change in expenditure on the life year burden of disease
in the 11 PBCs where mortality based outcome elasticities could be estimated are applied to measures of
QALY burden in each of these PBCs (i.e., effects on the mortality burden of disease are used as a
surrogate for effects on QALY burden). The proportionate effect on burden of disease due to the change
in expenditure across these PBCs can then be applied to measures of QALY burden in the other 11 PBCs
where mortality effects could not be estimated (i.e., the observed effects of changes in expenditure on
burden of disease is extrapolated to the other PBCs where health effects cannot be observed). In this way
we can use all the information available about the mortality and quality of life effects of the different
types of disease that make up each PBC, particularly those where mortality based outcome elasticities are
not available. Applying a proportionate effect to measures of QALY burden of disease is equivalent to
assuming that any effects on life years are lived at quality of life that reflects a proportionate improvement
to the quality of life with disease14 It also allows quality of life effects of changes in expenditure to be
included; also based on proportionate improvement in the quality of life with disease.
14 In Section 4.3 each life year gained could be assumed to be lived in full health, lived in a quality of life that reflects
age and gender norms of the general population or lived in a quality of life that reflects the original disease state.
Applying an estimated proportionate effect on the life year burden of disease to measures of QALY burden of
disease implies a proportionate improvement in the quality of life with disease applied to any life year effects.
Therefore, basing estimates on measures of QALY burden provides are more conservative estimate of the QALY
effects of changes in mortality than the best estimate reported in Section 4.3, which was based on quality of life
norms.
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In Section C.2.2, each life year gained could be assumed to be lived in full health, lived in a quality of life
that reflects age and gender norms of the general population or lived in a quality of life that reflects the
original disease state. Applying an estimated proportionate effect on the life year burden of disease to
measures of QALY burden of disease implies a proportionate improvement in the quality of life with
disease applied to any life year effects. Therefore, basing estimates on measures of QALY burden
provides are more conservative estimate of the QALY effects of changes in mortality than the best
estimate reported in Section C.2.2, which was based on quality of life norms.
Previously, up to Section C.2.3.1 (corresponding to Chapter 3 and Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.1 of main
report), expenditure elasticities were not estimated for the other 11 PBCs where outcome elasticities
could not be estimated because the same health effect of changes in expenditure was assumed, i.e., it did
not matter how changes in expenditure was allocated between them. Given expenditure elasticities where
only estimated for PBC 23 and the 11 PBCs where outcome elasticities could be estimated, in analyses up
to Section C.2.3.1 the remaining change in total spend was assigned to the other 11 PBCs. As a
consequence, proportionally more of the share of a change in total spend was allocated to these other
PBCs in previous sections (see column 3 of Table C8). However, in this section it does matter how the
remaining change in expenditure is allocated between the other 11 PBCs as they have different QALY
burdens so different implied health effects of expenditure. Therefore, expenditure elasticities are
estimated for all 23 PBCs (see column 2 of Table C8). However, it is not possible to estimate expenditure
equations for all 23 PBCs simultaneously, so the 23 independently estimated expenditure elasticities do
not account for all of a change in overall spend, i.e., the sum of changes in PBC expenditure based on the
estimated PBC expenditure elasticities accounts for less than a 1% change in total spend. This remaining
change in total spend is allocated between all 23 PBCs reflecting their relative share of changes in
expenditure based on their estimated expenditure elasticities (see column 4 of Table C8).
The total QALY burden of disease for the population with disease in a particular year includes: i) the
quality adjusted years of life lost due to all the disease related mortality that could occur in this population
over their remaining duration of disease and ii) the reduction in quality of life while alive also for their
remaining disease duration. These components of burden represent, respectively, the QALY lost due to
premature death (QALYldeath) and the QALY lost while alive (QALYlalive) as a consequence of disease.ܤݑݎ݀݁݊ =  ܳܣܮܻ݈ௗ௘௔௧௛ + ܳܣܮܻ݈௔௟௜௩௘ (7)
However, applying the estimated proportionate effects on mortality and life years to such a measure of
total burden would provide an estimate of the effects of a change in expenditure, not just in one year, but
in all the remaining years of disease for the population at risk in that year. Recall from Section C.2.1 that
we have adopted the conservative assumption that changes in expenditure will only have health effects in
one year for the population with disease in that year. Therefore, it is not a measure of total burden that is
required, but a measure of the QALY burden of disease during one year for the population with disease
(prevalent and incident) in that year. The estimated outcome elasticities can then be appropriately (and
directly) applied to this measure of burden. Of course, it would be possible to solve for a lower outcome
elasticity that could be applied to total burden which would return the required estimate of total QALY
effects restricted to one year.
The information from GBD used to derive QALY ratios in Section C.2.3.2 includes information about
the YLL and duration of disease for those incident to a U-code, i.e., the measure of QALY burden from
the information included in the ratios is a measure of the total burden of the disease but only for the
population that is incident (rather than total population with disease) in one year. Assuming that
incidence is stable over the disease duration this is also equivalent to the QALY burden of disease during
one year for the population with disease (i.e., those that are incident and prevalent) in that year. This is
valid as long as estimates of the quality of life decrement of disease from HODaR and MEPS are
assumed representative of average effects across those earlier (incident) and later (prevalent) in their
disease duration.
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However, in moving from ratios to absolute measures of burden it becomes more important to examine
and then adjust for any inconsistency between information about YLL and size of the incident population
from GBD (which is available by U-codes and can be mapped to ICDs), and the information about net
YLL and observed deaths for each PBC based on ONS data as described in Section C.2.2.3  see
Table C.44.
Table C.44: Comparing deaths and YLL from ONS and GBD.
deaths YLL
Excess
deaths ONS
All
deaths
ONS
All deaths
GBD*
adjustment
factor
(deaths)
Net
estimates
ONS
Total YLL
GBD*
adjustment
factor
(YLL)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
1 Infectious diseases 2,797 6,958 1,408 4.94 36,962 25,142 1.47
2 Cancer 95,715 130,810 140,124 0.93 1,347,184 1,932,637 0.70
4 Endocrine 3,769 6,765 7,509 0.90 51,225 95,401 0.54
7 Neurological 6,909 15,353 12,854 1.19 93,917 164,796 0.57
10 Circulatory 79,218 159,852 178,454 0.90 823,768 1,750,608 0.47
11 Respiratory 7,386 65,446 67,441 0.97 68,030 594,529 0.11
13 Gastro-intestinal 15,199 24,147 28,329 0.85 227,703 396,829 0.57
17 Genito-urinary 2,172 10,625 8,606 1.23 18,127 77,338 0.23
18+19 Maternity & neonates 226 226 2,211 0.10 16,801 149,868 0.11
Total 213,391 420,182 446,936 0.94 2,683,717 5,187,148 0.52
There are a number of reasons for the potential inconsistencies: i) GBD is based on earlier years of
mortality data; ii) the imprecision of mapping from U-codes to PBC via ICD codes; and iii) the YLL
reported in GBD are based on life expectancy at the age of death (see Section C.2.2 and C.2.3) and will
overestimate the net YLL. The YLL by U-code, reported in GBD, that are mapped to ICDs are adjusted
by these proportionate differences (column 7 of Table C.44) to ensure that the YLLs associated with all
contributing ICD codes are consistent with (do not overestimate) the net YLL for the PBC as a whole.
The variation across ICDs in the adjusted QALY burden associated with mortality gains (for the
population with disease in a particular year) is depicted in column 2 of Table C.45.
Table C.45: Variation across ICDs of the QALY burden of disease for a patient with disease in a
particular year
Burden while alive
Burden due to premature
death
Burden
PBC Median [5th to 95th percentile]
[1] [2] [3]
1 Infectious diseases 0.47 [0.00 to 0.82] 0.25 [0.11 to 42.87] 0.72 [0.72 to 42.87]
2 Cancers and Tumours 0.09 [0.00 to 0.10] 2.82 [0.51 to 5.11] 2.92 [0.58 to 5.11]
3 Disorders of Blood 0.05 [0.05 to 0.07] 0.01 [0.01 to 0.03] 0.06 [0.06 to 0.09]
4 Endocrine 0.10 [0.00 to 0.17] 0.01 [0.01 to 4.82] 0.11 [0.11 to 4.82]
5 Mental Health 0.10 [0.07 to 0.22] 0.02 [0.00 to 0.04] 0.12 [0.07 to 0.26]
6 Learning Disability 0.10 [0.06 to 0.10] 0.02 [0.00 to 5.34] 0.12 [0.10 to 5.41]
7 Neurological 0.27 [0.00 to 0.37] 0.02 [0.02 to 22.79] 0.29 [0.25 to 22.79]
8 Vision 0.05 [0.00 to 0.06] 0.00 [0.00 to 20.99] 0.05 [0.03 to 20.99]
9 Hearing 0.05 [0.00 to 0.05] 0.00 [0.00 to 20.99] 0.05 [0.00 to 20.99]
10 Circulation 0.09 [0.09 to 0.19] 0.37 [0.06 to 0.39] 0.48 [0.18 to 0.56]
11 Respiratory system 0.14 [0.00 to 0.21] 0.01 [0.00 to 5.17] 0.15 [0.00 to 5.18]
12 Dental 0.03 [0.01 to 0.03] 0.01 [0.00 to 0.01] 0.04 [0.01 to 0.04]
13 Gastro intestinal system 0.10 [0.00 to 0.18] 0.05 [0.00 to 23.67] 0.15 [0.00 to 23.67]
14 Skin 0.06 [0.00 to 0.06] 0.02 [0.02 to 20.99] 0.08 [0.08 to 20.99]
15 Musculo skeletal system 0.10 [0.00 to 0.10] 0.02 [0.00 to 20.99] 0.12 [0.06 to 20.99]
16 Trauma and injury NA NA NA
17 Genito Urinary system 0.11 [0.00 to 0.13] 0.04 [0.00 to 8.90] 0.15 [0.05 to 8.90]
18 Maternity 0.01 [0.00 to 0.01] 0.00 [0.00 to 4.68] 0.01 [0.00 to 4.68]
19 Conditions of neonates 0.00 [0.00 to 0.00] 0.03 [0.02 to 0.03] 0.03 [0.02 to 0.03]
20 Poisoning and AE 0.03 [0.00 to 0.06] 0.00 [0.00 to 18.63] 0.03 [0.02 to 18.63]
21 Healthy Individuals 0.05 [0.05 to 0.05] 0.01 [0.01 to 0.01] 0.06 [0.06 to 0.06]
Note: QALY burden of disease reflects burden while alive in one year and mortality burden in one year. Any mortality effects of
disease in one year can lead to the loss of more than one life year, and for this reason burden due to premature death may assume
values bigger than 1.
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It is QALY burden per patient with disease in a particular year that is reported in this Table, including the
median and range across the ICD codes contributing to each PBC. Such measure of burden considers
quality of life burden while alive in one year and mortality burden for the same time period. Note that
mortality effects of disease in one year can lead to the loss of more than one life year, and for this reason
burden due to premature death (and consequently overall burden) may assume values bigger than 1.
Burden values in this Table reflect variation across ICDs and should not be misinterpreted as the
average QALY burden for the PBC, as this depends on how PBC effects are allocated to ICDs and the
average burden for groups of PBCs depends on how a change in overall expenditure is shared between
them, i.e., the expenditure elasticities estimated for each PBC in Appendix B.
Due to the earlier years of data and imprecision in mapping from U-codes to ICDs there might also be
some inconsistency in estimates of the total incidence of disease for a PBC. Insofar as disease related
mortality risk is stable, the same number of deaths should be observed in GBD and ONS data for the
same at risk population. The PBC deaths recorded in GBD and those observed in ONS data (columns 2
and 3 in Table C.44) are similar but nonetheless the proportionate difference is used to adjust the scale of
quality of life burden while alive based on GBD information (equivalent to adjusting estimates of
incidence). Notable exceptions are PBC1 and PBC18+19 where the discrepancies are likely to be due to
imperfect mapping from U-code to PBC via ICD codes. Summaries of the ICD specific values of the
adjusted burden of disease while alive are depicted in column 1 of Table C.45. Total burden (for the
population with disease in a particular year) is the sum of the two components of burden (Table C.46
presents a few examples for illustration).
Table C.46: Examples of QALY burden of disease for the population with disease in a particular year
Ucode QALY burden (QALY lostdeath + QALY lostalive)
U037 (Other infectious diseases)* 0.20 (0.09+0.11)
U016 (Tetanus) 2.73 (2.73+0.00)
U061 (Mouth and oropharynx cancers) 2.97 (2.87+0.10)
U141 (Spina bifida) 0.65 (0.18+0.46)
Note: QALY burden of disease reflects burden while alive in one year and mortality burden in one year. Any mortality effects of
disease in one year can lead to the loss of more than one life year, and for this reason burden due to premature death may assume
values bigger than 1.
*Note that differential adjustments have been made to YLL (affecting QALY lostdeath) and to the incidence (affecting
QALY lostalive), thus implied ratios from these burden estimates may differ from ratios presented is Section C.2.3.1.
The implications for the cost per QALY threshold of using information about the QALY burden of
disease for all PBCs, rather than QALY ratios for those where an outcome elasticity can be estimated, are
reported summarily in Table C.47 and in detail in Table C.48. The QALY effects of a change in PBC
expenditure are a weighted average of the QALY effects within each of the ICDs that contribute to the
PBC. The figures reported in column 2 are based on weighing the effects at ICD level by the proportion
of the total PBC population within each contributing ICD code, rather than the contribution to variance
in HES costs .15
Table C.47: Summary of the cost per QALY threshold
Cost per QALY gained
QALY ratios
(HoDAR and MEPs)
QALY burden
(HoDAR and MEPs)
[1] [2]
big 4 PBC's £5,990 £3,036
11 PBCs (with mortality) £10,297 £5,128
All 23 PBCs £11,638* £10,187*
* Preferred analysis
15 IHES costs are a much smaller proportion of total PBC expenditure for the 11 PBCs where a mortality effects
could not be estimated (HES costs account for less than 15% of total PBC expenditure) and account for very little
of a the variability in PBC costs across PCTs (the contribution that variance in HES costs makes to variance in PBC
expenditure in this group of PBCs is less than 8%). Therefore, allocating PBC level effects to ICDs based on
contribution to variance in HES costs is less appropriate when information about QALY burden in this groups of
PBCs is used to inform the estimate of the overall threshold.
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The cost per QALY threshold for the 11PBCs with outcome elasticities is a little lower using a measure
of QALY burden (£5 128) rather than the QALY ratios (£10,297) described in Section C.3.2.1. This is in
part because the way GBD calculates YLL overestimates net YLL (which accounts for counterfactual
deaths, as detailed in Section C.2.2.3). This will make no difference to the first term in the QALY ratio
(Rdeath) used in Section C.2.3.1 since an overestimate of YLL affects both denominator and numerator of
the ratio. However, the second term (Ralive) is likely to be underestimated. Therefore the ratios will tend
to underestimate the QALY effects of expenditure and overestimate the cost per QALY threshold (see
Table C.47). We are able to adjust the GBD based measure of QALY burden for this overestimation in
calculating the QALY threshold reported in column 2.
Since the purpose of this Section is to use the estimated mortality and life year effects as a surrogate for a
more complete measure of likely health effects, it is the cost per QALY threshold for all 23 PBCs that is
of most relevance. The cost per QALY threshold for all 23 PBCs is based on applying the proportionate
effects on the QALY burden of disease, based on the observed effects of changes in expenditure on
mortality in the 11 PBC with outcome elasticities,16 to the QALY burden of disease in the other PBCs.
This generates a higher cost per QALY threshold (£10 187) than the one based only on the 11 PBC with
outcome elasticities (£11,638). The reason is that the QALY burden of disease in the other PBCs is, in
general, lower than the QALY burden of disease across those PBCs where outcome elasticities can be
estimated (see Table C.45 above).
Therefore, applying the same proportionate effects to a lower QALY burden generates a smaller health
effect of a change in expenditure.17 In essence the difference between these estimates is that in column 1
of Table C.47 the absolute effect on health associated with an absolute change in expenditure is
extrapolated to the other PBCs, whereas in column 2 it is the relative effect on health of an absolute
change in expenditure that is extrapolated. Since we know that QALY burden differs between (and
within) PBCs and especially between the groups of PBCs with and without estimated outcome elasticities
(see Table C.45), it is the values based on QALY burden in column 2 of Table C.47 that are regarded as
most credible and represent our central or best estimate.
A detailed breakdown of changes in expenditure and changes in QALYs across all PBCs is shown in
Table C.48 when the analysis is based on QALY ratios and on QALY burden of disease. A comparison
of these values suggests that QALY effects for the other PBC are generally lower and therefore the cost
per QALY for each of these PBCs are in general higher when based on a proportionate effect on QALY
burden. Of course, we have not directly observed quality of life effects in these PBC but inferred them
from the proportionate effects that we can observe. Insofar as investment and disinvestment
opportunities in these PBCs might have been more valuable (offered greater improvement in quality of
life) than suggested by the implied PBC thresholds, then overall QALY effects will tend to be
underestimated and the cost per QALY threshold overestimated.
16 Note that this is the ratio of total change in health to total change in expenditure across these PBC (rather than an
average ratio) and the contribution that each of these PBCs make to these total effects on health and expenditure
depends on the estimated expenditure as well as outcome elasticities.
17 Applying the absolute health effect of expenditure from the 11 PBCs with outcome elasticities implies different
(higher) proportionate effects in the other PBCs
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Table C.48: Breakdown of the cost per QALY threshold
QALY ratios
(HoDAR and MEPs)
QALY burden
(HoDAR and MEPs)
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
2 Cancer £19 1 699 £11,283 2 121 £12,772
10 Circulatory problems £33 6 713 £4,956 8 347 £5,631
11 Respiratory problems £22 3 215 £6,937 28 072 £1,123
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £17 3 605 £4,577 3 922 £5,944
Big 4 £5,990 £3,036
1 Infectious diseases £8 27 £305,724 74 £158,349
4 Endocrine problems £18 2 036 £8,673 6 905 £3,613
7 Neurological problems £17 342 £50,295 1 361 £17,844
17 Genito-urinary problems £32 12 £2,623,379 34 £1,320,516
16 Trauma & injuries £10 0 NA 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates £8 273 £29,327 14 £813,578
First 11 PBCs £10,297 £5,128
3 Disorders of Blood £11 1 087 £10,297 1 215 £6,814
5 Mental Health Disorders £204 19 828 £10,297 10 878 £13,876
6 Learning Disability £31 2 990 £10,297 207 £109,806
8 Problems of Vision £24 2 348 £10,297 561 £31,858
9 Problems of Hearing £6 621 £10,297 1 168 £4,047
12 Dental problems £23 2 282 £10,297 578 £30,030
14 Skin £11 1 021 £10,297 103 £75,158
15 Musculo skeletal system £15 1 469 £10,297 1 005 £11,129
20 Poisoning and adverse effects £4 426 £10,297 42 £76,909
21 Healthy Individuals £18 1 781 £10,297 40 £336,325
22 Social Care Needs £68 6 566 £10,297 0 NA
23 Other £78 0 NA 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £11,638 £10,187
For the reasons discussed in previous sections, we regard all the cost per QALY threshold reported in
column 2 of Table C.47 to be on balance conservative with respect to overall health effects of a change in
expenditure. However, the estimate of £10 187may be conservative with respect to health effects (i.e.,
overestimated) based, as it is on an extrapolation of the proportionate effects to measures of burden on
these PBC, rather than observations of the direct impact of changes in expenditure on quality of life in
these types of disease. This is especially important in PBC 5, Mental Health Disorders, which accounts
for a large proportion of the change in overall expenditure (22%) and where a review of the evidence
suggests that the investment and disinvestment opportunities in this PBC may have been more valuable
than the implied PBC cost per QALY of £13,876 (see Addendum 3 to this Appendix). The lower cost
per QALY threshold for the 11PBCs with outcome elasticities (£5 128) might be regarded as more secure
in this respect but they only account for a proportion (38%) of any change in overall expenditure (see
Table C.53).
Table C.49 reports how the estimated QALY effects based on measures of QALY burden for each PBC
can be decomposed into that part associated with life year effects adjusted for quality and that part
associated with pure quality of life effects. These results are similar to those reported in Table C.40
which were based on QALY ratios for the 11 PBCs with an estimated outcome elasticity. Those PBCs
for which mortality is the major concern have a much greater share of total QALY effects associated with
avoidance of premature death (e.g., PBC2 and PBC10) compared to those where quality of life is the
major concern (e.g., PBC 7). The differences tend to favour QALYs gained though avoidance of
disability, which reflects the underestimation of the effects on pure quality of life when using QALY
ratios based on estimates of YLL from GBD (see the discussion above). The exceptions are PBC 1 and
PBC 18 &19. The reason is that there are significant adjustments made based on differences in observed
and recorded mortality (to adjust for differences in recording) as well as differences in YLL due to the
GBD method of calculation (see Table C.42).
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Table C.49: Decomposing estimated QALY effects by PBC
PBC
QALY
change
(total)
QALY
change
(death)
% QALY gained
for
premature
death
for disability
while alive
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 2 121 1 968 93% 7%
10 Circulatory 8 347 5 727 69% 31%
11 Respiratory 28 072 1 072 4% 96%
13 Gastro-intestinal 3 922 1 446 37% 63%
1 Infectious diseases 74 13 18% 82%
4 Endocrine 6 905 380 5% 95%
7 Neurological 1 361 60 4% 96%
17 Genito-urinary 34 8 22% 78%
16 Trauma & injuries* 0 0 NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 14 10 69% 31%
3 Disorders of Blood 1 215 62 5% 95%
5 Mental Health 10 878 949 9% 91%
6 Learning Disability 207 41 20% 80%
8 Problems of Vision 561 22 4% 96%
9 Problems of Hearing 1 168 9 1% 99%
12 Dental problems 578 1 0% 100%
14 Skin 103 38 37% 63%
15 Musculo skeletal 1 005 50 5% 95%
20 Poisoning and AE 42 7 16% 84%
21 Healthy Individuals 40 6 16% 84%
22 Social Care Needs 0 0 NA NA
23 Other 0 0 NA NA
The implied QALY per life year gained and death averted are reported in Table C.50. As expected, the
implied QALY per PBC death averted across all 11PBCs with outcome elasticities is higher (12.6 QALY)
than reported in Section C.2.3.1 (6.3 QALY) because of the previous bias against quality of life effects.
Table C.50: Implied QALY per excess death averted: using burden
PBC PBC description
QALY per LY
gained
Implied QALY
per excess death
averted
Implied QALY
per PBC death
averted
[1] [2] [3]
2 Cancer 0.70 9.86 7.21
10 Circulatory problems 0.93 9.63 4.77
11 Respiratory problems 16.40 151.10 17.05
13 Gastro-intestinal problems 1.78 26.66 16.78
Big 4 2.66 30.02 10.82
1 Infectious diseases 3.83 50.62 20.35
4 Endocrine problems 11.89 161.59 90.04
7 Neurological problems 14.86 202.05 90.92
17 Genito-urinary problems 2.85 23.80 4.87
16 Trauma & injuries NA NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates 0.54 40.33 40.33
First 11 PBCs 3.05 34.65 12.63
In Section C.2.3.1, the ratios of QALYs to YLL due to disease in those PBCs where outcome elasticities
could not be estimated could not be used to inform estimates of the threshold or indicate how any total
health effects in these other PBCs are likely to be shared between life year effects adjusted for quality
and that part associated with pure quality of life effects (see Table C.42). By applying the observed
proportionate effects of changes in expenditure to measures of QALY burden of disease in these other
PBCs the likely share of any effects on QALYs between avoidance of premature mortality and avoidance
of disability more closely reflect the nature of these types of diseases (see Table C.49). As expected, a
much greater proportion of QALY effects are associated with quality of life during the disease compared
to the 11PBCs where mortality based outcome elasticities could be estimated. The share of effects in
particular PBCs are also much more credible. For example, in PBC5 Mental Health Disorders the
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overwhelming share of QALY effects are associated with quality of life itself and for others, such as
PBC12 Dental problems, PBC9 Problems of Hearing and PBC8 Problems of Vision; almost all effects are
associated with quality of life rather than mortality and life years. For this, and the other reasons
discussed above, the analysis based on measures of QALY burden are regarded as the best estimate of a
cost per QALY ratio that reflects a more complete picture of the likely health effects of changes in overall
expenditure.
C.2.3.3 Summary of the cost per QALY threshold
The results of the three sequential steps of analysis described in this Chapter are summarised in
Table C.51. In Section C.2.1 we explored ways in which the estimated effects on mortality from the
econometrics work in Appendix B might be better translated in to life year effects by overcoming some
of the limitations of mortality data available at PCT level and taking account of counterfactual deaths.
The results of this analysis were reported in Table C.21 and are repeated in column 1 of Table C.51.
These results can be interpreted as cost per QALY thresholds conditional on the assumption that all life
years are lived in full health and the quality of life with disease is zero (equivalent to death).
Table C.51: Summary of cost per QALY threshold estimates
[1]
(Table C.20)
[2]
(Table C.34)
[3]
QoL associated with life extension: 1 Norm
Based on burdenQoL during disease: 0 0
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 4.1 QALY ~ 3.5 QALY1 ~ 14.9 QALY
big 4 PBC's £8,080 £9,631 £3,036 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £18,622 £5,128 [2]
All 23 PBCs £17,663 £21,047 £10,187 [3]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality:
Remainder of
disease duration
Remainder of
disease duration
Remainder of
disease duration
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL ~ 4.1 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 4.1 QALY ~ 3.5 QALY ~ 14.9 QALY
big 4 PBC's £3,846 £4,252 £674 [4]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £6,106 £6,852 £860 [5]
All 23 PBCs £6,901 £7,744 £1,843 [6]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted: 2 YLL 2 YLL 2 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 2 QALY ~ 1.9 QALY ~ 7.2 QALY
big 4 PBC's £16,432 £17,456 £6,292 [7]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £32,387 £34,492 £10,626 [8]
All 23 PBCs £36,604 £38,983 £21,111 [9]
In Section C.2.2 we considered how the estimated life year effects might be adjusted for the quality of life
in which they are likely to be lived, taking account of the gender and the age at which life years are gained
or lost (see Table C.34). The results of this analysis are repeated in column 2 below. Finally, in the
current Section, C.2.3, we explored ways to also take account of the likely effects of changes in
expenditure on quality of life during disease as well as the effects associated with mortality and life years
(see column 3). These estimates provide our central estimate of a cost per QALY threshold, because they
make best use of available information while the assumptions required, which on balance are likely
conservative with respect to health effects, appear more reasonable than the other alternatives available.18
18 Note that the proportionate difference between the estimates in column 3 and columns 1 and 2 are greater in lines 1 and 2,
reflecting the additional health effects from considering the likely impact of changes in expenditure on quality of life during
disease. These differences are less marked in line 3 because the effects in those PBCs where an outcome elasticity can be
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The estimate of £5,128 per QALY (line 2) is restricted to the effects of changes in expenditure in the
11PBCs where outcome elasticities can be estimated. Although this might be regarded as more secure
these PBCs only account for a proportion of the change in overall expenditure (approximately 38%,
column 6 in Table C.8). The threshold of £10,187 uses the estimated proportionate effects of
expenditure on the QALY burden of disease in these PBC as a surrogate for proportionate effects in the
others, i.e., assuming that the effects that can be observed will be similar to those that cannot. As
discussed in Section C.2.3.2, there are reasons to suspect that this may underestimate health effects in
these PBCs which have most influence on the overall threshold. As in previous sections, no health effects
are assigned to PBC23 (General Medical Services) on the basis that any health effects of this expenditure
would be recorded in the other PBCs. 19 Therefore, the best or central estimate of cost per QALY
threshold is £10,187(column 3, line 3).
This estimate reflects changes in undiscounted QALYs associated with changes in expenditure. Although
all the health effects of a change in expenditure are restricted to one year (so no discounting is necessary)
some of the quality adjusted life year effects of a change in mortality in that year will occur in future years,
so in principle should be discounted. However, discounting these life year effects, even at the higher rate
of 3.5% recommended by NICE, only increases the cost per QALY threshold to £10,333 (Table C.52).
Table C.52: Summary of QALY threshold, discounted.
[1] [2]
undiscounted discounted2
Best estimate
big 4 PBC's £3,036 £3,097 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £5,128 £5,218 [2]
All 23 PBCs 1 £10,187 £10,333 [3]
1 in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
2 Only quality adjusted net YLL were discounted, and thus QALYs associated with gains in QoL during disease were not. The
discounting factor has been calculated by applying a 3.5% discount rate to each year of life lost in the PBCs  the estimate of
years of life lost used was the implied YLL per death averted in each PBC (in column 2 of Table C.21 ). This discounting factor
was applied to net YLLs, before applying the outcome elasticity to calculate YLL averted.
As in previous Sections of this Chapter, the upper and lower bounds for the cost per QALY thresholds in
column 3 are based on making the necessary assumptions about duration of health effects and how long a
death might be averted optimistic (providing the lower bound for the threshold) or conservative (an
upper bound for the threshold). The lower bound (lines 4 to 6) is based on assuming that health effects
are not restricted to one year but apply to the whole of the remaining disease duration of the population
at risk in PBCs during one year. Although this combines optimistic assumptions, it is possible that at least
some part of a change in expenditure may prevent disease so will have an impact on populations that are
incident to PBCs in the future. Such effects are not captured in any of the estimates presented in this
Chapter so all are conservative with respect to this type of health effects of expenditure. The upper
bound (lines 7 to 9) is based on the combination of assuming that health effects are restricted to one year
for the population currently at risk and that any death averted is only averted for 2 years (see
Section C.2.1.5).
estimated are extrapolated to the other PBCs using proportionate effect on QALY burden and measures of QALY burden in
these other.
19 It would be inappropriate to assign all the change in GMS expenditure to the estimate of cost per QALY based only on the 11
PBCs with outcome elasticities because it would imply that GMS only contributes to these PBCs. Restricting attention to the 11
PBCs with outcome elasticities but allocating part of the change in GMS expenditure to them based on their proportional share
of changes in overall expenditure would yield a slightly higher cost per QALY than reported in line 2. It should be noted that
including changes in GMS expenditure but not assigning health effects to this PBC is likely to overestimate the threshold because
any health effects associated with GMS (or PBC 22 see Footnote 48 and 56) will not be reflected in the estimated outcome
elasticities of other PBCs unless the effects happen to be correlated with changes in expenditure in those PBCs.
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C.2.4. Which PBCs matter most?
Which PBCs have the greatest influence on the overall threshold depends, to a large extent, on how a
change in overall expenditure is allocated to the different PBCs (see column 1 in table C.53), i.e., those
that account for a greater share of the change in expenditure will tend to have the greater influence. 20
However, the overall threshold also depends on the proportionate effect of a change in PBC expenditure
on the QALY burden associated with the PBC21 and the scale of the QALY burden (for the population at
risk) associated with the type of diseases that make up each PBC22. These determine the cost per QALY
associated with each PBC (see column 4 below). The share, attributable to each PBC, of the total health
effects of a change in overall expenditure (see column 2) is the combined effect of all of these. The
proportionate impact on the overall cost per QALY threshold of a 10% change in PBC health effects in
gives an indication of how sensitive the overall threshold is to the estimate of health effects associated
with each PBC (see column 3).
Table C.53: Impact of each PBC on the overall cost per QALY threshold
PBC
% share of
change in
overall
expenditure
% share of
total health
effects
(QALY)
Elasticity of the
threshold*
PBC cost per
QALY
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 3.99 3.18 0.32 £12,772
10 Circulatory 6.92 12.52 1.25 £5,631
11 Respiratory 4.64 42.12 4.22 £1,123
13 Gastro-intestinal 3.43 5.89 0.59 £5,944
1 Infectious diseases 1.74 0.11 0.01 £158,349
4 Endocrine 3.67 10.36 1.04 £3,613
7 Neurological 3.58 2.04 0.20 £17,844
17 Genito-urinary 6.61 0.05 0.01 £1,320,516
16 Trauma & injuries* 2.15 0 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 1.67 0.02 <0.01 £813,578
3 Disorders of Blood 1.22 1.82 0.18 £6,814
5 Mental Health 22.23 16.32 1.63 £13,876
6 Learning Disability 3.35 0.31 0.03 £109,806
8 Problems of Vision 2.63 0.84 0.08 £31,858
9 Problems of Hearing 0.70 1.75 0.18 £4,047
12 Dental problems 2.56 0.87 0.09 £30,030
14 Skin 1.14 0.16 0.02 £75,158
15 Musculo skeletal 1.65 1.51 0.15 £11,129
20 Poisoning and AE 0.48 0.06 0.01 £76,909
21 Healthy Individuals 2.00 0.06 0.01 £336,325
22 Social Care Needs 7.36 0 0 NA
23 Other 16.28 0 0 NA
* Calculated using the effect on the threshold of a 10% increase (or decrease) in QALY change of the PBC.
Although the 11PBCs where outcome elasticities could be estimated only account for 38.4% of the
change in overall expenditure they account for 76.3% of the overall health effects. Within this group
some PBCs contribute more than others. For example, PBC11 (Respiratory) accounts for a greater share
of total health effects and has a higher elasticity (4.22%) than PBC10 (Circulatory) even though it
accounts for a greater part of a change in overall expenditure. The reason is that the cost per QALY
associated with changes in expenditure in PBC11 is lower than PBC10 and much lower than the overall
threshold (so generates more health effects for the same, or even smaller, change in expenditure). The
elasticities in column 3 are instructive, e.g., the elasticity for PBC11 suggests that even if the health effects
of a change in expenditure in this PBC were overestimated by 30% the overall threshold would only
increase by 12.7% to £11,477. All other PBCs have much less influence in this respect. Nonetheless
20 Which are determined by the estimated expenditure elasticities (the proportionate change in PBC expenditure due
to a change in overall expenditure) and total PBC expenditure (see Chapter 3 and section B11 in Appendix B).
21 Which are determined by the outcome elasticities (the proportionate effects on mortality and YLL of a
proportionate change in PBC expenditure (see section C.2.3 for details of how these estimates can be applied to
measures of QALY burden in all PBCs).
22 See section C.2.3 for how PBC level effects can be allocated to the contributing ICD codes and how measures of
QALY burden for each ICD code can be established
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PBC10 is important compared to others as it does contribute a large share of total health effects and has
one of the highest elasticities (1.25%).
The other 12 PBCs, where outcome elasticities could not be estimated, account for the greater part of a
change in overall expenditure (61.6%) but only 23.7% of the overall health effects, i.e., the cost per
QALYs associated with a change in expenditure in these PBCs are, in general, higher. Of course, we have
not directly observed quality of life effects in these PBCs but inferred them from the proportionate
effects that we can observe. Insofar as investment and disinvestment opportunities in these PBCs might
have been more valuable (offered greater improvement in quality of life) than suggested by the implied
PBC thresholds in column 4, the overall QALY effects will tend to be underestimated and the overall
cost per QALY threshold will be overestimated.
PBC5 (Mental Health Disorders) accounts for a large proportion of the change in overall expenditure
(22%), contributes most to the overall health effects (16.32%) and has the highest elasticity (1.63%)
compared to these other PBCs. The cost per QALY associated with this PBC (£13,876) is based on an
extrapolation of estimated proportionate effects to a population based measures of QALY burden in this
PBC, rather than observations of the direct impact of changes in expenditure on quality of life in the
types of diseases that make up the PBC. Evidence that is available suggests that the investment and
disinvestment opportunities in this PBC may have been more valuable than this implied cost per QALY
(Addendum 3 to this Appendix). A search for evidence about interventions in those ICD codes that
contribute most to the PBC (based on prevalence or the contribution to the variance in PBC costs),
suggests that pharmacological, psychological and social interventions for depression are all more cost
effective (in general much less than £10,000 per QALY) than the overall threshold and significantly more
valuable than the implied QALY threshold for this PBC. Based on the contribution that each ICD makes
to variance in HES costs across PCTs, it is schizophrenia that contributes most. 23 Although
interventions that may have been invested or disinvested in schizophrenia are, in general, less cost
effective (in general less than £24,000 per QALY) than those available for depression, they do not appear
any less valuable than the implied cost per QALY of this PBC in Table C.53. 24
C.2.5. How uncertain are the estimates?
There are a number of sources of uncertainty which may contribute to an assessment of how uncertain a
central or best estimate of the cost per QALY threshold might be. There are three reasons why
uncertainty in the estimate of the threshold might be of policy interest: i) the uncertainty in the
parameters that determine the threshold might influence the mean or expected value of the threshold if
they have a non linear relationship to the threshold or when they have a multi linear relationship but are
correlated with each other; ii) the consequences of over or underestimating the threshold differ so the
uncertainty may have an influence on the extent to which a policy threshold (a single value that can be
compared to the incremental cost effectiveness ratio of a new technology) should differ from the mean or
expected value of the central or best estimate; and iii) in conjunction with other methods of analysis it can
indicate the potential value of gathering more information to improve these estimates in the future. Such
23 HES costs only account for 16.8% of total costs in PBC5 and only explain 5.9% of the variance PBC in costs
across PCTs, therefore it seems unlikely that a large proportion of investment and disinvestment in this PBC has
been associated with these ICD codes.
24 Although the published evidence suggests that investment and disinvestment opportunities in this PBC tend to be
much more valuable than the implied cost per QALY, we have little information on the particular investments and
disinvestments that were actually made by PCTs. The review of local data sources (see Addendum 2, Appendix C)
revealed very little routinely collected information about specific investments and disinvestments beyond more
aggregate measures of spending. In common with other PBCs, there will inevitably be inefficient, ineffective or
even iatrogenic practice (e.g., due to poor diagnosis and inappropriate prescribing). Insofar as these types of
activities are sensitive to changes in PBC expenditure this will tend to increase the cost per QALY associated with
changes in expenditure in this PBC. Whether both the extent of these inefficiencies and their sensitivity to changes
in expenditure are sufficient to increase the cost per QALY above £13,876 is unclear, although it seems unlikely.
Note that the effects of the scale and sensitivity to expenditure of inefficient or even harmful practice in the other
PBCs where outcome equations could be specified are already captured in the estimated outcome elasticities.
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analysis, known as value of information analysis, has firm foundations in statistical decision theory and
has been applied to health care decisions. A form of these analyses could be applied in subsequent
research, ideally capturing some of the other sources of uncertainty. More recently it has been applied to
the decisions faced by NICE when considering whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
approval of a new technology.[7] Of course, hypothesis testing and the traditional rules of inference
associated with it , such as statistical significance, p-values and confidence intervals, have no relevance
when making unavoidable decisions about policy relevant quantities based on information currently
available and the best use thereof.[8]
An assessment of parameter uncertainty
Two sets of parameters are critical to the threshold, the expenditure elasticities estimated for each of the
23 PBCs, and the outcome elasticities estimated for 11 of these. These parameters are estimated with
uncertainty, indicated by the standard errors on the relevant coefficients in the econometric analysis
detailed in Appendix B. Since these statistical models estimate coefficients using normality on the
relevant scale, normal distributions can be assigned to each of these estimated coefficients, each with a
mean and standard deviation based on the results of the econometric analysis. These distributions
represent the uncertainty in the mean estimate of each of the parameters and can be propagated through
the various calculations required to estimate and overall cost per QALY threshold (i.e., through the
sequence of analysis detailed in Section C.2.2 to C.2.4) using Monte Carlo simulation which randomly
samples from the assigned distributions. The use of Monte Carlo simulation in this context is in essence
Bayesian, where the standard errors from the frequentist econometric analysis are used to assign normal
prior distributions with means equal to the point estimates and a standard deviation equal to the estimated
standard errors. This is equivalent to a fully Bayesian analysis with initially uninformative priors which are
updated through the analysis of expenditure and mortality data.
The results of each random sample from the Monte Carlo simulation represent one possible realisation of
the overall threshold, given the uncertainty in estimates of the mean parameter values that determine it.
By repeatedly sampling, a distribution of potential values that the overall threshold might take can be
revealed. The results of this simulation are illustrated in Figure C.6 showing a histogram of threshold
values, and in Figure C.7 showing the cumulative probability density function for a cost per QALY
threshold based only on the 11 PBCs with estimated outcome elasticities and for all 23 PBCs. It
represents the probability (on the y axis) that the threshold lies below a particular value.
Figure C.6 Distribution of the cost per QALY threshold (all 23 PBCs)
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Figure C.7 Cumulative probability density function for the cost per QALY threshold
It has already been noted that restricting attention only to changes in expenditure in those 11PBC where
an outcome elasticity can be estimated results in a much lower estimate of the threshold than considering
all changes in expenditure across all PBCs. This lower estimate of £5,144 per QALY is much less
uncertain but these PBCs only account for 38% of a change in overall expenditure, so it is the higher
estimate, for all 23PBCs, that is of most relevance for policy (see Sections C.2.3.3 and C.2.4). The fact
that this estimate is more uncertain simply reflects the quality and quantity of data currently available.
Since useful analysis should endeavour to faithfully characterise uncertainty in policy relevant quantities,
rather than select those quantities or questions for which precise estimates are possible, it is the more
uncertain estimate for all 23 PBCs that should be of primarily interest. The values that are used to
generate Figure C.6 are available in column 2 of Table C.54. They indicate that the probability that the
overall threshold is less than £20,000 per QALY is 0.97 and the probability that is less than £30,000 is
1.00.
Table C.54: Uncertainty over the QALY threshold.
11PBCs All 23 PBCs
[1] [2]
Best estimate (deterministic) £5,128 £10,187
Mean estimate (from the simulations) £5,114 £10,092
Threshold value at the probability of (from the simulations):
2.5% £2,956 £6,228
5.0% £3,237 £6,744
50.0% £5,250 £10,378
95.0% £8,845 £17,061
97.5% £10,068 £20,472
Probability (from the simulations)of the threshold being smaller than:
£3,000 per QALY 0.03 0.00
£4,000 per QALY 0.19 0.00
£5,000 per QALY 0.44 0.00
£6,000 per QALY 0.66 0.02
£7,000 per QALY 0.81 0.07
£8,000 per QALY 0.92 0.18
£9,000 per QALY 0.96 0.31
£10,000 per QALY 0.97 0.45
£15,000 per QALY 1.00 0.90
£20,000 per QALY 1.00 0.97
£25,000 per QALY 1.00 0.99
£30,000 per QALY 1.00 1.00
C.3 Re-estimating the cost per QALY threshold using 2008 expenditure data
The same methods of analysis can be applied to the econometric analysis of the 2008/09 expenditure and
2008 to 2010 mortality data (see Section 3.5.3 in Chapter 3 and Section B11 in Appendix B). The
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differences between the 2006 analysis reported above and the analysis of expenditure in 2008 reported
below are the: i) total PBC expenditure ii) estimated expenditure elasticities; iii) estimated outcome
elasticities; iv) observed PBC deaths by age and gender; and v) life expectancy by age and gender. The
other information about quality of life norms (see Section C.2.2.2), disease related decrements (see
Section C.2.2.3) and the information from GBD about incidence (by age and gender) and duration of
disease (C.2.3) remain unchanged between 2006 and 2008.
It should be noted that important improvements were made to the classification and collection of PBC
expenditure data that took place after the 2006 data were collected. Therefore, the differences in
threshold estimates for 2006 and 2008 partly reflect this (see Section 3.5.4 and B11.4 in Appendix B) so
should not be over interpreted. The results of the analysis of 2007 and 2008 expenditure are comparable
in this respect, providing insights into how the threshold might change over time and with changes in the
overall budget. For the purposes of this methodological research the 2008 expenditure and 2008 to 2010
mortality data were the latest to be analysed.
Table C.55: Outcome and spend elasticities (2008)
Total spend
2008/09,
m£
Spend elasticities
Change in spend, m£ (%
share)
Outcome
elasticities*PBC PBC description
Unadjuste
d(i)
Analysis
up to
4.4.1
(C.2.3.1
in App C)
Analysis
in 4.4.2
(C.2.3.2
in App
C)
Analysis up
to 4.4.1
(C.2.3.1 in
App C)
Analysis in
4.4.2
(C.2.3.2 in
App C)
[1] [2] [2] [3]
2 Cancer £4,843 0.525 0.525 0.724 25 (3.2) 35 (4.5) 0.307
10 Circulatory £6,655 0.648 0.648 0.894 43 (5.5) 59 (7.6) 1.319
11 Respiratory £3,994 0.652 0.652 0.900 26 (3.3) 36 (4.6) 1.808
13 Gastro-intestinal £3,989 0.456 0.456 0.629 18 (2.3) 25 (3.2) 1.364
Big 4 £19,481 113 (14.4) 156 (19.8)
1 Infectious diseases £1,201 1.545 1.545 2.132 19 (2.4) 26 (3.3) 0.504
4 Endocrine £2,222 0.484 0.484 0.668 11 (1.4) 15 (1.9) 1.170
7 Neurological £3,466 0.980 0.980 1.352 34 (4.3) 47 (6) 0.417
17 Genito-urinary £3,779 0.697 0.697 0.962 26 (3.4) 36 (4.6) 1.615
16
Trauma &
injuries* £3,255 1.344 1.344 1.854 44 (5.6) 60 (7.7) -
18+19
Maternity &
neonates* £3,978 0.975 0.975 1.345 39 (4.9) 54 (6.8) 0.125
First 11 PBCs £37,382 285 (36.3) 393 (50.1)
3
Disorders of
Blood £998 1.171 2.291 1.616 23 (2.9) 16 (2.1) -
5 Mental Health £9,794 1.036 2.027 1.429 198 (25.3) 140 (17.9) -
6 Learning Disability £2,874 0.205 0.401 0.283 12 (1.5) 8 (1) -
8 Vision £1,688 0.654 1.279 0.902 22 (2.8) 15 (1.9) -
9 Hearing £417 1.191 2.330 1.643 10 (1.2) 7 (0.9) -
12 Dental £3,198 0.513 1.003 0.708 32 (4.1) 23 (2.9) -
14 Skin £1,657 0.674 1.318 0.930 22 (2.8) 15 (2) -
15 Musculo-skeletal £4,081 0.505 0.988 0.697 40 (5.1) 28 (3.6) -
20 Poisoning and AE £938 0.562 1.099 0.775 10 (1.3) 7 (0.9) -
21
Healthy
Individuals £1,831 1.097 2.146 1.514 39 (5) 28 (3.5)
-
22 Social Care Needs £1,874 0.911 1.782 1.257 33 (4.3) 24 (3) -
23 Other £11,666 0.494 0.494 0.682 58 (7.4) 80 (10.1) -
All (23 PBCs) £78,398 784 (100) 784 (100)
* without the negative sign
C.3.1 From mortality to life years
In this section we summarise report the calculation of net YLL, which take account of the fact that some
of the observed deaths would have occurred anyway (had the same population not been at risk in the
particular PBC) when estimating YLL (unobserved counterfactual deaths). In summary, to obtain net
55
YLL, all observed deaths - both those that occur below and those that occur above LE (Table C.56)  are
taken into account. Those deaths occurring below LE generate YLL and those that occur at ages above
LE generate life years gained (YLG). By subtracting YLG from YLL to generate net YLL we take
account of the fact that not all deaths below LE are excess deaths but some deaths above LE are.
Table C.56. Number of deaths above LE in 2008/9/10, by PBC
PBC
<LE
2008
>LE
2008
<LE
2009
>LE
2009
<LE
2010
>LE
2010
Annual
N deaths
<LE
Annual
N deaths
> LE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
1 Infectious diseases 3,406 2,586 3,044 2,190 2,667 1,894 3,039 2,223
2 Cancer 94,873 37,029 94,276 37,151 94,309 38,198 94,486 37,459
4 Endocrine 4,033 2,877 3,834 2,826 3,816 2,902 3,894 2,868
7 Neurological 9,638 6,859 9,445 6,939 9,951 7,480 9,678 7,093
10 Circulatory 80,894 76,292 76,048 73,342 74,035 73,719 76,992 74,451
11 Respiratory 32,083 35,180 29,912 33,304 29,691 33,176 30,562 33,887
13 Gastro-intestinal 15,945 8,259 15,361 8,161 15,595 8,372 15,633 8,264
17 Genito-urinary 4,471 6,667 4,378 6,900 4,453 7,166 4,434 6,911
18+19 Maternity & neonates 267 0 281 1 247 0 265 0
The estimates of net YLL calculated considering estimates of the life expectancy for each PBC are
detailed in Table C.57.
Table C.57. Net YLL using life expectancy for each PBC (2008)
PBC
LE of
Males
LE of
Females
Average2006-2008
Deaths
YLL YLG Net YLL
<LE >LE
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
1 Infectious diseases 79.6 83.6 2,919 2,344 53,926 15,132 38,794
2 Cancer 83.0 84.7 100,487 31,459 1,456,255 134,089 1,322,166
4 Endocrine 81.0 84.7 3,945 2,818 65,800 15,983 49,817
7 Neurological 79.6 83.3 9,112 7,659 137,791 47,722 90,069
10 Circulatory 83.0 86.5 89,434 62,009 1,049,459 278,421 771,038
11 Respiratory 80.3 84.0 29,828 34,621 306,838 229,403 77,434
13 Gastro-intestinal 80.6 84.5 15,612 8,286 271,395 46,141 225,254
17 Genito-urinary 83.5 85.6 5,058 6,287 49,036 32,528 16,508
18+19 Maternity & neonates 78.7 83.1 265 0 19,783 1 19,781
The impact on the cost per life year threshold is summarised in column 2 of Table C.58, and a detailed
breakdown in Table C.59.
Table C.58. Summary of cost per life year threshold (2008)
2006 2008
[1] [2]
big 4 PBC's £8,080 £10,220
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £23,360
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12 PBCs) £57,497 £64,275
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12
PBCs, except GMS)*
£17,663 £25,214
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
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Table C.59: Breakdown of the cost per life year threshold (2008).
Using LE of the PBC population
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m Net YLL
Change in
net YLL
Cost per LY
gained, £
[1] [5] [6] [7]
2 Cancer £25 1 322 166 2 131 £11,931
10 Circulatory problems £43 771 038 6 590 £6,544
11 Respiratory problems £26 77 434 913 £28,528
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £18 225 254 1 401 £12,983
Big 4 £10,220
1 Infectious diseases £19 38 794 302 £61,425
4 Endocrine problems £11 49 817 282 £38,122
7 Neurological problems £34 90 069 368 £92,282
17 Genito-urinary problems £26 16 508 186 £141,746
16 Trauma & injuries* £44 NA 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £39 19 781 24 £1,608,817
First 11 PBCs £23,360
3 Disorders of Blood £23 979 £23,360
5 Mental Health Disorders £198 8 496 £23,360
6 Learning Disability £12 493 £23,360
8 Problems of Vision £22 924 £23,360
9 Problems of Hearing £10 416 £23,360
12 Dental problems £32 1 374 £23,360
14 Skin £22 935 £23,360
15 Musculo skeletal system £40 1 726 £23,360
20 Poisoning and AE £10 441 £23,360
21 Healthy Individuals £39 1 682 £23,360
22 Social Care Needs £33 1 430 £23,360
23 Other £58 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £25,214
Note that we have been unable to obtain a satisfactory outcome model for trauma & injuries and have assumed a zero outcome elasticity.
Note that, for expenditure in 2006/7, the neonate category has been merged with maternity to obtain plausible outcome and expenditure models.
The estimates of net YLL imply a number of excess deaths required to generate them in each PBC. The
implied excess deaths associated with net YLL are reported in Table C.60.
Table C.60: Excess deaths implied by net YLL (2008).
PBC Net YLL
YLL per
observed
death
Excess
deaths
Total
deaths
% excess
deaths
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1 Infectious diseases 38,794 13.4 2,934 5,262 56%
2 Cancer 1,322,166 14.1 93,917 131,945 71%
4 Endocrine 49,817 13.7 3,663 6,762 54%
7 Neurological 90,069 13.6 6,642 16,771 40%
10 Circulatory 771,038 10.5 74,217 151,443 49%
11 Respiratory 77,434 9.2 8,432 64,449 13%
13 Gastro-intestinal 225,254 15.2 15,049 23,897 63%
17 Genito-urinary 16,508 8.3 1,978 11,345 17%
18+19 Maternity & neonates 19,781 74.1 265* 265 100%
Excess deaths are calculated for each gender by dividing net YLLs by the YLL per death (column [3] = column [1] / column [2] )
* The number of excess deaths estimated in PBC18&19 was initially estimated to be 265, higher than the number of total deaths.
This is due to the use of approximations (i.e. in the life expectancy, or in using the net YLL) thus, for consistency, we assumed
this to be 100% of the total deaths.
The cost per excess death and the cost per PBC death averted are reported in Table C.61, and a detailed
breakdown of changes in spend and excess or total deaths across PBCs is shown in Table C.62. The cost
per PBC death averted is, of course; significantly lower than the cost per excess death as excess deaths are
only a proportion of total deaths (see Table C.61).
57
Table C.61. Summary of the cost per death averted threshold (2008)
2006-2008 2008-2010
Cost per excess
death averted, £
Cost per PBC
death averted, £
Cost per excess
death averted, £
Cost per PBC
death averted, £
[1] [2] [3] [4]
big 4 PBC's £91,129 £32,864 £115,234 £46,692
11 PBCs (with mortality) £177,691 £64,774 £265,784 £105,872
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining
12 PBCs)
£653,744 £238,310 £731,301 £291,305
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for
remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)*
£200,828 £73,208 £286,872 £114,272
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
Table C.62: Breakdown of the cost per death averted threshold (2008).
PBC deaths Excess deaths
PBC PBC description
Change
in spend,
£m
Total
PBC
deaths
Change
in PBC
deaths
Cost per PBC
death averted,
£
Excess
deaths
Change
in excess
deaths
Cost per
excess death
averted, £
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
2 Cancer £25 131 945 212.66 £119,559 93 917 151.37 £167,969
10 Circulatory problems £43 151 443 1294.40 £33,316 74 217 634.34 £67,983
11 Respiratory problems £26 64 449 759.74 £34,276 8 432 99.40 £261,992
13
Gastro-intestinal
problems £18 23 897 148.64 £122,379 15 049 93.60 £194,332
Big 4 £46,692 0 £115,234
1 Infectious diseases £19 5 262 40.97 £452,858 2 934 22.84 £812,249
4 Endocrine problems £11 6 762 38.29 £280,856 3 663 20.74 £518,533
7 Neurological problems £34 16 771 68.54 £495,603 6 642 27.14 £1,251,391
17
Genito-urinary
problems £26 11 345 127.71 £206,253 1 978 22.27 £1,182,744
16 Trauma & injuries* £44 NA 0 NA NA 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £39 265 0.32 £120,090,566 265 0.32 £120,090,566
First 11 PBCs £105,872 £265,784
3 Disorders of Blood £23 215.92 £105,872 86.01 £265,784
5
Mental Health
Disorders £198 1874.69 £105,872 746.76 £265,784
6 Learning Disability £12 108.86 £105,872 43.36 £265,784
8 Problems of Vision £22 203.97 £105,872 81.25 £265,784
9 Problems of Hearing £10 91.76 £105,872 36.55 £265,784
12 Dental problems £32 303.11 £105,872 120.74 £265,784
14 Skin £22 206.34 £105,872 82.19 £265,784
15
Musculo skeletal
system £40 380.77 £105,872 151.68 £265,784
20 Poisoning and AE £10 97.40 £105,872 38.80 £265,784
21 Healthy Individuals £39 371.11 £105,872 147.83 £265,784
22 Social Care Needs £33 315.43 £105,872 125.65 £265,784
23 Other £58 0 NA 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £114,272 £286,872
The number of life years gained associated with each excess death averted are reported for each PBC in
Table C.63 (column 1) and range from 74.6 years for PBC18&19 to 8.3 years for PBC17. On average,
across all 11 PBCs each excess death averted is associated with 11.4 life years gained. The life years
associated with each observed death are reported for each PBC in (column 2) and range from 74.6 years
in PBC 18 & 19 to 1.2 for PBC17. On average across all 11 PBCs each PBC death averted is associated
with 4.5 life years gained.
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Table C.63: Implied YLL per death averted for each PBC (2008)
PBC PBC description
Implied YLL per
excess death
averted
Implied YLL per
PBC death
averted
[1] [2]
2 Cancer 14.1 10.0
10 Circulatory problems 10.4 5.1
11 Respiratory problems 9.2 1.2
13 Gastro-intestinal problems 15.0 9.4
Big 4 11.3 4.6
1 Infectious diseases 13.2 7.4
4 Endocrine problems 13.6 7.4
7 Neurological problems 13.6 5.4
17 Genito-urinary problems 8.3 1.5
16 Trauma & injuries NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates 74.6 74.6
First 11 PBCs 11.4 4.5
Summary of cost per life year estimates
The cost per life year threshold in lines 1 to 4 in Table C.64 are regarded as the central or best estimates
given the evidence available and the credibility of alternative assumption that could be made. As
explained in Section C.1, these are based on the conservative assumption that any health effects of
changes in expenditure are restricted to one year, which, to some extent, may be offset by the more
optimistic assumption any death averted returns the individual to the mortality risk face by the general
population, matched for age and gender. See Section C.2.5 for guidance in the interpretation of the upper
and lower bound estimates.
Table C.64: Summary of the cost per life year threshold with upper and lower bounds (2008)
2006-2008 2008-2010
[1] [2]
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year
YLL per PBC death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL ** ~ 4.5 YLL **
big 4 PBC's £8,080 £10,220 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £23,360 [2]
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12
PBCs)
£57,497 £64,275 [3]
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12
PBCs, except GMS)*
£17,663 £25,214 [4]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: Remainder of disease Remainder of disease
YLL per PBC death averted: ~ 4.1 YLL ** ~ 4.5 YLL **
big 4 PBC's £3,846 £5,083 [5]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £6,106 £8,579 [6]
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12
PBCs)
£22,463 £23,605 [7]
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12
PBCs, except GMS)*
£6,901 £9,260 [8]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year
YLL per PBC death averted: 2 YLL 2 YLL
big 4 PBC's £16,432 £23,346 [9]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £32,387 £52,936 [10]
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for remaining 12
PBCs)
£119,155 £145,653 [11]
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for remaining 12
PBCs, except GMS)*
£36,604 £57,136 [12]
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal.
** see Table C.63
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C.3.2 Adjusting life years for quality of life
The central or best estimates of the cost per life year threshold, which were presented in Table C.64 (lines
2 and 4) take no account of the health related quality of life in which years of life, expected to be gained
or lost through changes in expenditure, are likely to be lived. In this Section we examine the ways in
which the life years reported in Section C.3.2 can be adjusted for quality, taking account of information
that is available about: i) how quality of life differs by age and gender, and ii) how the quality of life years
associated with mortality changes might be affected by the types of diseases that make up each PBC.
Quality of life based on the general population
Quality of life norms (in Figure C.4) can be applied to the YLL associated with all observed deaths in
each PBC, taking account of gender and age at death. The results are reported in column 4 to 6 of
Table C.65.
Table C.65: Net YLL adjusted for quality of life norms (2008)
PBC
Unadjusted life years Quality adjusted life years
YLL YLG YLL YLG YLL YLG
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1 Infectious diseases 53,926 15,132 38,794 43,703 10,187 33,516
2 Cancer 1,456,255 134,089 1,322,166 1,129,191 89,231 1,039,960
4 Endocrine 65,800 15,983 49,817 52,465 10,598 41,867
7 Neurological 137,791 47,722 90,069 110,532 32,262 78,270
10 Circulatory 1,049,459 278,421 771,038 807,893 183,796 624,097
11 Respiratory 306,838 229,403 77,434 237,981 154,300 83,680
13 Gastro-intestinal 271,395 46,141 225,254 214,756 30,811 183,945
17 Genito-urinary 49,036 32,528 16,508 37,178 21,190 15,989
18+19 Maternity & neonates 19,783 1 19,781 17,176 1 17,175
The implications of the quality adjustment to a cost per QALY threshold that only accounts for the direct
health effects of mortality are summarised in Table C.66, and detailed in Table C.67.
Table C.66: Summary of cost per QALY threshold based on population norms and mortality effects
(2008)
2006-2008 2008-2010
Cost per life year
threshold
Cost per QALY
threshold
Cost per life year
threshold
Cost per QALY
threshold
Population norms Population norms
[1] [2] [3] [4]
big 4 PBCs £8,080 £9,631 £10,220 £12,338
11 PBCs £15,628 £18,622 £23,360 £28,045
All 23 PBCs £17,663 £21,047 £25,214 £30,270
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Table C.67: A breakdown of the cost per QALY threshold based on population norms (2008)
YLL using LE of PBC
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
[1] [2] [3]
2 Cancer £25 1 676 £15,169
10 Circulatory problems £43 5 334 £8,084
11 Respiratory problems £26 986 £26,399
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £18 1 144 £15,899
Big 4 £12,338
1 Infectious diseases £19 261 £71,098
4 Endocrine problems £11 237 £45,361
7 Neurological problems £34 320 £106,193
17 Genito-urinary problems £26 180 £146,347
16 Trauma & injuries* £44 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £39 21 £1,852,926
First 11 PBCs £28,045
3 Disorders of Blood £23 815 £28,045
5 Mental Health Disorders £198 7 077 £28,045
6 Learning Disability £12 411 £28,045
8 Problems of Vision £22 770 £28,045
9 Problems of Hearing £10 346 £28,045
12 Dental problems £32 1 144 £28,045
14 Skin £22 779 £28,045
15 Musculo skeletal system £40 1 437 £28,045
20 Poisoning and adverse effects £10 368 £28,045
21 Healthy Individuals £39 1 401 £28,045
22 Social Care Needs £33 1 191 £28,045
23 Other £58 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £30,270
Table C.68 depicts the judgements over life years, quality of life weights and total QALYs implicit in
calculations of the threshold cost per QALY in Table C.64.
Table C.68: Implied YLL per excess death averted and implied QoL score per YLL gained, for each PBC
(2008)
PBC PBC description
Implied YLL per
excess death
averted
Implied YLL per
PBC death averted
Implied QALYs
gained per excess
death averted
Implied QALYs
gained per PBC
death averted
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 14.08 10.02 11.07 7.88
10 Circulatory 10.39 5.09 8.41 4.12
11 Respiratory 9.18 1.20 9.92 1.30
13 Gastro-intestinal 14.97 9.43 12.22 7.70
Big 4 11.28 4.57 9.34 3.78
1 Infectious diseases 13.22 7.37 11.42 6.37
4 Endocrine 13.60 7.37 11.43 6.19
7 Neurological 13.56 5.37 11.78 4.67
17 Genito-urinary 8.34 1.46 8.08 1.41
16 Trauma & injuries* NA NA NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 74.65 74.65 64.81 64.81
First 11 PBCs 11.38 4.53 9.48 3.78
Adjusting age related quality of life for disease decrements
By using age related quality of life disease decrements (exemplified in Figure C.5) YLL can be adjusted for
quality of life of disease. The results are reported in column 4 to 6 of Table C.69.
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Table C.69: Net YLL adjusted for disease and age related quality of life (2008)
PBC
Unadjusted life years Quality adjusted life years
YLL YLG YLL YLG YLL YLG
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
1 Infectious diseases 53,926 15,132 38,794 34,108 7,524 26,584
2 Cancer 1,456,255 134,089 1,322,166 943,650 72,197 871,452
4 Endocrine 65,800 15,983 49,817 43,063 8,334 34,729
7 Neurological 137,791 47,722 90,069 69,520 18,084 51,436
10 Circulatory 1,049,459 278,421 771,038 625,150 135,622 489,527
11 Respiratory 306,838 229,403 77,434 173,953 106,200 67,754
13 Gastro-intestinal 271,395 46,141 225,254 162,441 22,060 140,380
17 Genito-urinary 49,036 32,528 16,508 30,770 16,949 13,820
18+19 Maternity & neonates 19,783 1 19,781 16,100 1 16,099
The implications of the quality adjustment to a cost per QALY threshold that only accounts for the direct
health effects of mortality are summarised in Table C.70, and detailed in Table C.71.
Table C.70: Summary of cost per QALY threshold based on disease and age related quality of life and
mortality effects (2008)
2006 2008
Cost per life year
threshold
Cost per QALY
threshold
Cost per life year
threshold
Cost per QALY
threshold
Disease related
disutility
Disease related
disutility
[1] [2] [3] [4]
big 4 PBC's £8,080 £12,109 £10,220 £15,534
11 PBCs (with mortality) £15,628 £23,395 £23,360 £35,397
All 23 PBCs (zero health effects for
remaining 12 PBCs)
£57,497 £86,072 £64,275 £97,395
All 23 PBCs (non-zero health effects for
remaining 12 PBCs, except GMS)*
£17,663 £26,441 £25,214 £38,206
* in PBCs without a mortality signal, health effects were estimated by valuing changes in expenditure at the same rate as observed
in PBCs for which there was a mortality signal except GMS.
Table C.71: A breakdown of the cost per QALY threshold based on disease and age related quality of life
and mortality effects (2008)
YLL using LE of PBC
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
[1] [2] [3]
2 Cancer £25 1 405 £18,102
10 Circulatory problems £43 4 184 £10,307
11 Respiratory problems £26 799 £32,604
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £18 873 £20,833
Big 4 £15,534
1 Infectious diseases £19 207 £89,638
4 Endocrine problems £11 197 £54,685
7 Neurological problems £34 210 £161,594
17 Genito-urinary problems £26 156 £169,315
16 Trauma & injuries* £44 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £39 20 £1,976,769
First 11 PBCs £35,397
3 Disorders of Blood £23 646 £35,397
5 Mental Health Disorders £198 5 607 £35,397
6 Learning Disability £12 326 £35,397
8 Problems of Vision £22 610 £35,397
9 Problems of Hearing £10 274 £35,397
12 Dental problems £32 907 £35,397
14 Skin £22 617 £35,397
15 Musculo skeletal system £40 1 139 £35,397
20 Poisoning and adverse effects £10 291 £35,397
21 Healthy Individuals £39 1 110 £35,397
22 Social Care Needs £33 943 £35,397
23 Other £58 0 NA
All (23 PBCs) £38,206
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Table C.72 depicts the judgements over life years, quality of life weights and total QALYs implicit in
calculations of the threshold cost per QALY in Table C.70.
Table C.72: Implied YLL per excess death averted and implied QoL score per YLL gained, for each PBC
(2008)
PBC PBC description
Implied YLL per
excess death
averted
Implied YLL per
PBC death averted
Implied QALYs
gained per excess
death averted
Implied QALYs
gained per PBC
death averted
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 14.08 10.02 9.28 6.60
10 Circulatory 10.39 5.09 6.60 3.23
11 Respiratory 9.18 1.20 8.04 1.05
13 Gastro-intestinal 14.97 9.43 9.33 5.87
Big 4 11.28 1.80 7.42 3.01
1 Infectious diseases 13.22 7.37 9.06 5.05
4 Endocrine 13.60 7.37 9.48 5.14
7 Neurological 13.56 5.37 7.74 3.07
17 Genito-urinary 8.34 1.46 6.99 1.22
16 Trauma & injuries* NA NA NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 74.65 74.65 60.75 60.75
First 11 PBCs 11.38 4.53 6.77 2.99
Summary of the cost per QALY threshold based only on mortality effects
The analysis to this point is summarised in Table C.73. The three estimates of a cost per QALY
threshold are based on assuming that each life year gained is either: lived in full health (see column 1),
lived in a quality of life that reflects age and gender norms of the general population (column 2); or lived
in a quality of life that reflects the original disease state (column 3).
Table C.73: Summary of QALY threshold estimates based only on mortality effects (2008)
[1] [2] [3]
(QoL score =1) (QoL norm) (QoL diseased)
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted *: ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL
QALYs per death averted *: ~ 4.5 QALY ~ 3.8 QALY ~ 3.0 QALY
big 4 PBC's £10,220 £12,338 £15,534 [1]
11 PBCs £23,360 £28,045 £35,397 [2]
All 23 PBCs £25,214 £30,270 £38,206 [3]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: Remainder of disease Remainder of disease Remainder of disease
YLL per death averted *: ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL
QALYs per death averted *: ~ 4.5 QALY ~ 3.8 QALY ~ 3.0 QALY
big 4 PBC's £5,083 £5,811 £7,305 [4]
11 PBCs £8,579 £9,861 £12,720 [5]
All 23 PBCs £9,260 £10,644 £13,729 [6]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted *: 2 YLL 2 YLL 2 YLL
QALYs per death averted *: ~ 2 QALY ~ 1.8 QALY ~ 1.4 QALY
big 4 PBC's £23,346 £26,138 £32,797 [7]
11 PBCs £52,936 £59,151 £74,183 [8]
All 23 PBCs £57,136 £63,844 £80,069 [9]
* see Table C.72
C.3.3. Including quality of life effects during disease
In this section we explore how estimates of effects of expenditure that can be observed (i.e., on mortality)
can be used to infer the likely effects on what cannot be directly observed (quality of life), rather than
making extreme assumptions that are not credible (e.g., assuming that changes in expenditure will have
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no effects on quality of life outcomes). In Section C.2.3.2, we described the use of ratios of QALYs lost
to life years lost due to disease and explored how the use of the QALY burden of disease is preferable to
inform estimates of the threshold. We here only present the results for the QALY burden approach.
In Table C.74, deaths and YLL from ONS (2008 to 2010 mortality data) compare to those from GBD.
The factors used to adjust GBD information are reported in columns 4 and 7.
Table C.74: Comparing deaths and YLL from ONS and GBD. (2008)
deaths YLL
Excess
deaths ONS
All
deaths
ONS
All deaths
GBD*
adjustment
factor
(deaths)
Net
estimates
ONS
Total YLL
GBD*
adjustment
factor
(YLL)
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
1 Infectious diseases 2,934 5,262 1,408 3.737 38,794 25,142 1.543
2 Cancer 93,917 131,946 140,124 0.942 1,322,166 1,932,637 0.684
4 Endocrine 3,663 6,762 7,509 0.901 49,817 95,401 0.522
7 Neurological 6,642 16,771 12,854 1.305 90,069 164,796 0.547
10 Circulatory 74,217 151,443 178,454 0.849 771,038 1,750,608 0.440
11 Respiratory 8,432 64,449 67,441 0.956 77,434 594,529 0.130
13 Gastro-intestinal 15,049 23,897 28,329 0.844 225,254 396,829 0.568
17 Genito-urinary 1,978 11,345 8,606 1.318 16,508 77,338 0.213
18+19 Maternity & neonates 265 265 2,211 0.120 19,781 149,868 0.132
Total 207,097 412,140 446,936 0.92 2,610,861 5,187,148 0.50
The threshold cost per QALY based on burden associated with one year of disease derived from GBD
are summarised in Table C.75 and detailed in Table C.76.
Table C.75: Summary of the cost per QALY threshold (2008)
2006 2008
[1] [2]
big 4 PBC's £3,036 £4,872
11 PBCs (with mortality) £5,128 £8,308
All 23 PBCs £10,187 £12,936
Table C.76: Breakdown of the cost per QALY threshold (2008)
QALY burden
(HoDAR and MEPs)
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
[1] [4] [5]
2 Cancer £35 2 064 £16,997
10 Circulatory problems £59 8 453 £7,038
11 Respiratory problems £36 17 981 £1,998
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £25 3 441 £7,293
Big 4 £4,872
1 Infectious diseases £26 1 229 £20,829
4 Endocrine problems £15 4 749 £3,124
7 Neurological problems £47 8 551 £5,480
17 Genito-urinary problems £36 829 £43,813
16 Trauma & injuries* £60 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £54 18 £2,969,208
First 11 PBCs £8,308
3 Disorders of Blood £16 1 712 £9,419
5 Mental Health Disorders £140 7 469 £18,744
6 Learning Disability £8 54 £149,883
8 Problems of Vision £15 333 £45,788
9 Problems of Hearing £7 1 098 £6,239
12 Dental problems £23 533 £42,472
14 Skin £15 152 £101,042
15 Musculo skeletal system £28 1 819 £15,628
20 Poisoning and adverse effects £7 64 £113,546
21 Healthy Individuals £28 53 £526,771
22 Social Care Needs £24 NA
23 Other £80 NA
All (23 PBCs) £12,936
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Summary of the cost per QALY threshold
The results of the three sequential steps of analysis are summarised in Table C.77, for this year of analysis.
They include: i) the cost per life year (column 1) based on the methods of analysis outlined in Section
C.2.1; ii) the cost per life year adjusted for quality of life (column 2) based on the methods of analysis
outlined in Section C.2.2; and iii) the cost per QALY (column 3) based on the methods of analysis
outlined in Section C.2.3. These estimates, in column 3, take account of the likely effects of changes in
expenditure on quality of life during disease as well as the effects associated with mortality and life years;
making best use of available information, while the assumptions required appear more reasonable than
the other alternatives available. For this reason these estimates remain our central or best estimates for all
the waves of expenditure and mortality data.
Table C.77: Summary of cost per QALY threshold estimates (2008)
[1] [2] [3]
QoL associated with life extension: 1 Norm
Based on burdenQoL during disease: 0 0
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 4.5 QALY ~ 3.8 QALY ~ 15.0 QALY
big 4 PBC's £10,220 £12,338 £4,872 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £23,360 £28,045 £8,308 [2]
All 23 PBCs £25,214 £30,270 £12,936 [3]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality:
Remainder of
disease duration
Remainder of
disease duration
Remainder of
disease duration
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL ~ 4.5 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 4.5 QALY ~ 3.8 QALY ~ 15.0 QALY
big 4 PBC's £5,083 £5,811 £1,194 [4]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £8,579 £9,861 £1,175 [5]
All 23 PBCs £9,260 £10,644 £2,018 [6]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year 1 year 1 year
YLL per death averted: 2 YLL 2 YLL 2 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 2 QALY ~ 1.4 QALY ~ 6.6 QALY
big 4 PBC's £23,346 £26,138 £11,040 [7]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £52,936 £59,151 £18,827 [8]
All 23 PBCs £57,136 £63,844 £29,314 [9]
The estimate of £8,308 per QALY (line 2) is restricted to the effects of changes in expenditure in the
11PBCs where outcome elasticities can be estimated. However, these PBCs only account for a
proportion of a change in overall expenditure (approximately 50%, see Table C.80 below). As was
explained in Section C.2.3 the QALY threshold of £12,936 (column 3, line 3) uses the estimated
proportionate effects of expenditure on the QALY burden of disease in the 11PBCs as a surrogate for
proportionate effects in the others, (i.e., assuming that the effects that can be observed will be similar to
those that cannot) and represents our central or best estimate. As in previous sections, no health effects
are assigned to PBC23 or 22 (General Medical Services and Social Care) on the basis that any health
effects of this expenditure would be recorded in the other PBCs. Although this estimate of £12,936
reflects changes in undiscounted QALYs associated with changes in expenditure, discounting the quality
adjusted life year effects only increases the cost per QALY threshold to £13,141(Table C.78). The effects
of discounting are modest because: i) the health effects of a change in expenditure are restricted to one
year (where no discounting is necessary); ii) most of the total QALY effect occurs in that year; iii) it is
only some of the life year effects (adjusted for quality) of a change in mortality in that year that occur in
future years that need to be discounted; and iv) these need to be discounted only over 4.5 years on
average.
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Table C.78: Summary of QALY threshold, discounted (2008).
2008-2010
discounted
Best estimate
big 4 PBC's £4,998 [1]
11 PBCs £8,467 [2]
All 23 PBCs £13,141 [3]
2 Only quality adjusted net YLL were discounted, and thus QALYs associated with gains in QoL during disease were not. The
discounting factor has been calculated by applying a 3.5% discount rate to each year of life lost in the PBCs  the estimate of
years of life lost used was the implied YLL per death averted in each PBC (in column 2 of Table C.63). This discounting factor
was applied to net YLLs, before applying the outcome elasticity to calculate YLL averted.
The upper and lower bounds for the cost per QALY thresholds in column 3 are based on making the
necessary assumptions about duration of health effects and how long a death might be averted optimistic
(providing the lower bound for the threshold) or conservative (an upper bound for the threshold). The
lower bound (lines 4 to 6) is based on assuming that health effects are not restricted to one year but apply
to the whole of the remaining disease duration of the population at risk in PBCs during one year.
Although this combines optimistic assumptions, it is possible that at least some part of a change in
expenditure may prevent disease so will have an impact on populations that are incident to PBCs in the
future. Such effects are not captured in any of the estimates presented in this report so all are
conservative in this respect. The upper bound (lines 7 to 9) is based on the combination of assuming that
health effects are restricted to one year for the population currently at risk and that any death averted is
only averted for 2 years (see Section C.2.1.5).
The estimated QALY effects associated with each PBC can be decomposed into that part due to life year
effects adjusted for quality and that part associated with effects on quality during disease (Table C.79).
Those PBCs for which mortality is the major concern have a much greater share of total QALY effects
associated with avoidance of premature death (e.g., PBC2 and PBC10) compared to those where quality
of life is the major concern (e.g., PBC 7).
Table C.79: Decomposing estimated QALY effects by PBC (2008)
PBC
QALY
change
(total)
QALY
change
(death)
% QALY gained
for
premature
death
for disability
while alive
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 2,064 1,912 93% 7%
10 Circulatory 8,453 5,778 68% 32%
11 Respiratory 17,981 789 4% 96%
13 Gastro-intestinal 3,441 1,268 37% 63%
1 Infectious diseases 1,229 282 23% 77%
4 Endocrine 4,749 254 5% 95%
7 Neurological 8,551 335 4% 96%
17 Genito-urinary 829 162 20% 80%
16 Trauma & injuries* 0 0 NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 18 12 69% 31%
3 Disorders of Blood 1,712 88 5% 95%
5 Mental Health 7,469 652 9% 91%
6 Learning Disability 54 11 20% 80%
8 Problems of Vision 333 13 4% 96%
9 Problems of Hearing 1,098 8 1% 99%
12 Dental problems 533 1 0% 100%
14 Skin 152 56 37% 63%
15 Musculo skeletal 1,819 90 5% 95%
20 Poisoning and AE 64 10 16% 84%
21 Healthy Individuals 53 8 16% 84%
22 Social Care Needs 0 0 NA NA
23 Other 0 0 NA NA
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C.3.4. Which PBCs matter most?
Table C.80: Impact of each PBC on the overall cost per QALY threshold (2008)
PBC
% share of change
in overall
expenditure
% share of total
health effects
(QALY)
Elasticity of the
threshold*
PBC cost per
QALY
[1] [2] [5]
2 Cancer 4.47 3.41 0.34 £16,997
10 Circulatory 7.59 13.95 1.40 £7,038
11 Respiratory 4.58 29.67 2.97 £1,998
13 Gastro-intestinal 3.20 5.68 0.57 £7,293
1 Infectious diseases 3.27 2.03 0.20 £20,829
4 Endocrine 1.89 7.84 0.78 £3,124
7 Neurological 5.98 14.11 1.41 £5,480
17 Genito-urinary 4.64 1.37 0.14 £43,813
16 Trauma & injuries* 7.70 0 0 NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 6.83 0.03 <0.01 £2,969,208
3 Disorders of Blood 2.06 2.82 0.28 £9,419
5 Mental Health 17.86 12.32 1.23 £18,744
6 Learning Disability 1.04 0.09 0.01 £149,883
8 Problems of Vision 1.94 0.55 0.05 £45,788
9 Problems of Hearing 0.87 1.81 0.18 £6,239
12 Dental problems 2.89 0.88 0.09 £42,472
14 Skin 1.97 0.25 0.03 £101,042
15 Musculo skeletal 3.63 3.00 0.30 £15,628
20 Poisoning and AE 0.93 0.11 0.01 £113,546
21 Healthy Individuals 3.53 0.09 0.01 £526,771
22 Social Care Needs 3.00 0 0 NA
23 Other 10.14 0 0 NA
* Calculated using the effect on the threshold of a 10% increase (or decrease) in QALY change of the PBC.
C.3.5. How uncertain are the estimates?
In Section C. 2.5, the impact of uncertainty over the spend and outcome elasticities on estimates of the
cost per QALY threshold has been illustrated and interpreted in detail using expenditure data from
2006/07. We here repeat this analysis using expenditure data from 2008/09 and mortality data from 2008
to 2010. Figure C.8 shows the histogram of threshold values from the Monte Carlo simulation (where
each random sample from the simulation represents one possible realisation of the overall threshold), and
Figure C.9 shows the cumulative probability density function for a cost per QALY threshold based on the
11 PBC with estimated outcome elasticities and for all 23 PBCs.
Figure C.8: Histogram of simulation of undiscounted threshold (all 23 PBCs) (2008)
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Figure C.9: Cumulative probability density function for the cost per QALY threshold (2008)
Table C.81: Uncertainty over the QALY threshold (2008).
11PBCs All 23 PBCs
[1] [2]
Best estimate (deterministic) £8,308 £12,936
Mean estimate (from the simulations) £8,330 £13,050
Threshold value at the probability of (from the simulations):
2.5% £5,176 £8,141
5.0% £5,438 £8,760
50.0% £8,346 £13,084
95.0% £17,452 £25,505
97.5% £21,693 £32,173
Probability (from the simulations)of the threshold being smaller than:
£5,000 per QALY 2% 0%
£6,000 per QALY 10% 0%
£7,000 per QALY 25% 0%
£8,000 per QALY 45% 2%
£9,000 per QALY 59% 6%
£10,000 per QALY 71% 13%
£15,000 per QALY 93% 68%
£20,000 per QALY 97% 89%
£25,000 per QALY 98% 95%
£30,000 per QALY 99% 97%
£35,000 per QALY 99% 98%
£40,000 per QALY 99% 99%
£45,000 per QALY 99% 99%
£50,000 per QALY 99% 99%
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C.4 Re-estimating the cost per QALY threshold using 2007 expenditure data
The same methods of analysis were applied to the econometric analysis of the 2007/08 expenditure and
2007 to 2009 mortality data (see Section B10 in Appendix B). Given the detailed reporting of the
methods and interpretation of the analyses for other expenditure years (see Sections C.2 and C.3), we will
here only present the necessary Tables of results.
Table C.82: Outcome and spend elasticties (2007)
Total spend
2007/08, (£)
Spend elasticities Outcome
elasticities*PBC PBC description unadjusted adjusted
[1] [2] [2] [3]
2 Cancer £4,573 0.890 0.890 0.365
10 Circulatory problems £6,325 0.293 0.293 1.277
11 Respiratory problems £3,431 0.536 0.536 2.205
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £3,805 0.622 0.622 1.328
Big 4 £18,134
1 Infectious diseases £1,119 1.436 1.436 0.548
4 Endocrine problems £1,997 0.264 0.264 0.566
7 Neurological problems £3,165 1.035 1.035 0.339
17 Genito-urinary problems £3,439 1.004 1.004 1.855
16 Trauma & injuries* £2,918 1.686 1.686 0.369 +
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £3,662 0.514 0.514 0.110
First 11 PBCs £34,434
3 Disorders of Blood £986 1.83 2.879 -
5 Mental Health Disorders £9,171 1.145 1.801 -
6 Learning Disability £2,748 0.44 0.692 -
8 Vision £1,556 1.17 1.841 -
9 Hearing £409 1.029 1.619 -
12 Dental problems £3,014 0.424 0.667 -
14 Problems of the Skin £1,542 0.428 0.673 -
15 Musculo-skeletal system £3,848 0.806 1.268 -
20 Poisoning and AE £803 0.668 1.051 -
21 Healthy Individuals £1,594 0.986 1.551 -
22 Social Care Needs £1,789 1.852 2.913 -
23 Other £11,763 0.563 0.563 -
All (23 PBCs) £73,656
* without the negative sign
+ Estimated 0.369 but not used in the threshold calculations for consistency with other years of analysis
Total spend
2007/08,
m£
Spend elasticities
Change in
spend, m£
(% share)
Outcome
elasticities*PBC PBC description unadjusted
analysis
in 4.4.2
Analysis in
4.4.2
[1] [2] [3]
2 Cancer £4,573 0.890 1.118 51 (6.9) 0.365
10 Circulatory £6,325 0.293 0.368 23 (3.2) 1.277
11 Respiratory £3,431 0.536 0.673 23 (3.1) 2.205
13 Gastro-intestinal £3,805 0.622 0.781 30 (4) 1.328
Big 4 £18,134 127 (17.3)
1 Infectious diseases £1,119 1.436 1.804 20 (2.7) 0.548
4 Endocrine £1,997 0.264 0.332 7 (0.9) 0.566
7 Neurological £3,165 1.035 1.300 41 (5.6) 0.339
17 Genito-urinary £3,439 1.004 1.261 43 (5.9) 1.855
16
Trauma &
injuries* £2,918 1.686 2.118 62 (8.4) 0.369 +
18+19
Maternity &
neonates* £3,662 0.514 0.646 24 (3.2) 0.110
First 11 PBCs £34,434 324 (44)
3
Disorders of
Blood £986 1.83 2.299 23 (3.1) -
5 Mental Health £9,171 1.145 1.438 132 (17.9) -
6 Learning Disability £2,748 0.44 0.553 15 (2.1) -
8 Vision £1,556 1.17 1.470 23 (3.1) -
9 Hearing £409 1.029 1.293 5 (0.7) -
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12 Dental £3,014 0.424 0.533 16 (2.2) -
14 Skin £1,542 0.428 0.538 8 (1.1) -
15 Musculo-skeletal £3,848 0.806 1.013 39 (5.3) -
20 Poisoning and AE £803 0.668 0.839 7 (0.9) -
21
Healthy
Individuals £1,594 0.986 1.239 20 (2.7)
-
22 Social Care Needs £1,789 1.852 2.327 42 (5.7) -
23 Other £11,763 0.563 0.707 83 (11.3) -
All (23 PBCs) £73,656 737 (100)
Table C.83. Number of deaths above LE in 2007/8/9, by PBC
PBC
<LE
2007
>LE
2007
<LE
2008
>LE
2008
<LE
2009
>LE
2009
Annual
N deaths
<LE
Annual
N deaths
> LE
1 Infectious diseases 3,906 3,731 3,404 2,588 3,042 2,192 3,451 2,837
2 Cancer 95,385 35,401 94,814 37,088 94,218 37,209 94,806 36,566
4 Endocrine 3,970 2,747 4,031 2,879 3,832 2,828 3,944 2,818
7 Neurological 8,852 6,494 9,632 6,865 9,439 6,945 9,308 6,768
10 Circulatory 80,687 78,404 80,834 76,352 75,993 73,397 79,172 76,051
11 Respiratory 29,571 35,029 32,059 35,204 29,890 33,326 30,507 34,520
13 Gastro-intestinal 15,667 8,367 15,937 8,267 15,354 8,168 15,653 8,267
17 Genito-urinary 4,077 6,553 4,468 6,670 4,375 6,903 4,307 6,709
18+19 Maternity & neonates 216 0 267 0 281 1 255 0
Table C.84: Net YLL using LE of the PBC (2007)
PBC
LE of
Males
LE of
Females
Average2007-2009
Deaths
YLL YLG Net YLL
<LE >LE
1 Infectious diseases 79.6 83.6 3,280 3,008 57,715 19,085 38,629
2 Cancer 83.0 84.7 100,810 30,561 1,464,726 129,810 1,334,916
4 Endocrine 81.0 84.7 4,004 2,759 66,575 15,386 51,189
7 Neurological 79.6 83.3 8,719 7,357 135,760 44,925 90,835
10 Circulatory 83.0 86.5 92,729 62,494 1,069,632 276,368 793,264
11 Respiratory 80.3 84.0 29,668 35,359 304,168 230,245 73,922
13 Gastro-intestinal 80.6 84.5 15,640 8,280 271,092 45,500 225,593
17 Genito-urinary 83.5 85.6 5,008 6,007 47,656 30,931 16,725
18+19 Maternity & neonates 78.7 83.1 255 0 18,844 1 18,843
Table C.85: Comparing deaths and YLL from ONS and GBD (2007).
deaths YLL
Excess
deaths ONS
All
deaths
ONS
All deaths
GBD*
adjustment
factor
(deaths)
Net
estimates
ONS
Total YLL
GBD*
adjustment
factor
(YLL)
1 Infectious diseases 2,925 6,288 1,408 4.47 38,629 25,142 1.54
2 Cancer 94,827 131,372 140,124 0.94 1,334,916 1,932,637 0.69
4 Endocrine 3,765 6,762 7,509 0.90 51,189 95,401 0.54
7 Neurological 6,692 16,076 12,854 1.25 90,835 164,796 0.55
10 Circulatory 76,322 155,223 178,454 0.87 793,264 1,750,608 0.45
11 Respiratory 8,034 65,027 67,441 0.96 73,922 594,529 0.12
13 Gastro-intestinal 15,064 23,920 28,329 0.84 225,593 396,829 0.57
17 Genito-urinary 2,005 11,016 8,606 1.28 16,725 77,338 0.22
18+19 Maternity & neonates 255 255 2,211 0.12 18,843 149,868 0.13
Total 209,890 415,939 446,936 0.93 2,643,916 5,187,148 0.51
Table C.86: Summary of the cost per QALY threshold (2007)
2006 2007 2008
[1] [2] [3]
big 4 PBC's £3,036 £4,549 £4,872
11 PBCs (with mortality) £5,128 £8,513 £8,308
All 23 PBCs £10,187 £13,554 £12,936
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Table 87: Breakdown of the cost per QALY threshold (2007)
QALY burden
(HoDAR and MEPs)
PBC PBC description
Change in
spend, £m
Change in
QALY
Cost per QALY
gained, £
[1] [4] [5]
2 Cancer £51 3 820 £13,384
10 Circulatory problems £23 3 462 £6,724
11 Respiratory problems £23 16 522 £1,398
13 Gastro-intestinal problems £30 4 166 £7,137
Big 4 £4,549
1 Infectious diseases £20 1 300 £15,530
4 Endocrine problems £7 1 143 £5,796
7 Neurological problems £41 6 421 £6,409
17 Genito-urinary problems £43 1 224 £35,449
16 Trauma & injuries* £62
18+19 Maternity & neonates* £24 7 £3,250,386
First 11 PBCs £8,513
3 Disorders of Blood £23 2 695 £8,407
5 Mental Health Disorders £132 8 316 £15,863
6 Learning Disability £15 117 £129,512
8 Problems of Vision £23 600 £38,140
9 Problems of Hearing £5 956 £5,534
12 Dental problems £16 444 £36,177
14 Skin £8 98 £84,977
15 Musculo skeletal system £39 2 926 £13,319
20 Poisoning and adverse effects £7 77 £87,852
21 Healthy Individuals £20 48 £414,420
22 Social Care Needs £42 NA
23 Other £83 NA
All (23 PBCs) £13,554
Table C.88: Decomposing estimated QALY effects by PBC (2007)
PBC
QALY
change
(total)
QALY
change
(death)
% QALY gained
for
premature
death
for disability
while alive
[1] [2] [3] [4]
2 Cancer 3,820 3,542 93% 7%
10 Circulatory 3,462 2,369 68% 32%
11 Respiratory 16,522 687 4% 96%
13 Gastro-intestinal 4,166 1,536 37% 63%
1 Infectious diseases 1,300 258 20% 80%
4 Endocrine 1,143 63 5% 95%
7 Neurological 6,421 264 4% 96%
17 Genito-urinary 1,224 247 20% 80%
16 Trauma & injuries* 0 0 NA NA
18+19 Maternity & neonates* 7 5 69% 31%
3 Disorders of Blood 2,695 139 5% 95%
5 Mental Health 8,316 726 9% 91%
6 Learning Disability 117 23 20% 80%
8 Problems of Vision 600 24 4% 96%
9 Problems of Hearing 956 7 1% 99%
12 Dental problems 444 0 0% 100%
14 Skin 98 36 37% 63%
15 Musculo skeletal 2,926 145 5% 95%
20 Poisoning and AE 77 12 16% 84%
21 Healthy Individuals 48 7 16% 84%
22 Social Care Needs 0 0 NA NA
23 Other 0 0 NA NA
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Summary of the cost per QALY threshold
Table C.89: Summary of cost per QALY threshold estimates (2007)
QoL associated with life extension:
Based on burdenQoL during disease:
Best estimate
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.8 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 16.8 QALY
big 4 PBC's £4,549 [1]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £8,513 [2]
All 23 PBCs £13,554 [3]
Lower bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality:
Remainder of
disease duration
YLL per death averted: ~ 4.8 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 16.8 QALY
big 4 PBC's £1,116 [4]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £1,361 [5]
All 23 PBCs £2,436 [6]
Upper bound
Effect of expenditure on mortality: 1 year
YLL per death averted: 2 YLL
QALYs per death averted: ~ 7.0 QALY
big 4 PBC's £10,965 [7]
11 PBCs (with mortality) £20,517 [8]
All 23 PBCs £32,670 [9]
Table C.90: Summary of QALY threshold, discounted (2007)
2007-2009
[2]
big 4 PBC's £4,690 [1]
11 PBCs £8,718 [2]
All 23 PBCs £13,801 [3]
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Appendix C: Addendum 1
DATA SOURCES
Contents
A. General Practice Research Database (GPRD)
B. Global Burden of Disease (GBD)
C. Health Survey for England (HSE)
D. Health Outcomes Data Repository (HODaR)
E. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
F. Hospital Episode Statistics (HES)
G. Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs)
H. Tables of prevalence distribution within PBCs
References
A. General Practice Research Database (GPRD)
GPRD contains over 3 million active patient records drawn from approximately 400 primary care
practices in the UK. The Medicine Control Agency manages the dataset. The database has clinical and
prescription data and can provide information to support pharmaco-vigilance (indication, utilization, and
risk/benefit profiles of drugs) and formal pharmaco-epidemiologic studies, including information on
demographics, medical symptoms, therapy (medicines, vaccines, devices), and treatment outcomes.
As of 29th March 2012 GPRD has become the Clinical Practice Research Database (CPRD), an
expanded dataset that represents The All England Data and Interventional Research Service. GPRD was
approached to provide information on the prevalence of disease by ICD-10 disease code. A sample set of
data was analysed by researchers at Pharmatelligence25 who were tasked with extracting data on
prevalence of each disease state by ICD-10.
We were provided with access to data comprising of 22,313,086 rows/patientICD10 events (3 digit)26
representing 4,229,910 patients with data on new diagnosis of diseases observed between 1 Jan 2006 and
24 June 2011. Multiple events per patient are thus possible, and all patients are active in the dataset, i.e.
patients had at least one new diagnosis in the period of interest. Newly diagnosed (incident) events were
defined using a wash-in period of 24 months (or from registration to index date if lower than 24 months).
The sample contains 1873 unique ICD codes in the dataset. 70 ICD codes account for 50% of the total
number of events, 166 for 75% and 306 for 90%.
Diagnoses are collected in GPRD using Read codes. These were mapped into three-character ICD-10
codes. Cross-mappings from Read V2 and Read V3 to ICD-10 were used in order to maximize the
number of GPRD Read and ICD-10 codes included (33.2% of Read codes; 99.7% of ICD codes)27.
25 Prof. Craig Currie and Sara Jenkins-Jones
26 This represents six fewer than the incidence data as in these instances the end dates for the disease were
beyond the end of the data collection period.
27 Mapping algorithms were provided by the NHS Connecting for Health group, see
http://www.connectingforhealth.nhs.uk/systemsandservices/data/clinicalcoding/crossmap for more
details
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Unfortunately due to the short collection period of GPRD it was not possible to directly observe
prevalence only incidence over a period. Attempts were made to elicit prevalence estimate through
observed incidence data from GPRD coupled with clinical expertise on expected disease duration
(provided by Dr. Charlotte Haylock, Hull and East Yorkshire Hospitals NHS Trust). Our approach
classified expected duration for all ICD-10 diseases by 3-digit code into one of five duration buckets28.
However, the limitations of the data were deemed too extensive to provide sufficient accuracy of
estimates to represent a stronger estimate of prevalence than provide by GBD.
B. Global Burden of Disease (GBD)
The WHO GBD project draws on a wide range of data sources to quantify global and regional effects of
diseases, injuries and risk factors on population health. We were provided with access to the beta version
of the WHOs National Burden of Disease (NBD) toolkit for the United Kingdom which represents a set
of metrics on World Health Organisation (WHO) prior estimates of mortality and burden of disease for
WHO Member states for 2004 (based on the Global Burden of Disease: 2004 update[9])29.
The metrics of interest to our analysis included disease incidence, prevalence, duration and mortality.
These metrics were provided by U-code disease code which were mapped to ICD-10 using direct WHO
mapping algorithms[10]. In addition, in many cases each U-code was sub-divided by disease sequela
which represent disease sub-categories of each U-code[10]. As an individual may be represented in
multiple sequela in a single U-code to avoid double counting in the event of multiple sequela in a given U-
code our analysis uses prevalence estimates based on the sequela with the largest prevalent population.
Our analysis uses two forms of prevalence data, point prevalence and annual prevalence. Point
Prevalence represents the instantaneous prevalence of a disease whereas annual prevalence represents
the extent of the prevalence population over a given year. To calculate annual prevalence incidence of a
disease was multiplied by expected disease duration rounded up to the nearest year.
All data was provided by age, given for both genders in fixed age buckets (either eight or nineteen
buckets depending on the data of interest), as a result it was necessary to assume the relevant population
could be represented by the mid-point of that bucket for the relevant metric.
C. Health Survey for England (HSE)
The Health Survey for England (HSE) comprises a series of annual surveys beginning in 1991. This
survey is now commissioned and published by The NHS Information Centre. It is designed to provide
regular information on various aspects of the nation's health. All surveys have covered the adult
population aged 16 and over living in private households in England.30
In order to define the quality of life norms for the population of the UK required for the analysis detailed
in section 4.3.1 data from six Health Surveys for England (1996, 2003-2006 and 2008) were pooled. Self-
reported health status and EQ-5D data were extracted and used to generate mean health state utility
values for the normal population.
28 Representing instantaneous, one month, one year, five years and life-long
29 For more information on access to the Toolkit see
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/tools_nbd_toolkit/en/index.html
30 For more information on the surveys and the data they collect see
http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/PublishedSurvey/HealthSurveyForEngland/index.h
tm
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Surveys are not completed for people age under 16; as a result we have assumed that all persons age 0 to
15 have the same quality of life norms as a person age 16. In addition the number of surveys recorded for
persons over 91 years of age is relatively small, as a result all persons over 91 are assumed to have the
same quality of life norm as a person age 91. The quality of life norms for each age and gender are shown
in figure 1 in section 4.3.1.
D. Health Outcome Data Repository (HODaR)
HODaR represents a supplement of routine clinically coded data from the Cardiff and Vale NHS
Hospitals Trust, UK, with survey data covering socio-demographic characteristics, QoL, utility, and
resource use information[4]. HODaR data was collected for subjects treated at Cardiff and Vale NHS
hospital from 2002 to 2004. Inpatients were surveyed 6 weeks post-discharge whilst outpatients are
handed a survey package when they attend. More than 30,000 observations (aged above 18) are available
relating to approximately 2,000 diagnoses of disease by ICD-10.
We used HODaR to estimate Health Related Quality of Life (HRQoL) by ICD-10 diagnoses codes and
age using EQ-5D. If data on a patient was provided with multiple diagnoses the primary condition was
used.
E. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS)
MEPS is a national representative survey of the US civilian non-institutionalised population, collecting
information on health care utilisation which began in 1996.[5] EQ-5D was employed to measure HRQoL
of the population in years 2000 to 2002. There are about 38,000 adults (aged above 18) completing EQ-
5D relating to 700 ICD-10 diagnoses. MEPS consists of a household component and an insurance
component, both aimed at identifying the medical usage of individuals as well as how they are funded,
their cost, and the scope and breadth of health insurance held and available.
As with HODaR, MEPS allowed us to estimate the HRQoL by ICD-10 code and age. If data on a patient
was provided with multiple conditions the primary condition was used.
F. Hospital Episode Statistics (HES)
HES represents a collection of data with details on all admissions to the NHS hospital in England. It
contains admitted patient care data from 1989 onwards, with more than 12 million new records added
each year, and outpatient attendance data from 2003 onwards, with more than 40 million new records
added each year.
Expenditure by ICD-10 codes and PCT was used to estimate the contribution to variance of each PBC.
This was done by calculating the contribution of that ICD to the variance in expenditure between PCTs
within a PBC (total costs allocated to individual ICDs were divided by the number of patients using
services in the PCT). For our analysis we make use of HES data on the year 2007/08.
G. Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs)
Introduced in 2009, the English NHS Patient Reported Outcomes (PROMs) programme routinely
collects self-reported health status of patients receiving surgery for four elective procedures: knee and hip
replacement, groin hernia repair, and varicose vein surgery. Patients are invited to complete a
questionnaire prior to surgery, and again six (or three) months after surgery.[11] Differences in their self-
reported health status are used to explore differences between provider performance in improving patient
health.[12] The data that are collected include both condition specific questions (the Oxford Hip Score,
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Oxford Knee Score and the Aberdeen Varicose Vein score; no condition specific instrument is available
for hernia) as well as the generic instrument, the EQ-5D (both the EQ-5D profile, and the patient's
global assessment of their health, the EQ-VAS - see.[13] All NHS patients receiving these surgical
procedures are invited to complete the PROMs questionnaires - in practice, for a variety of reasons, some
patients do not participate, or complete only the pre-surgery, or the post-surgery, questionnaire - so the
data do not cover 100% of patients. However, good coverage rates have been achieved - for example, the
response rate from hip surgery patients to April 2012 was 78% for the pre-surgery questionnaire, and
81% on the post-surgery questionnaire.[14]
Patient-level data from the PROMs programme are freely available to download in anonymised form.
Those data can also be linked to further information in the HES database, via requests to the NHS
Information Centre. Standardised reports on the PROMs data, including the average (case-mix adjusted)
performance of providers, is regularly published by the Information Centre, currently on a quarterly
basis.
There are plans to extend the PROMs programme in the future, in keeping with the Government's NHS
Outcomes Framework, and a number of pilot studies have been commissioned by the Department of
Health in order to inform the roll out to other NHS services. There is currently work underway or being
planned around the potential use of PROMs in a wide range of long term conditions; primary care; in
cancer survivorship; cardiovascular services; muscular skeletal; and cosmetic surgery.
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G. Tables of prevalence distribution within PBCs
Table C1.1: Distribution of PBC1 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of each
ICD
A- HIV disease (B20-B24) G- Viral infections characterized by skin and mucous
membrane lesions (B00-B09)
M- Viral infections of the central nervous system (A80-A89)
B- Other bacterial diseases (A30-A49) H- Mycoses (B35-B49) N- Other infectious diseases (B98-B99)
C- Certain zoonotic bacterial diseases (A20-A28) I- Protozoal diseases (B50-B64) O- General symptoms and signs (R50-R69)
D- Arthropod-borne viral fevers and viral haemorrhagic fevers
(A90-A99)
J- Other viral diseases (B25-B34) P- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere
classified (R70-R99)
E- Rickettsioses (A75-A79) K- Helminthiases (B65-B83) Q- Persons with potential health hazards related to
communicable diseases (Z20-Z29)
F- Other spirochaetal diseases (A65-A69) L- Pediculosis, acariasis and other infestations (B85-B89) R- Persons with potential health hazards related to family and
personal history and certain conditions influencing health status
(Z80-Z99)
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Table C1.2: Distribution of PBC2 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of each
ICD
A- Malignant neoplasms, breast and female genital organs (C50-
C58)
I- Malignant neoplasms, secondary and ill-defined (C76-C80) P- In situ neoplasms (D00-D09)
B- Malignant neoplasms, digestive organs (C15-C26) J- Malignant neoplasms, eye, brain and central nervous system
(C69-C72)
Q- Benign neoplasms (D10-D36)
C- Malignant neoplasms, human male genital organsmale genital
organs (C60-C63)
K- Malignant neoplasms, lip, oral cavity and pharynx (C00-C14) R- Neoplasms of uncertain or unknown behaviour (D37-D48)
D- Malignant neoplasms, urinary organs (C64-C68) L- Malignant neoplasms, endocrine glands and related structures
(C73-C75)
S- Other diseases of urinary system (N30-N39)
E- Malignant neoplasms, respiratory system and intrathoracic
organs (C30-C39)
M- Other diseases of the respiratory system (J95-J99) T- Persons encountering health services for examination and
investigation (Z00-Z13)
F- Malignant neoplasms, stated or presumed to be primary, of
lymphoid, haematopoietic and related tissue (C81-C96)
N- Malignant neoplasms, bone and articular cartilage (C40-C41) U- Persons encountering health services for specific procedures
and health care (Z40-Z54)
G- Malignant neoplasms, skin (C43-C44) O- Malignant neoplasms of independent (primary) multiple sites
(C97-)
V- Persons with potential health hazards related to family and
personal history and certain conditions influencing health status
(Z80-Z99)
H- Malignant neoplasms, connective and soft tissue (C45-C49)
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Table C1.3: Distribution of PBC3 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of each
ICD
A- Aplastic and other anaemias (D60-D64) E- Haemolytic anaemias (D55-D59)
B- Nutritional anemias (D50-D53) F- Coagulation defects, purpura and other haemorrhagic conditions (D65-D69)
C- Other diseases of blood and blood-forming organs (D70-D77) G- Congenital malformations and deformations Other (Q80-Q89)
D- Certain disorders involving the immune mechanism (D80-D89) H- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified (R70-R99)
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Table C1.4: Distribution of PBC4 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of each
ICD
A- Diabetes mellitus (E10-E14) G- Metabolic disorders of amino-acids (E70-E72) M- Metabolic disorders of combinations (E76-E78)
B- Other metabolic disorders (E79-E90) H- Other disorders of glucose regulation and pancreatic
internal secretion (E15-E16)
N- Metabolic disorders of lipids (E75-)
C- Thyroid gland / Thyroid hormone (E00-E07) I- Parathyroid gland / PTH (E20-E21) O- Other nutritional deficiencies (E50-E64)
D- Adrenal gland / Aldosterone, cortisol, epinephrine,
norepinephrine (E24-E27)
J- Pituitary gland / ADH, oxytocin, GH, ACTH, TSH, LH,
FSH, prolactin (E22-E23)
P- Malnutrition (E40-E46)
E- Gonads / Estrogen, androgens, testosterone, etc. (E28-E30) K- Obesity and other hyperalimentation (E65-E68) Q- General symptoms and signs (R50-R69)
F- Other endocrine diseases (E31-E35) L- Metabolic disorders of carbohydrates (E73-E74) R- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere
classified (R70-R99)
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Table C1.5: Distribution of PBC5 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of each
ICD
A- Mental and behavioural disorders due to psychoactive substance use (F10-F19) G- Other degenerative diseases of the nervous system (G30-G32)
B- Mood (affective) disorders (F30-F39) H- Disorders of adult personality and behaviour (F60-F69)
C- Neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders (F40-F48) I- Behavioural and emotional disorders with onset usually occurring in childhood and (F90-F98)
D- Behavioural syndromes associated with physiological disturbances and physical factors (F50-
F59)
J- Unspecified mental disorder (F99-)
E- Organic, including symptomatic, mental disorders (F00-F09) K- Persons with potential health hazards related to socioeconomic and psychosocial circumstances
(Z55-Z65)
F- Schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional disorders (F20-F29)
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Table C1.6: Distribution of PBC6 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of each
ICD
A- Disorders of psychological development (F80-F89) D- Behavioural and emotional disorders with onset usually occurring in childhood and (F90-F98)
B- Mental retardation (F70-F79) E- Persons with potential health hazards related to family and personal history and certain
conditions influencing health status (Z80-Z99)
C- Chromosomal abnormalities, not elsewhere classified (Q90-Q99)
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Table C1.7: Distribution of PBC7 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of each
ICD
A- Episodic and paroxysmal disorders (G40-G47) I- Inflammatory diseases of the central nervous
system (G00-G09)
Q- Other bacterial diseases (A30-A49) X- Symptoms and signs nervous and
musculoskeletal systems (R25-R29)
B- Extrapyramidal and movement disorders (G20-G26) J- Systemic atrophies primarily affecting the
central nervous system (G10-G13)
R- Other viral diseases (B25-B34) Y- Symptoms and signs urinary system (R30-
R39)
C- Other degenerative diseases of the nervous system
(G30-G32)
K- Diseases of myoneural junction and muscle
(G70-G73)
S- Helminthiases (B65-B83) Z- Symptoms and signs cognition, perception,
emotional state and behaviour (R40-R46)
D- Other disorders of the nervous system (G90-G99) L- Viral infections of the central nervous system
(A80-A89)
T- Tuberculosis (A15-A19) AA- Symptoms and signs speech and voice
(R47-R49)
E- Nerve, nerve root and plexus disorders (G50-G59) M- Other disorders of ear (H90-H95) U- Protozoal diseases (B50-B64) AB- General symptoms and signs (R50-R69)
F- Demyelinating diseases of the central nervous system
(G35-G37)
N- Congenital malformations and deformations
nervous system (Q00-Q07)
V- Symptoms and signs circulatory and
respiratory systems (R00-R09)
AC- Abnormal clinical and laboratory
findings, not elsewhere classified (R70-R99)
G- Polyneuropathies and other disorders of the
peripheral nervous system (G60-G64)
O- Viral infections characterized by skin and
mucous membrane lesions (B00-B09)
W- Symptoms and signs skin and
subcutaneous tissue (R20-R23)
AD- Persons with potential health hazards
related to family and personal history and
certain conditions influencing health status
(Z80-Z99)
H- Cerebral palsy and other paralytic syndromes (G80-
G83)
P- Other diseases of urinary system (N30-N39)
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Table C1.8: Distribution of PBC8 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of each
ICD
A- Disorders of ocular muscles, binocular movement,
accommodation and refraction (H49-H52)
H- Disorders of conjunctiva (H10-H13) N- Other viral diseases (B25-B34)
B- Glaucoma (H40-H42) I- Disorders of iris and ciliary body (H20-H22) O- Protozoal diseases (B50-B64)
C- Disorders of lens (H25-H28) J- Disorders of vitreous body and globe (H43-H45) P- Helminthiases (B65-B83)
D- Disorders of eyelid, lacrimal system and orbit (H00-H06) K- Disorders of optic nerve and visual pathways (H46-H48) Q- Congenital malformations and deformation eye, ear, face
and neck (Q10-Q18)
E- Disorders of choroid and retina (H30-H36) L- Visual disturbances and blindness (H53-H54) R- Persons encountering health services for specific
procedures and health care (Z40-Z54)
F- Disorders of sclera and cornea (H15-H19) M- Other diseases casused by chlamydiae (A70-A74) S- Persons with potential health hazards related to family
and personal history and certain conditions influencing health
status (Z80-Z99)
G- Other disorders of eye and adne (H55-H59)
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Table C1.9: Distribution of PBC9 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of each
ICD
A- Other disorders of ear (H90-H95) D- Diseases of external ear (H60-H62)
B- Diseases of middle ear and mastoid (H65-H75) E- Congenital malformations and deformation eye, ear, face and neck (Q10-Q18)
C- Diseases of inner ear (H80-H83)
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Table C1.10: Distribution of PBC10 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of
each ICD
A- Ischemic heart diseases (I20-I25) G- Hypertensive diseases (I10-I15) L- Protozoal diseases (B50-B64)
B- Cerebrovascular diseases (I60-I69) H- Pulmonary heart disease and diseases of pulmonary
circulation (I26-I28)
M- Symptoms and signs circulatory and respiratory systems
(R00-R09)
C- Congenital malformations and deformations circulatory
system (Q20-Q28)
I- Other and unspecified disorders of the circulatory system
(I95-I99)
N- General symptoms and signs (R50-R69)
D- Other forms of heart disease (I30-I52) J- Acute rheumatic fever (I00-I02) O- Persons encountering health services for specific
procedures and health care (Z40-Z54)
E- Diseases of veins, lymphatic vessels and lymph nodes, not
elsewhere classified (I80-I89)
K- Chronic rheumatic heart diseases (I05-I09) P- Persons with potential health hazards related to family and
personal history and certain conditions influencing health status
(Z80-Z99)
F- Diseases of arteries, arterioles and capillaries (I70-I79)
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Table C1.11: Distribution of PBC11 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of
each ICD
A- Chronic lower respiratory diseases (J40-J47) H- Other diseases of pleura (J90-J94) O- Other viral diseases (B25-B34)
B- Acute upper respiratory infections (J00-J06) I- Other diseases of the respiratory system (J95-J99) P- Symptoms and signs circulatory and respiratory systems (R00-R09)
C- Influenza and Pneumonia (J09-J18) J- Other bacterial diseases (A30-A49)
Q- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere classified
(R70-R99)
D- Lung diseases due to external agents (J60-J70)
K- Suppurative and necrotic conditions of lower respiratory
tract (J85-J86)
R- Persons encountering health services for examination and
investigation (Z00-Z13)
E- Other diseases of upper respiratory tract (J30-J39) L- Mycoses (B35-B49)
S- Persons encountering health services for specific procedures and
health care (Z40-Z54)
F- Other acute lower respiratory infections (J20-J22) M- Tuberculosis (A15-A19)
T- Persons with potential health hazards related to family and
personal history and certain conditions influencing health status (Z80-
Z99)
G- Other respiratory diseases principally affecting the
interstitium (J80-J84) N- Other diseases casused by chlamydiae (A70-A74)
U- Congenital malformations and deformations respiratory system
(Q30-Q34)
87
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
M00 M05 M15 M30 M45 M60 M70 M80 F00 F05 F15 F30 F45 F60 F70 F80
A
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Proportion of
patients
contribution
to variance
Table C1.12: Distribution of PBC12 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of
each ICD
A- Diseases of oral cavity, salivary glands and jaws (K00-K14)
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Table C1.13: Distribution of PBC13 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of
each ICD
A- Intestinal infectious diseases (A00-A09) G- Noninfective enteritis and colitis (K50-
K52)
L- Diseases of veins, lymphatic vessels
and lymph nodes, not elsewhere
classified (I80-I89)
Q- Arthropod-borne viral fevers adn viral
haemorrhagic fevers (A90-A99)
B- Diseases of oesophagus, stomach and duodenum
(K20-K31)
H- Diseases of peritoneum (K65-K67) M- Viral hepatitis (B15-B19) R- Mycoses (B35-B49)
C- Diseases of appendix (K35-K38) I- Other diseases of the digestive system (K90-
K93)
N- Diseases of oral cavity, salivary
glands and jaws (K00-K14)
S- Symptoms and signs digestive system and
abdomen (R10-R19)
D- Other diseases of intestines (K55-K63) J- Congenital malformations and deformations
digestive system (Q35-Q45)
O- Certain zoonotic bacterial diseases
(A20-A28)
T- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not
elsewhere classified (R70-R99)
E- Diseases of liver (K70-K77) K- Helminthiases (B65-B83) P- Other spirochaetal diseases (A65-
A69)
U- Persons with potential health hazards related
to family and personal history and certain
conditions influencing health status (Z80-Z99)
F- Disorders of gallbladder, biliary tract and pancreas
(K80-K87)
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Table C1.14: Distribution of PBC14 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of
each ICD
A- Other disorders of the skin and subcutaneous
tissue (L80-L99)
G- Urticaria and erythema (L50-L54) L- Pediculosis, acariasis and other
infestations (B85-B89)
Q- Persons encountering health services for
specific procedures and health care (Z40-Z54)
B- Disorders of skin appendages (L60-L75) H- Radiation-related disorders of the skin and
subcutaneous tissue (L55-L59)
M- Certain zoonotic bacterial diseases
(A20-A28)
R- Persons with potential health hazards
related to family and personal history and
certain conditions influencing health status
(Z80-Z99)
C- Dermatitis and eczema (L20-L30) I- Other diseases of urinary system (N30-N39) N- Other bacterial diseases (A30-A49) S- Symptoms and signs skin and subcutaneous
tissue (R20-R23)
D- Infections of the skin and subcutaneous tissue
(L00-L08)
J- Viral infections characterized by skin and
mucous membrane lesions (B00-B09)
O- Other spirochaetal diseases (A65-
A69)
T- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings,
not elsewhere classified (R70-R99)
E- Papulosquamous disorders (L40-L45) K- Mycoses (B35-B49) P- Congenital malformations and
deformations Other (Q80-Q89)
U- Burns and corrosions (T20-T32)
F- Bullous disorders (L10-L14)
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Table C1.15: Distribution of PBC15 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of
each ICD
A- Arthrosis (M15-M19) H- Deforming dorsopathies (M40-M43) N- Infectious arthropathies (M00-M03)
B- Inflammatory polyarthropathies (M05-M14) I- Other dorsopathies (M50-M54) O- Tuberculosis (A15-A19)
C- Spondylopathies (M45-M49) J- Chondropathies (M91-M94)
P- Congenital malformations and deformations musculoskeletal
system (Q65-Q79)
D- Osteopathies (M80-M90) K- Disorders of muscles (M60-M63)
Q- Congenital malformations and deformation eye, ear, face and neck
(Q10-Q18)
E- Other soft tissue disorders (M70-M79) L- Disorders of synovium and tendon (M65-M68) R- Congenital malformations and deformations Other (Q80-Q89)
F- Other joint disorders (M20-M25)
M- Other disorders of the musculoskeletal system and
connective tissue (M95-M99)
S- Persons encountering health services for specific procedures and
health care (Z40-Z54)
G- Systemic connective tissue disorders (M30-M36)
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Table C1.16: Distribution of PBC17 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of
each ICD
A- Other diseases of urinary system (N30-N39) G- Renal tubulo-interstitial diseases (N10-N16) L- Congenital malformations and deformations genital organs
(Q50-Q56)
B- Infections with a predominantly sexual mode of
transmission (A50-A64)
H- Renal failure (N17-N19) M- Symptoms and signs urinary system (R30-R39)
C- Other disorders of kidney and ureter (N25-N29) I- Other viral diseases (B25-B34) N- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere
classified (R70-R99)
D- Hypertensive diseases (I10-I15) J- Congenital malformations and deformations urinary system
(Q60-Q64)
O- Persons encountering health services for specific procedures
and health care (Z40-Z54)
E- Glomerular diseases (N00-N08) K- Helminthiases (B65-B83) P- Persons with potential health hazards related to family and
personal history and certain conditions influencing health status
(Z80-Z99)
F- Urolithiasis (N20-N23)
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Table C1.17: Distribution of PBC18&19 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance
of each ICD
A- Maternal care related to the fetus and
amniotic cavity and possible delivery
problems (O30-O48)
G- Complications predominantly related
to the puerperium (O85-O92)
M- Infections specific to the perinatal period (P35-P39) S- Other bacterial diseases (A30-A49)
B- Complications of labour and delivery
(O60-O75)
H- Other obstetric conditions, not
elsewhere classified (O95-O99)
N- Transitory endocrine and metabolic disorders
specific to fetus and newborn (P70-P74)
T- Pregnancy with abortive outcome (O00-O08)
C- Disorders related to length of
gestation and fetal growth (P05-P08)
I- Birth trauma (P10-P15) O- Other diseases of urinary system (N30-N39) U- Other bacterial diseases (A30-A49)
D- Other maternal disorders
predominantly related to pregnancy
(O20-O29)
J- Haemorrhagic and haematological
disorders of fetus and newborn (P50-
P61)
P- Digestive system disorders of fetus and newborn
(P75-P78)
V- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not
elsewhere classified (R70-R99)
E- Delivery (O80-O84) K- Other disorders originating in the
perinatal period (P90-P96)
Q- Conditions involving the integument and
temperature regulation of fetus and newborn (P80-P83)
W- Persons encountering health services in
circumstances related to reproduction (Z30-Z39)
F- Respiratory and cardiovascular
disorders specific to the perinatal period
(P20-P29)
L- Fetus and newborn affected by
maternal factors and by complications of
pregnancy, labour and delivery (P00-P04)
R- Oedema, proteinuria and hypertensive disorders in
pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium (O10-O16)
X- Persons with potential health hazards related
to family and personal history and certain
conditions influencing health status (Z80-Z99)
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Table C1.18: Distribution of PBC20 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of
each ICD
A- Complications predominantly related to the puerperium
(O85-O92)
G- Disorders of skin appendages (L60-L75) L- Other and unspecified effects of external causes (T66-T78)
B- Other obstetric conditions, not elsewhere classified
(O95-O99)
H- Congenital malformations and deformations Other (Q80-
Q89)
M- Complications of surgical and medical care, not elsewhere
classified (T80-T88)
C- Other diseases of the digestive system (K90-K93) I- Abnormal clinical and laboratory findings, not elsewhere
classified (R70-R99)
N- Persons with potential health hazards related to family and
personal history and certain conditions influencing health status (Z80-
Z99)
D- Other maternal disorders predominantly related to
pregnancy (O20-O29)
J- Poisoning by drugs, medicaments and biological substances
(T36-T50)
O- Pregnancy with abortive outcome (O00-O08)
E- Complications of labour and delivery (O60-O75) K- Toxic effects of substances chiefly nonmedicinal as to
source (T51-T65)
P- Other diseases of urinary system (N30-N39)
F- Radiation-related disorders of the skin and subcutaneous
tissue (L55-L59)
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Table C1.19: Distribution of PBC21 prevalence by age, gender and contributing ICD alongside proportion of prevalence patients and contribution to variance of
each ICD
A- Obesity and other hyperalimentation (E65-E68) D- Persons with potential health hazards related to communicable diseases (Z20-Z29)
B- Metabolic disorders of combinations (E76-E78) E- Persons encountering health services for specific procedures and health care (Z40-Z54)
C- Persons encountering health services for examination and investigation (Z00-Z13) F- Persons with potential health hazards related to socioeconomic and psychosocial circumstances
(Z55-Z65)
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A. The role of local data in this study
The aim of this research project, noted in Chapter 1, is to develop and demonstrate methods for
threshold estimation that make best use of routinely available NHS data. The principal focus of that
methodological development, as reflected in the main body of this report, has been the use of
econometric methods to exploit observed variations in spending and health outcomes between PCTs, at
the programme budget level of aggregation.
However, we also aimed to investigate, as a complementary element of the project, the extent to which
there may be other, more disaggregated sources of evidence on investment and disinvestment decisions
made by local NHS organisations which might inform our analysis.
Specifically, we set out to (a) identify and evaluate what data might be routinely available from local NHS
organisations with respect to their decisions to increase or decrease spending on specific services, and (b)
consider whether and how such evidence might contribute directly toward the quantitative estimates of
the threshold  for example, by providing more granular, contextual information on spending decisions
that might assist in the interpretation of model estimates. For example, we wished to explore whether
there were any routinely collected data from local NHS organisations that could tell us something about
which ICDs within a given PBC might be the focus of investment and disinvestment.
The work which was undertaken was therefore focused on the potential use of local data alongside the
econometric analysis  rather than their potential use as an alternative means of identifying the marginal
cost of a QALY in the NHS[15].
B. Sources of publicly available data on PCT investment and disinvestment
To help us identify possible sources of data on NHS spending decisions, we began by consulting a
number of experts within the NHS, identified for us by our collaborator, Professor David Parkin (Chief
Economist at NHS South East Coast). These included Directors of Finance, Commissioning and Public
Health. Those discussions helped direct us to a number of initiatives which involved the development of
tools or evidence to inform resource allocation decisions, and helped to identify types and sources of
documents published by PCTs that potentially contained relevant information on spending decisions. We
then undertook a search for publicly available documents, in each case identifying what was available, and
assessing its potential relevance for the purposes of this work outlined above. In evaluating each data
source, the key considerations were:
(a) Whether the data were routinely collected: Routinely-collected data are preferred, as our overarching
aim is to develop a set of methods to estimate the threshold, which can be readily updated from data
routinely generated by the NHS.
(b) Whether the data were in the public domain: Published data are preferred to data that can only be
obtained on request, because this would increase the cost and effort required in obtaining data from all
relevant organisations.
(c) Whether the data were collected and reported in a systematic and consistent manner that would
facilitate comparisons between PCTs, and with sufficient detail to enable us to link spending decisions to
specific programme budgets or ICDs. This aspect of the work was undertaken during 2010.
The following were identified as potential sources of data:
B.1. Programme Budgeting tools  quadrant analysis  spend outcome tool (SPOT)
Data are available for three years, 06/07, 07/08 and 08/0931 under the Spend Outcome Tool (SPOT)
which is available to download. Expenditure data are organised by Programme Budget Category only,
31 from http://www.yhpho.org.uk/resource/view.aspx?RID=49488
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with no lower level of disaggregation. The data shows, for each PCT, the spend per head this year, the Z-
score of that spend, and the PCTs national ranking based on their Z-score.
Outcomes data have also been captured, with different outcome measures within each PB category.
Again, for each outcome there is a related Z-score and the PCTs national ranking based on that Z-score.
The tool enables users to see graphically how one PCT compares to others nationally, by SHA and by
those PCTs similar to it by cluster (eg. other PCTs in manufacturing towns). The quadrant analysis tool
has to origin as the mean PCT for that PB category, with Z-score for both expenditure and outcome
equal to zero. The y-axis shows outcome, and the y-axis expenditure, both by Z-score.
While a useful tool, this source added little to the data already used in the econometric analysis, as it does
not provide any additional information on the allocation of resources within PBs.
B.2. Lists of interventions not normally funded
Most PCTs provide information about interventions not normally funded. However, these were of
limited usefulness because most of the procedures listed are those that might be expected (cosmetic
surgery; tattoo removal, etc), and are not particularly informative about the marginal cost per QALY in
the NHS. We did not find any information regarding whether any previously funded treatments had been
added to these lists.
B.3. Special therapeutic and cancer committees
These are regionally based (not PCT or SHA) specialised committees that make decisions regarding
spending on new cancer medicines and other special therapeutic areas. While such decisions would be
potentially of direct relevance, we were unable to find any public documentation on their processes or
decision outcomes.
B.4. Quality Innovation Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) published data on efficiency
savings in the NHS
Introduced in 2009, QIPP addresses the quality and productivity challenge faced by the NHS. Developed
by NICE, the Cochrane Quality and Productivity (QP) topics identify areas where resources could be
significantly reduced or stopped completely without reducing the quality of NHS care, releasing cash
and/or resources to other areas in the NHS. Each Cochrane topic has been established from systematic
reviews undertaken by reviewers at the Cochrane Collaboration.
Every month the Cochrane Collaboration informs NICE as to new or existing Cochrane reviews where
they have found that the existing treatment options(s) are harmful or ineffective and should not be used,
or where evidence is unavailable or insufficient to support widespread use of that treatment in the NHS.
NICE then completes an assessment of a Cochrane topic, to evaluate the efficiency savings that are likely
against the QIPP criteria of likely ease of implementation, impact on productivity, and on the quality of
care.
Savings per 100,000 patients are calculated, and then efficiency gains per PCT can be calculated. Once a
topic has been accepted as best practise, users (PCTs) are encourage to submit their experience of
implementing the changes, and the users achieving the best efficiency gains become QIPP examples of
best practise.
The data shows which procedures are considered inefficient use of resources, although to the extent these
are based on means of achieving the same or improved outcomes but with lower resources, will not be
revealing of the marginal cost of producing a QALY in the NHS. Further, there is incomplete
information about the extent to which PCTs actually implement these recommendations.
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B.5. NHS Right Care
This website32, has a section on the NHS Atlas of variation in health care, which seeks to reduce
unwarranted variations in health care, defined as variation in the utilisation of health care services that
cannot be explained by variation in patients or patients preferences, to increase value and improve
quality.
It also provides a Third Annual Population Value Review which uses programme budgeting and marginal
analysis to deliver QIPP. This provides, amongst other things, a 10-step, structured approach for PCTs
to follow to establish where investment and disinvestment decisions could be made.
Further, it provides a tool for NHS Foundation Trusts to improve efficiency via Service Line
Management.
While these tools may be being used by PCTs and Foundation Trusts, it was not clear to what extent that
was the case, and there is no routine data on their use by NHS organisations or the decisions that resulted
from that.
B.6. Health Investment Network  case studies of PBMA
The NHS network, Health Investment Network, was established to provide the access to the latest
knowledge and tools to help commissioners optimise their investment and disinvestment decisions. It
provides case studies of PCTs which have used PBMA to identify efficiency gains. This includes examples
of spend to save decisions e.g. where an initial investment (eg in vascular checks for men in deprived
areas) could be more than outweighed by savings. Such initiatives, while important, are not useful in
identifying the marginal cost per QALY in the NHS. Other case studies identify wish lists (areas which
PCTs prioritise for additional spending, should budgets expand) and hit lists (services that might be
reduced, to free up resources for more cost effective services). These case studies provide useful selected
examples  but do not provide a routine or systematic reporting of such decisions across all PCTs.
B.7. Annual operating plans and strategic commissioning plans
PCTs are required to publish, each year, operating plans and strategic commissioning plans detailing their
planning for the coming year, including information on the way that PCTs have made decisions
concerning resource allocation. Because these reports are published annually, we considered that they
constituted the most promising source of data, as they are produced routinely, and cover all PCTs.
Contact details and websites were identified for all 142 PCTs. Strategic Commissioning Plans were
obtained for an initial 70 of these. These were used to identify any information provided about
programmes of care or specific services where spending was planned to be increased or decreased. Those
data were extracted and recorded into a spreadsheet, along with any relevant contextual information eg
relating to the process by which the decision had been made.
Our review of the data from the first 70 of these showed that there was considerable variation between
the documents in terms of the level of detail and specificity about the services which were the subject of
changes in spending. In many cases, the services were described in terms of broad initiatives which might
have related to multiple programme budgets and ICDs. There was also variation in, and occasionally a
lack of clarity about, the way in which spending changes were described: in some cases these were
described in terms of absolute changes in spending; in others, as net changes, once estimates of offsetting
savings elsewhere had been taken into account; and in others it was not stated.
Given those concerns, the data were considered unlikely to be useful to complement the econometric
analysis, and the research team decided not to proceed with further data extraction for the remaining
PCTs.
32 Available at http://www.rightcare.nhs.uk/atlas/index.html
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C. Conclusions
The context within which this element of the work took place may be relevant to note. While the NHS
was not subject to the budget cuts imposed on other areas of government activity in response to the
financial crisis, the NHS was required to make substantial productivity improvements within its existing
budgets. This gave rise to a number of initiatives in response to the productivity challenge and, generally,
heightened interest in the identification of ways to improve efficiency; potential areas for disinvestment;
and areas for investment which were motivated by spend to save. This may have made it more likely
that we would observe disinvestment decisions. The NHS was also, during the course of this project,
undergoing a period of restructuring. The transition from PCTs to clinical commissioning groups, and the
disestablishment of strategic health authorities, may have had an effect on the availability of data and
information relating to decision making. It may also have broader implications for the availability of data
in the future, given the change in administrative units.
Our review of local data sources suggested that there is very little routinely collected data on investment
and disinvestment by local NHS organisations beyond the high-level aggregate data on spending by PB
which are used in the econometric analysis. More disaggregated data on spending decisions about specific
services could, of course, be obtained by other means  for example, by surveying PCTs, or by
requesting such information from them using a Freedom of Information request. However, that would
impose data collection costs and would need to be designed carefully to ensure that such efforts yielded
complete and consistent information.
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A. Introduction
As has been highlighted in the main body of this project, it was not possible to produce an outcome
equation for PBC 5: mental health problems, because no relevant mortality data was available from the
NHS IC by PCT. Mental health represents a significant incidence and expenditure within the NHS. As a
result we investigated the direction of bias from the exclusion of mental health problems on our estimate
of the cost-effectiveness threshold. To understand this bias we examined current investment decisions in
mental health. Recent investments in treatments with ICERs above the estimated threshold would
suggest that not including PBC 5 more directly in our calculation may underestimated the threshold,
conversely if recent investment has ICERs below the estimated threshold it would suggest that its
exclusion results in an overestimated threshold. We focussed on depression and schizophrenia because
of their high prevalence and contribution to variance.
B. Method employed
To evaluate the direction of bias of the exclusion of PBC 5 we followed four steps to make the
connection from the identification of the most significant ICDs of PBC 5 to considering the cost-
effectiveness of the investment and disinvestment decisions made in the NHS around these disease areas.
The strategy was as follows:
Step 1:
- Identify the mental health ICD codes that are most influential and suitable on which to focus our
analysis
o Done from number of patients and contribution to variance calculations using HES.
Step 2:
- Determine the medications or treatments used in the NHS to treat each of the significant ICDs
o There is likely to be a large cross-over in the use of treatments for mental health areas,
for example antipsychotics and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) are both widely
used.
o We made use of the NHS Choices website coupled with clinical expertise for this
identification.
Step 3:
- Identify the cost-effectiveness of the current treatments and medications used in the NHS.
o This identification will be done from a range of sources including: published HTAs,
published guidance, TUFTs, NHS EED and Medline searches.
o This step relies heavily on the literature published, literature tends to cover historical
activities many of which represent treatments of interest for this analysis. The case could
be made that historical treatments that have not been evaluated have escaped evaluation
due to their apparent cost-effectiveness, and are as such unlikely to be marginal activities.
o Further difficulties arose in the identification of the relevant cost-effectiveness figure.
Ideally it would represent the cost-per QALY relative to what would be performed if
that activity was no longer available to the NHS.
Step 4:
- Connecting the available literature on the cost-effectiveness to recent investment and
disinvestment decisions made in the NHS.
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C. Results of analysis
C.1. Step 1: identification of relevant ICDs
We first rank ICDs by prevalence and contribution to variance. Prevalence is estimated from HES data.
The contribution to variance is calculated as the variance in expenditure across PCTs for each ICD
compared to the total variance in expenditure across PCTs for all ICDs within PBC 5. The most
prevalent ICD was for depressive episode (F32) at 25.07% of all ICDs within PBC 5 (Table C3.1). The
ICD with the greatest contribution to variance was for schizophrenia (F20) with 45.16% (Table C3.2).
Depression (F32) and (F33) and schizophrenia (F20) have been chosen as the focus of our evaluation as
they represent two of the largest mental health ICDs in terms of proportion of patients as well as
proportion of variance in expenditure, as shown in Tables C3.1 and C3.2 below. In addition they
represent ICDs that involve interventions by the NHS that can be more clearly defined (in contrast to, for
example, unspecified dementia and mental and behavioural disorders due to the use of alcohol33).
Table C3.1: table showing ranking of mental health ICDs by prevalence from HES
ICD Description
% of Mental
health
prevalence
Contribution
to variance
F10 Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of alcohol 27.84% 9.70%
F20 Schizophrenia 10.01% 45.16%
F32 Depressive episode 9.96% 6.91%
F31 Bipolar affective disorder 6.19% 6.38%
F41 Other anxiety disorders 4.92% 0.26%
F60 Specific personality disorders 4.33% 14.11%
F03 Unspecified dementia 3.93% 3.29%
F01 Vascular dementia 3.32% 1.58%
G30 Alzheimer disease 3.30% 0.84%
F33 Recurrent depressive disorder 2.83% 3.68%
Table C3.2: table showing ranking of mental health ICDs by contribution to variance
ICD Description
% of Mental
health
prevalence
Contribution
to variance
F20 Schizophrenia 10.01% 45.16%
F60 Specific personality disorders 4.33% 14.11%
F10 Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of alcohol 27.84% 9.70%
F32 Depressive episode 9.96% 6.91%
F31 Bipolar affective disorder 6.19% 6.38%
F33 Recurrent depressive disorder 2.83% 3.68%
F03 Unspecified dementia 3.93% 3.29%
F01 Vascular dementia 3.32% 1.58%
G30 Alzheimer disease 3.30% 0.84%
F41 Other anxiety disorders 4.92% 0.26%
33 This contrast was informed by our clinical representative
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C.2. Step 2: determination of treatment employed
Table C3.3 provided an overview of the main treatments for depression and schizophrenia. This list of
treatments was identified using the NHS Choices website34 as well as discussion with our clinical
representative for each of the respective illnesses. This list was used to inform a literature search of cost-
effectiveness publications.
Table C3.3: table showing treatments for schizophrenia and depression in the NHS
ICD Disease Treatments
F20 Schizophrenia 1. Typical antipsychotics
2. Atypical antipsychotics
3. Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT)
4. Crisis resolution teams (CRT)
F32 & F33 Depressive episode &
recurrent depressive episode
1. Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT)
2. Interpersonal therapy (IPT)
3. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs)
.Serotoninnorepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs)
5. Tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs)
6. Monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs)
7. Lithium
8. Electro-convulsive therapy (ECT)
C.3. Step 3: evaluation of the relevant cost-effectiveness literature
Using the treatment categories identified in step 2 of this work a systematic search was conducted to
attempt to identify the range of literature on the cost-effectiveness of current NHS treatment of
schizophrenia and depression. For both illnesses five online databases were searched: the Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) Registry of the Tufts Medical Centre, the NHS Economics Evaluation
Database run by the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination (CRD) at the University of York, Medline,
the NICE online database of Technical Appraisals (TA) and Clinical Guidelines (CG), as well as NIHRs
Health Technology Assessments (HTA). All searches were conducted on the 19th October 2011.
The search strategies employed to search for relevant cost-effectiveness literature and details of the results
can be found in the search strategy section at the end of this addendum. For both schizophrenia and
depression five sources of information were searched sequentially: the Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)
Registry, the NHS Economic Evaluation Database (EED), Medline, NICEs online library of Technical
Appraisals (TA) and Clinical Guidelines (CG), and finally NIHRs online library of Health Technology
Assessments (HTAs). For schizophrenia this approach identified 61 unique publications, five of which
were deemed to be of broad relevance to this analysis. For depression 65 publications were discovered,
ten of which were relevant. A paper of relevance to our analysis of mental health was deemed to be so if
it presented cost-effectiveness results (in the form of a cost per QALY ICER) of a comparison of at least
two of the treatments for either schizophrenia or depression identified in section C.2. These results could
be from a de-novo analysis or from a systematic review of the relevant literature.
Table C3.4 reports the cost-effectiveness results of antipsychotics for schizophrenia as first line
treatments. The NICE clinical guidelines for schizophrenia (CG82)[16] demonstrate that the differences
in costs and effects of the 1st and 2nd generation treatments described are very similar with ICERs
comparing each to no treatment ranging from £21,517 to £23,237 per QALY. Comparisons to active
treatments result in ICERs of £5,156 to £33,240 per QALY[17, 18].
34 Available at http://www.nhs.uk/Pages/HomePage.aspx accessed on 10/10/2011
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Table C3.4: table showing cost-effectiveness studies of antipsychotics for schizophrenia
Study Treatment Comparator
Cost (£) QALYs
ICER
(£/QALY)
NICE
CG82[16]
Zotepine (2nd) No treatment 139,170 6.468 21,517
Paliperidone (2nd) No treatment 142,173 6.427 22,121
Olanzapine (2nd) No treatment 141,212 6.42 21,996
Risperidone (2nd) No treatment 149,112 6.417 23,237
Haloperidol (1st) No treatment 143,406 6.413 22,362
Aripiprazole (2nd) No treatment 145,697 6.4 22,765
Amisulpride (2nd) No treatment 147,920 6.392 23,141
Knapp et al
2008 [17]
Olanzapine (2nd) other
antipsychotics 5,156
Davies et al
2008 [18]
Clozapine (2nd) Other 2nd gen
antipsychotics 33,240
Aripiprazole then
risperidone
risperidone then
olanzapine 9,440
The CG82 results are similar to the first line treatment results from Bagnall et al.[19], shown below in
Table C3.5. The cost-effectiveness of antipsychotics compared to no treatment as second, third or final
therapy are less than £20,000 per QALY.
Table C3.5: table showing cost-effectiveness studies of antipsychotics for schizophrenia
Bagnall et al., 2003 [19]
ICER (£/QALY) Line of treatment
Antipsychotic 1st 2nd 3rd Final
Chlorpromazine (1st) 21,989 15,185 15,419 15,303
Haloperidol (1st)
24,069 17,177 17,211 17,022
Clozapine (2nd)
24,500 17,595 17,577 17,402
Olanzapine (2nd)
25,719 18,869 18,808 18,865
Quetiapine (2nd) 26,316 19,090 18,751 19,096
Zotepine (2nd) 22,769 16,350 16,360 16,400
Risperidone (2nd) 22,255 15,596 15,599 15,700
Ziprasidone (2nd)
21,935 15,192 15,191 15,224
Amisulpride (2nd) 23,174 15,941 15,945 15,962
Sertindole (atypical) 23,181 16,297 16,308 16,354
Only one study reported the cost-effectiveness of a psychological or social intervention for schizophrenia.
Barton et al. [20] conducted a randomised trial to estimate the clinical and cost-effectiveness of social
recovery orientated cognitive behavioural therapy (SRCBT) against case management alone for people
recently diagnosed with psychosis. SRCBT consisted of three stages of social recovery combined with
CBT techniques including vocational case management. SRCBT was found to have an ICER of £18, 844
per QALY compared to case management. However, it is not clear that all forms of CBT are well
represented by this one study or that these results relate well to schizophrenia since this study was for the
use of social recovery CBT for psychosis disorders in general.
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Table C3.6: table showing cost-effectiveness of psychological/social interventions for
schizophrenia
Study Treatment Comparator ICER
(£/QALY)
Barton et al. 2009 [20] SRCBT case management 18,844
Table C3.7 reports the cost-effectiveness results of publications identified in the systematic search of drug
treatments for depression in the NHS. As was highlighted in table C3.3 a range of drug treatments are
available for depression, broadly falling into five categories: selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors
(SSRIs), Serotoninnorepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (SNRIs), tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs),
monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs) and lithium.
The NICE guideline CG90 tested the cost-effectiveness of numerous treatments for moderate and severe
depression. It was found that across all the treatments tested the mean QALYs for moderate depression
had a range of 0.053 and severe depression had a range of 0.065. The costs had a range of £408 for
moderate and £396 for severe depression. The results suggest that mirtazapine has the lowest ICER for
both moderate and severe depression. If mirtazapine is not a suitable treatment option than escitalopram
or sertraline is preferred because escitalopram dominates venlafaxine and sertraline dominates the
remaining antidepressants. The ICERs of escitalopram versus sertraline are £32,987 per QALY for
moderate depression and £27,172 per QALY for severe. The authors thus suggest that according to
these results escitalopram should be considered when mirtazapine and sertraline are not suitable. Other
ICERs reported in CG90 can be found in Table C3.7. CG90 states that the economic evidence had
limitations and these comparisons were considered insufficient to make specific recommendations for
treatments.
ICERs in other studies range from £2,172 - £20,600 per QALY, with TCA being dominated by
Lofepramine (TCA) in two cases and fluoxetine being dominated by amitriptyline (TCA).
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Table C3.7: table showing cost-effectiveness of drug treatments for depression
Study Treatment comparator
incremental
cost
incremental
QALY
ICER
(£/QALY)
NICE CG 90
[21]
Combined SSRI and CBT
(severe depression) SSRI alone £5,558
Duloxetine (SNRI) SSRI £6,300
Duloxetine (SNRI)
Mirtazapine
(TCA) £2,400
Duloxetine (SNRI)
Venlafaxine
(SNRI) dominates
escitalopram (moderate
depression) (SSRI)
Sertraline
(SSRI) £32,987
escitalopram (severe
depression) (SSRI)
Sertraline
(SSRI) £27,172
Lenox-Smith et
al. 2009[22]
Venlafaxine (major
depression) (SNRI) SSRI £20Ԝ600
Fluoxetine (SSRI)
Amitriptyline
(TCA) dominated
Kendrick et al.
2006[23]
SSRI TCA £2,692
TCA
Lofepramine
(TCA) dominated
SSRI
Lofepramine
(TCA) £5,686
Hatziandreu et
al. 1994[24] Sertraline (SSRI)
Dothiepin
(TCA) £2,172
Peveler, 2005[25]
SSRI
Lofepramine
(TCA) 0.035 £199 £5,686
TCA
Lofepramine
(TCA) 0.004 £93 dominated
SSRI TCA 0.039 £105 £2,692
Kendrick,
2009[26] SSRI + SC SC 14,854
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Table C3.8 provides the results of the combination therapies for moderate and severe depression
presented in CG90 [21]and Simon et al.[27]. These studies considered the impact of combined SSRI and
CBT versus SSRI alone. Both of these studies find combined CBT and antidepressant to have ICERs of
less than £8,000 per QALY.
In addition table C3.8 provides results of analyses of computerised CBT (CCBT) compared to treatment
as usual or relaxation. The results generally find CBT and CCBT to be highly cost-effective, with the
exception of BT Steps[28] all ICERs are found to be under £18,000 per QALY.
Table C3.8: table showing cost-effectiveness of psychological and social intervention for
depression
Study Treatment comparator
incremental
cost
incremental
QALY
ICER
(£/QALY)
NICE CG 90[21] Combined SSRI and CBT
(moderate depression) SSRI alone £7,052
Combined SSRI and CBT
(severe depression) SSRI alone £5,558
Simon et al.
2006[27]
CBT + antidepressants in
severe dep fluoxetine £5,777
CBT + antidepressants in
moderate dep fluoxetine £14,540
Kaltenthaler et
al., 2002 [29] Beat the Blues CCBT (BtB)
Treatment as
usual (TAU)
£1,209 to
£7,692
Kaltenthaler et al.,
2006 [28]
BtB TAU £147 0.08 £1,801
Cope CCBT TAU £193 0.03 £7,139
Overcoming Depression
CCBT TAU £64 0.01 £5,391
FearFighter CCBT Relaxation CBT £138 0.058 £2,380
Therapist lead CBT Relaxation £194 0.011 £17,604
BT Steps CCBT Relaxation £360 -0.01 Dominated
Hollinghurst et al.,
2010 [30] Online CCBT TAU £17,173
C.4. Step 4: connection to investment and disinvestment decisions
In this section we discuss the investment and disinvestment decisions made considering the cost-
effectiveness information in the previous section. If we believe that decision makers will invest in
treatments below their cost-effectiveness threshold and disinvest in treatments above this threshold then
by considering the ICERs of treatments subject to investment and disinvestment we can create a range
for their cost-effectiveness threshold. This approach and its role in the consideration of a cost-
effectiveness threshold has been previously discussed by Appleby et al. [31]. With a view of the cost-
effectiveness threshold within PBC 5 we consider how its exclusion from our calculation of the threshold
might influence our results.
To identify the broad areas of investment in the disease areas we make use of recent NICE guidance
documents. While NICE clinical guidance does not definitively represent observed shifts in practice and
are often not well implemented in mental health trusts[32] it can help to inform our evaluation. NICE
guidance does not identify areas where disinvestment should occur within a disease; as a result we have
consulted experts in the respective fields to gain an understanding of any significant recent disinvestment
decisions. For schizophrenia we were provided expert opinion by Professor Tim Kendall (Centre for
Psychological Services Research, University of Sheffield) and for depression by Professor Simon Gilbody
(Health Sciences, University of York).
For both schizophrenia and depression we will briefly discuss the areas of investment and disinvestment
in two care categories: (i) drug treatments, and (ii) psychological and social interventions.
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C.4.1. Results of step 4 for schizophrenia
C.4.1.1. Analysis of drug treatment
Antipsychotics used for the treatment of schizophrenia can be broadly identified as first or second
generational (typical and atypical antipsychotics). To a certain extent there is still a debate over the relative
strengths and weaknesses of each[33], and the significance of the adverse events associated with the
second generation may still not be fully understood (such as the impact on new-onset type-2 diabetes
[34]). However, our clinical experts indicated that clinicians were largely concerned with the adverse
effects associated with the second generational drugs, and the increasing evidence questioning the relative
efficacy, such as Rosenheck [33] who suggests that the first generational drugs in many cases are just as
effective. Recent NICE guidance leaves the choice of first or second generational drugs to the clinician to
decide[16].
When considering the impact on our estimate of the threshold of the possible shift to first generation
from second generation antipsychotics we must attempt to generalise about the relative cost-effectiveness
of the two. Clearly this is difficult as each generation represents many different drugs. However, from
CG82 the costs and benefits of the mainstream antipsychotics are broadly similar Table C3.4. This would
suggest that a shift away from the second generation back towards the first would have little impact on
the overall threshold as the costs and benefits associated with each are very similar.
Olanzapine came off patent in the third quarter of 201135. Olanzapine and similar second generation
antipsychotics are associated with a cost of around £30million a year36, clearly the introduction of generics
to the market would significantly reduce this cost and thus increases the cost-effectiveness of these drugs.
While this shift does not fall within the years of our analysis, it will have a significant impact on the future
value of the cost-effectiveness threshold.
The other significant area of debate, as identified by our clinician, is the role of the antipsychotic
clozapine, which has often been viewed as the most effective antipsychotic drug for schizophrenia
however has been connected with some severe adverse events (such as myocarditis[35],
agranulocytosis[36] and central nervous system depression). This has lead to the NICE guidelines
advising clozapine only if an array of other antipsychotics has failed[16]. While clozapine is highly
clinically effective it is associated with a higher overall cost (a significant proportion due to the associated
adverse events). As is shown in table C3.4 Davies et al. [18] show clozapine to have an ICER of £33,240
when compared to other second generation antipsychotics. Disinvestment of clozapine suggests that the
threshold is lower than £33,240 per QALY. However, current investment in other 1st line antipsychotics
suggests that the threshold in mental health is over £23,237 per QALY.
C.4.1.2. Analysis of psychological and social intervention
In this section we discuss all non-drug related interventions for schizophrenia. The NICE guidelines[16]
outline the provision of CBT, arts therapy and family interventions to treat schizophrenia, however,
efficacy of these interventions is disputed[37] and little is known about their cost-effectiveness. The
systematic review only yielded one paper that was relevant to our analysis, as is shown in Table C3.6. The
Barton et al.[20] study found that SRCBT had an ICER of less than £20,000 per QALY relative to case
management. However, as mentioned previously, this study may not represent all forms of CBT or
schizophrenia.
Our clinical advisors informed us that CBT provision varies significantly across PCTs and therefore
represents an intervention likely to be subject to investment and disinvestment at the margin. The
variation in CBT provision (and indeed other psychosocial/social interventions) is largely a result of the
poor support for its efficacy and significant initial cost.
Other interventions of relevance to this investigation include art therapies and family interventions. As
with CBT there is a significant variation in the provision of family interventions. No information on its
cost-effectiveness was found from our search. Art therapies include: music therapy, art therapy, and body
35 See: http://www.dispensingdoctor.org/content.php?id=1335 accessed 03/05/2012
36 Estimate by Tim Kendal
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movement or dance therapy. Our clinical advisors have highlighted increasing investigations into arts
therapy, including the Matisse trial[38], publications around which have shown that art therapy as
adjunctive therapy had little benefit over a comparator activity or treatment as usual[37]. No information
on its cost-effectiveness was found from our search.
Early interventions in schizophrenia, which aims to identify and treat early symptoms associated with
schizophrenia, have been a significant area of investment over recent years in the NHS. While we were
unable to identify any relevant cost-effectiveness literature around early interventions in schizophrenia it
is generally expected that these represent cost-effective interventions over the long term37.
While the lack of cost-effectiveness literature clearly limits the potential to directly associate these
interventions with the wider cost-effectiveness threshold it is widely accepted that many social
interventions for schizophrenia (specifically around CBT and family interventions) are cost-saving for the
NHS38, as they reduce hospitalisation by reducing emergency hospital access and relapse rates that are
high in schizophrenia representing the majority of related hospitalisations[39].
Investment in CBT with an expected ICER of £18,844 per QALY suggests that the threshold for mental
health treatments is above this value.
C.4.2. Results of step 4 for depression
As table C3.3 shows depression is associated with a wider range of treatment than schizophrenia,
specifically a wider range of drug treatments are available. As with the schizophrenia section of this
addendum we will deal with the treatments under the two categories of drug treatments and
psychological/ social interventions. Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), which is included in the treatment
options available in the NHS as shown in table C3.3, is excluded from this analysis based on expert
opinion on the grounds of it being a very rarely used but extreme treatment that is not likely to be further
subject to substantial investment or disinvestment, so is not relevant for our analysis.
Recent NICE clinical guidance[21] highlights a range of key priorities for implementation. As with
schizophrenia there is no guarantee that these are the areas of investment in depression care but it
represents a suitable outline of the areas of interest. Several areas are highlighted:
- Early identification and diagnosis
- Low intensity psychological interventions (CBT, CCBT and group physical activity) for persistent
sub-threshold depressive symptoms or mild to moderate depression
- Reduced routine use of antidepressant for sub-threshold depressive symptoms or mild
depression
- Combination therapies (antidepressant and psychological) for moderate or severe depression
- Extension of therapy (antidepressant and psychological) beyond remission to reduce relapse
- SSRIs are presented as the preferred type of antidepressant due to their equivalent efficacy and
favourable risk-benefit ratio.
These are the areas of investment that our analysis will focus on.
C.4.2.1. Analysis of drug treatment for depression
Our clinical advisors reported that the current area of activity in antidepressants is the creation of drugs
such as escitalopram (an SSRI) and venlafaxine (an SNRI) that are relatively similar to generic treatments
currently in the market. As these new drugs are covered by patents they are relatively expensive. Table
C3.7 reports the results on the cost effectiveness of these two drugs from NICE CG90[21] as well as
Lenox-Smith et al.[22]. In both reports the drugs are compared to alternative SSRIs in moderate and
severe depression. In both cases the newer SSRIs were approved by NICE with an ICER for
escitalopram of £32,928 per QALY and for venlafaxine of £20,600 per QALY. If mirtazapine and
37 This view was informed by our clinical advisors
38 This view was informed by our clinical advisors
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sertraline are not suitable then the ICER of escitalopram for moderate depression is £5,357 per QALY
compared to citalopram. While evidence was not available on whether clinicians were making use of
these newer SSRIs, an investment in them away from alternative SSRIs may represent an increase in the
cost-effectiveness threshold due to the relatively high ICERs reported in the two studies. However, the
cost-effectiveness of each depends on what they displace and ICERs may be lower if the more cost-
effective treatments have failed.
Investment decisions in the NHS for antidepressants are likely to represent changes in the type of
antidepressant being prescribed rather than a shift from no treatment to treatment. The majority of trials
discovered by systematic review given in table C3.7 show that while the ICER of SSRIs versus TCAs is
very low [25] this is largely driven by very small gains in QALYs but for a similarly small increase in cost.
As a result any observed investment in SSRIs away from TCAs is likely to lead to a small decrease in an
observed threshold for the NHS.
C.4.2.2. Analysis of psychological and social intervention for depression
The NICE guidelines reported in CG90 place a lot of focus on the provision of psychological
interventions such as CBT (and CCBT) over antipsychotics wherever possible. Table C3.8 provides the
results of the combination therapies for moderate and severe depression presented in CG90 [21]and
Simon et al. [27]. These considered the impact of combined SSRI and CBT versus SSRI alone and
concluded that combined therapies in both populations had ICERs of less than £15,000 per QALY.
According to our clinicians, this is an area that is likely to have had significant investment in recent years.
The two HTAs reported in table C3.8 [28, 29] provide a good analysis of the cost-effectiveness of
computer cognitive behavioural therapy (CCBT) versus treatment as usual (TAU). They show that the
CCBTs investigated have ICER of less than £8,000 per QALY relative to TAU. Further analyses
investigated different kinds of CCBT and found that compared to relaxation CBT ICERs ranged from
£2,380 per QALY to dominated. Hollinghurst et al. report that two CBT interventions compared to
TAU had ICERs of £17,173.
As NICE guidelines encourage the use of CBT and our clinical experts believe this has been an area of
increased investment, this review suggests that the threshold in mental health is over £17,173 per QALY.
D. Conclusion
There is very little accessible data on the investment and disinvestment decisions in specific areas of
mental health and so we relied on the opinions of clinical experts. The NHS Information Centre has
some information on prescriptions of mental health treatments, however it was not clear for which
diseases these treatments were being used or for which line of therapy. As a result this data was not
included in our analysis as it was decided it may not represent the investment and disinvestment decisions
that we were seeking to identify.
Most treatments reviewed had an ICER of less than £24,000 per QALY. Two treatments had higher
ICERs. Clozapine for the first line treatment of schizophrenia was found to have an ICER of £33,240
per QALY compared to other 2nd generation antipsychotics. NICE's recommendation to use clozapine
only as a last line treatment suggests that the threshold is less than £33,240 per QALY. Escitalopram for
moderate depression has been recommended by NICE and was reported to have an ICER of £32,987 per
QALY compared to seratraline. Conclusions on the threshold from this finding are unclear. The cost-
effectiveness of escitalopram in the NHS will depend on its use. If it is used rather than seratraline then
the threshold may be over £32,987, but if it is used as third line therapy than according to CG90 its use is
less costly and more effective than the next best options.
How well the actual threshold reflects the ICERs reported above depends on how well clinical practice
matches the clinical guidelines i.e. whether the more cost-effective treatments are being used first.
111
Search Strategies
Search Strategy for schizophrenia
CEA Registry search:
Six keywords associated with the entire Schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional disorders ICD10 sub-
chapter were search for in the CEA Registry, these were: schizophrenia, schizotypal, delusional, psychotic,
schizoaffective and psychosis. A search for any of these keywords in the Registry yielded 18 different
papers at the time of searching, with four of these being deemed suitable for our investigation (Barton
2009, Davies 2008, Jarbrink 2009, Knapp 2008 and Davies 2007).
NHS EED search:
A single relatively simple search strategy was defined to investigate NHS EED, this was as follows:
((Schizophrenia) AND (cost effectiveness):TI) and Economic evaluation:ZDT and Abstract:ZPS)
This result strategy yielded 28 hits, only one of which was both relevant to our search and not discovered
in the CEA Registry search (Rosenheck 2007).
Medline search:
Medline was searched using the strategy:
cost benefit analysis and (schizophrenia or schizotypal personality disorder or delusions) and Great
britain(MeSH)
This strategy yielded 13 hits, none of which were both relevant and had not been previously identified
through the CEA Registry of NHS EED searches.
NICE Technical Appraisals (TA) and Clinical Guidelines (CG):
NICEs online database of published mental health related TAs and CGs
(http://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/index.jsp?action=byTopic&o=7281) was searched for schizophrenia
related publications. Only one was found to fulfil our criteria for schizophrenia: CG82.
NIHRs HTAs:
Finally NIHRs database of published HTAs was searched. This activity discovered one additional
relevant publication: HTA 00/20/01 - Bagnall, 2003.
Search Strategy for Depression
CEA Registry:
Two keywords were searched on the CEA Registry, they were: depression and depressive. These
keywords yielded 17 papers, 5 of which were deemed relevant for our purposes (Hollinghurst 2010,
Lenox-Smith 2009, Kendrick 2006, Simon 2006, and Hatzinandreu 1994).
NHS EED search:
A search similar in structure to the search for schizophrenia papers was conducted in NHS EED:
((depressive OR depression):TI AND (cost-effectiveness):TI) and Economic evaluation:ZDT and
Abstract:ZPS) IN NHSEED
This yielded 43 hits, none of which were both relevant and previously undiscovered by the CEA registry
search. Due to the complete nature of the CEA Registry and NHS EED searches as well as time
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constraints on the systematic review, a Medline search was not conducted as it was decided it would not
provide sufficient added value.
NICE Technical Appraisals (TA) and Clinical Guidelines (CG):
Searching the NICE database of TAs and CGs yielded one publication deemed relevant to the analysis:
CG90- depression in adults.
NIHRs HTAs:
A search of the NIHRs online database of published HTAs yielded four relevant publications:
HTA 01/23/01- Bennett, 2000
HTA04/01/01- Kaltenthaler, 2006
HTA- 96/61/11- Peveler, 2005
HTA- 01/70/05- Kendrick, 2009
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Appendix C: Addendum 4
What type of health is forgone by the approval of a new technology?
The methods of analysis described in this work can identify not only how many QALYs are likely to be forgone across
the NHS as a consequence of approving a technology which imposes incremental costs on the NHS, it can also indicate
where those QALYs are likely to be forgone and how they are made up, i.e., the additional deaths, life years lost
(unadjusted and adjusted for quality of life) and the quality of life impacts on those with disease. Based on the 2008
central estimate of the cost per QALY threshold, we will exemplify within this Addendum the likely health displaced
elsewhere in the NHS as a consequence of approving a new technology.
The example of ranibizumab for diabetic macular oedema
In 2011, NICE considered whether ranibizumab for the treatment of diabetic macular oedema in patients with central
UHWLQDOWKLFNQHVVPLFURPHWUHVVKRXOGEHDSSURYHGIRUZLGHVSUHDGXVHLQWKH1+67$>@,QLWLDOO\WKLV
technology was rejected by NCE on the grounds that, at its current price, it would be unlikely to be cost effective. In
2012, however, a rapid review of TA237 [41] approved Ranibizumab if use was restricted to the most cost effective sub
JURXSWKRVHZLWKFHQWUDOUHWLQDOWKLFNQHVVPLFURPHWUHVDQGDIWHUD3DWLHQW$FFHVV6FKHPH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of patients was offered (details of the PAS which provides a discounts to the NHS is commercial in confidence). The
Committee concluded that the most plausible ICER for the subgroup of people with thicker retinas was likely to be
higher than the manufacturer's estimate (of £13,322 per QALY), but would be under £25,000 per QALY gained.[41]
The appraisal and guidance documents (http://guidance.nice.org.uk/TA/Wave23/41) provide the information required
to estimate the additional NHS costs of treating this sub group of patients each year. The original manufacturer
submission presented an estimate of the numbers of patients in the NHS eligible to receive ranibizumab, based on its
licensed indication[42]. These estimates are presented in Table C4.1. In the first year of implementation, up to 44,000
NHS patients would be eligible for treatment with ranibizumab based on its licensed indication. No consideration is
made as to the size of the sub-population approved for treatment, however the RESTORE trial (that informs the
submission) found approximately half of the participants in the study to be in this sub-population [114 of
217 (52.5%)].[40] The subgroup of patients where ranibizumab was ultimately approved is thus likely to be approximately
23,000 in the first year after approval.
Table C4.1 Estimated size of the NHS population eligible for ranibizumab [42]
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Licensed indication
Prevalent cases 43,847 0 0 0 0
Incident cases 0 5,481 5,481 5,481 5,481
Total eligible number of patients 43,847 49,328 54,809 60,290 65,771
Sub-population approved for treatment by NICE
Prevalent cases 23,020 0 0 0 0
Incident cases 0 2,878 2,878 2,878 2,878
Total eligible number of patients 23,020 25,897 28,775 31,652 34,530
The incremental costs associated with the new treatment (compared to laser monotherapy) in the initial submission
(TA237) were £3,506 per patient[42]. Given estimates reported in the rapid review are not available (commercial in
confidence), we will use this estimate of incremental costs for the subpopulation of interest. These data suggests that the
approval of ranibizumab in this subgroup at the original appraisal in 2011 (i.e., without a PAS) would impose just over
£80m of additional NHS costs for treating the eligible population each year.
Table C4.2 Estimated total budget impact of ranibizumab
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total eligible number of patients 23,020 25,897 28,775 31,652 34,530
Total cost, without PAS (£) £80,708,120 £90,794,882 £100,885,150 £110,971,912 £121,062,180
Total cost, 30% lower incremental costs(£) £56,495,684 £63,556,417 £70,619,605 £77,680,338 £84,743,526
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With introduction of the PAS, it is likely that a simple discount on the acquisition price of the new technology has been
approved by the DH.[41] Given the scale of the discount is not available (commercial in confidence) we assumed that
this discount would reduce incremental costs by 30% (to £2,454 per patient). After such a PAS, the approval of
ranibizumab in this subgroup would impose just £56m (rather than £80m) of additional NHS costs for treating the
eligible population in the first year.
What type of health is forgone by approval of a new technology?
Based on the 2008 central estimate of the cost per QALY threshold (£12,936 in Table 5.1) the approval of ranibizumab
without a PAS would have been likely to displace 6,184 QALYs elsewhere in the NHS. However, the analysis which
underpins the threshold estimate can also be used to identify where the additional NHS cost of £80m are likely to impact
and where and what type of health effects are likely to be forgone. This is illustrated in Table C4.3.
Table C4.3: Heath forgone across PBCs due to the approval of ranibizumab (£80m budget impact)
change in
spend
(m£)
Additional
deaths
Life
years
foregone
QALYs foregone
PBC PBC description
Total
QALYs
forgone
Due to
premature
death
Quality of
life effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
2 Cancer £3.58 30 300 211 195 16
10 Circulatory problems £6.07 182 928 863 590 273
11 Respiratory problems £3.67 107 129 1,835 80 1,754
13 Gastro-intestinal £2.56 21 197 351 129 222
Big 4 £16 340 1554 3259 995 2265
1 Infectious diseases £2.61 6 43 125 29 97
4 Endocrine problems £1.51 5 40 485 26 459
7 Neurological problems £4.78 10 52 873 34 838
17 Genito-urinary problems £3.71 18 26 85 17 68
16 Trauma & injuries £6.16 0 0 0 0 0
18+19 Maternity & neonates £5.46 0 3 2 1 1
11 PBCs £40 389 1717 4828 1101 3727
3 Disorders of Blood £1.65 3 13 175 9 166
5 Mental Health Disorders £14.29 23 103 762 67 696
6 Learning Disability £0.83 0 2 6 1 4
8 Problems of Vision £1.55 0 2 34 1 33
9 Problems of Hearing £0.70 0 1 112 1 111
12 Dental problems £2.31 0 0 54 0 54
14 Skin £1.57 2 9 16 6 10
15 Musculo skeletal system £2.90 3 14 186 9 176
20 Poisoning and AE £0.74 0 2 7 1 5
21 Healthy Individuals £2.83 0 1 5 1 5
22 Social Care Needs £2.40 0 0 0 0 0
23 Other £8.11 0 0 0 0 0
All (23 PBCs) £80 411 1864 6184 1197 4987
How the additional NHS cost of £80m will tend to affect spending in each of the 23 PBCs (see column 1) will be based
on the estimated expenditure elasticities and total PBC expenditure (see Table C.55 in Appendix C). In calculations of the
threshold, the inputs above (expenditure elasticities and total expenditure) allow predicting how a 1% change in total
spend is distributed by PBC. The same rationale is used here to establish how the additional NHS cost of £80m will
affect each PBC. Hence, changes in spend reported here will be proportional to changes in spend across PBCs evaluated
in calculations of the threshold (as in Table C.76 in Appendix C).
The estimated outcome elasticities (Table C.55 in Appendix C) allow the absolute changes in spend in each PBC
described above to be translated into a change in deaths and life year effects for the 11PBCs where mortality effects
could be estimated (see columns 2 and 3 of Table C.43 in Appendix C). Applying the estimated proportional effect on
the mortality burden of disease to measures of QALY (including the other PBCs) provides an estimate of the total
QALY effect of the change in spend in each PBC (see Column 4).39 The QALY consequences of changing expenditure
39 Although there was insufficient mortality available at PCT level to estimate outcome elasticities for the other PBCs, the measure of
QALY burden in some of these PBCs does include some mortality (based on ONS data). Therefore, applying a proportionate effect
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by £80m thus reflect PBC estimates of cost per QALY  for example, for the cancer PBC, the predicted total health
foregone of 211 QALY was calculated from the change in spend of £3.58m and reflects the PBC specific cost per QALY
estimate of £16,997 reported for the threshold estimate in Table C.76. In an analogous way, the comparison of life year
and total QALY effects allows the distinction to be made between QALY effects due the life year effects of additional
deaths and QALY effects due only to quality of life (see column 5 and 6).
to measures of QALY burden of will include some mortality and life year effects although they represent only a small proportion of
the total QALY effects.
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Table C4.4: Heath forgone across specific PBCs and groups of ICDs due to the approval of ranibizumab (£80m budget impact)
Total change in spend analysed = £80 m
change in spend
(m)
Life years
foregone
QALYs foregone
Total QALYs
forgone
Due to
premature death
Quality of life
effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Overall £80 1864 6184 1197 4987
PBC specific
PBC2 (Cancer) £3.58 300 211 195 16
Malignant neoplasms, digestive organs (C15-C26) 81 56 53 3
Malignant neoplasms, respiratory system and intrathoracic organs (C30-C39) 69 46 45 1
Malignant neoplasms, breast and female genital organs (C50-C58) 55 43 35 8
Malignant neoplasms, stated or presumed to be primary, of lymphoid,
haematopoietic and related tissue (C81-C96)
27 18 18 1
Malignant neoplasms, human male genital organsmale genital organs (C60-C63) 17 13 11 1
Other ICD codes in this PBC 51 35 33
PBC10 (Circulatory) £6.07 928 863 590 273
Ischemic heart diseases (I20-I25) 523 476 334 142
Cerebrovascular diseases (I60-I69) 190 183 117 66
Other forms of heart disease (I30-I52) 75 64 48 16
Congenital malformations and deformations circulatory system (Q20-Q28) 18 43 13 30
Diseases of veins, lymphatic vessels and lymph nodes, not elsewhere classified
(I80-I89)
36 28 22 5
Other ICD codes in this PBC 87 69 54 15
PBC11 (Respiratory) £3.67 129 1835 80 1754
Chronic lower respiratory diseases (J40-J47) 57 1568 36 1532
Lung diseases due to external agents (J60-J70) 8 71 5 66
Other diseases of upper respiratory tract (J30-J39) 7 65 4 60
Other respiratory diseases principally affecting the interstitium (J80-J84) 3 26 2 24
Other diseases of pleura (J90-J94) 3 26 2 24
Other ICD codes in this PBC 51 79 32 47
PBC7 (Neurological) £4.78 52 873 34 838
Episodic and paroxysmal disorders (G40-G47) 10 640 7 633
Extrapyramidal and movement disorders (G20-G26) 10 72 6 66
Other degenerative diseases of the nervous system (G30-G32) 9 44 5 39
Other disorders of the nervous system (G90-G99) 2 22 1 21
Nerve, nerve root and plexus disorders (G50-G59) 2 19 1 18
Other ICD codes in this PBC 19 75 13 62
PBC5 (Mental Health) £14.29 103 762 67 696
Mental and behavioural disorders due to psychoactive substance use (F10-F19) 39 311 27 283
Mood (affective) disorders (F30-F39) 2 129 1 128
Organic, including symptomatic, mental disorders (F00-F09) 34 89 20 69
Neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders (F40-F48) 1 72 1 71
Behavioural syndromes associated with physiological disturbances and physical
factors (F50-F59)
3 44 2 42
Other ICD codes in this PBC 24 118 15 103
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The results reported in Table C4.3 suggests that approval is likely to results in 411 additional deaths
(column 2) and 1,864 life years (column 3) forgone, most of which are likely to occur in Circulatory,
Respiratory and Cancer PBCs. However, impact of approval of this technology on QALYs forgone due
to premature death (column 5) only accounts for a proportion of the total QALY effects (column 4).
Most (4,987) are associated with quality of life forgone during disease (column 6). These quality of life
impacts are most likely to occur in Respiratory, Neurological and Mental health PBCs. The PBC level
effects in Table C4.3 can also be examined at ICD level (Table C4.4) whilst recognising the caveats
discussed in Chapter 4. 40 For example, within the respiratory PBC, it appears to be Chronic lower
respiratory diseases (J40-J47) where most additional deaths, life years and quality of life would be forgone.
In the Mental Health PBC the additional deaths appear to be associated with disorders due to
psychoactive substance use (F10-F19) and Mood (affective) disorders (F30-F39).
The impact of a reduction in the price of this technology, either through value based pricing or the PAS
that was offered during the rapid review, can also be examined in the same way. The PAS was
commercial in confidence, so here we will consider the hypothetical case that a 30% reduction in NHS
costs (incremental costs) would make this technology cost-effective for this subgroup of patients. Such a
discount would be expected to save 1,855 QALYs including 126 deaths averted, 559 life years (359 when
adjusted for quality) and quality of life effects during disease equivalent to 1,496 QALYs, compared to
approval of the technology at the original list price (Table C4.5).
Table C4.5: Heath forgone before and after a hypothetical PAS scheme on ranibizumab
change in
spend
(m)
Additional
deaths
Life years
foregone
QALYs foregone
PBC description
Total
QALYs
forgone
Due to
premature
death
Quality of
life effects
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Before PAS
big 4 £16 340 1554 3259 995 2265
11PBCs £40 389 1717 4828 1101 3727
all 23 £80 421 1864 6184 1197 4987
After PAS
big 4 £11 238 1088 2281 696 1585
11PBCs £28 272 1202 3380 771 2609
all 23 £56 295 1305 4329 838 3491
Difference
big 4 -£5 -102 -466 -978 -298 -679
11PBCs -£12 -117 -515 -1448 -330 -1118
all 23 -£24 -126 -559 -1855 -359 -1496
40 Information about the age, gender and the incidence of sequelae associated with different diseases within a PBC
are only available for u-codes which can be mapped to groups of three digit ICD codes. Also allocating PBC level
effects to ICD codes was based on the proportion of the total PBC population within each contributing ICD codes
because PBC costs are not available at ICD level across PCTs. Although costs from HES data are available at ICD
level they are only a small component of total PBC costs and contribute very little to the variability in PBC costs
across PCTs especially in those PBCs where mortality effects could not be estimated (also see Footnote 75 and 81
and Addendum 1 in Appendix A).
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Appendix D: Project Protocol
1. Title
Methods for estimation of the NICE cost-effectiveness threshold.
2. Importance
A comparison of the incremental cost effectiveness ratio (ICER) of a new technology with a cost-effectiveness
threshold is not the only consideration when the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) and its
advisory committees issues guidance. But is an important one: it allows an assessment of whether the health expected
to be gained from the use of a technology exceeds the health expected to be forgone elsewhere as other NHS
activities are displaced. For this reason a comparison of the ICER of a technology to a threshold range is a critical
part of the reference case in the NICE Guide to Methods of Appraisal1 and is often taken to be the starting point for
deliberations about other consideration including judgements of social value. Therefore, the value of the threshold or
the range of values used is critical to the assessment of whether technologies can be regarded as cost-effective with
implication for NHS patients, local NHS decision makers, the Department of Health, HM Treasury, manufacturers
(pharmaceuticals and devices) as well as NICE itself.
i) What is the cost-effectiveness threshold?  In principle, the cost effectiveness threshold is an estimate of
health forgone as other NHS activities are displaced to accommodate the additional costs of those technologies
recommended in NICE guidance.2 A national decision-making body like NICE needs an estimate of what is likely to
be forgone on average across the NHS as we currently find it. Of course, this will change as circumstances and the
NHS changes; tending to rise with increases in budget and health care costs but tending to fall with increases in the
productivity of health technologies and the efficiency of the NHS in general - including better local commissioning
decisions.3 A body like NICE cannot and does not necessarily need to know what specific services and treatments will
be displaced in particular localities or who will actually forgo health. What is required, however, is an accountable
and empirically-based assessment of the health that is likely to be forgone on average across the NHS.
ii) What are current estimates based on?  Currently NICE uses a threshold range of £20,000 to £30,000 per
quality adjusted life year (QALY) gained, where additional considerations are required towards the upper bound. The
empirical basis of this range of values is very limited. At best it represents an informal assessment of the health gained
by some of the least productive (in health outcome terms) of the activities currently undertaken by the NHS.
Unsurprisingly, it does, to a certain extent, represent the implied values from past NICE decisions. It is widely
recognised, by NICE4 and the House of Commons (HoC) Health Committee5 among many others,6 that the current
range ought to be more firmly based on empirical analysis. The HoC Health Committee highlighted particular concerns
that the additional costs of NICE guidance imposed on local NHS commissioners might be causing the displacement
of more valuable health care.5 On the other hand, manufacturers and others have argued that the threshold range is too
low, restricting market access, prices and revenue and ought to be based on how much individuals are willing to pay for
improvements in health.7 In 2009 NICE convened a workshop to discuss what the threshold ought to represent and
how it might be more securely estimated.8 Most of the applicants contributed to that workshop and it has informed the
plans for research set out below.
iii) What is needed?  Explicit scientific methods for estimation are required which will provide
accountability so that estimates can be scrutinised by a range of stakeholders. Since estimates of the threshold will
need to be periodically revised, methods which make best use of routinely available NHS data are needed. As well
as accountability, this will also provide more predictability in likely changes to the threshold for the investment
decisions of technology manufacturers. Providing more secure estimates of the threshold will necessarily require
application of specialist expertise and the development and application of sometimes
sophisticated methods. Nevertheless these must be communicated effectively to stakeholders to ensure transparency.
Suitable methods should provide estimates relevant to NICE - that is, relevant across the NHS; they should capture
the effects of health care on both length and quality of life, offer the opportunity to estimate changes in the threshold
over time and indicate the impact of non marginal changes which have a significant budget impact on the NHS.
3. Scientific Potential
3.1 People and Track Record
The principal investigator and co-applicants form a substantial and complementary team with long experience
of the type of multi-disciplinary research required for the development of methods and their application in
health policy. Importantly, they have complementary expertise in key areas of: analysis of system performance
and the application of econometric methods; familiarity with a range of relevant data sets; methods of
outcome measurement in health and relevant sources of evidence; and how estimates of cost-effectiveness can
be used to inform health care decisions. They also have complementary and intimate knowledge of the NICE
process from a number of perspectives; knowledge of the wider policy environment and an understanding of
the needs and difficulties faced by local commissioners and providers. Together they can draw on the
resources of a large, well established and experienced team of researchers. In addition, a multidisciplinary
advisory group for the project will include representation of key stakeholders.
Karl Claxton is a Professor in the Department of Economics and the Centre for Health Economics at the
University of York. His research interests encompass the economic evaluation of health care technologies and how
such evidence should be used inform decisions in health care.2,3,5 He has made a particular contribution to the
development of methods to more fully reflect uncertainty in estimates of cost-effectiveness and establish the value
of information associated with health care decisions. He has served as a member of the NICE Appraisal Committee
since 1999. He is a member of the NICE Decision Support Unit and contributed to the review of the NICE Guide
to the Methods of Technology Appraisal.1
Nancy Devlin is Director of Research at the Office of Health Economics and Senior Associate at the Kings
Fund, London. Nancys principal research interests are the measurement and valuation of health-related quality of
life; and the cost effectiveness thresholds used in health technology appraisals. Nancys 2004 econometric analysis of
NICE decision making, together with David Parkin, continues to be highly cited in this field.9 More recently, she was
involved in research (funded by NICE R&D) to investigate the feasibility of identifying the threshold implicit in local
NHS decision making.10 She is a member of the Executive of the EuroQol Group and leads the EuroQol Groups
research on the development of time trade-off methods of valuing the EQ5D, and is researching new methods for
analysing EQ-5D data collected via PROMs.11
Steve Martin is a research fellow in the Department of Economics at the University of York. He has
published in various areas of health economics including resource allocation and the impact of waiting times on
the demand for and supply of NHS health care. He has participated in a series of studies that have examined the
relationship between health care expenditure and health outcomes at the PCT level. These studies have used
English programme budgeting expenditure and mortality data to estimate the cost of a life year saved in several
disease areas.12-14
Nigel Rice is Professor of Health Economics at the Centre for Health Economics, University of York, and is
Director of the Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG). HEDG is a research group focused on the use of
applied quantitative techniques capable of informing health and health care policy. The Groups research aims to
inform health-related policy in areas such as health inequality, health policy evaluation and the performance of health
care systems.12-14 Nigel is also member of the Department of Health sponsored Public Health Research Consortium.
He has researched and written extensively on methods for resource allocation and has published on the relationship
between health care expenditure and health outcomes. He is a member of the Advisory Committee on Resource
Allocation (ACRA) and its technical advisory group.
Mark Sculpher is lead applicant, Professor of Health Economics at the Centre for Health Economics,
University of York, and Director of the Programme on Economic Evaluation and Health Technology Assessment.
Mark has worked in economic evaluations of range of technologies and contributed to methods in the field,
particularly decision analytic modelling and handling uncertainty. He is a member of the UK National Institute of
Health Research College of Senior Investigators. He has been a member of the NICE Technology Appraisal
Committee and currently sits on the NICE Public Health Interventions Advisory Committee. He chaired NICE's
2004 Task Group on methods guidance for economic evaluation and advised the Methods Working Party for the
2008 update of this guidance.1,2 He is also a member of the Commissioning Board for the UK NHS Health
Technology Assessment programme and the UK Medical Research Councils Methodology Research Panel. He
recently led a research team which assessed NICEs methodological research needs, a study funded by the
NIHR/MRC.
Peter C. Smith is currently Director of the Centre for Health Economics and will, from October 2009, be
Professor of Economics at Imperial College Business School. He is a mathematics graduate from the University of
Oxford, and started his academic career in the public health department at the University of Cambridge. He has
published widely on the financing and performance of health systems, and has a special interest on the links
between research evidence and policy.12-14 In the UK, Professor Smith has served on numerous Health
Department advisory committees5 on finance and productivity issues, and was a board member of the Audit
Commission. He has also acted as consultant to many overseas ministries and international agencies.
Collaborators: David Parkin from the South Eastern Strategic Health Authority (SHA) will provide an
important NHS perspective and specialist expertise9-11 in identifying possible sources of evidence of disinvestment
at a local level to complement the analysis of national programme budget data.
Advisory Group: A multidisciplinary advisory group will provide complementary expertise and experience
to inform the development of each stage of this research. We will agree the make up of the advisory group with
NICE. However, we anticipate representation from key stakeholders; e.g., NHS commissioners, senior members
of NICE and its advisory bodies; Department of Health, HM Treasury; and manufacturers.
3.2 Environment
This research will be collaboration between the Centre for Health Economics (CHE) at the University of
York, Imperial College Business School and the Office of Health Economics.
The University of York is internationally renowned for its contribution to health services research in general, health
economics in particular and the timely application of methods to inform health policy. The University of York
jointly headed the RAE2008 table for quality of health services research (researchresearch.com/RAE2008), with
CHE making a major contribution to the submission. The University of York pioneered the development of health
economics in the UK, and in 1983 created CHE, which is now one of the largest and best known health economics
research centres in the world. CHE operates across all areas of the discipline, with a particular emphasis on
methodological thinking and high policy impact. It is known especially for its work in health technology assessment,
health status measurement, performance measurement and productivity, health care financing and econometric
methodology.
The evaluation team in CHE has long experience of providing high quality technology assessments for
NICE and developing methods to support the functions of the Institute. It has a wealth of experience in methods,
application and the demands of the NICE process. In addition the team has contributed to a broader understanding
of how evidence of cost-effectiveness can be used to inform social decisions about health care, pricing and research.
The health policy team and HEDG undertake applied and methodological research to inform health and health care
policy. Recent work includes: improving the methods of measuring the productivity informing the changes
introduced by the Office of National Statistics; comparative performance and efficiency analyses of health and other
public sector organisations; and analysis of the link between expenditure and outcomes in the NHS.12-14
The Office of Health Economics (OHE) undertakes research, advisory and consultancy services on
economic and policy issues within the health care, pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors. OHE aims to
stimulate and inform discussion and debate about health economic and policy issues among academics, policy
makers and industry executives. In addition to OHEs research programme, its activities include seminar series;
annual lectures; and an in-house publication series. The quality and independence of OHEs publications are
safeguarded through its Policy Board and Editorial Board. Funding for the research undertaken at OHE comes
from a range of sources including the Gates Foundation; SDO; NIHR; DH R&D; EuroQol Foundation; and the
Kings Fund; as well as from industry.
The group has well-established collaborations on a range of methodological issues. It has bid
collaboratively for several research grants, and members of each group have published extensively together on a
range of topics. They are experienced at communicating methods and results to non-specialist policy audiences. All
the applicants pursue active dissemination strategies which, in additional to the traditional routes of publication and
presentation, include direct involvement in a plethora of committees and engagement in a variety of advisory roles,
as well as contributing to a range of training for relevant stakeholders. In summary, the group has the necessary
expertise and experience of the types of methods and their application as well as familiarity with sources of data
which are required for this research. They also have a wealth of experience of NICE, wider health policy and the
needs of local NHS decision makers which is further strengthened though collaboration with South East Coast
SHA. In addition, they have a long history of successful collaboration with well-established and close working
relationships.
3.3 Research Plans
The experience of attempts to look in some detail at the decision making processes and outcomes at a local level have
demonstrated the complexity, variability and difficultly of estimating the cost effectiveness thresholds implicit in
local NHS decision making.10,15 Although such studies provide valuable insights into the nature of local decision
making, they are unlikely to meet the needs set out in section 2 because: i) they do not readily provide the
national picture NICE requires; ii) it is not clear how they could be used to estimate changes over time, the
effects of non-marginal changes or add to predictability; and iii) such detailed studies are very much bespoke and
specific to time and place, so the more granular view they provide cannot feasibly be routinely collected. In
addition, it may not be necessary to know precisely which health technologies are displaced, for which patients or
why. What is required is an estimate of the health that is likely to be forgone on average across the NHS, ideally
based on routinely available data. Therefore, this research will focus on complementary methods which can make
best use of those data that are already available, where there are already plans to make data available or where
additional data could feasibly be made available at reasonable cost. The research plans fall into the following 4
complementary areas of activity, all of which will be evaluated at a user impact workshop.
3.3.1 Review of principles, methods and estimates of the threshold
The literature which considers the cost-effectiveness threshold has grown over recent years.3 However, most is
rather discursive,7,16 some more analytic,2,9 but only a few attempts to offer methods for empirical estimation.10,12-14
This diverse literature (including policy documents) needs to be thoroughly reviewed and pulled together in a clear,
comprehensive and structured way. This will: i) clarify the terms of the debate and establish a common
understanding of concepts and the types of estimates that are required; ii) review how different approaches to
estimation seek to meet the needs outlined in 2); and iii) outline what is missing from current estimates and how
methods might be most usefully developed. This review will be written for a wide policy audience, but will also be
comprehensive; covering all the issues raised in recent debates and explain alternative methods of estimation in an
accessible way. The review may inform the basis of an agreed framework with all relevant bodies (NICE, DoH,
HoC Health Committee, HM Treasury etc). It might also inform the remit of the type of independent body
suggested by HoC Health Committee5 or the periodic reviews suggested by NICE.8
3.3.2 Analysis of programme budget data
Since 2003 data on expenditure on health care across 23 programmes of care have been prepared by each Primary
Care Trust (PCT) in the English NHS. These programme budgeting (PB) data seek to allocate exhaustively to disease
categories (via ICD10 codes) all items of NHS expenditure, including expenditure on inpatient care, outpatient care,
community care, primary care and pharmaceuticals and devices. It serves a number of purposes, notably to assist in
the local planning of healthcare. But its crucial merit for this study is that it opens up the possibility of examining the
relationship between local spending and associated disease-specific outcomes.
Previous work by some of the applicants has demonstrated the potential value of programme budgeting
data in estimating the link between expenditure on a programme of care and the health outcomes achieved, in the
form of disease-specific mortality routinely available from the National Centre for Health outcomes Development.
In each programme changes in mortality associated with changes in expenditure are transformed into life years,
providing estimates of the marginal cost per life-year gained on average across the NHS. This work has focused
largely on spending and outcomes in two of the largest programmes of healthcare: circulatory disease and cancer12,
but has also informed the link across other programme categories13,14. Estimates of the cost per life year gained for
2006/07 are £15,387 for cancer; £9,974 for circulation problems; £5,425 for respiratory problems; £21,538 for
gastro-intestinal problems; and £26,428 for diabetes. These estimates are based on a straightforward, though
carefully constructed, theoretical model of health production which informs the specification and estimation of a
system of equations (issues of endogeneity are dealt with by identifying and testing suitable instruments). In doing so,
they account for variation in the clinical needs of the local population relevant to the programme of care and broader
local environmental factors relevant to the costs of care and outcomes. In principle, this approach, based on routine
data, estimates the type of cost-effectiveness threshold required by NICE: the 'average' marginal elasticity of
spending with respect to income amongst the PCTs. However, the methods of analysis need to be developed in a
number of important respects; not least to express outcome in terms of quality as well as length of life (see 3.3.3).
These are outlined below.
i) What is the overall threshold for the NHS? - The overall threshold for the NHS will depend on the
programmes of care where disinvestment takes place. Hitherto, each programme of care has been estimated
separately so it is not clear how expenditure on particular programmes changes with the overall budget, e.g., does
disinvestment tend to fall on respiratory care or diabetes? In principle, spending on programmes is linked by a
system of equations, and we will seek to model the programme expenditure equations as a set of linked
simultaneous equations, reflecting the potential for interactions between spending on the different programmes,
brought about by the need for PCTs to operate within a fixed overall budget. This will offer an opportunity to
study the budget elasticity of expenditure in each programme of care. It is then feasible to derive estimates of
the impact of marginal increases (or decreases) in overall PCT budgets on spending in each of the programme
categories. As well as indicating budgetary influences on programme spending these can then be linked to
changes outcomes by programme. This can provide an estimate of the cost per life year gained on average
across the NHS, for marginal changes in budget. This type of estimate of the threshold will take account of how
such budgetary changes translate through local decisions into changes in expenditure on programmes of care
and then to health outcomes. In addition, knowledge of budget elasticities of expenditure across the different
programmes of care, coupled with the estimated relationship between expenditure and health outcome, will
indicate how expenditure changes in one programme impacts on health outcomes in other programmes of care,
providing more secure estimates of the relationship between overall expenditure and overall health outcome.
ii) What is the likely impact of non-marginal changes? - To the extent that data permit, we shall seek to study
year-on-year changes in spending, as well as a cross section of spending decisions. Changes in budgets are in practice
incremental, and it may be the case that the elasticities of programme expenditure in times of budgetary increase
(when new initiatives are introduced) are not the same as in times of budgetary decrease (when the focus is on
disinvestment). They may also vary depending on the current level of expenditure (relative to need) on a specific
programme of care. In general, elasticity might be expected to increase as spending increases, but this can be tested.
This offers the opportunity to explore the possible effect of non-marginal changes on programme expenditure and
possibly outcome, providing estimates of the threshold for a range of budget impacts. This type of analysis would
provide some guidance to NICE on when a decision might regarding a new technology have such a significant
impact on the NHS budget that there will be significant reallocations of expenditure between programmes, with
more valuable health care forgone so that a lower estimate of the threshold might be appropriate. It might also
suggest when a series of apparently marginal changes (mandatory NICE guidance) will start to have non-marginal
effects on the NHS.
iii) How do estimates change over time? - We will investigate whether successive years of PB data can be used
to form a panel dataset. This might be limited by changes to PCT boundaries but, should it prove feasible, a robust
panel will allow an assessment of the stability of our estimates. It will also allow: an investigation of how elasticities
and estimates of the threshold change over time; an assessment of the feasibility of periodically re-estimating the
threshold based on these types of data; and an exploration of the possibility of making predictions based on overall
budget forecasts. Previous analysis of PB data assumed a quasi long-run equilibrium so that health outcomes could
be contemporaneously linked to expenditure. This is likely to be more tenable in some programmes of care than
others. However, should it prove feasible to construct a robust panel, we will investigate empirically the
appropriateness of the assumption of equilibrium and whether the relationship between programme expenditures
and health outcomes is better represented by data lags and how a suitable lag structure might differ between
programmes. We will also investigate the potential of using other data sources to complement the programme
budget data. For example, Hospital Episode Statistics, while restricted to secondary care, may allow analyses at a
more granular level than the PB data alone. This may include small area data on heath care needs and supply which,
together with practice Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) data, may provide a better means of adjusting for
variation across practices within and between PCTs.
Overall the analysis will yield a set of budget elasticities of expenditure, disaggregated by programme of care
and (if feasible) by level of spending with appropriate links between programme expenditure and outcomes over
time. An important policy question is, then, the impact of a policy shock on spending patterns, over time and
between programmes. In principle, the study should yield information needed to examine the dynamic impact of
such a shock, using simulation methods such as system dynamics.17 The feasibility and specification of this approach
will depend on the information secured in the earlier stages, but the study will seek to develop such a model, to the
extent that data permit.
3.3.3 Evidence of quality of life
The link between variations in budget, changes in expenditure on programmes of care and health outcomes, in the
form of disease-specific mortality described in 3.3.2, needs to be extended so that outcome can be expressed in
terms of quality of life. The previous analysis of PB data made this link by assigning quality of life estimates (by
ICD10 from the Health Outcomes Data Repository (HODaR)) to the change in life years estimated from disease
specific mortality within each programme. However, the reported costs per QALY gained for each programme did
not capture improvements in quality of life independent of effects on mortality, tending to overestimate the
programme-specific thresholds, particularly in those programmes where expenditure tends to be associated with
improvements in quality rather than mortality. A cost-effectiveness threshold for NICE needs to be expressed as the
cost per QALY gained. Therefore a more complete picture of the quality of life outputs from the NHS spending in
3.3.2 is needed. Additional work is required to evaluate complementary sources of evidence and methods of analysis
which will allow them to be combined with the results from the econometric analysis outlined in 3.3.2. There are two
areas in particular where additional work is required:
i) Weighting improvements in length of life - The estimated gains in life expectancy associated with
reductions in disease-related mortality need to be weighted to reflect the health-related quality of life (HR-QoL) of the
additional years of life. As each year of life gained is not experienced in full health, costs per life-year gained will tend
to underestimate the cost per QALY gained. Also, the HR-QoL of additional years is likely to differ between
programmes. Therefore it is important incorporate evidence of HR-QoL to obtain a more complete picture of the
relationship between expenditure and health outcome. This will be addressed two ways. Firstly, by reviewing, in each
programme and associated ICD10 chapters, published quality of life evidence, exploiting existing databases of quality
of life studies, e.g., the TUFTS Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry, EuroQol group. It is anticipated that this will
reveal considerable heterogeneity between, but also within, programmes. These variations might suggest the need to
complement aggregate data at programme and ICD chapter level (see 3.3.4) with other evidence. Any systematic
differences and variations will provide a basis for a sensitivity analysis around the quality of life weightings applied to
programmes. Secondly, other sources of data currently available (see HODaR below) or likely to become available in
the future (see PROMs below) will be reviewed for suitability and quality. Where possible, the impact of using
alternative sources of HR-QoL evidence on estimates of the threshold will be demonstrated through sensitivity
analysis.
ii) Capturing improvements in quality of life - NHS resources are often spent on services which do not have the
aim of reducing mortality, but rather of improving quality of life. Failing to account for this type of output will
underestimate health outcomes and overestimate the cost per QALY gained, with the scale of overestimation
differing across programmes. This will be addressed in two ways. Firstly, the review of published HR-QoL evidence
described above will distinguish QALY gains arising from reductions in mortality and improvements in quality
alone. We will examine whether there are any systematic differences between programmes in the proportion of
health gain arising from improved length or quality of life. Again, we expect to find heterogeneity within and
between programmes which might suggest that complementing aggregate data with other evidence of displacement
could be useful (see 3.3.4).
Secondly, we will investigate the use of disease specific data sets, which report HR-QoL and may supplement
the type of analysis in 3.3.2. For example, the Patient Reported Outcome Measures (PROMs) initiative was introduced
in April 2009. The pilot for PROMs provided condition-specific and generic health outcomes data before and after
surgery for four elective procedures, which allows analyses of the relationship between variation in spending and
improvements in QALYs11,18 by procedure. The PROMs project is to be rolled out over a range of chronic conditions
in the near future. However, it is unlikely that these data will be available within the timeframe for this project.
Nevertheless, establishing the method of analysis that will be needed to make best use of these data will be useful, so
they can complement the analysis in 3.3.2 when they become routinely available. We will also investigate the use of
HODaR which collects single observations of the EQ-5D profile from patients 6 weeks following a range of
procedures and services delivered in secondary care. These data record ICD10 chapter and may provide a means of
estimating the HR-QoL of patients for a range of interventions within and between programmes. Unlike PROMS
there are no repeated measures with HODaR, so estimating gains in HR-QoL will not be possible. Nevertheless, it may
provide a means of establishing post-treatment QALYs within programmes and, together with evidence from the
review, indicate the variation within and between programmes. We are aware of, and will investigate further, the
availability and potential usefulness of other NHS datasets collecting only disease-specific measures. For example,
some data are routinely collected in mental health, using instruments such as HoNOS and COR-OM. However, there
are concerns about data quality and the difficulty of translating these measures into QALYs.19
The analysis of elasticities described in 3.3.2 will be used to identify those programmes which are a
particular priority for review and analysis of quality of life estimates. For example, it may be that only a few ICD
chapters account for most of the changes in programme expenditure due to marginal changes in budget. By
prioritising in this way we will be able to focus the search and analysis of quality of life estimates on those
programmes which are most critical to the cost-effectiveness threshold. Based on estimates over time, this type of
approach will also be used to identify priorities for future routine data collection in those programmes which are
most critical to estimates of the threshold.
3.3.4 Evidence of investment and disinvestment
Although the analysis of PB data will provide estimates of how programme expenditure responds to marginal
changes in overall spending it cannot, by itself, provide details of how changes in expenditure on a particular
programme are allocated within the programme, e.g., the services, treatments and procedures invested in or
disinvested. As discussed above, diseases-specific mortality is only one aspect of outcome, but there is likely to be
significant heterogeneity within and between ICD chapters in quality of life. Therefore, it would be valuable to have
more detailed evidence about the types of investments and disinvestments made within programmes and ICD
chapters. Other sources of evidence would enable use of estimates quality of life which more closely matched the
types of investment and disinvestment which lie behind the more aggregate changes in programme expenditure and
complement the econometric analysis of PB data in 3.3.2. A complete and detailed picture of all investment and
disinvestments across the NHS is not feasible on a routine basis nor would it be necessary. Our focus will be on
what can be gained from other routinely collected data at a local level, and what additional evidence would be most
useful and could be gathered at reasonable cost. We will also explore how and whether such evidence might
contribute directly to the quantitative estimates from 3.3.2 and 3.3.3, or provide useful contextual information and
help with a qualitative assessment of the considerations that ought to be applied when interpreting estimates of the
threshold.
We will be working with the support and guidance of Professor David Parkin, Chief Economist at South
East Coast SHA to identify and evaluate potentially useful sources of evidence that are already, or planned to be,
collected at a local level (PCT and Trusts). For example, from March 2009, PCTs have been required to provide
documents that detail their policies on services that they will not normally fund. Working with SHAs, we will collate
these lists across the NHS. Initial communications from one SHA indicate their PCT lists contain nearly 100 such
items. We will also examine the pledges for new services or service delivery routinely reported in the Operating
Frameworks of SHAs and PCTs. We will link all these items to programmes in 3.3.2 and to the review of quality of
life in 3.3.3, whilst anticipating that some items may require bespoke review of published literature. We will explore
what impact this more granular information on investment and disinvestment within programmes has on estimates
of programme-specific expenditure per QALY gained and estimates of the overall threshold. However, we recognise
that these data are unlikely to report all forms of investment and disinvestment (e.g., scale of services and eligibility
for treatment). For this reason, we will recruit and work with NHS organisations within the South East Coast SHA
to design and pilot additional data collection to supplement that available from the sources described above. We will
prioritise any additional data collection based on the analysis in 3.3.2 and 3.3.3. For example, we will focus the pilot
of additional data collection on those programmes which account for most of the changes in expenditure (high
elasticities) due to changes in overall budget. It is estimating the QALY impact of these changes which contributes
most to the cost-effectiveness threshold. While evidence from this pilot data collection may not be representative of
the NHS as a whole, it will show whether additional data would be a useful complement to national PB data and
routinely collected quality of life measures. It will also identify whether additional data collection is likely to be
feasible on a routine and representative basis. The analysis of the PB data will help identify what might constitute a
representative sample of PCTs for these purposes.
3.3.5 User impact assessment
We plan to present and assess the impact of this research through a workshop which will involve a range of key
stakeholders. We hope that the workshop will be under the auspices of NICE and would be a full day, adopting a
similar format to the recent methods workshops which informed the revision of the NICE Methods guide. All
material will be pre-circulated, and will clearly pose the questions to be addressed. The presentations of the three
aspects of the work described above will be followed by group discussion with facilitators and note takers with
feedback on the day. The results will be circulated to participants for comment before a final report is produced. We
will consult our advisory group and the Institute about possible workshop participants. However, we anticipate that
they will include representation from key stakeholders including: NICE; PCTs and other local NHS decision makers;
Department of Health (including those with responsibility for commissioning and pharmaceutical pricing); HoC
Health Committee; HM Treasury; National Audit Office; industry (pharmaceutical and medical devices); and
academics from the relevant research communities. The primary output will be a series of recommended options
that NICE may choose to take forward for public consultation.
4. Ethics and Research Governance
This proposal does not involve patients in the collection of primary data, and there are no ethical implications
which would require approval from the University of York ethics committee.
5. Data Preservation for Sharing
There are no issues as our primary purpose is to develop methods which can make best use of data that are, or
maybe, routinely available within the NHS.
6. Public Engagement with Science
The recommendations made to the Institute following the workshop may well be taken forward for public
consultation by NICE.
7. Exploitation and dissemination
Dissemination to a wide range of stakeholders and audiences will take place in a number of ways. The initial results
will be disseminated through the user impact workshop. The final project report and a report from the workshop
will, we hope, be disseminated through the NICE website. We intend to present this work at the NICE conference
and, internationally, at iHEA and HTAi. We plan to write a number of papers addressing different aspects of this
work and different audiences. We anticipate the following publications: British Medical Journal, communicating the key
principles of methods, estimates and their implications; Journal of Health Economics presenting the development of
methods and, where possible, their application to UK data. We will also incorporate this knowledge into taught
courses both as part of MSc programmes in York and in short course programmes delivered by both centres
nationally and around the world.
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